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Abstract
Who qualifies, with full status, as an American citizen? Like all modern nation-states, the United States erects
and maintains various types of legal and geographic boundaries to demarcate citizens from noncitizens. The
literature in political science tends to focus on the ways in which immigration law structures citizenship over
time, but this is only half the story. As this dissertation demonstrates, governments also regulate the birth of
citizens from one generation to the next. The concept of a ‘civic lineage regime’ is introduced as the domestic
counterpart to the ‘immigration regime,’ when it comes to structuring civic membership in the United States
(and other nations). To bring visibility to this deeply constitutive yet largely unexamined dimension of
American political development, the project engages in a close analysis of U.S. Supreme Court cases targeting
civic lineage during the twentieth century. Examining eugenic sterilization laws, birth control, abortion, and
welfare reform, the dissertation maintains that the federal and state governments regulate the intimate lives of
Americans for many of the same reasons governments seek to control immigration. In both realms, the state
makes legal distinctions between who can and cannot become a member by coercively privileging certain
visions of American identity over others. This often entrenches hierarchies of citizenship based on race,
gender, ethnicity, class, disability, religion, and sexuality. These state-building policies, involving the regulation
of reproduction and birth, have the ability to define and redefine the meaning and scope of U.S. citizenship
across time by shaping the future “face” of the American polity. Finally, although many older inegalitarian
conceptions of civic membership are now discredited, the dissertation concludes with evidence that the
conflictual politics involved in constructing an American civic lineage regime continue today in the form of
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Who qualifies, with full status, as an American citizen? Like all modern nation-states, the 
United States erects and maintains various types of legal and geographic boundaries to 
demarcate citizens from noncitizens. The literature in political science tends to focus on 
the ways in which immigration law structures citizenship over time, but this is only half 
the story. As this dissertation demonstrates, governments also regulate the birth of 
citizens from one generation to the next. The concept of a ‘civic lineage regime’ is 
introduced as the domestic counterpart to the ‘immigration regime,’ when it comes to 
structuring civic membership in the United States (and other nations). To bring visibility 
to this deeply constitutive yet largely unexamined dimension of American political 
development, the project engages in a close analysis of U.S. Supreme Court cases 
targeting civic lineage during the twentieth century. Examining eugenic sterilization laws, 
birth control, abortion, and welfare reform, the dissertation maintains that the federal and 
state governments regulate the intimate lives of Americans for many of the same reasons 
governments seek to control immigration. In both realms, the state makes legal 
distinctions between who can and cannot become a member by coercively privileging 
certain visions of American identity over others. This often entrenches hierarchies of 
citizenship based on race, gender, ethnicity, class, disability, religion, and sexuality. 
These state-building policies, involving the regulation of reproduction and birth, have the 
ability to define and redefine the meaning and scope of U.S. citizenship across time by 
shaping the future “face” of the American polity. Finally, although many older 
inegalitarian conceptions of civic membership are now discredited, the dissertation 
concludes with evidence that the conflictual politics involved in constructing an 
American civic lineage regime continue today in the form of the rise of a new ‘neoliberal 
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and the state wherein they reside.—
Citizenship Clause, Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
 
I am speaking of the average citizens, the average men and women who make up 
the nation…Into the woman's keeping is committed the destiny of the generations 
to come after us…the foundation of all national happiness and greatness.—
Theodore Roosevelt, 1905 
 
Perhaps our brightest hope for the future lies in the lessons of the past. As each 
new wave of immigration has reached America it has been faced with 
problems…[but] Somehow, the difficult adjustments are made and people get 
down to the tasks of earning a living, raising a family, living with their neighbors, 
and, in the process, building a nation. –John F. Kennedy, 1964 
 
Children are, after all, our country’s most precious resource and our most 
important responsibility.—William J. Clinton, 1996 
 
In May 2002, Virginia’s Governor Mark Warner issued a formal apology for the more 
than eight thousand Virginians who were forcibly sterilized from 1924 to 1979, under a 
state law that permitted such treatment of individuals deemed likely to produce “socially 
inadequate offspring.”1  The first in a series of governors to apologize for their state’s 
eugenics programs during the twentieth century, Warner’s act coincided with the 75th 
anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Buck v. Bell, which upheld Virginia's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 William Branigin, “Virginia Apologizes to the Victims of Sterilizations,” Washington Post, May 3, 2002. 
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eugenic sterilization law as constitutional, making the law a legal model for over thirty 
states across the nation.2  Facing growing pressure from civil rights and mental health 
groups to acknowledge and renounce this disgraceful past and apologize to living 
survivors of the policy, Governor Warner expressed his remorse for “Virginia's 
participation in eugenics,” labeling it as “a shameful effort in which state government 
never should have been involved."3  The governors of Oregon, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and California quickly followed his example, delivering similar apologies over 
the next year for the involvement of each of their states in the eugenics movement.  
Following the Supreme Court’s 1927 decision in Buck v. Bell, over 65,000 Americans 
were sterilized across the nation, with the practice extending into the early 1980s in 
locations like Oregon.4  The victims of these eugenic sterilization laws were selected 
because they lived at the margin of mainstream “respectable” society, often due to their 
ancestry, class, race, religion, sexual promiscuity, marital status, sexual orientation, 
disability, criminality, or lack of economic self-sufficiency.  The explicit purpose of these 
laws: To breed “better” Americans by preventing “less desirable” segments of the 
population from producing future generations of citizens. 
Prior to the media attention to victims of these laws and apologies issued by state 
leaders, most Americans were unaware that eugenics played such a significant role in 
U.S. reproductive policy, associating eugenics largely with the atrocities of Nazi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
3 Peter Hardin, “Apology for Eugenics Set: Warner Action Makes Virginia First State to Denounce 
Movement,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 2, 2002. 
4 Laurence M. Cruz, “Eugenics Yields Dark Past,” Statesman Journal (Salem, OR), December 1, 2002; 




Germany.  Yet the Court’s opinion in Buck v. Bell unabashedly linked the state’s interest 
in controlling the fertility of its citizens to its ambition of building a “better” American 
polity in the future.   Comparing the involuntary sterilization of inferior citizens to the 
civic duty required from America’s “best citizens,” expected to defend the nation through 
military conscription during times of war, the Court suggested that it was the civic 
responsibility of less valuable members of society, like Carrie Buck, who was 
erroneously diagnosed by her doctor as “feebleminded,” to submit to state-sponsored 
sterilization.  “It is better for all the world,” wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “if 
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for a crime, or let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 
kind...Three generations of imbeciles is enough.”5   
With these fateful words, the Supreme Court declared eugenic sterilization 
constitutional in the United States, allowing Virginia to proceed with the involuntary 
sterilization of Carrie Buck, who was institutionalized at the age of 17 for becoming 
pregnant out of wedlock and falsely diagnosed as mentally impaired.  Although the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Buck v. Bell is often classified as an anomaly in American law 
and politics, as we shall see, eugenic sterilization continued as a norm within many state 
hospitals, mental institutions, and prisons for over fifty years.  Moreover, this Supreme 
Court decision is worth highlighting in the introduction of my dissertation—though the 
issue of eugenics serves as just one of many examples addressed in the chapters that 
follow—precisely because Buck v. Bell provides a striking example of a much broader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
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and more pervasive pattern in American political development.  From the founding of the 
nation to the present, the American government has often engaged in state-building 
efforts aimed at shaping the composition and character of its polity across generations by 
coercively regulating the actual reproduction of its citizens.   
The purpose of this dissertation is to document empirically and explore 
normatively an under-examined, under-analyzed, and generally overlooked political 
process, which I refer to as “the reproduction of citizenship.”  Who counts as an 
American citizen?  And how has this changed over time?  Like all modern nation-states, 
the government erects and maintains various types of legal and geographic boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion, aimed at regulating the intergenerational transmission of civic 
membership within its polity. The most familiar example of this phenomenon is the 
state’s juridical control over immigration, since laws pertaining to immigration and 
naturalization function as easily discernible instances of direct governmental control over 
who can become a future U.S. citizen. By using laws to distinguish between members 
and nonmembers of its political community, the United States inevitably privileges 
certain visions of nationhood and civic identity over others in a manner that shapes the 
future composition of its citizenry.  As scholars of immigration emphasize, one of the 
primary ways in which modern nation-states, like the United States, define themselves is 
by determining who qualifies as a new member of their political community.  For this 
reason, the literature in political science tends to focus almost exclusively on the ways in 
5	  
	  
which immigration law structures citizenship over time.6  I argue that this is far less than 
half the story. By examining federal court cases in the United States pertaining to 
domestic population control during twentieth century, this dissertation demonstrates that 
a similar political process also occurs through governmental regulation of the actual birth 
of citizens from one generation to the next. As the example above illustrates, such 
regulations often entrench various types of group hierarchy based on gender, race, class, 
ethnicity, religion, sexuality, and disability.  And though many older inegalitarian 
conceptions of civic membership—including the eugenic ideal for citizenship during the 
Progressive Era—are now discredited, I argue in the chapters that follow that the 
conflictual politics involved in regulating the fertility and birth of citizens continue today 
in the form of a new significantly inegalitarian ‘neoliberal ideal of citizenship.’   
 
The Concept of a Civic Lineage Regime: 
I introduce the concept of a ‘civic lineage regime’ as the domestic counterpart to the 
‘immigration regime,’ when it comes to structuring civic membership in the United 
States (and other nations).  Scholars frequently use the term ‘immigration regime’ to refer 
to the set of laws and practices that together comprise a nation’s immigration policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See e.g.: Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Douglass Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, 
Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 2002); Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Caroline Brettell and James Hollifield, eds., 
Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines (New York: Routledge, 2008); T, Alexander Aleinikoff and 
Douglass Klusmeyer, eds., From Migrants to Citizenship: Membership in a Changing World (Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Beyond 
Fortress Europe (New York: Manchester University Press, 2008); Carol M. Swain, ed., Debating 
Immigration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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(broadly construed) at a given political moment. I coin the term ‘civic lineage regime’ in 
a similar manner to describe reproductive policies targeting citizenship.  Just as nations 
inevitably regulate immigration in the modern world, they also regulate the birth of 
citizens.  These state-building policies have the ability to redefine the meaning and scope 
of U.S. citizenship across time by shaping the future “face” of the American polity.  For 
instance, when we reflect upon the thousands of children (and their children, 
grandchildren, and so on) that were never born due to involuntary sterilization laws 
during the last century, there is little doubt that this civic lineage policy will continue to 
have lasting repercussions on the demographic landscape of the United States.  Indeed, as 
the case of Buck v. Bell illustrates, the government’s historic and contemporary regulation 
of reproductive policy (by both state governments and the federal government) tends to 
function as a powerful, yet relatively invisible and frequently overlooked, mechanism for 
producing and perpetuating numerous and intersecting forms of civic hierarchy as well as 
avenues for civic inclusion across generations.  
The chief aim of this project is to launch an inquiry into the reproduction of 
citizenship by focusing on the ways in which ‘civic lineage’ policies targeting fertility 
and family are frequently rooted in formal governmental attempts to shape the boundaries 
of the political community.  While I often use these terms interchangeably in the chapters 
that follow, there is a slight difference in how I conceptualize them.  I consider the term 
‘reproduction of citizenship’ to refer to this state-building process, while the concept of a 
‘civic lineage regime’ addresses the outcome of this process.  Any given civic lineage 
regime is comprised of alliances and coalitions among political actors supporting specific 
7	  
	  
civic lineage policies designed to institutionalize certain ideals of citizenship and national 
identity. Since a broad range of reproductive policies comprise our civic lineage regime 
at any given political moment, for the sake of clarity, let me list some of the most 
noteworthy examples (many of which I address in my case studies). Perhaps the most 
obvious civic lineage policy involves the scope of “birthright citizenship” under the 
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which confers U.S. citizenship to most 
children born on American soil. However, since scholars often treat birthright citizenship 
laws as part of the ‘immigration regime,’ particularly because the U.S. government 
applies birthright citizenship to the U.S. born children of undocumented immigrants, I 
focus in this dissertation on less overt yet equally influential policies targeting citizenship 
through the regulation of birth.  For instance, a sampling of civic lineage policies 
encompasses: eugenic sterilization; birth control and abortion laws selectively 
encouraging and discouraging motherhood; discriminatory marriage restrictions; the 
coercive regulation of fertility in federal welfare policy; laws encouraging and 
discouraging various types of adoption; and the complex landscape of access to new 
reproductive technologies with the explosion of recent scientific breakthroughs in human 
genetics.   
In this regard, I intentionally define “reproductive policies” broadly to encompass 
myriad ways in which the government has sought to regulate and shape citizenship, 
through measures targeting family, intimacy, lineage, and fertility.  Just as immigration 
laws often perpetuate civic hierarchies by policing the boundaries of citizenship, laws 
regulating who can give birth to full legal citizens and under what circumstances have the 
8	  
	  
same result.  In his work on immigration, Daniel Tichenor writes that: “Nations define 
themselves through the official selection and control of foreigners seeking permanent 
residence on their soil.  Immigration policy involves not only regulating the size and 
diversity of the population, but also the privileging of certain visions of nationhood…”7  
Pursuing a similar line of analysis, I argue that the U.S. government and state 
governments regulate the intimate lives of Americans for many of the same reasons that 
governments seek to control immigration.  In both realms, the state makes legal 
distinctions between who can and cannot become a member by coercively privileging 
certain visions of American identity over others. For instance, just as Congress passed the 
Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 to restrict immigration from “undesirable” 
groups on eugenic grounds during the Progressive Era—which had the effect of placing 
substantial limitations on the numbers of Catholics, Southern and Eastern Europeans, 
Jews, Asians, and indigent Mexicans that could legally move to the United States—the 
Supreme Court during this time also upheld state involuntary sterilization laws to prevent 
“defective” citizens from procreating on similar eugenic grounds.8  Additionally, the 
Court issued rulings supporting the exclusion of Native Americans and Puerto Ricans 
from birthright citizenship under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
based on the convenient legal reasoning that these groups purportedly belonged to semi-
sovereign (neither foreign nor entirely domestic) nations.9  As these examples illustrate, 
both the regulation of immigration and the regulation of birth can entrench a wide range 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 1.  
8 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
9 Most importantly, see: Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); and 
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
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of intersecting and overlapping forms of group-based civic hierarchy in the name of 
policing the boundaries of national identity and membership in the political community. 
The place of slavery in American law and society provides the clearest political 
example of how public policies can perpetuate invidious structures of civic exclusion.  
Although my project focuses on the twentieth century, the institution of slavery serves as 
a disturbing reminder of the fact that our nation was, in many respects, founded upon an 
uneasy “civic lineage compromise.”   While the U.S. Constitution institutionalized 
slavery as a legitimate part of the Union, most notably in the form of the three-fifths 
clause for voting and representation in national government, the survival of slavery also 
rested upon the political manipulation of the racial meaning of African ancestry through 
reproductive policy.  Control over the reproduction of enslaved women, and rules 
specifying racial classification based upon ancestral African hypodescent, were vital for 
the survival of slavery in antebellum America.  Prior to the Civil War, the government’s 
legal regulation of black women’s procreation, as Dorothy Robert’s puts it, “helped to 
sustain slavery,” giving masters both an economic incentive and the legal authority to 
govern the reproductive lives of their slaves.10  Since the children of female slaves were 
the property of the slave-owner irrespective of their paternity, female slaves were 
financially valuable to their masters not only as bounded laborers, but also as the 
producers of more slaves.  For this reason, law rarely recognized marriage between 
slaves.  The exclusionary link between racial ancestry and American citizenship under 
slavery was spelled out explicitly and upheld by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1997), 22-24. 
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Sandford (1857). Here Chief Justice Roger Taney emphasized that no person of African 
descent, whether a slave or free, could rank as a member of “the political community 
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States,” for as he put 
it, “…they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word, 
"citizens," in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges 
which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.”11  
Ultimately, this disgraceful civic lineage ruling by the Court—which excluded those with 
known African ancestry from national citizenship and overturned the “Missouri 
Compromise”—would further fuel the growing conflagration between the North and 
South culminating in the Civil War.   
Like the Buck case, the ignominious legacy of slavery shines a disturbing light on 
the government’s historical role in politically regulating the ‘reproduction of citizenship’ 
in ways that overtly harnessed law to foster extreme forms of civic inequality and 
exclusion. To bring visibility to this deeply constitutive yet frequently veiled and largely 
unexamined aspect of American political development, my dissertation analyzes actual 
court cases involving state and national laws targeting civic lineage heard by the Supreme 
Court during the twentieth century.  As primary texts addressing this under-analyzed 
process, occurring throughout American history, Supreme Court cases bridge many of the 
complexities of our (often obscuring) system of federalism, because state and national 
public policies targeting civic lineage can both end up in federal court. 12 The fact that the 
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issues of intimacy and childbirth are often treated as non-political or pre-political has 
added to the public veiling and relative lack of sustained scholarly scrutiny of this 
process. In this dissertation, I hope to demonstrate just how deeply political the issue of 
procreation and birth have historically been, and continue to be, when it comes to actual 
government policies and laws shaping the meaning and scope of citizenship.  It is one of 
my central theoretical contentions that the federal and state governments frequently shape 
the meaning and boundaries of citizenship, a quintessentially public category, through 
policies aimed at structuring purportedly private issues and institutions relating to 
reproduction, such as sexuality, intimacy, and the family.  
 
Global Implications: 
The United States is not exceptional in this. All nation-states have a clear interest in 
regulating the reproduction of their citizenry.  While I seek to bring greater empirical 
visibility and theoretical understanding to this phenomenon by focusing on the United 
States as an in-depth case study, it is important to emphasize at the outset that I see my 
thesis as having far-reaching global implications.  A fundamental dimension of the way 
in which nations define and shape their membership in the modern world, all countries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
officials link reproductive policy to citizenship.  Given the structural hurdle of federalism in the American 
political system, I use federal court cases as a springboard from which to locate, document, and analyze 
broader reproductive policy orderings within the United States. The practical benefit of focusing on the 
judicial system is that it allows me to address cases concerning both national and state laws because the 
Supreme Court is the “Court of last resort” for disputes emerging at both levels of government, allowing 
me to take federalism seriously in my analysis of civic lineage policy.  Moreover, as Robert Dahl (1957) 
persuasively argued in his classic article on the role of the Supreme Court in the American political system, 
the Court rarely exercises its power of judicial review in a manner that is contrary to the interests of the 
dominant governing coalition in the other branches of government for very long.   
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institute civic lineage regimes of various kinds to govern and construct their political 
communities. I hope this project will help fuel a broader conversation about the role that 
civic lineage regimes play in other nations around the globe.  
Let me briefly touch upon a few noteworthy examples.  Consider China.  The 
“one-child” policy in China has not only helped achieve its intended purpose of 
controlling the nation’s once exploding population, but the policy has also produced one 
of the most skewed sex ratios in the world.  After reaching their goal of declining 
fertility, China’s younger generation is now comprised of almost 20% more males than 
females.  Partly in response to this uneven sex ratio, the Chinese government recently 
introduced a two-child policy.13  Conversely, in other parts of Asia and much of Europe, 
many nations are struggling to keep their populations stable (at replacement rate).  
Several countries, including Japan, Russia, Germany, and Taiwan, have responded by 
offering to pay citizens—usually ethnically-native women and couples—to have 
children.14 The goal of these programs is to replace their current declining population 
with future generations of citizens that are ethnically “Japanese,” for instance, as opposed 
to expanding their citizenship laws to incorporate immigrants of other ethnicities as full 
citizens.  Also noteworthy is the fact that Israel actively embraces population control 
policies aimed at recruiting Jewish immigrants from around the world as citizens while, 
at the same time, increasing the numbers of Jewish settlers in contested territory claimed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For instance, see e.g. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/11/15/will-the-end-of-chinas-one-
child-policy-shift-its-boy-girl-ratio/ (last checked 12/9/2015) 
14 See e.g., Robert Smith, “When Governments Pay People to Have Babies,” National Public Radio, 
November 3, 2011. This article is available online at: 
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2011/11/03/141943008/when-governments-pay-people-to-have-babies 
(last checked 12/9/2015) 
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by Palestinians and refusing to permit many Arab Israelis from bringing their non-Jewish 
spouses to Israel. The Israeli government was recently implicated in not allowing Jewish 
Ethiopian women to enter the country without first receiving shots of a contraceptive 
drug, Depo-Provera.15 These policies have much in common with U.S. government 
efforts to displace Native Americans with Anglo settlers on the western frontier, during 
the nineteenth century, and more recently, as we shall see in Chapter 6, to control the 
fertility of women on welfare, and particularly women of color, by coercively promoting 
semi-permanent forms of birth control. 
Familiar to many scholars of comparative politics, laws targeting population 
control in other nations share many features with those I document in the United States.  
In each instance, governments sponsor civic lineage regulations in order to ideologically 
promote and structurally entrench particular visions of national membership within their 
political communities.  Thus, just as we expect states to police their borders through the 
laws comprising their immigration regime (as a definitive feature of statehood), so too 
should we expect them to institute civic lineage policies aimed at regulating who can be 
born a potential citizen.  As Jacqueline Stevens points out, the regulation of boundaries of 
“kinship” among citizens is a universal feature of statehood in the modern world, but it is 
also a site for the production of a host of inegaliterian inequalities both within and 
between nations.16  Precisely because they play such a fundamental role in structuring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For instance, see e.g., http://mic.com/articles/25070/forced-birth-control-in-israel-shows-population-
control-can-violate-human-rights (last checked 12/9/2015) 
16 Jacqueline Stevens, Reproducing the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
14	  
	  
political communities over time, governments have always constructed civic lineage 
regimes of various kinds, and they will continue to do so in the future.  
Citizenship and State-building: 
A central theme in this dissertation is to frame ‘citizenship’ as an institution that has 
undergone significant “political development” throughout American history via state-
sponsored reproductive policy.  By focusing on political membership, I am analyzing 
citizenship in its most basic sense (of simple belonging), while nonetheless examining the 
ways in which civic hierarchies are both driving and being reinforced by state regulations 
of reproduction.  Hence, while I have identified a relatively consistent historical pattern 
of governmental regulation of ‘the reproduction of citizenship,’ it is crucial to emphasize 
that the precise institutional orderings and policy configurations driving this phenomenon 
have been far from static throughout American history.  Recognizing this as a dynamic 
political phenomenon that the government pursues in different ways over time, the heart 
of my project involves an effort to grasp what Karen Orren and Steven Skowronek term 
“the processes of change and their broader implications on the polity.”17  
Normally, in democratic theory, we expect the public to be shaping and regulating 
the government through various forms of political participation, far more than the other 
way around.  Yet my focus here is on the ways in which the government uses 
‘reproductive policy’ to mold the status, composition, and boundaries of citizenship.  It is 
axiomatic that no state can survive in the absence of a base population of people for it to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6. 
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govern and represent.  Although the question of “people-making” is often assumed to be 
prior to statehood and national politics in the contemporary era, this elides a more 
complex and interesting reality.  As Rogers Smith has emphasized, political elites 
frequently engage in ongoing people-building projects by striving to unite citizens to 
embrace a common ideological, cultural, and national vision.18  Neither states that label 
themselves as democracies, like the United States, nor the citizens they purport to 
represent, are natural phenomena.  Rather, governments make rules and laws designating 
the boundaries of membership within their polity (i.e. such as determining who counts as 
a citizen), in addition to shaping the substantive possibilities for political participation 
available to citizens.  While most theories of citizenship in the United States reflexively 
presume the prior existence of such a political community (or national body politic), the 
fact nonetheless remains that the ability of modern nation-states to continue to exist and 
thrive over time in the current global order is dependent upon the intergenerational 
perpetuation and continuation of their citizenry through various policies regulating 
certain forms of lineage within the nation.  When states such as ours address people 
differently through rules and procedures aimed at regulating the makeup of their 
citizenry, this is likely to reinforce and undermine notions of sociopolitical standing and 
participatory capacities in the political system.  Speaking of the role of the state in 
defining membership, Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss write that, “public policies define 
the boundaries of the political community, establishing who is included in membership, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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the degree of inclusion in various memberships, and the content and meaning of 
citizenship.”19   
This raises an obvious but important point: The reproduction of citizenship is a 
highly gendered phenomenon.  While laws regulating reproduction have historically 
influenced the status and opportunities of many different groups in American society, 
including different groups of men, I would be remiss not to highlight that these coercive 
policies have disproportionately targeted the sexual behavior and reproductive capacities 
of women. But while women as a group tend to bear a disproportionate burden when it 
comes to the government’s regulation of reproduction of citizenship—as the “mothers of 
tomorrow’s children”—the goal of fostering sexual inequality is rarely the sole or even 
primary focus of these laws.  Despite the fact that women represent the disproportionate 
victims of this coercive legislation, many of these laws appear to effectively “hijack” 
women’s bodies as a means towards achieving another end: breeding future generations 
of citizens according to specific civic lineage ideals of national identity and community 
membership.  The politics of regulating the reproduction of citizenship intersects with the 
goals of American state-building in multiple (and sometimes conflicting) ways, and in the 
process, the biological capacity of women to bear children has been treated as both an 
asset and a threat to the future of the American state and its polity during many, if not 
most, times in history.  For instance, the governmental manipulation of women’s 
sexuality and motherhood has often been conducted in the name of broader state-building 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss, “The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: 
Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 1 (2004): 55-73, 61. 
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goals, ranging from the perpetuation of slavery, to the settling and taming of the western 
frontier, to the contemporary regulation of welfare.  Civic lineage policy is not reducible 
purely to “a woman’s issue,” because it shapes multiple and intersecting hierarchies in 
the realms of race, class, and disability—and influences the status of men as well as 
women in vulnerable minority groups.  Nonetheless, the government’s regulation of 
reproduction functions in practice as a profoundly gendered phenomenon precisely 
because it depends upon the control of sexuality, fertility, procreation, childbirth, and 
family in the name of shaping the future of American citizenship.   
The United States can quite literally be said to “make citizens” through the 
reproductive policies it sponsors and enforces in society.  This should not be taken to 
imply, however, that biological factors determine citizenship. The boundaries of 
citizenship are not rooted in any intrinsic features involving a community’s ancestry or 
physical appearance.  Citizenship is fundamentally a political category and not a 
biological one.  To call a person a “citizen” of the United States—or any other country—
is to invoke a political relationship between this person and her country’s government 
and fellow members.  Hence, the question of whether or not a person qualifies as a citizen 
is determined not by the circumstances of her birth in a biological sense, but rather by the 
political qualifications stipulated in the nation’s constitution and citizenship laws, which 
in turn shape the boundaries of citizenship, in part, through the avenue of birth. With this 
logical distinction in mind, the central question motivating this dissertation can be 
rearticulated more narrowly to address, with greater precision, the pivotal link I hope to 
draw between “state-building” and “people-making”: that is, how does the state make 
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citizens through the avenue of reproductive policy?  Furthermore, under what contexts, 
and for what reasons, has the state constructed citizenship differently or similarly through 
this process over time?  What factors help explain these developments and shifts in 
reproductive policy alliances?  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, how have the 
political actors sponsoring these governmental policies linked their goals and efforts at 
“people-making” to broader trends in state development, including ideas about what 
constitutes proper American civic identity and what sort of American body politic is 
desirable in the future?  
 
An Overview: 
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to provide convincing evidence in support of 
my central “civic lineage regime” thesis. The chapters that follow each address a 
particular arena of the U.S. government’s regulation of fertility and birth during the 
twentieth century, focusing on U.S. constitutional law to trace its development. Chapter 2 
begins with eugenic sterilization during the Progressive Era.  Chapter 3 examines the 
early movement to legalize birth control in the name of public health and doctor’s rights 
during the same period.  Chapter 4 turns to the later, more successful, movement to 
legalize both birth control and abortion under the constitutional doctrine of reproductive 
privacy.  Chapter 5 examines the development of Medicaid health insurance for 
impoverished Americans in the 1960s and judicial struggles over whether or not 
Medicaid required states to fund abortion in addition to childbirth.  Finally, Chapter 6 
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turns to the topic of welfare reform in 1996 at the end of the twentieth century.  These 
examples of civic lineage policies are not meant to be exhaustive of all those within our 
civic lineage regime (i.e. there are multiple and overlapping civic lineage policies 
comprising it), but together I maintain that they provide powerful empirical 
documentation supporting my thesis that the American government, like all modern 
nation-states, regulates citizenship by targeting reproduction and birth across generations 
to promote certain national ideals.   
In addition to demonstrating that civic lineage policies exist, I also trace and 
document important common themes and several fundamental shifts from one dominant 
civic lineage regime to another throughout the twentieth century.  Like policies targeting 
immigration, as we shall see, those aimed at birth change over time to reflect shifting 
values and ruling coalitions in the United States.  I document at least three dominant civic 
lineage regimes during the twentieth century.  These are: the fitter families regime 
reflecting a dominant eugenics coalition during the Progressive Era, the white picket 
fence regime reflecting the ideals of a nuclear family with a breadwinner husband and 
homemaker wife during postwar America, and our new dominant neoliberal civic lineage 
regime. In this overview, I will briefly summarize the main civic lineage developments 
addressed in each chapter. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the fitter-families ideal, which was the dominant civic 
lineage regime associated with the eugenics movement during the Progressive Era.  
During the Progressive Era, the federal and state governments instituted civic lineage 
structures that placed issues of gender, race, class, ethnicity, deviant sexuality, and 
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disability at the forefront of their hierarchical ideal of U.S. citizenship.  This regime 
embraced the notion that state and federal governments could (and should) regulate 
reproduction—through mechanisms such as endorsing involuntary eugenic sterilization, 
banning birth control and abortion, and prohibiting interracial marriage—in the name of 
protecting the public health and morality of the entire political community.  There is little 
doubt that the goals of these policies were intended by government actors to influence 
civic membership and status across generations. By labeling reproduction as the public 
concern of the state, the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell was clear about its eugenic 
intentions regarding breeding the “best” Americans.  But who were these ideal American 
citizens celebrated by the government’s civic lineage regime during this period?  Was 
there a positive ideal for the reproduction of citizenship that fueled these negative 
eugenics laws?   
The short answer is yes.  To this day, we can find images of this “ideal citizen” in 
archival photographs from the “Fitter Families” contests at state fairs, which were 
sponsored across the country by eugenics organizations to educate the public about the 
importance of better breeding.  These positive eugenics exhibitions awarded prizes to the 
“fittest families” in several categories for being not only “prime racial specimens,” but 
also “good citizens,” and these events were popular until the Nazi’s forever gave 
eugenics a bad name in the aftermath of World War II.20  The photographs from these 
contests reveal a specific stereotype of the ideal citizen: the winners invariably look like 
“wholesome” white upper-middle class families, often with several generations residing 
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together, conforming to traditional gender roles, and with several children—the bigger 
the family, the better!21  This “Fitter Family” prototype is definitive of the Progressive 
Era’s civic lineage regime, for it provides an image of the ideal citizen and family.   
 Chapter 3 focuses on the early birth control movement during the Progressive Era.  
This chapter is an important transitional part of my analysis because it introduces a 
competing ideal of civic lineage, which I term “voluntary motherhood.” Spearheaded by 
Margaret Sanger, founder of Planned Parenthood, in the name of the freedom of women 
to decide whether and when to become mothers, the early birth control movement 
focused on challenging anti-contraceptive laws that pre-dated the eugenics movements 
and, as I shall argue, were relics of the nineteenth century Victorian ideal of “moral 
purity.” By forming strategic alliances with the dominant eugenics coalition during the 
Progressive Era, Sanger was able to successfully overturn many of these laws—
particularly at a state and local level—based on a shared interest with eugenicists in 
protecting public health. However, as we shall see, the breadth of her success was limited 
by the fact that her proposed ideal of voluntary motherhood clashed with the dominant 
fitter families civic lineage regime. Although eugenicists supported birth control for 
“unfit” citizens, Sanger asserted that all women ought to have access to contraceptives, 
irrespective of “eugenic fitness.”  Specifically, she spearheaded what I call her “clinic 
plan,” establishing public birth control clinics to provide access to contraceptives and 
family planning advice to all women, rich and poor alike.  
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This highlights the fact that there is always contestation, uneasy alliances, and 
compromises within civic lineage regimes. The ideal of voluntary motherhood for all 
women remained an unrealized possibility during the progressive era as well as the years 
that followed.  In subsequent chapters, I appropriate and expand this ideal of “voluntary 
motherhood” to encompass a broad range of voices advocating for voluntarism in 
reproductive choice, irrespective of race, ethnicity, religion, disability, or sexual 
behavior.  Although never a dominant regime, I argue that voluntary motherhood arose as 
a genuine yet, as it turns out, unrealized possibility after the victories of the civil rights 
and women’s movements during the 1960s and 1970s. If this had occurred, we would 
have seen the rise of a much more egalitarian civic lineage regime instituted in 
government policy and state institutions today. As we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6, 
however, the rise of voluntary motherhood was hijacked in the late twentieth century by 
an emerging neoliberal coalition of political elites within government, championing a 
new inegalitarian neoliberal civic lineage regime.   
Chapter 4 traces the judicial development of a fundamental right to privacy 
protecting reproduction and its influence on the civic lineage regime.  In Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965) the director and chief doctor of a Planned Parenthood clinic in the 
city of New Haven were convicted for distributing contraceptives to married couples 
under an 1879 Connecticut “Comstock law” that made it illegal to prescribe or distribute 
contraception. The Supreme Court reversed this criminal conviction by creating a new 
line of constitutional jurisprudence on the grounds that there is a fundamental right to 
marital privacy, which protects the right of married couples to use birth control in the 
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Constitution.  In the words of Justice William Douglas, there are “penumbras” (or 
shadows) to the Bill of Rights located in the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, which create “zones of privacy” that constitute a fundamental right to 
reproduction.  As I argue in this chapter, the concept of marriage celebrated by the 
majority of the Court in Griswold is the postwar ideal of the homemaker mother and 
breadwinner father in the 1940s and 1950s, which I call the “white picket fence” ideal of 
the reproduction of citizenship.  After the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany turned 
Americans against eugenics, the white picket fence ideal eclipsed the inegalitarian 
eugenic fitter families ideal as the new dominant civic lineage order in postwar America.  
While it extolled a smaller (nuclear) family—illustrated in television shows like Leave it 
to Beaver, Father Knows Best, and The Donna Reed Show—this ideal continued to 
prioritize a white, middle-class, highly gendered, and Christian vision of proper 
American civic reproduction.  Albeit a new dominant civic lineage regime with its 
emphasis on a nuclear family and marital privacy, given these demographic 
commonalities, the postwar regime was not a complete break from the past.   
Moreover, somewhat ironically, I suggest that the Supreme Court intentionally 
celebrated traditional marriage in Griswold as a tactic of “camouflaged conservatism,” 
cloaking the right to use birth control under the cover of traditional family values during 
the social and political upheavals of the 1960s. Within the next decade, the Court 
expanded its new reproductive privacy doctrine to cover the right of individuals to use 
contraceptives and obtain an abortion in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1971) and Roe v. Wade 
(1973), rooting reproductive rights firmly in the new privacy doctrine divorced from 
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marriage. By constraining the state from invading the reproductive lives of citizens, the 
development of a right to privacy in reproduction and marriage would appear, at first 
glance, to suggest the weakening of a hitherto stringent and explicit civic lineage regime.  
But this belies a more complex story regarding the reproduction of citizenship.  During 
the Progressive Era, when the goal was to regulate the reproduction of citizenship in the 
name of the public health of the larger political community, the Court used the language 
of “citizenship” in a direct manner to justify state action.  Moving away from explicit 
language linking reproductive regulations to citizenship, the Court began to rely on a 
discourse of human rights to prevent the state from invidiously interfering in reproductive 
freedom after the Second World War.  “If the right to privacy means anything,” wrote 
Justice William Brennan in Eisenstadt, “it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”22   
Nonetheless, as I shall argue, this de-emphasis on citizenship in the discourse on 
privacy by no means suggests that the resulting civic lineage regime was weaker than 
before.  Indeed, as Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate (on Medicaid and welfare, respectively), 
treating reproduction as a private choice has facilitated the rise of public policies denying 
government assistance to poor, disproportionately non-white women seeking 
contraceptive and abortion services, whose children often grow up with fewer resources 
and the burdens of social stigma associated with their under-privileged status.  Moreover, 
though far less brutal or overtly discriminatory than forced sterilization, the transition to 
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classifying reproduction as a private issue has significant ambiguities and limits that 
government actors have used to perpetuate old and new forms of civic hierarchy through 
more subtle mechanisms.  
Chapter 5 on Medicaid traces the beginnings of a new neoliberal civic lineage 
regime in the 1970s, which I continue to analyze in Chapter 6 on welfare.  From a civic 
lineage standpoint, the 1960s and 1970s was a time of transition. The Supreme Court 
developed a fundamental constitutional right to reproductive privacy over a relatively 
short period of time, starting with birth control for married couples in 1965 and 
expanding this right to abortion in 1973.  These legal developments in reproductive 
jurisprudence happened at the same time as significant social upheavals, including the 
victories of the civil rights movement, the advent of the women’s movement, and the 
sexual revolution. Furthermore, Congress passed President Lyndon Johnson’s proposed 
“War on Poverty” healthcare Amendments to the Social Security Act (i.e. Medicare and 
Medicaid), ushering in the first governmental health insurance program for the poor in 
1965, and President Richard Nixon signed the Title X Family Planning Program in 1970, 
establishing public family planning clinics and services for the poor. Since these 
developments happened separately but in the same timeframe, it was unclear how they 
would fit together, and a number of political paths were open at this juncture.23 In fact, I 
argue there was a period of time in which it genuinely looked as if something like a 
voluntary motherhood ideal might prevail in future civic lineage policy. Since the Court 
in its early privacy rulings was not clear about what a fundamental right to reproduction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Public Law 91-572. 
26	  
	  
required from the government, it was quite possible that it would link access to birth 
control and abortion to a robust version of equal protection in federal and state anti-
poverty programs.  
However, in a series of cases from 1977 to 1991, which I broadly refer to as the 
“abortion defunding cases,” a closely split Court used the initial framing of abortion as a 
privacy right (not equal protection) to allow states and the national government to 
effectively privatize abortion by withdrawing public funding for abortion and instead 
funding only childbirth for pregnant poor women.  Under this formulation, the right to 
privacy is the ultimate form of negative liberty, so it sets up a barrier against “undue” 
state intrusion but in practice does not protect against all state regulations—nor does it 
guarantee a woman’s access to birth control, abortion, or medical assistance in 
procreation.  In these cases, I introduce the beginnings of a neoliberal civic lineage 
regime, and show how the dissenting voices on the Court argued that the majority’s 
narrow reading of reproductive rights would serve to reinforce civic inequality in 
reproduction and birth. 
Chapter 5 introduces and Chapter 6 develops the concept of a neoliberal civic 
lineage ideal of citizenship, which I contend underlies the contemporary civic lineage 
regime. In contrast to the earlier “Fitter-Families” and “White Picket Fence” ideals of 
citizenship, I suggest that today we have a neoliberal ideal of citizenship upheld and 
reinforced through government policy. The idea of ‘neoliberal citizenship’ may initially 
seem like a contradiction in terms.  The concept of ‘neoliberalism,’ at first glance, 
appears to undermine the significance of citizenship as a meaningful distinction in an 
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increasingly globalized world.  But the hallmark of this new civic lineage regime is that 
the government is actively endorsing public policies that channel direct governmental 
oversight and public accountability to the whims of the private market.  Definitive of this 
regime is the manner in which political actors actively cloak these public state-sponsored 
laws in the clothes of the private market.  The vitality of neoliberalism, as Wendy Brown 
has recently argued, depends upon state laws and regulations that reshape identity and the 
political landscape by supporting market based policies of privatization and framing 
liberties in commercial and economic terms.24  The dominant neoliberal civic lineage 
regime no longer links good citizenship to the anachronistic goal of having large families, 
as it did during the Progressive Era.  Rather, the emphasis now is on self-sufficiency, 
personal responsibility, and providing market opportunities to one’s children.   
This newly emerging civic lineage regime expands the ability for many women 
and men to take advantage of reproductive opportunities and technologies not available to 
them before.  But neoliberalism also cuts against equal citizenship.  By reinforcing old 
patterns of inequality in the American demographic landscape through market forces—
such as differential economic access and the aggregation of discriminatory personal 
preferences—we end up with a public regulatory system that often keeps civic hierarchies 
reinforced by reproductive regulation, and is empowered to do so by the very mechanism 
purportedly intended to protect reproductive autonomy: Namely, a thin version of “the 
right to privacy.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




To give a face to this new neoliberal civic lineage regime and the ideals of civic 
reproduction that it promotes, I compare, in Chapter 6, the popular stereotypes of the 
irresponsible “welfare queen” and the responsible “soccer mom,” two important (and 
contrasting) tropes during the 1996 election, one denounced and the other lauded by the 
press. In a similar manner as the fitter-families contests of the progressive era and the 
white-picket-fence ideal of the postwar period, the soccer mom—coined in the media as 
both a key citizen-consumer and the most important political voice (swing voter) in the 
1996 presidential election—gives us a picture of what it meant to conform to the 
reproductive norms of our dominant civic lineage regime at the end of the twentieth 
century. As my analysis of the “soccer mom” illustrates in Chapter 6, the ideal neoliberal 
female citizen is a self-sufficient market actor (akin to her male counterpart), who has the 
economic agency to take full advantage of her right to privacy and engage in self-
conscious and deliberate family planning such that her children have access to numerous 
developmental and educational opportunities, thereby giving them a head start in an 
increasingly competitive market economy.   
In this regard, the mainstream feminist movement succeeded in its push to 
normalize the concept of the professional woman (e.g. with a new one to two child 
norm).  The problem is that this market ideal of self-sufficiency and independence itself 
produces (and I argue depends upon) civic inequalities, particularly among those who are 
economically dependent and poor—which intersects with the already uneven 
socioeconomic landscape of race, gender, and ethnicity in the United States.  Indeed, for 
those dependent upon government Welfare and Medicaid programs and within the ready 
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grasp of agents of the state, the promise of a reproductive “right to privacy” can 
sometimes seem elusive, both because they are subject to state programs and because 
they cannot always afford to exercise their right to birth control or abortion.25 Speaking 
of the unequal access to privacy rights women now experience based upon their 
socioeconomic status, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated in an interview in the New 
York Times in 2009, “There will never be a woman of means without choice anymore.  
That just seems to me so obvious. The states that changed their abortion laws before Roe 
are not going to change back. So we have a policy that only affects poor women.”26 
Framed as a tool for liberty and a great achievement for reproductive freedom 
won by the feminist movement (which isn’t wrong), the right to privacy in reproduction 
is a huge step towards equality.  On the flip side, the policies flowing from this discourse 
on privacy tend to obscure and reify the coercive underbelly of the neoliberal ideal 
promoted by civic lineage laws today. As a result of a long history of invidious 
discrimination and segregation, class in the United States is inextricably connected to 
structural hierarchies in areas such as race, ethnicity, and gender (intersecting with issues 
of age, sexual orientation, religion, and disability).  Hence, while the neoliberal ideal of 
citizenship is facially more inclusive than the explicitly hierarchical rhetoric of the 
Progressive Era, and lessens concerns of overt discrimination, as I shall argue, its 
practical outcome produces and reinforces relatively extreme civic lineage inequalities by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See e.g. Johanna Schoen, Choice & Coercion: Birth Control, Sterilization, and Abortion in Public Health 
and Welfare (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005); and Roberts, Killing the Black 
Body, 159. 
26 Interview of Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Emily Bazelon, “The Place of Women on the Court,” The New York 
Times Magazine, July 7, 2009. 
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translating liberties (via privatization) to the forces of “supply and demand” in the 
market.  
Chapter 6 traces the rise and triumph of this new dominant neoliberal civic 
lineage regime through the lens of welfare policy at the end of the twentieth century. 
Dubbed by President Bill Clinton as “the end of welfare as we know it,” the 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) replaced 
the sixty-year Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program of the 1935 
Social Security Act with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Not only 
does TANF bar most legal immigrants from receiving public assistance for their first five 
years residing in the United States, thereby placing the boundaries of citizenship front 
and center in this civic lineage policy, but it prioritizes getting welfare recipients into the 
labor market as quickly as possible and also promotes a broad set of “traditional” family 
values associated with marriage and sexual responsibility.  As I shall argue, there is 
strong evidence that the emergence of this regime is no accident, but was a conservative 
response to the victories of the civil rights and women’s movements of the 1960s and 
1970s, spearheaded by a coalition of strange bedfellows—fiscal conservatives, religious 
right “family values” proponents, and racial conservatives—who were able to find 
common ground on welfare reform for a host of different reasons, including in part 
maintaining the previous hierarchical status quo. Acting in concert, the different branches 
and levels of government shaped a narrow conceptualization of reproductive freedom 
under the “right to privacy,” which in turn meant that a woman’s ability to take advantage 
of this right depended upon her opportunities as a market actor.   
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In sum, the chapters that follow seek to demonstrate the existence of a ‘civic 
lineage regime’ by focusing on specific examples of the U.S. federal government and 
state governments shaping citizenship through regulating reproduction during the 
twentieth century.  In addition to my chief goal of demonstrating that a civic lineage 
regime exists, I also trace shifting political coalitions sponsoring various ideals of civic 
reproduction in the form of the three dominant civic lineage orders in the United States, 
discussed above. Drawing attention to how these regimes have developed over time and 
the role of constitutional law in this process of political development, the chapters that 
follow point to noteworthy areas of continuity and disjuncture in civic lineage policies 
during the last century. Ultimately, as we shall see, while the governmental mechanisms 
for regulating the reproduction of citizenship have changed over time, with the rise and 
fall several dominant civic lineage regimes, the face of the future generations of citizens 
these policies seek to reproduce has remained surprisingly similar. Despite the legal civil 
rights victories in the 1960s and 1970s, the ideal remains white, middle-class to affluent, 
able-bodied enough to work, conforming to mainstream Christian family values, and 









Citizens Never Born: 




In the landmark case of Buck v. Bell (1927), the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a eugenic law passed by the Virginia legislature in 1924, permitting 
the involuntary sterilization of people deemed by the state to be mentally or morally 
deviant and likely to produce “socially inadequate offspring.”27  Carrie Buck, the plaintiff 
in this case, was shortly thereafter compelled by law to submit to surgical sterilization 
(via tubal ligation) at the age of twenty-one.28  The Court’s opinion was pithy and blunt.  
“It is better for all the world,” wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “if instead of 
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for a crime, or let them starve for their imbecility, 
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”29  
Explicitly comparing the involuntary sterilization of inferior citizens to the civic duty 
required from America’s “best citizens,” who are expected to defend the nation through 
military conscription during times of war, the Court suggested that it was the civic 
responsibility of less valuable members of society, like Carrie Buck, to submit to state-
sponsored sterilization to protect society from the birth of unfit citizens.  In the words of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 “The Virginia Sterilization Act,” Virginia Acts (1924), 570; the Buck case involved a challenge to the 
constitutionality of this Virginia Statute.   
28 Roberta M. Berry, “From Involuntary Sterilization to Genetic Enhancement: The Unsettled Legacy of 
Buck v. Bell,” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Policy 12 (1998): 5. 
29 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
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the Court, “We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best 
citizens for their lives [i.e. military service].  It would be strange if it could not call upon 
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices [i.e. 
sterilization]…The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to 
cover cutting the fallopian tubes.”  Highlighting the fact that both Carrie and her mother 
were committed to the same state mental institution for alleged sexual promiscuity and 
hereditary feeblemindedness, and that Carrie’s sixth month old baby daughter Vivian was 
also ambiguously labeled as “not quite normal” for her age, Justice Holmes sharply 
concluded his opinion for the Court with the now infamous proclamation: “Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.” 
This Virginia law would ultimately provide the justification for the sterilization of 
more than 8,300 inmates in mental institutions in the state of Virginia between 1927 and 
1972.30   With the enthusiastic endorsement of the Supreme Court, it also set the stage for 
similar laws to be passed in over 33 states, which would together sanction the mass 
sterilization of more than 65,000 Americans classified by government officials as “unfit” 
for procreation, in addition to emboldening doctors in other states and territories to 
perform large numbers of undocumented sterilizations.31  Any accurate estimate is 
impossible to measure.32  Today, both the facts of the Buck case and the subsequent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Paul A. Lombardo, “Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell,” New York University 
Law Review 60 (1985): 30-62.  
31 In the decade following the Supreme Court’s decision, 20 states passed eugenic sterilization statutes, 
with most of them patterned closely after the Virginia law.  During the twentieth century, at least 33 states 
have had such statutes at one time or another. See Lombardo, “Three Generations, No Imbeciles,” 1985. 
32 65,000 is likely a vast underestimate of the number of people sterilized during this time. This number 
accounts only for the cases in which doctors filed official paperwork documenting the procedure with the 
government. In the aftermath of Buck ruling, many states allowed and encouraged doctors to perform 
private (often undocumented) sterilizations. Moreover, while these statistics end in the 1960s, many state 
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statistics associated with the Court’s ruling appear to be shocking violations of 
reproductive rights, particularly given the fact that neither Carrie nor her daughter were 
truly mentally defective but were simply stereotyped as the Progressive Era’s equivalent 
of “poor white trash” in the rural south, making them vulnerable to being condemned to 
dependence upon public charity and state institutions.  Yet, although Buck v. Bell is 
frequently labeled as an anomaly in American law and political history, associated with 
the “eugenics craze” during the Progressive Era,33 this particular Court decision is worth 
highlighting here, precisely because it is NOT an anomaly.  Rather, the case provides one 
of the clearest and most striking judicial examples of the Supreme Court rigorously 
endorsing a coercive civic lineage agenda aimed at curtailing the fertility of less desirable 
citizens in the name of fostering a stronger nation.  A triumph for the eugenics movement 
during the Progressive Era, the Buck ruling serves as a critical juncture in paving the way 
for the proliferation of the “sterilization agenda” across the United States—which 
remained active behind the closed doors of state and local mental institutions, prisons, 
and hospitals until the late 1970s.  
In the realm of reproductive policy, the Progressive Era represents a fascinating 
period in American political development.  Whereas the Victorian Era framed sexuality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
policies continued well into the 1970s.  Finally, some states never officially legalized sterilization, like 
Colorado, but doctors in institutions nonetheless performed undocumented sterilizations on patients without 
the legal authorization to do so.  When questioned later, they emphasized it was a national norm. On 
Colorado, see: Harry Bruinius, Better for All the World: The Secret History of Forced Sterilization and 
America’s Quest for Racial Purity (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 2006).  See 
also: Alexandra Minna Stern, Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005); Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the 
Supreme Court, and Buck v. Bell (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Berry, “From 
Involuntary Sterilization,” 1-38. 
33 The phrase “eugenics craze” was, as far as I know, coined by Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in 
American Thought (New York: G. Braziller, 1959). 
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as an intimate matter that ought to remain outside of the public sphere, as discussed in the 
next chapter on the early birth control movement, the eugenics movement during the 
Progressive Era succeeded in its campaign to flip these norms. The case of Buck v. Bell 
serves as the juridical highpoint of this trend by clearly labeling reproduction as the 
public concern of the state.  Since the Supreme Court made no attempt to sugarcoat its 
eugenic intentions about breeding the best citizens, there is a tendency for scholars to 
frame Buck v. Bell as about gender, class, race, sexuality, disability, and indeed the case 
concerns all these intersecting issues.  However, as I shall argue, these avenues of 
discrimination, taken together, paint a picture of the broader civic lineage regime 
promoted by politicians during the Progressive Era. I label this the ‘fitter-families’ civic 
lineage regime.  
What did the fitter families ideal of citizenship look like? To this day, we still 
have access to archival photographs from popular Fitter-Families Contests, sponsored by 
eugenics organizations during the Progressive Era to educate the public about good 
breeding, at state and county fairs across the country. The trophy wining (or “fittest”) 
families in these pictures are invariably white, middle-class, Christian, born and raised in 
America, often with multiple generations living together in the same home, all appearing 
healthy and able-bodied (i.e. during a time in which sicknesses such as polio and 
tuberculosis were widespread), with husband and wife both present, and with several 
children of different ages. There is no doubt that this fitter family civic lineage regime 
was racist, sexist, and classist (among other things), but my larger point is that these 
policies targeting civic lineage across generations were first-and-foremost aimed at 
shaping the future composition of the American citizenry, just we see in laws regulating 
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immigration in the United States. During this time, politicians spoke openly about using 
public policy to breed desirable citizens and curtail the fertility of less desirable members 
of society, and we have a clear picture of the ideal they had in mind in the winners of 
these eugenic Fitter Families contests.   
Broadly, this chapter is divided into ten parts. In Parts 1 and 2, I begin by defining 
eugenics, and describing how this movement fit into the spirit of the Progressive Era—a 
time, in which political actors turned to experts to come up with scientific solutions for 
social problems, including population control.  The growth of larger and more dispersed 
governmental bureaucracy provided the perfect recipe for elites to transform eugenic 
ideas into a major top-down political movement mobilized around the goal of breeding 
“better” American citizens.  In Section 2, I first introduce the Fitter Families Contests 
sponsored by eugenics organizations, which I continue to reference throughout this 
chapter. After discussing how Virginia adopted a model eugenic sterilization law, 
Sections 3 and 4 examine how the state selected a young woman named Carrie Buck to 
serve as the test case to convince the Supreme Court to declare eugenic sterilization 
constitutional.  By the time Buck v. Bell made it to the Supreme Court, the justices were 
increasingly sympathetic to state-based regulations in the name of social welfare, 
particularly those involving the issue of motherhood.  I examine this contextual 
background in Part 5, before turning in the next section to a detailed analysis of Justice 
Holmes’ majority opinion for the Court in Buck v. Bell (1927).  Not only did Holmes 
explicitly frame the Court’s ruling as about the patriotic duty of citizens to make personal 
sacrifices for the greater good of the nation, but most significantly, Justice Brandeis—the 
intellectual founder of a “right to privacy”—joined the majority opinion in casting the 
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issue as the public concern of the community as opposed to a matter of privacy, 
differentiating this case from the prevailing “right to privacy” approach to reproductive 
law today. After discussing how Buck v. Bell became law of the land, I briefly examine 
the ways in which involuntary sterilization skyrocketed throughout the nation—in the 
name of preventing “unfit” members of society from spreading their traits to the next 
generation of citizens.   
This chapter concludes with the political puzzle of why eugenic sterilization did 
not disappear in the United States after the Nazis forever gave eugenics a bad name in the 
aftermath of World War II.  During this period, the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 
cast reproduction as a fundamental right yet nonetheless upheld its basic ruling in Buck.  
To explain how coercive sterilization continued in America, Part 9 looks at the ways in 
which the Court’s Buck v. Bell ruling ceded power to state legislatures to pass 
sterilization laws.  Using the Virginia Law as a model, state governments invariably left 
the implementation of their eugenic sterilization laws to the superintendents of local 
institutions through a bureaucratic dispersion of power, with little to no federal oversight.  
This effectively froze the architecture of this civic lineage policy in time, allowing it to 
continue in a path dependent fashion within the shadows of institutions long after the 
public abandoned support for eugenics in the wake of the atrocities of the Nazis during 
the Second World War—a type of persistence through neglect, which I term “shadow 
continuity.”34  Although the fitter families ideal of citizenship is specific to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Although beyond the scope of this chapter focusing on the “eugenic ideal” during the Progressive Era, it 
is worth noting that: not only did the Court in Buck offer the veneer of judicial legitimacy to the practice of 
coercively sterilizing “defective” citizens, like Carrie Buck, within institutions, but the Court’s ruling in 
this case would later enable the Nixon Administration to seamlessly incorporate sterilization into federal 
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Progressive Era, some of the civic lineage policies that were a part of this regime took 
longer to abolish. Not only did the Court in Buck offer the veneer of legitimacy to the 
practice of coercively sterilizing “defective” citizens, like Carrie Buck, within 
institutions, but as Part 10 documents, the Court’s ruling in this case would later enable 
local bureacrats and doctors during the 1960s and 1970s to target underprivileged and 
minority women—until a public and legal backlash by civil rights groups. Despite the 
advent of a new civic lineage regime with the repudiation of eugenics after World War II 
and the rise of the judicial doctrine of “reproductive privacy,” discussed in Chapter 4, 
during the mid twentieth century, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has never 
overturned its ruling in Buck. In fact, the Court has continued to cite this case as 
precedent supporting state intervention into reproduction in the name of the welfare of 
society. Let us turn now to the eugenics movement and the fitter-families civic lineage 
regime, which endorsed the eugenic sterilization of “unfit citizens” during the 
Progressive Era. 
 
1. Background: What was Eugenics during the Progressive Era?  
Given the multifarious coalitions that formed the dominant civic lineage regime during 
the Progressive Era, it is useful to begin by first defining eugenics and relating it to the 
politics of this period.  At least as far back as Plato’s Republic, scholars have 
hypothesized about the possibility that the fertility of citizens could be controlled in ways 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Welfare and Medicaid policy in the name of population control, targeting the reproductive capacities of 
hundreds of thousands of underprivileged minority women. These women were targeted by local doctors 




that politically strengthen the state through eugenic breeding practices.  Sir Francis 
Galton, a pioneer statistician and Charles Darwin’s cousin, coined the term ‘eugenics,’ 
which he derived from the Greek eugenes, meaning “well-born” or “good in birth,” in the 
1880s to refer to organized and selective breeding among human populations.35  For 
Galton, this mainly involved encouraging the fittest citizens to reproduce (positive 
eugenics), but also logically extended to discouraging and even preventing the weakest 
from reproducing (negative eugenics).  In this sense, eugenic ideas were not new in the 
Progressive Era.  Rather, these ideas ripened over time and hit their stride with the advent 
of more expansive government during the early twentieth century.  In the words of 
historian Diane Paul, legislation pertaining to eugenics first required “the rise of the 
welfare state,” or at least the beginnings of larger government and public health 
initiatives.36  During this period, the United States government turned to increasingly 
bureaucratic and locally dispersed policies targeting the domestic issues within the 
nation.  In a world marked by rapid industrialization and the rise of capitalism, combined 
with massive immigration and worries about overpopulation and other social ills, the 
growth of state bureaucracy and institutions offered ways of trying to regulate the 
population in a more direct way than before.  Aimed at social engineering and population 
control, the field of eugenics fit perfectly within the political spirit of the Progressive 
Era.37 
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The Progressive Era was a time in which virtually everybody embraced eugenics, 
in one form or another.  As Thomas Leonard puts it, “Progressive Era eugenics was, in 
fact, the broadest of churches.  It was mainstream; it was popular to the point of 
faddishness; it was supported by leading figures in the newly emerging science of 
genetics; it appealed to an extraordinary range of political ideologies,” including 
progressive reformers, liberal idealists, social conservatives, birth control advocates, 
feminist reformers, environmental conservationists, Fabian Marxists, economic 
Malthusians, evolutionary scientists, opponents of immigration, proponents of American 
imperialism, and even preachers in the Calvinist tradition who took genes as markers of 
predestination.38  As an academic discipline, most colleges offered biology classes in 
eugenics, which had their own textbooks consisting of a mix between evolutionary 
genetics and dubious political conclusions about heredity.  This was considered good 
science.  As a political movement, Eugenics depended upon the state control of 
differential fertility, and sought to direct human breeding and heredity in such a way that 
it improved the vigor of the population.  The assumption was that factors like 
intelligence, mental health, temperament, moral character, and even civic virtue were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
problems associated with urban decay; including poverty, hunger, overpopulation, homelessness, combined 
with an emphasis on Malthusian concerns about population collapse.  Next, this period in time also 
witnessed major advancements in the science of heredity, by Charles Darwin and Gregor Mendel (among 
others).  Forth, new medical advancements in surgery made operations like sterilization much less invasive 
and dangerous than before: Now, a simple vasectomy could replace castration in men, and women could 
simply have their “tubes tied” without removing any organs from their bodies.  Fifth, state governments 
became increasingly bureaucratic and emboldened to regulate the lives of citizens.  Additionally, 
government agents and politicians turned to “experts” to come up with scientific solutions to 
socioeconomic problems facing the nation.  Finally, during the Progressive Era, the United States 
government turned to increasingly bureaucratic and locally dispersed policies targeting domestic issues 
within the nation.  Due to this confluence of events, existing ideas about eugenics finally ripened and hit 
their stride in the structural milieu of the Progressive Era.  
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based in large part on differences in heredity, and passed directly as genetic traits from 
parents to children.  For instance, in his popular 1924 book on eugenics, The Fruit of the 
Family Tree, Albert Edward Wiggam told his readers that “good and bad citizenship” 
was something inherited by nature.  Wiggam rhetorically asked: “Do you know that good 
and bad citizenship, bright and dull minds, good and bad health…are largely due to the 
sort of ancestors a man had, and that such things can be attained only to a limited extent 
by any economic ‘system’ or scheme of education?”39 
This raises a vital point.  Although often downplayed in the literature on the 
eugenics movement in the United States, the future of American citizenship appears to 
have been one of the most prominent themes driving the politics of “better breeding” 
during the Progressive Era.  By the 1890s, it was popular for social commentators to 
declare that the U.S. frontier was finally “closed,” and to hypothesize about what this 
meant for the identity of the nation.  At the same time, scholars began to sound the alarm 
that the birthrate among immigrants from southern and eastern Europe was eclipsing that 
of “old-stock” or “native” (Anglo) Americans, the former of which were having much 
larger families.  Politicians and economists at the time were particularly concerned about 
the connection between immigration and overpopulation, but somewhat ironically, their 
concern was not framed as a strictly Malthusian worry about too many mouths to feed 
and the corresponding danger of population collapse per se; rather, “what worried 
economists,” emphasizes Thomas C. Leonard, was “the population’s changing racial 
composition” in the United States.40  These concerns not only resulted in Chinese 
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Exclusion laws and other restrictions on immigration to keep “undesirable” groups from 
migrating to the United States, but they also inspired frequent laments about the specter 
of internal “race suicide” in America.  Often attributed to Edward A. Ross (1901), the 
idea of ‘race suicide’ quite literally turned the principles of Darwinian evolution on its 
head.41  Invoking the fears of the social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, scholars like Ross 
warned that America (and the industrial world more generally) was entering a dysgenic 
nightmare in which the best citizens were increasingly being outbred by the unfit.  The 
most frequently cited cause of this differential fertility was the advent of industrial 
capitalism, which purportedly resulted in “unnatural” modes of life, with technological 
innovation interfering with “the natural discipline of the survival of the fittest,” and in 
turn, “making it more likely that the unfit would survive and reproduce.”42  While the 
fittest citizens were having fewer children in response to the unnatural conditions of 
industrial urban life, scholars bemoaned statistical evidence that immigrants and the 
lowest classes tended to have the largest families.43  
The term “race suicide” gained the attention of President Theodore Roosevelt in 
1907, when he labeled it as the “greatest problem of civilization.”44  Rather than a right of 
all members of society, Roosevelt framed reproduction as both a privilege and duty of the 
best citizens.  The eugenics movement dominated civic lineage policy during the early 
twentieth century.  Disposing of Victorian Era notions that sexuality was an intimate 
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concern of the family and had no place in the public sphere, Roosevelt and many other 
prominent politicians of his day, labeled childbirth as the public concern of the entire 
nation and vital for the preservation of the “American race.”45   
Here it is important to emphasize that the term ‘race’ carried multiple and vague 
meanings during the Progressive Era, and its imprecision was exploited and conflated in 
discussions about population control and U.S citizenship.  ‘Race’ was sometimes used to 
refer to all of humanity (the “human race”), sometimes to the citizens of a particular 
nation (i.e. the American race), and often to something closer to what it colloquially 
means today (i.e. the “White race” or “Negro race”).  For instance, The Universal 
Dictionary of the English Language, with a publication date of 1902, lists two main 
definitions: 1) Race could refer to “lineage, line, family, [or] descent,” and it could also 
refer to 2) “a class of individuals sprung from common stock; the descendants of a 
common ancestor; a family, tribe, nation or people belonging to the same stock.”46  In 
this vein, when the topic of “race suicide” came up, it was almost always a dual reference 
to anxieties about the future of American citizenship (the American race) and racist 
concerns about the outbreeding of those of superior racial stock by inferior races (i.e. 
including blacks, Catholics, Jews, Chinese, southern and eastern Europeans, Mexicans, 
and various other unpopular immigrants).  In a letter to his friend and soon-to-be 
President, William Howard Taft, the outgoing President Roosevelt emphasized the 
national danger that differential fertility and race suicide posed to the United States: 
“Among the various legacies of trouble which I leave you there is none as to which I 
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more earnestly hope for your thoughts and care than this [i.e. race suicide]…I do not 
know whether you yourself realize how rapid the decline in the birth rate is, how rapid 
the drift has been away from the country to the cities.  In spite of our enormous 
immigration, there is good reason to fear that unless the present tendencies are checked 
your children and mine will see the day when our population is stationary, so far as the 
native stock is dying out.”47 
President Roosevelt was remarkably preoccupied with the relationship between 
fertility and American citizenship.  Speaking of the duties of fatherhood to prevent 
“national death, [or] race death” he announced, “I feel pretty melancholy when I see how 
in this country, when there is no war to kill our bravest men, the best men nevertheless 
seem content [that] the citizens of the future come from the loins of others” [italics 
mine].48  Likewise, comparing mothers to both saints and soldiers, he told the American 
people that the primary civic duty of women was to take up the mantle of motherhood.  
President Roosevelt compared the woman who refused to marry or flinched at the idea of 
having children to the soldier who fled from enemy fire, calling her “a criminal against 
the [American] race.”49  The worth of the female citizen could be determined by counting 
how many healthy children she contributed to the nation, for not only do the “the pangs 
of childbirth make all men the debtors of all women,” but also those who have large 
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families were fulfilling their patriotic duty as “good citizens.”50 While Presidents Taft, 
Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover would also publicly praise the importance of 
proper breeding and childrearing (embracing the eugenics agenda, one after the other), no 
U.S. President was as outspoken about differential fertility as Teddy Roosevelt.  He 
celebrated parenthood as one of the most fundamental duties and privileges of 
citizenship.   
However, Roosevelt was careful to note that, just as the best citizens had a civic 
duty to reproduce, the weakest citizens have the opposite duty to restrict their fertility and 
refrain from passing on their undesirable traits to the future generation of Americans. 
Speaking to Charles Davenport, the head of the Eugenics Records Office, Roosevelt 
wrote in 1913 after his presidency, “I agree with you that…society has no business to 
permit degenerates to reproduce their kind…Some day we will realize that the prime duty 
of a good citizen of the right type is to leave his or her blood behind him in the world, and 
we have no business perpetuating citizens of the wrong type” [italics mine].51  Ultimately, 
Roosevelt’s gendered (and otherwise exclusionary) views about the importance of 
childbirth as essential for preventing ‘race suicide,’ gives us a glimpse into the ideational 
connections between eugenic principles and popular definitions of what it meant to be a 
good citizen.  
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2. The Eugenics Movement 
The American eugenics campaign was not a fringe movement.  Spearheaded by a select 
cadre of scientists and economists at the national level, these academics in turn convinced 
wealthy philanthropists like Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Kellogg to fund scientific 
research stations and organized propaganda outlets for disseminating their agenda.52  
Although ideas about eugenics were popular among the American people in general, the 
campaign to establish involuntary sterilization as a legal and institutional norm in the 
United States was the mission of eugenics experts.  These so-called academic specialists 
and their allies in government worked in coalition with doctors in local institutions to 
make sterilization a routine practice in state institutions across the country.  Their 
research and publications were dispersed widely in the press and through propaganda 
outlets, convincing every U.S. President—and many other prominent public and political 
figures—during the heart of the Progressive Era to speak out in support of eugenic 
principles.  In this section, I briefly examine the ideas associated with this elite-driven 
movement, paying particular attention to the most influential figures and early (well-
organized) interest groups driving the political dissemination of their eugenic agenda to 
shape the future of American citizenship. These same figures were key players in the case 
of Buck v. Bell, which was orchestrated specifically by elite eugenicists to legalize 
involuntary sterilization. 
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Charles Benedict Davenport, the recipient of Roosevelt’s letter above (see 
excerpt), is arguably the most important figure in campaign for eugenic sterilization.53  A 
Mendelian geneticist, Davenport argued that traits such as good and bad citizenship, 
poverty, alcoholism, laziness, and promiscuity were all heritable.54  When the Carnegie 
Institute in Washington, DC formed the American Breeders Association (ABA) in 1903 
to study breeding in animals, Davenport petitioned the ABA to fund a research facility 
for the study of human breeding and evolution in Cold Spring Harbor, NY, called The 
Station for Experimental Study of Evolution.55  He became the newly appointed director 
of the Eugenics Section of the Carnegie Institute, forming a Committee in 1906, “to 
investigate and report on heredity in the human race, and emphasize the value of superior 
blood and the menace to society of inferior blood.”56  By 1910, he left the Carnegie 
Institute form his own organization, the Eugenics Record Office (ERO), as “a center for 
research in human genetics and for propaganda in eugenics,” funded largely by wealthy 
philanthropist, Mrs. E.H. Harriman, the widow of the successful Railroad magnate, and 
also sponsored by the Carnegie Institute and John D. Rockefeller (among others).57  With 
the ERO as an institutional base and scientific luminaries like Alexander Graham Bell, 
inventor of the telephone, on its board of directors, Davenport set out to popularize what 
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he referred to as, “the religion of eugenics.”58  In 1911, he published Heredity in Relation 
to Eugenics, which was cited in over a third of high school biology textbooks until World 
War II, and tied fears of social degeneration to themes of racial contamination through 
immigration and bad breeding.59  In his words, “The population of the United States will, 
on account of the recent influx of immigrants from Southeastern Europe, rapidly become 
darker in pigmentation, smaller in stature, more mercurial, more attached to music and 
art, more given to crimes of larceny, kidnapping, assault, murder, rape, and sex-
immorality…than were the original English settlers.”60  A scientist with a mission, 
Davenport was instrumental in organizing eugenics into a powerful political movement in 
the United States.   
The ERO was concerned with promoting research and legislation aimed at 
policing the boundaries of U.S. citizenship, both through restricting immigration from 
abroad and reproduction at home.  Davenport appointed Harry Hamilton Laughlin the 
superintendent of the ERO, charging him with overseeing daily activities.61  Initially, the 
ERO collected thousands of family records—many willingly submitted by families proud 
of their racial fitness and others collected from asylums as examples of unfit citizens—in 
order to create genealogical charts and document traits and disorders that seemed to run 
in families.  As an expert on eugenics at the ERO, Laughlin would enthusiastically testify 
before Congress, during the hearings on the “Johnson-Reed” Immigration Act of 1924, 
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about the importance of building eugenics into immigration policy.62  The bill that 
Congress subsequently passed, and which President Coolidge signed into law, followed 
Laughlin’s recommendations on immigration restrictions targeting southern Europeans 
and Jewish immigrants (among others), which would later prevent large numbers of 
Jewish refugees from seeking safety in the United States during the rise of the Third 
Reich in Germany.63  Given the fact that the Nazis glowingly cited his work as inspiration 
for their eugenics program a decade later, Laughlin’s role in spurring U.S. Congress to 
restrict the immigration of “unwanted” Jewish applicants is particularly tragic.64  
In addition to limiting immigration from undesirable groups, the Eugenics 
Records Office and other eugenics organizations like the American Eugenics Society 
(AES) focused on making sure that, on a domestic level, the best citizens would become 
parents.65  In the name of public education, the ERO engaged in “eugenic” marriage 
counseling to ensure that couples were well matched to produce healthy and strong 
offspring.  The organization also funded Fitter Families and Better Babies contests at 
state fairs across the country, aimed at instructing the American people about the 
importance of eugenics and good breeding.66  The winners of these contests received 
awards for their good heritage as “prime specimens,” and were also routinely praised as 
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“good citizens.”67  But despite this public propaganda promoting positive eugenics, Paul 
Lombardo argues that the ERO “seemed organized to marshal support for sterilization,” 
and indeed among its primary goals was the study of the “best methods of restricting the 
strains that produce the defective and delinquent classes of the community.”68  This 
double positive/negative agenda resulted in a normative dichotomy between the “mother 
of tomorrow” (whose duty it was to bear children for the nation) versus the wayward 
feebleminded woman in society (whose duty it was to remain barren).69  While the 
former had the patriotic responsibility to save the American race by raising large families, 
the obligation of the latter was to refrain from passing her tainted genes to the next 
generation.  Since race suicide could happen as a result of either internal or external 
mechanisms, and many factors can weaken a population, it followed that defective 
citizens had the civic duty not to bear children by submitting to sterilization.  Ultimately, 
Laughlin spent the bulk of his efforts devising ways to prevent weak and defective people 
from contaminating the nation’s gene pool, through the joint avenues of curtailing both 
immigration and reproduction from less desirable groups.  His work would play a vital 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For example, praising the patriotism of the parents of a large family, President Roosevelt wrote in a 
letter: “Three cheers for Mr. and Mrs. Bower and their really satisfactory American family of twelve 
children. That is what I call being good citizens” [italics mine]. “Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Mr. 
and Mrs. R.T. Bower,” Letters III (February 14, 1903), cited in Dyer, Theodore Roosevelt, 153. 
68 Lombardo, Three Generations, 2008, 47.  
69 See e.g., Wendy Kline, Building A Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the 
Century to the Baby Boom (Oakland: University of California Press, 2001), 29. 
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3. The Model Sterilization Law 
Indiana was the first state to pass eugenic sterilization legislation in 1907, with 
Washington, California, and Connecticut following soon after.70  But many of these early 
eugenic sterilization laws hit a major legal roadblock in the court system.71  After 12 
states passed eugenic sterilization laws, victims and members of their families contested a 
total of 7 of these laws in court between 1913 and 1918.72  Every judicial challenge 
succeeded at the state level on due process grounds, as detailed below.  To address this 
problem, Harry Laughlin took matters into his own hands, publishing a Model 
Sterilization Law first in 1914 as an ERO pamphlet and later as part of a lengthy book.73 
A key recipient of a copy was Dr. Albert Priddy, the superintendent of the Virginia 
Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-minded in Lynchburg, Virginia.74  After setting out to 
have Laughlin’s Model Law passed in Virginia, Dr. Priddy and the directors of his 
Virginia Colony searched for a test case to get the courts to uphold the law. Their goal 
was to create a legal record that would legitimize eugenic sterilization not only in 
Virginia, but also throughout the nation.  Using Laughlin’s book as a legal roadmap, the 
test subject they selected was a young woman named Carrie Buck.   
Laughlin’s book, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States, is essentially a 
“how-to manual” for crafting and enacting his model sterilization law.  His entire book is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See: Jason S. Lantzer, “The Indiana Way of Eugenics: Sterilization Laws, 1907-74,” in A Century of 
Eugenics in America: From the Indiana Experiment to the Human Genome Era, ed. Paul A. Lombardo 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 26-41. 
71 See Paul, Controlling Human Heredity, 82. 
72 See an essay by Paul Lombardo on the topics, available at: 
http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay8text.html  
73 Harry Hamilton Laughlin, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States (Psychopathic Laboratory of the 
Municipal Court of Chicago, 1922); see, in particular, “Chapter XVI: Explanatory Comments on the Model 
Sterilization Law,” 454-60. 
74 Lombardo, Three Generations, 2008, 90.  
52	  
	  
devoted to a detailed legal analysis of past eugenic sterilization cases on a state-by-state 
basis, identifying strengths and flaws found by various courts, and ending with 
suggestions for how to overcome these weaknesses in the future.  Covering over 500 
pages, the volume was commissioned by Chief Judge Harry Olson of the Municipal 
Court of Chicago, where Laughlin was officially appointed as a legal consultant on 
eugenics.75  After conducting several studies on the enforcement of eugenic sterilization 
policies throughout the country, Laughlin concluded that physicians were often hesitant 
to perform involuntary sterilizations because they feared prosecution by patients in court.  
Furthermore, the main problem cited by courts about sterilization statutes involved the 
patient’s lack of access to due process of the law, because most patients were given little 
recourse to procedurally challenge their doctor’s diagnosis. What the eugenics movement 
needed, according to Laughlin, was a model law specifically designed to circumvent the 
(due process) concerns raised by state courts and insulate doctors from judicial backlash 
in the future. To pass legal muster, Laughlin drafted his Model Law to set up state and 
local Eugenics Boards to examine each individual case, weigh the evidence, and allow 
patients the opportunity to dispute decisions by challenging their diagnoses with new 
information.  In his book’s preface, Laughlin specifically wrote that his project “was 
intended primarily for practical use” by government agents who wanted to pass and 
uphold successful laws relating to eugenic sterilization, including 1) “law-makers” 
interested in drafting legislation, 2) “judges of the courts…deciding upon the 
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constitutionality of new statues,” and 3) “administrative officers who represent the state 
in locating, and genetically analyzing persons” as candidates for sterilization.76  
Laughlin’s procedural suggestions did not detract from the breadth of his Model 
Law, which cut as widely as possible when it came to labeling people as candidates for 
eugenic sterilization.  The primary goal of Laughlin’s book remained that of breeding 
“better” American citizens.  In the book’s Introduction, Judge Olson argued that eugenics 
is necessary for democracy to function properly, because it breeds good citizens and a 
democratic nation requires a vigorous citizenry to function.77 Quoting Irving Fisher, a 
well-known economist and board member of the ERO, Olson wrote that, 
“Eugenics…represents the highest form of patriotism and humanitarianism, while at the 
same time it offers immediate advantages to ourselves and our children.”78  In this spirit, 
Laughlin proposed that “socially inadequate” people supported in institutions or 
“maintained wholly or in part by public expense” ought to be authorized for sterilization 
in the name of protecting the public health of the community.79  The law included a wide 
range of people under its umbrella—all afflicted with problems that the ERO claimed 
were largely hereditary in nature—including the “feebleminded, insane, criminalistics, 
epileptic, inebriate, diseased, blind deaf; deformed; and dependent”—such as, “orphans, 
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ne’er-do-wells, tramps, the homeless and paupers.”80  In sum, Laughlin’s Model Law was 
specifically designed to address the procedural “due process” weaknesses of the early 
legislation struck down by state courts.  But while these Eugenics Boards would serve to 
insulate individual doctors from being sued by patients from a practical standpoint, the 
ideas driving his engagement with the topic were fears about race suicide and the erosion 
of meaningful democratic citizenship in America.  Now, Laughlin just needed a state to 
adopt his proposal! 
The Commonwealth of Virginia delivered.  On March 20, 1924, Virginia passed 
the “Eugenical Sterilization Act,” signed into law on the same day as its new “Racial 
Integrity Act,” the latter of which banned interracial marriage in order to protect white 
racial purity.81  Under the Eugenical Sterilization Act, any individual confined to a state 
institution could be sterilized, if this person was “afflicted with hereditary forms of 
insanity that are recurrent, idiocy, imbecility, feeble-mindedness or epilepsy.”82  With the 
help of Dr. Priddy, the procedural part of the law was modeled directly after Laughlin’s 
recommendations.  A patient could only be sterilized after the superintendent of the 
colony or hospital in which they were housed petitioned a special board of directors for 
sterilization on a case-by-case basis.  A copy of the paperwork for the petition must be 
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those considered legally “white.” Indeed, the fact eugenic sterilization mainly targeted poor whites, like 
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presented to the patient and their legal guardian, who then had 30 days to challenge the 
decision before the sterilization was permitted to proceed (as directed by the board).83  
Regardless of whether or not appeals were taken seriously, the point was to provide 
evidence of “due process” to the judiciary.  
Following the procedures outlined in the law, Dr. Priddy at the Virginia Colony 
submitted a list of sixteen patients he recommended for sterilization to the institution’s 
board later that year.84  Before he performed the surgeries, Priddy set out to test the law’s 
constitutionality in the courts.  The board selected Carrie Buck as the test case.  Carrie 
was a 17 old girl from Charlottesville, Virginia, who had been diagnosed as 
“feebleminded.”  In his petition, Dr. Priddy emphasized to the Board that both Carrie and 
her mother shared the hereditary traits of sexual promiscuity and feeblemindedness. For 
not only had Carrie recently given birth to a baby daughter out of wedlock (subsequently 
placed in foster care), but her mother Emma was already a resident at the same asylum.  
Since Carrie had likely passed her defective traits on to her baby daughter, Vivian, Dr. 
Priddy emphasized that this young woman was an ideal candidate for the new law’s 
qualification of being a “probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring.”85  
With three generations of “feebleminded” women in the same family, all of whom were 
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4. The Show Trial of Carrie Buck 
The case against Carrie Buck was on its face relatively straightforward: First, the state 
argued that Carrie Buck was feebleminded (a moron).  Second, it maintained that she was 
afflicted with a hereditary form of feeblemindedness that she inherited from her mother 
and had already passed on to her baby daughter.  Third, the state maintained that it 
possessed a legitimate state interest in sterilizing “defective persons who if now 
discharged or paroled would likely become by propagation of their kind a menace to 
society.”86  The state interest in promoting the welfare of society grants it the police 
power to sterilize feebleminded people such as Buck in the name of public health.  
Finally, it emphasized that Buck received proper due process under the law, because her 
case was examined on its individual merits by the board members of the Virginia Colony, 
and Carrie was able to appeal the ruling of the board on the off-chance that she was 
mistakenly selected for sterilization.  This was all spelled out in the original petition to 
sterilize Carrie Buck, in which Priddy stated bluntly that Buck was a “moral delinquent,” 
for she “had just given birth to a mentally defective child before admission” to the 
Virginia Colony.87  
The case began in the Circuit Court of Amherst County, and the trial took five 
hours.88  Since his purpose was to establish the constitutionality of the law, Dr. Priddy 
hired State Senator Aubrey Strode, the lawyer who had drafted the sterilization law for 
Virginia’s legislature, to defend the Colony’s position.  He also hired Irving P. 
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Whitehead, a former Colony board member and accomplished lawyer, to defend Carrie 
Buck on the Virginia Colony’s own budget.  These two lawyers were good friends.  Not 
only were they connected to the Virginia Colony, but Senator Strode and Mr. Whitehead 
shared a strong commitment to eugenic sterilization and appear to have collaborated in 
their efforts to get the law declared constitutional by colluding with the Colony’s officials 
to work against Carrie Buck.  Strode would construct a powerful case for sterilization, 
and Whitehead would focus almost solely on the issue of due process.  After drafting the 
Virginia eugenical sterilization legislation, with the help of Dr. Priddy, Aubrey Strode 
used his legal knowledge and skills to smoothly steer it through the court system.  As 
Strode and Whitehouse knew, the original trial was their main opportunity to structure the 
evidence and testimony that would later be reviewed by higher courts.  While Whitehead 
filed a short brief on behalf of his client (approximately 5 pages) and called no witnesses 
of his own to testify in defense of Carrie, the brief by Strode defending the Virginia 
sterilization law was over 40 pages in length and he had a dozen witnesses to defend it.89  
By making Carrie Buck, the subject of a eugenics “show trial,” the two lawyers went to 
great lengths to provide the most compelling case possible to the Circuit Court.   
 
The Local Witnesses: 
After Whitehead presented his short introductory argument in defense of Buck’s rights to 
due process and equal protection under the law, Aubrey Strode called 8 witnesses from 
Charlottesville to support sterilizing Carrie Buck under the new Virginia law.  None of 
them knew Carrie well and most had never met her, but all painted a negative picture of 
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Carrie Buck, with rumors and negative remarks about her family.  The main local 
witness—the seventh witness in the trial that morning—was Caroline Wilhelm, a Red 
Cross nurse who had moved to Charlottesville the year before to become the county’s 
administrator of public welfare.  She began her comments by admitting that the real 
reason that Mr. Dobbs, Carrie’s foster father, reported Carrie to the welfare office was 
not because she was feebleminded per se, rather Carrie was pregnant and, “he wanted her 
committed somewhere…sent to some institution.”90  When she first took the stand, 
Wilhelm announced that she sympathized with Carrie’s situation, stating that girls like 
her were, “more and more at the mercy of other people.”91  However, when Strode 
pressed her about whether Carrie was “obviously feebleminded?,” Wilhelm took the bait 
and agreed, emphasizing her expertise: “I should say so, as a social worker.”92  Moreover, 
although she had previously told Dr. Priddy that she could not label Carrie’s baby 
daughter as feebleminded at such a young age and she saw no evidence of any “defect” in 
the child, Wilhelm changed her position before the trial.93  In her words, “It is difficult to 
judge the probabilities of a child as young as that, but it seems to me a not quite normal 
baby…There is a look that is not quite normal, but just what it is, I can’t tell.”94  
 
The Experts: 
The afternoon was dedicated to expert testimony.  The first “eugenics expert” called to 
testify was Dr. Joseph S. DeJarnette, who had worked in mental health for over fifty 
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years and was now superintendent of Virginia’s Western State Hospital.  Proud to have 
the nickname “Sterilization DeJarnette,” he was not only an avid supporter for 
sterilization at his own prison, but he was also known to compose poems about eugenics 
as a hobby (“Oh why do we allow these people/ To breed back to the monkey’s nest/ To 
increase our country’s burdens/ When we should only breed the best?”95)96  In his 
testimony, DeJarnette emphasized that it was absurd to allow “defective” humans to be a 
“social burden” on the state and harm “our own race,” when the farmer “breeding his 
hogs, horses, cows, sheep…selects a thoroughbred.”97 DeJarnette firmly stated that 
sterilizing Carrie Buck would be of great benefit to social welfare.  He pointed out that 
sterilization was a “cheap and effective” procedure, and hence much less of the state’s 
income would have to go to housing “the defective portion of our population.” 98   
The main witness was Dr. Arthur H. Estabrook.  Strode was an old acquaintance 
of Estabrook, who had visited the area a number of times doing research for his book, 
Mongrel Virginians, on the weaknesses of mixed race people.99  A well-known eugenicist 
at the Carnegie Institute and the Eugenics Records Office (which had merged in 1917), 
the Virginia Colony paid to have Estabrook travel to Virginia and spend a day examining 
the entire Buck family, and then return to testify in court.100  Estabrook announced in 
court that he was certain that the Bucks were all feebleminded after his “sufficient 
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examination” (in a single afternoon), and concluded that the family’s “germ plasm [italics 
mine], of which Emma Buck [Carrie’s mother] is a member carries a defective strain in 
it.”101 Carrie and her daughter were both feebleminded, a weakness they inherited from 
her mother’s side.102 Putting aside the difficulties of testing the intelligence of babies, and 
particularly those taken from their mothers at infancy with the stigma of being “born 
defective” and placed in foster care, Estabrook announced with confidence: “I gave the 
child the regular mental test for a child of the age of six months and judging from her 
reactions to the tests I gave her, I decided she was below the average for a child of eight 
months of age.”103  
After testifying that Carrie and her family members were all feebleminded, 
Estabrook then volunteered the analogy of the Kallikak family. Widely cited during the 
Buck trial, Henry Goddard’s book, The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of 
Feeble-Mindedness, published in 1912, examines the history of two family bloodlines 
allegedly fathered by a soldier in the Revolutionary War.104 The soldier was given the 
pseudonym Martin Kallikak, but readers were assured of the authenticity of the family.  
The Kallikak descendants divided into two bloodlines, one wholesome and the other a 
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“race of defective degenerates.”105  The degenerate offspring were all descended from 
Martin’s liaison with a barmaid (identified as “the nameless feeble-minded girl”) during 
his military service, which resulted in the birth of an illegitimate son. After the war, 
Martin married a normal girl of wholesome ancestry from an upstanding Quaker family. 
His legitimate offspring and their descendants grew up to become distinguished members 
of society, including “doctors, lawyers, judges, educators, traders, landholders,” and none 
were problems to society.106 As Goddard emphasizes, “There have been no feeble-
minded among them; no illegitimate children; no immoral women...”107 In contrast, 
Martin’s illegitimate son, whom he abandoned in infancy (later nicknamed, “Old 
Horror”), produced a line of miscreants, scoundrels, deviants, criminals, prostitutes, and 
alcoholics with a vast majority being feebleminded.108 Importantly, Goddard’s analysis 
attributed the prosperity of Martin’s legitimate line of descendants to his wife, and the 
degeneracy of his illegitimate line of descendants to his feebleminded lover.  The 
assumption was that feeblemindedness was a dominant trait on the female side. Rooting 
his findings in nature and not the environment, Goddard brushed aside the notion that 
there could be a more persuasive explanation than genetics for why Martin Kallikak’s 
legitimate children, growing up with both parents in a financially stable household, might 
end up becoming more successful than the illegitimate child of a working-class lover that 
he abandoned to a life of poverty during the war. Nor did Goddard reflect upon how the 
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advantages and disadvantages of one’s upbringing might be transmitted though 
socioeconomic factors from generation to generation.   
The Kallikak Family was so popular that it went through twelve editions in 
twenty-five years, from the date of its publication to 1939.109  As Diane Paul emphasizes, 
references to the Kallikaks were common in scholarly books, journals, high school and 
college biology textbooks, and even popular magazines.110  Like Richard Dugdale’s 
earlier family pedigree study, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease, and 
Heredity, which found a family marked by criminal behavior traced back a number of 
generations through the prison system in upstate New York,111 Goddard’s Kallikaks 
capitalized on the fears of feebleminded people invading communities, and weakening 
the body politic in a similar manner as a plague or internal parasite.112  Estabrook did not 
hesitate to draw attention to his own follow-up study for the ERO of “The Jukes in 1915” 
at the trial, and he stated that the best cure for the problem (of a family of morons) was to 
curb their ability to reproduce.113 As far as the public was concerned, the Jukes and the 
Kallikaks were like an invading army of degenerates (akin to locusts), who would sap the 
vitality of America from within her own borders.  The implication was that the Buck 
family, like the notorious Jukes and Kallikaks, would surely produce more defective and 
degenerate citizens without state intervention via sterilization. 
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110 Ibid. 
111 Richard L. Dugdale, “The Jukes”: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease, and Heredity (New York: 
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Although he couldn’t make it in person, it is worth noting that Laughlin himself—
by far, the most famous figure in the nationwide eugenic sterilization campaign—
submitted an official deposition to the court, which Strode read out loud as the final 
expert witness on the topic.114 When asked to state the facts of the case, Laughlin simply 
quoted Priddy’s claim in a letter to him that Carrie Buck “has a life-long record of moral 
delinquency and has borne one illegitimate child, considered feebleminded.”115  He had 
never met Carrie Buck, but based on secondhand information from Priddy, Laughlin 
surmised that Buck was clearly feebleminded, and her feeblemindedness was almost 
certainly the result of heredity not environment: “These people belong to the shiftless, 
ignorant, and worthless class of anti-social whites of the South.”116  In addition to 
referencing numerous chapters from his own book, Eugenical Sterilization—which 
“contains pedigree charts and other analytical data, and demonstrates, beyond a 
reasonable doubt that…the particular inadequacy was inborn”—Laughlin also cited two 
of his own forthcoming articles in Eugenical News, “Segregation Versus Sterilization” 
and “Purging the Race.”  These publications, he emphasized, supported “the right of the 
State to limit human reproduction in the interest of race betterment.”117  Laughlin 
concluded his deposition by asserting that the Virginia law was an effective and 
appropriate statute for limiting fertility in the name of public health and welfare.  
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Without a Defense: 
What is surprising is that Carrie’s own defense lawyer (Irving Whitehead) did not call 
any witnesses from Carrie’s hometown to defend her character and mental abilities.  
There is no evidence that he met with his client before the trial to hear Carrie’s side of the 
story.118  Nor did he expose any of Strode’s witnesses to a strenuous cross-examination, 
or draw attention to the rather puzzling fact that few of the witnesses had even met 
Carrie.  Instead, Whitehead’s questioning involved polite inquiries regarding the 
witnesses’ personal conjectures about Carrie, which often resulted in more damning 
hypotheses about her mental capacities than came out during Strode’s initial examination.  
Perhaps most importantly, Whitehead never questioned the principle allegation that 
Carrie was feebleminded, and instead repeated to witnesses that her mental condition was 
a fact.119  Ironically, we now have ample evidence that Carrie’s sterilization was based 
upon a false diagnosis.  Although Whitehead never called a single one of Carrie’s 
grammar school teachers to the witness stand in defense of her academic capabilities, her 
school records confirm that she was a fine student.  Until the Dobbs’ took her out of 
school in the sixth grade to help around the house as more of a maid than a foster child, 
her grades were good and she was promoted to the sixth grade with the official remark 
from her teacher, “very good—deportment and lessons.”120  In addition to this glaring 
failure to question the validity of her diagnosis, Whitehead also never challenged the 
claim that Carrie was sexually promiscuous, which is offset by the fact that Carrie stated 
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on a number of occasions that the nephew of her foster parents raped her.  Whitehead 
never aggressively cross-examined the social worker about these inconsistencies in her 
testimony, or called any member of the Dobbs family to the witness stand.  Nor did he 
call any expert scientists of his own to question some of the controversial (and downright 
false) claims made by Strode’s crew of experts about heredity.  Throughout the case, 
Whitehead simply focused on procedural formality.   
Paul Lombardo has persuasively argued that Whitehead’s inadequate 
representation of Carrie Buck was not a sign of incompetence, but rather he was working 
for the Virginia Colony.121  The Colony and its board rewarded Whitehead handsomely 
for his loyalty.  This is one of the few examples in which the “public defense” received 
more money than the prosecution, and Whitehouse’s efforts in this case are linked to a 
series of significant professional advancements.122  Yet his failure to represent his client 
properly in court not only left Carrie defenseless, but was also an egregious breach of 
professional ethics and his duties to his client as a lawyer.   Carrie Buck’s fate was sealed 
from the outset.  She was a pawn in a scheme devised by Virginia’s most avid 
eugenicists—and their allies throughout the nation—to get involuntary sterilization 
upheld by the Supreme Court.  Nobody questioned the assertion that Carrie was a 
“moron,” or that her mother and daughter shared this defect.  The family studies of the 
Kallikaks and Jukes connected the dots more effectively than any references to the 
science of heredity.  The implication of Strode’s argument was that the Bucks were no 
better than these families of popular notoriety in discussions of race suicide.  They were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the worst kind of citizens, and appeared to only grow worse from one generation to the 
next.  Surely, asked Strode, three generations of the feebleminded Buck family is all the 
good people of Virginia ought to be forced to endure and support with taxpayer money?  
He would find a friendly ear to this argument from Justice Holmes when the case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court.123 
The initial trial went very well for Dr. Albert Priddy, but he died of Hodgkin’s 
disease before Judge Gordon formally announced his opinion in favor of sterilizing 
Carrie Buck.124  After the ruling, the institution’s board remained determined to see the 
case through to the next level, so Whitehead filed an appeal on Carrie’s behalf to the 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.  When Virginia’s highest court agreed to hear the 
case, Dr. John H. Bell, who was Priddy’s former assistant and had replaced him as 
superintendent of the Virginia Colony, became the newly named defendant in the case—
thereafter labeled, Buck v. Bell.125   
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124 See: Lombardo, Three Generations, 2008, 149-51. 
125 Like Priddy, Bell declared that he was “in entire sympathy with the effort being made to reach a final 
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decisions of Judges in the name of the larger goals of the eugenics movement. Lombardo, Three 




5. The Supreme Court and Public Health Regulations 
The United States Supreme Court that agreed to hear Buck v. Bell in 1926 was presided 
over by Chief Justice and former President, William Howard Taft.  Although Taft was 
not known for being racist—in fact, he rejected “race prejudice” as irrational when it 
came to mandated racial segregation126—he shared Theodore Roosevelt’s concerns about 
‘race suicide’ and had spoken out in favor of eugenics in the past.127  The Taft Court was 
acutely concerned about the changing face of the American polity and maintaining 
national integrity in the midst of American imperialism, as demonstrated by its decision, 
written by Taft, to arguably exclude Puerto Rico from statehood in Balzac v Porto Rico 
(1922) in part to preserve the cultural, ethnic, and racial face of America’s citizenry.128  
The Court ruled 8-1 in favor of sterilizing Carrie Buck. With only Justice Pierce Butler 
dissenting, purportedly because he was a Roman Catholic (but he offered no written 
dissent), Chief Justice Taft assigned the task of writing the majority opinion to Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 129   
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the Buck v. Bell opinion, it would be 
useful to consider this case in the context of the Progressive Era.  During the Progressive 
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invasion of procreation and a form of mutilation. 
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Era, states increasingly sought to pass legislation regulating the welfare of their citizens, 
which helped to pave the way for the development of a much more expansive and 
localized civic lineage regime.  Although Buck v. Bell was the first case before the 
Supreme Court that dealt explicitly with the issue of “eugenics,” the legal concerns raised 
in the case built upon a recent rise in jurisprudence related to state laws seeking to 
regulate issues concerning the “public health” of their citizens. In his early years on the 
Court, Justice Holmes staked out a clear-cut position in this ongoing debate about the 
constitutional legitimacy of such regulations.  Ranking Buck as part of this broader 
trend—despite the fact that the public health claims of the case seem grossly misguided 
today—sheds light on the Court’s decision in support of involuntary sterilization.  It also 
explains why Justice Holmes wrote such a bold opinion endorsing the policy.  Since he 
participated in almost all of these early “public health” cases during his long tenure on 
the Supreme Court, let us briefly examine Holmes’ own positions in these cases to gain a 
better understanding of his opinion in Buck v. Bell.   
By the time Buck v. Bell reached the Supreme Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
who would author the opinion, was in his late eighties and the most celebrated jurist on 
the court.130  Justice Holmes was particularly famous as a “champion of the common 
man,” a reputation he earned early in his tenure on the Supreme Court beginning with the 
now infamous case of Lochner v. New York (1905).131  When the Court’s majority struck 
down a New York “public health” law limiting the workweek of bakers to 60 hours a 
week, Holmes wrote a scathing dissent rejecting the majority’s analysis as imposing the 
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will of judges on the democratic process, and bluntly declaring that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” 132 Today, many 
remember Lochner as one of the worst decisions in Supreme Court history, because the 
Court rejected a law regulating basic worker safety and workplace sanitation in the name 
of supporting the prerogative of employers to make contracts with employees, 
irrespective of the conditions.133   Most now celebrate Holmes’ bold dissent in Lochner.  
Nonetheless, despite his rejection of the Court reading social Darwinism into the 
Constitution, Holmes was never really a justice of the common man (or woman), as Buck 
v. Bell (1924) would starkly illustrate more than twenty years later.   
Holmes believed that judges ought to defer to state laws, rather than impose their 
own views on democratically elected legislatures.134  According to Holmes, a good judge 
follows the democratic will of the people whenever possible, for it is “the majority vote 
of that nation that could lick all others.”135 Importantly, his support of the democratic 
process was consistent with the decision to uphold the state of Virginia’s eugenic 
sterilization law in Buck v. Bell.  In a similar manner to Lochner, the Buck case concerned 
a state law that was passed by the legislature in the name of protecting the welfare of 
society.    
Moreover, Holmes had already expressed his conviction that women warrant 
differential treatment from men, by virtue of their unique reproductive capacity to 
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become mothers.  In Muller v. Oregon (1908), soon after Lochner, the Court switched 
positions and unanimously upheld the idea that the freedom of contract could be limited 
by the state’s interest in protecting the health and welfare of its people (i.e. see the 
Brandeis brief).  The grounds on which it reached this decision was specifically in the 
name of protecting women as the mothers of future generations of citizens.136  The case 
did not overturn Lochner based on worker’s rights or the state’s interest in protecting 
public health in general, rather it qualified the Court’s earlier position on the basis of sex 
discrimination.  In his opinion for the Court, David Brewer (joined by Holmes) wrote, 
“As healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of 
women becomes the object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength 
and vigor of the race.”137  Although the labor movement lauded the Court’s decision in 
Muller as a victory—because they sought workplace protections for both men and 
women—it is important to note that the Court rejected any broader class-based arguments 
and upheld Lochner.138  The unique role of women versus men in childbirth was enough 
for the Court to reach precisely the opposite decision in Muller than it did in Lochner.  
From the standpoint of the Court, the decision rested upon concerns about civic lineage 
and motherhood, not class: “the performance of maternal functions place [woman] at a 
disadvantage which justifies a difference in legislation in regard to some of the burdens 
which rest upon her.”139  The Court unanimously concluded that the issue of 
‘reproduction’ justified the state using its police powers to grant special protections to 
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women’s safety in the name of the community’s legitimate interest in the health of 
children.  The public interest in mothers bearing and raising healthy offspring justified 
sex discrimination in the workplace by providing women with greater safeguards than 
men. Although Holmes supported the constitutionality of state laws protecting male 
workers as well as females, his endorsement of this highly gendered and racialized 
phraseology in Muller casts light on the role of civic lineage in Buck v. Bell.   
How does Muller connect to Buck v. Bell?  As we have seen, during the 
Progressive Era, just as healthy women were told by eugenicists that it was their civic 
duty to give birth to the next generation of citizens, those labeled as unfit, like Carrie 
Buck, were told that they had no right to procreate at all.  So, could women’s ability to 
bear children also justify preventing purportedly defective mothers from producing 
offspring in the first place in the name of what Justice Brewer termed in Muller, the 
“vigor of the race”?140  Holmes’s answer was a firm yes.  His colleagues on the Court 
agreed with this conclusion.   
 
6. The Buck v. Bell Opinion 
In Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes voted to uphold a public heath law passed by the 
democratically elected legislature in Virginia.141  Likewise, moving away from their 
(anti-regulation) position in Lochner, eight out of nine justices agreed that sterilizing 
Carrie Buck fell under the legitimate police powers of the state, because it protected 
society from degenerate offspring. As in Muller, the Court cast the reproduction of 
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citizenship as a fundamentally public matter open to state regulation.  The language about 
civic duty is particularly noteworthy, for Holmes frames reproduction as a public matter 
of citizenship rather than a private concern of the individual or family.  Based on the 
Buck opinion, we can conclude that during the Progressive Era many including the 
Supreme Court viewed the issue of reproduction as the legitimate interest of the entire 
community.  The concept of “reproductive bodily integrity” was neither a fundamental 
right nor a matter of a right to privacy, as it is framed under constitutional law today. 
In his opinion for Buck v. Bell, Holmes begins by listing “the facts” of the case, 
with an emphasis on Carrie’s diagnosis as feebleminded and the presumed heredity 
nature of her condition.  Reviewing the testimony at the trial, he then turns to the state’s 
compliance with procedural regularity under the law. In his words, 
 
Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was committed to the State 
Colony above mentioned in due form. She is the daughter of a feeble minded 
mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded 
child.  She was eighteen years old at the time of the trial of her case in the circuit 
court, in the latter part of 1924.  An Act of Virginia, approved March 20, 1924, 
recites the health of the patient and the welfare of society may be promoted in 
certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives, under careful 
safeguard…that the Commonwealth is supporting in various institutions many 
defective persons who if now discharged would become a menace but if incapable 
of procreating might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting with 
benefit to themselves and society; and that experience has shown that heredity 
pays an important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility…142 
 
After summarizing the extensive procedural safeguards Virginia gave Carrie Buck, 
Holmes concludes, “there is no doubt that, in that respect, the plaintiff in error has had 
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due process of law.”143  At this point, it becomes clear that Laughlin’s strategy for 
overcoming due process difficulties worked.   
Next, Holmes mocks Whitehead’s suggestion that the state could not, for any 
legitimate reason, violate a person’s “bodily integrity” under the Constitution through 
involuntary sterilization. Whitehead added this “bodily integrity” argument to his Brief at 
the last minute, as an attempt to cover all bases—including equal protection.  Dismissing 
the argument, Holmes simply cites Carrie Buck’s mental insufficiencies, and reiterates 
that the state granted her due process: 
It seems to be contended that in no circumstances could such an order be justified.  
It certainly is contended that the order cannot be justified upon existing ground.  
The judgment finds the facts have been recited and that Carrie Buck “is the 
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, like-wise afflicted, that 
she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health and that her 
welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization,” and thereupon 
makes the order…144 
 
The concept of a ‘fundamental right to reproduction’ was not yet a part of mainstream 
judicial discourse at the time.  This is why Holmes could so readily dismiss the “bodily 
integrity” argument.  Far from extending to encompass a broad protection of “bodily 
integrity,” the notion of a right to reproductive privacy was still inchoate.  Indeed, Justice 
Brandeis, who is typically identified with the idea of a right to privacy, joined Holmes in 
favor of sterilizing Carrie Buck.   
Despite his reputation as the founding theoretician of a “right to privacy” in 
American Constitutional law, Justice Brandeis voted for the sterilization of Carrie Buck, 
precisely because the Court framed the reproductive capacity of Carrie Buck as a public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




rather than a private matter.  The fact that Brandeis voted for the sterilization of Carrie 
Buck raises a crucial point about the early development of the idea of “a right to 
privacy,” and its original limits.  In a groundbreaking article published in the Harvard 
Law Review in 1890, coauthored with his law partner Samuel Warren, Brandeis famously 
articulates a new legal concept that he calls a “right to privacy,” and summarizes it most 
succinctly as the “right to be left alone.”145  Brandeis argued that an individual ought to 
be protected against undue invasion of his personal space and integrity (most broadly), 
except—and this is a crucial exception—for a compelling reason of public welfare.146  
This “right to be left alone” treats a man’s home as a hallowed space, protected from 
unsolicited intrusion, and prevents the press from exposing intimate details about a 
person’s life to the public, but Brandeis and Warren exclude matters of public health 
from their original concept of ‘privacy.’  The early views of Brandeis fail to reflect the 
direction in which the concept of “a right to privacy” would evolve when the Court later 
applied it to issues of birth control and abortion.  At this point in time, birth control was 
illegal under the Comstock Laws (addressed in detail in the next chapter on the early 
birth control movement), and the Court explicitly supported a civic lineage regime in 
which regulating the reproduction of women was a public matter.  In fact, only a year 
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after he joined in the Buck majority, Justice Brandeis highlighted his classic “right to be 
left alone” in his dissent in Olmstead v. U.S. (1928), while directly referring to the Buck 
case as an exception in order to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment does not stand in 
the way of the government rising to meet new demographic challenges posed by “modern 
conditions.”147  For Justice Brandeis, the sterilization of Carrie Buck was a matter of 
protecting social welfare in a swiftly evolving industrial society—nothing more. 
Holmes was even more outspoken on this issue.  The son of an eminent physician, 
who was an early public advocate of eugenic ideas within the scientific community, 
Justice Holmes was an candid supporter of eugenic principles, expressing disappointment 
in welfare reformers for being too passive about interfering with the composition of the 
population, for “I should expect more from systematic prevention of the survival of the 
unfit.”148  To drive home the idea that sterilization is a civic duty for people like Carrie, 
Holmes adds a particularly powerful analogy, comparing the duty of Carrie Buck to 
submit to sterilization to that of a solider defending his nation in war.  As he put it, both 
were duties of citizenship, assigned to different members of the polity based on their 
civic value to the nation:  
 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best 
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be 
such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with 
incompetence [italics mine].149 
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This is harsh language in a case about sterilizing a young woman, irrespective of her 
mental acuity.  But Holmes was a former soldier in the military. An honored veteran of 
the Civil War, he seemed to be invoking the memory of his comrades who had fallen on 
the battlefield. As a young man, Holmes served in a Union regiment that suffered more 
losses than any other during the War. He was severely wounded three times. After the 
War, in a speech at Harvard University, Holmes described the brave men who had fallen 
in the Civil War, fighting for the Union in the name of a cause greater than themselves, as 
“the best and noblest of our generation.”150  This rhetoric about citizenship is almost 
identical to that of Teddy Roosevelt, and it is clear that both men would agree that 
someone like Carrie Buck could never even approximate the contribution to society of a 
war hero.  Rather than fighting for her country, people like Carrie lived like parasites off 
the state, embodying an internal threat to the integrity of America by the specter of their 
defective progeny.   
In this regard, Holmes makes it clear that his argument is fundamentally about the 
reproduction of citizenship.  Referring back to Muller, we can conclude that Holmes bore 
a highly gendered view of the obligations of citizenship: The duty of men, he suggested, 
was to defend the nation in times of war, while the duty of women was to breed the next 
generation of citizens.  It was in the interest of the community to protect women so that 
they would bear and raise healthy children, according to the Court in Muller.  But if a 
woman is defective and deemed by the state as lacking fitness for motherhood, then it 
follows that she has a patriotic duty to submit to sterilization in the name of protecting 
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social welfare.  This is a much less significant sacrifice than that of the soldier on the 
battlefield, and promotes the welfare of society: “It is better for all the world, if instead of 
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 
kind.”151   
The only case that Holmes cites as precedent in his entire Buck opinion is 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905).152 He participated in this decision twenty years 
before, upholding a state law for a mandatory smallpox vaccination. He references the 
case near the end of his opinion, as a justification for coercive state action in the name of 
protecting public health.  In his words, “The principle that sustains compulsory 
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the fallopian tubes.”153 Less than a decade 
after the Great Influenza of 1918—with the nation still struggling to conquer diseases like 
polio and tuberculosis—the invocation of smallpox seems like more than merely a handy 
precedent.  Comparing compulsory vaccination to compulsory sterilization projects 
imagery of infection and contagion onto the procreation of “unfit” citizens.  It treats 
faulty genes in a similar manner to germs. Frequently called “germ plasm,” following 
August Weismann’s pioneering work in Mendelian genetics, the differences between the 
role of genes and germs in transmitting disease and genetic material remained a topic of 
some degree of scientific uncertainty and debate.154 Surely this precedent would have 
stirred anxieties that defective citizens were akin to a plague threatening the vitality of the 
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nation.  Finally, declaring eugenic sterilization constitutional, Holmes boldly proclaimed: 
“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”  
Carrie Buck was sterilized via tubal ligation on the morning of October 19, 1927.  
The notes from her surgery are atypical from a medical standpoint, because they include 
remarks from her doctor about the political significance of the procedure.  In his 
assessment of the status of his patient, Dr. Bell records that Carrie responded normally to 
the surgery and her hemorrhaging was contained, before writing that “this was the first 
case operated on under the sterilization law.”155  He then summarizes how the Virginia 
Colony had won the authorization to sterilize the patient through the court system. 156    
In many respects, as I have suggested above, Buck represents the other side of the 
coin of the same gendered principle expressed in Muller.  Both Muller and Buck were 
civic lineage cases concerning the public’s interest in shaping citizenship across 
generations, with women selected because they had the capacity to become mothers of 
the next generation.  But of course the story is also much more complex than this, for the 
trial can be framed as a case about the intersecting categories of gender, class, sexuality, 
race, and presumed disability.  More than anything, I would argue that this is a case about 
reproduction and its constitutional limits.  Although Buck v. Bell played out in a highly 
gendered fashion, the ruling could (and would) apply to the sterilization of men as well, 
because the decision legalized eugenic sterilization as a general principle endorsed by the 
highest court in the country.  Furthermore, as Buck starkly illustrates, during the 
Progressive Era, reproduction was a matter of legitimate public interest, which trumped 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




any meaningful idea of procreation as a matter of individual or familial privacy.  This 
case involved the judicial sanction of a civic lineage policy that labeled fertility and 
childbirth as a public rather than a private concern, boldly supporting the idea that the 
state ought to shape reproduction in the name of creating a stronger citizenry through 
highly coercive mechanisms such as involuntary sterilization.  In a path dependent 
fashion, the ruling in Buck had far-reaching consequences.  This case continues to shape 
the face of America today, for it not only legitimized the sterilization of at least 65,000 
citizens, preventing innumerable Americans from being born—but, as I shall discuss 
below, the Buck ruling has never been overturned by the Court. 
 
7. A Tyranny of Institutions: The Aftermath of the Buck ruling 
The Supreme Court’s Buck v. Bell decision had an immediate and lasting effect on the 
development of sterilization and the trajectory of reproductive law in America. In the 
twenty years between the first state law legalizing sterilization in Indiana in 1907, and the 
Buck decision in 1927, the practice of involuntary sterilization was fairly low in all states 
except for California.157  A total of 6,244 documented sterilizations are recorded during 
this period, and many states with laws on their books recorded no sterilizations at all.158  
Of course, it is important to recognize that this does not mean that individual physicians 
weren’t “taking matters into their own hands,” so to speak, but it does mean that 
compulsory sterilization was not considered an aboveboard or routine procedure in most 
areas of the nation.  This status quo changed overnight after the Supreme Court issued its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Buck decision.  Of the 65,000 documented involuntary sterilizations in the country (and 
remember this merely refers to a minority of cases in which paperwork was officially 
filed!), nearly 60,000 of these procedures occurred after the Court sided with Dr. Bell 
against Carrie Buck.159  In the aftermath of this case, new laws were passed, old laws 
were updated and revised to meet Laughlin’s standards, and doctors began to more 
actively take advantage of their constitutional ability to sterilize patients.  In the words of 
Edwin Black, “Many state officials were simply waiting for the outcome of the Carrie 
Buck case.  Once Holmes’ ruling was handed down, it was cited everywhere as the law of 
the land.”160  
Most states in America enacted and revised eugenic sterilization legislation in the 
after this ruling, and lower courts now had a national precedent to follow to uphold these 
laws.  Although the Supreme Court made this possible, the most important actors in the 
actual implementation of these laws were the bureaucrats and doctors associated with the 
institutions in which the patients (i.e. candidates for sterilization) were housed, including 
prisons, hospitals, and above all, mental institutions and homes for the “feebleminded.”  
In fact, as Randall Hansen and Desmond King have noted, the most influential person 
determining whether or not sterilization became routine practice at the local level was the 
superintendent of each institution, who occupied a number of important roles in this local 
political process as, “a carrier of ideas and a policy advocate outside the institution and a 
policy implementer within it.”161  Examples include Doctors Priddy and Bell, who were 
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superintendents at the same local institution and managed to organize a successful 
campaign to legalize sterilization at a national level.  In fact, when states established 
eugenic boards to oversee sterilization recommendations in the wake of Buck, the 
superintendents routinely became influential members of the boards.162  While doctors 
like DeJarnette bragged that he sterilized at least 600 patients himself, others avoided 
implementing the practice on a routine basis.163  This role of the local institution adds a 
twist to the eugenics story.  Above all, what the Court did in Buck did was empower local 
bureaucrats to make permanent decisions about the reproductive fate of their patients, 
without their informed consent.164 Whether or not these doctors and bureaucrats decided 
to take advantage of this new “medical treatment” was variable and unpredictable, which 
meant that a patient’s outcome depended upon the particular leadership and locality of 
the institution in which they were housed.  Indeed, Philip Reilly concludes, “When 
sterilization data are analyzed by institution, the influence of the superintendent is readily 
apparent.”165  With national endorsement from the Court, the reach of local 
superintendents was so complete over the reproductive fate of their patients that, I would 
argue, this seems to qualify as a classic example of the tyranny of local bureaucracy in 
America (i.e. a la theorists as different as Tocqueville or Foucault).   
This raises a crucial question: How can we call such a decentralized policy a civic 
lineage regime?  One can argue that there is not a central driving force that makes these 
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state and local civic lineage policies identical at one point (or place) in time, insofar as 
the federal government did not pass a single overarching law regulating involuntary 
sterilization.  Yet the fact that so many states passed similar laws legalizing sterilization, 
based upon the same basic template provided by Laughlin’s book, points to a unified 
national trend in favor of a particular strategy for regulating the reproduction of 
citizenship.  Combined with the fact the Supreme Court explicitly accepted this policy as 
constitutional at the federal level (giving legitimacy and momentum to this trend), it 
demonstrates that these laws and institutional practices nonetheless add up to a set of 
interconnected policies aimed at sterilizing the unfit, sanctioned by constitutional law, 
which together form a configuration substantial enough to label as a crucial component of 
the decentralized “civic lineage regime” of the Progressive Era.  More than anything, this 
civic lineage regime focused on preventing the specter of ‘race suicide.’  Furthermore, it 
is important to note that the prototypical citizen that these policies celebrated can be seen 
in the pictures of the winners of the “Fitter Families” contests at state fairs.166  This ideal, 
which was part of the propaganda of the positive side of the eugenics campaign, paints a 
picture of a specific stereotype of the ideal citizen bearing children (i.e. of a preferred 
racial and class background, gender expression, relationship status, sexual orientation, 
birthrate, evidence of physical fitness, and signs of healthfulness).  They were invariably 
attractive looking “wholesome” white upper-middle class families, usually with multiple 
generations living in the same home, and conforming to traditional gender roles with 
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three or more healthy children—the bigger, the better!167  Far from an elusive concept, 
there was an identifiable positive image of what it meant to embody (and act like) a good 
citizen promoted as the flip side to the eugenics movement’s negative campaign to 
sterilize certain members of the population.   
 
8. The transitional Case of Skinner v. Oklahoma  
This brings us to the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942).168  This case emerged at 
precisely the right political moment for a judicial rehearing of the issue of involuntary 
sterilization. At the height of the Great Depression, Americans were increasingly 
unsympathetic to the classic (sweeping) eugenics arguments, which blamed factors like 
poverty, homelessness, indebtedness, and criminality on hereditary weakness and one’s 
ancestral stock.169  Moreover, even before the United States entered World War II, 
ominous articles about the ambitious eugenics program of Nazi Germany spread across 
the pages of newspapers.170  Indeed, three major political factors—which emerged in 
tandem—inspired a judicial reexamination of eugenic sterilization: 1) the Great 
Depression with rampant poverty and organized crime, 2) the rise of Nazi Germany with 
its genocidal eugenic policies, and 3) a “new” Supreme Court, with different justices now 
operating under the “New Deal” judicial realignment.  Although the assumption that 
these events ended the tide of involuntary sterilization is false, the rise of the Nazi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Theodore Roosevelt, “Letter to Mr. and Mrs. R. T. Bower,” Letters III (February 14, 1903): 425, cited in 
Dyer, Theodore Roosevelt, 153. 
168 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
169 See Victoria F. Nourse, In Reckless Hands: Skinner v. Oklahoma and the Near Triumph of American 
Eugenics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 82, 107, 118. 
170 See Ibid., 128, 130. 
84	  
	  
eugenics program and the Court’s Skinner ruling nonetheless had a lasting influence on 
the trajectory of civic lineage policy in America.   
In 1935, the state of Oklahoma passed its Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, 
which allowed the state to impose compulsory sterilization as part of its sentence against 
any individual convicted of three or more crimes “amounting to felonies involving moral 
turpitude.”171  The Governor of Oklahoma advertised the Act as a mechanism to deter 
criminals from coming to the state during the Great Depression, and as a way of reducing 
crime from convicts who wanted to avoid sterilization in the future. The law stipulated 
that anyone who committed three felonies was by definition eugenically unfit, but it 
excluded a variety of classic white color crimes such as tax cheating, embezzlement, and 
various political offenses.  Claude Briggs, a state senator, objected to the idea of 
sterilizing people when the medical establishment was not united on the issue. With past 
experience as a lawyer and litigator, Briggs agreed to defend the inmates rallying against 
the “three strikes and you’re out” sterilization policy.172  His test case would be Jack 
Skinner, who was college educated, but encountered severe hardship during the Great 
Depression and had been convicted once for chicken stealing, then twice for armed 
robbery.173  Skinner stated that his infractions were due to desperation during the 
Depression, because he was unable to find a job to support himself and his wife after 
loosing his foot in an accident at work.  During the trial phase, Briggs questioned Skinner 
about what he hoped to do after being released from the penitentiary, and Skinner’s 
answer was simple: “I hope when I have served the judgment of the court to be released 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 State of Oklahoma Session Laws of 1935, chapter 26, “Sterilization of Habitual Criminals.” 
172 Lombardo, Three Generations, 2008, 222. 
173 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
85	  
	  
and become an honest citizen and marry and settle down and raise possibly a child or 
maybe two…I don’t hold any grudge against society for sending me to the penitentiary” 
[italics mine].174   
When Briggs sent his appeal to the Supreme Court, there was a good chance that 
the Court would decline to hear the Skinner case due to the existing Buck precedent.  
However, the Supreme Court was a remarkably different than the one that decided Buck 
v. Bell. 175 The only member still on the bench from the original decision was Chief 
Justice Harlan Stone, and the Court had recently changed its tenor regarding President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal government programs, by upholding the 
constitutionality of legislation calling for a minimum wage in West Coast Hotel v. Parish 
(1937).176  Against this backdrop of cultural and institutional change, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma would get its hearing.  Noting a number of procedural irregularities with the 
law, the Justices voted unanimously to review Skinner’s appeal. This was a prime 
moment of convergence for the Court to reflect critically on eugenic practices.   
The Court picked Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
justification for striking down the Oklahoma law.177 Justice Felix Frankfurter, a former 
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175 In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court overturned its earlier decision in 
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). The Supreme Court had wrestled with President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt over his efforts to expand federal programs to combat the Depression via the New 
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proposal by the President, the Court had reversed its course and taken a new road in interpreting the 
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176 See e.g., Nourse, In Reckless Hands, 139. 
177 Briggs provided the Court with a number of compelling reasons to reverse Skinner’s conviction to be 
sterilized, including the question of the narrow ex post facto clause.  Since Skinner’s last conviction 
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Harvard law professor and known as the resident scholar on the Court, took the 
unexpected position that the Oklahoma law violated equal protection, because it 
specifically exempted white-collar felons like tax cheaters and embezzlers but would 
sterilize a person convicted of stealing chickens three times, despite the fact that both 
types of crimes involved theft.178  The only Jewish member of the Court, after Brandeis’s 
retirement, Frankfurter was acutely aware of the eugenic policies of Nazi Germany and 
the legacy of racism in the United States. He argued that eugenics had become 
transformed in the 1940 to become, a “cloak for class snobbery, ancestor worship, and 
race prejudice.”179 Somewhat ironically, the member of the Court most skeptical of this 
equal protection argument was Chief Justice Stone, who had recently authored his 
famous Caroline Products Footnote 4 in 1938.180 In an otherwise unremarkable case, 
Stone’s Footnote 4 would later be cited to protect “discrete and insular” religious and 
racial minorities from the laws of hostile or unsympathetic majorities.181   Following 
Frankfurter’s recommendation, the Court ruled that treating similar crimes (felonies) 
differently violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Albeit 
issuing his own concurring opinion highlighting due process instead of equal protection, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
happened a year before the new law was passed, this legislation should not apply to him as a punishment.  
Likewise, as form of punishment rather than therapeutic medical treatment, sterilization in Skinner’s case 
was akin to “double jeopardy” under the Fifth Amendment.  Finally, the Justices noted numerous problems 
with procedural due process.  The law applied to everyone with “three strikes” regardless of their mental 
state, and there were no eugenics boards, as Laughlin had recommended.   
178 William O. Douglas, The Court Years: 1939-1975, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1980), 44. 
179 Cited in Nourse, In Reckless Hands, 147. 
180 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938): Footnote 4. 
181 See e.g., Louis Lusky, "Footnote Redux: A ‘Carolene Products’ Reminiscence," Columbia Law Review 
82, no. 6 (1982): 1093–1109. 
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Chief Justice Stone assigned the majority (equal protection) opinion to Justice Douglas, 
who had recently replaced Brandeis on the Court.182 
Few would have guessed at the time, but Skinner would become one of the most 
influential opinions of the twentieth century—particularly insofar as it is an early 
bellwether glimpse into the direction the Court would later take regarding both privacy 
and equal protection. Douglas’s choice of language at the beginning of the opinion is 
noteworthy as an early iteration of the path the Court would later follow regarding 
reproductive rights. In his words, “This case touches a sensitive and important area of 
human rights. Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the 
perpetuation of the race—the right to have offspring” [italics mine].183  Later in the 
opinion, Douglas repeats this point, “We are dealing here with legislation which involves 
one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race” [italics mine].184 The implication of this rhetoric 
is that reproduction represents a fundamental right.  At the time, the idea of a 
fundamental right to reproduction was an amorphous concept, not yet theorized in any 
depth. However, Skinner would later serve as crucial precedent in the most significant 
reproductive rights cases involving marriage, birth control, and abortion during the mid to 
late twentieth century. The Skinner case opened up the ideological and judicial space for 
the development of a meaningful fundamental right to reproduction.   
The equal protection argument in Skinner is narrow (and in this respect 
unexceptional), but it too provides a discursive frame that would set the stage for lasting 
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political change.  Following the logic suggested by Frankfurter, Douglas focuses on an 
arbitrary distinction the Oklahoma law made between two classes of criminals, with no 
basis in science to make a hereditary distinction between them. Framed as a eugenic 
sterilization law, the law must logically assume that a chicken thief has bad genes while 
an embezzler does not.  By not justifying distinctions between white and blue collar 
crimes, the arbitrariness of the law in this respect violated equal protection: “A person 
who enters a chicken coop and steals chickens commits a felony; and he may be sterilized 
if he is thrice convicted,” but the same principle does not apply to the clerk who 
“appropriates over $20 from his employers till,” for “no matter how habitual his 
proclivities for embezzlement are, and no matter how often his conviction, he may not be 
sterilized…Embezzlers are forever free.”185  The former is a common thief and will be 
sterilized, while the latter will not.  This distinction violates equal protection in a very 
rudimentary manner, but Douglas also includes another pivotal concept in this case 
relating to equal protection: Strict scrutiny.  Speaking of equal protection and the 
significance of the right to reproduce, by using language that borrowed from Chief 
Justice Stone’s Footnote 4, Douglass writes:  
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating 
effects.  In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to 
the dominant group to wither and disappear.  There is no redemption for the 
individual whom the law touches.  Any experiment which the State conducts is to 
be his irreparable injury.  He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.  We mention 
these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the States.  We 
avert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the 
classification which a state makes in a sterilization law is essential lest 
unwittingly or otherwise individual discriminations are made against groups or 
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guarantee of just and equal 
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laws.  The guaranty of “equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection 
of equal laws [italics mine].186  
 
This Douglas formula for “strict scrutiny” still guides the Supreme Court’s examination 
of laws that threaten fundamental Constitutional rights today.   
The Skinner case created an important foundation for civil rights jurisprudence 
concerning “privacy” and “equality,” yet the Court unanimously agreed that their 
decision in Skinner did not overrule the earlier Buck decision.  Still convinced that his 
vote in Buck was correct, Justice Stone notes that the basis for the decision was the strong 
testimony linking mental defects with hereditary traits, so the problem with Skinner is 
that the law wasn’t properly based upon eugenic logic.187  Likewise, in the majority 
opinion focusing on equal protection, Justice Douglas explicitly distinguishes the Court’s 
conclusion in Skinner from Buck, emphasizing that the Virginia law does a much better 
job at meeting the basic requirements of equal protection: The Virginia law “seeks to 
bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow 
[and]…applied only to feeble-minded persons in institutions of the State.”188  Finally, 
Justice Robert Jackson—who sides most radically with both the due process and equal 
protection arguments against the Oklahoma law—nonetheless reserves ample room to 
uphold Buck in his concurrence.  Highlighting imagery of the spread of an infectious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Ibid., at 545. 
187 As Justice Stone put it, “Undoubtedly a state may, after appropriate inquiry, constitutionally interfere 
with the personal liberty of the individual to prevent the transmission by inheritance of his socially 
injurious tendencies…But until now we have no been called upon to say that it may do so without giving 
him a hearing and opportunity to challenge the existence as to him of the only facts which could justify so 
drastic a measure…Science has found and the law has recognized that there are certain types of mental 
deficiency associated with delinquency which are inheritable.  But the State does not contend—nor can 
there be any pretense—that either common knowledge or experience, or scientific investigation, has given 
assurance that the criminal tendencies of any class of habitual offenders are universally or even generally 
inheritable.”   
188  Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) at 541-2. 
90	  
	  
disease used by Holmes in Buck, Jackson notes that “This Court has sustained such a 
[sterilization] experiment with respect to an imbecile, a person with definite and 
observable characteristics, where the condition had persisted through three generations 
and afforded grounds for the belief that it was transmissible and would continue to 
manifest itself in future generations to come.”189  Despite the future trajectory of 
Douglas’s reasoning in Skinner, the case staunchly upholds the Buck decision.  
What does the Skinner ruling reveal about the civic lineage regime of the time?  
As I argue above, this was an important transitional case—which would later contribute 
to significant doctrinal change under the Fourteenth Amendment in the areas of both 
reproductive rights and antidiscrimination law—but its direct effects were relatively 
minor.  After the ruling, American eugenicists issued statements emphasizing that the 
Court’s decision in Skinner did not interfere with most sterilization laws, because the 
Court unanimously upheld Buck v. Bell.  In addition to addressing two different 
populations of Americans (i.e. criminals vs. diagnosed morons), the two cases also 
endorse extremely gendered visions of citizenship.  For instance, the trial transcripts in 
Skinner suggest that “desexing” a man (i.e. rendering him impotent) was considered a 
much greater violation of his identity and bodily integrity as a “red-blooded” male, than 
sterilizing a woman was to her feminine integrity.190  Given that sterilization is more 
medically invasive and dangerous for women than men, and that motherhood was widely 
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promoted as vital to a woman’s expression of good citizenship, this double-standard was 
nothing short of sexist.  But since both rulings applied to men and women alike, with an 
emphasis on Carrie Buck’s purported faulty heredity as the key distinguishing factor 
between the two decisions, many scholars rank Buck v. Bell as first-and-foremost a 
disability case.191  The Court agreed that Carrie Buck could never be a productive 
member of society because her genes were defective, whereas it endorsed Jack Skinner’s 
dream to be an “honest citizen” when he was released from prison by settling down and 
raising a family.  While acknowledging that both factors of disability and gender are 
significant, I want to emphasize that together they point to a more general concern 
regarding population control and the role of coordinating fertility across generations.   
In a nation that accepted birthright citizenship as the law of the land, rooted in the 
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the fertility and procreative capacities 
of women quite literally made them the most direct “reproducers of nationhood,” in a 
manner not feasible for men.  According to the Court in Muller, this was enough to 
warrant sex discrimination in the workplace. Furthermore, as we shall see in later 
chapters, the idea that the community has a special investment in motherhood has 
continued to be cited by the Court in support of various government regulations of 
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9. After Skinner: In the Shadows of institutions 
During the years between the Buck decision in 1927 and the Skinner decision in the early 
1940s, doctors and eugenics boards documented over 30,000 involuntary sterilizations.192  
The pace of sterilizations skyrocketed in barely more than a decade, but they soon began 
to decline.  In 1937, at the height of the Great Depression, Georgia became the last state 
to pass a new sterilization statute, and the Governor of Puerto Rico also signed a 
sterilization law—encouraged by the U.S. federal government as a mechanism of 
population control—that same year.193  At this point a vast majority of states had 
legislation condoning various forms of eugenic sterilization, but public support for 
eugenics ended abruptly after World War II.  In addition to the questions raised by the 
Court in Skinner about the permissibility of certain sterilization laws, making courts and 
legislators less certain about what constituted legitimate eugenic laws after Buck, the 
atrocities of Nazi Germany in the name of breeding a master race has forever given 
eugenics a bad name.   
The Nazis directly credited American eugenicists for many of their strategies to 
control racial heredity.194  At the end of the War, President Harry Truman appointed 
sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson—who had participated in the Skinner 
case—to oversee the prosecution of the atrocities of the leaders of the Third Reich in the 
Nuremberg Trials.195  One of the first acts of Adolf Hitler, after achieving total control 
over Germany, was to pass the Law for the “Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased 
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Offspring” (Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses) in July 1933, which created 
over 200 eugenic courts in the country and required all doctors to report patients they 
deemed intellectually disabled, mentally ill, epileptic, blind, deaf, suffering from 
alcoholism, or physically deformed.196  An estimated 450,000 Germans were sterilized 
under this law, using methods and courts based directly on Laughlin’s recommendations 
in his 1922 book.197  In 1936, the University of Heidelberg awarded Harry Laughlin an 
honorary doctoral degree for his work spearheading the “science of racial cleansing,” and 
Laughlin proudly accepted the award.198  However, by the time the United States joined 
the War against Germany in the early 1940s, information about extensive Nazi 
sterilization and euthanasia programs appeared in American newspapers, denounced by 
scholars and politicians around the country as bad science and the result of totalitarianism 
run amuck.  During World War II, the term ‘eugenics’ became synonymous with racial 
bigotry and despicable violations of human rights.  Interestingly, before the Nuremberg 
Trials and in the midst of the Holocaust, the Supreme Court openly embraced this 
ideological global trend towards “human rights” in its Skinner ruling.  
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What is, however, surprising is that these events did not end the tide of 
involuntary sterilization in the United States.  While Germany abolished involuntary 
sterilization in 1945 after the War, in striking contrast, the United States continued this 
policy for over 30 years after this into the late 1970s.  Given the fact that eugenics was no 
longer popular among either the public or scientists, how could eugenic sterilization 
continue after these genocidal revelations about Nazi Germany?  What political factors 
allowed this policy survive so long?   
Most significantly, we must remember the role of local institutions in the 
implementation of sterilization laws.  Aubrey Strode drafted the model Virginia law, 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell, specifically to empower local institutions 
to implement the state’s policy.  The Virginia policy thrived within institutions.  The 
structural design of these state laws allowed the practice of eugenic sterilization to 
silently persist within institutions, outside the eyes of the public, for decades after the end 
of the Progressive Era.  The vitality of these laws depended upon bureaucratic dispersion, 
without serious governmental oversight—or persistence by neglect.  By continuing to 
operate behind the doors of institutions and largely neglected by higher levels of state and 
national government, these policies did not succumb to the “policy drift” that Jacob 
Hacker associates with neglect (i.e. allowing a program to wither through neglect or 
permitting its purposes and impact to change via inaction in the face new political 
realities), but rather remained durable on a local level in a path dependent fashion, veiled 
behind the protective barriers of institutions (and relatively immune to judicial challenge 
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after Buck).199  This, I suggest, can be viewed as a sort of shadow continuity, a particular 
type of path dependency in which lack of government oversight creates the conditions for 
outdated policies to remain alive through bureaucratic dispersion at the local level.200  
When policies are designed to function in a relatively self-sufficient manner within local 
institutions (and particularly without much publicity), then it follows that the design of a 
policy can freeze political agendas in ways that long outlast the political commitments 
and coalitions that first created them.  As discussed already, it was primarily the 
superintendents and doctors in institutions such as hospitals and mental institutions, who 
were empowered to make decisions about sterilization.  While many did not routinely 
perform involuntary sterilizations, those who desired to do so remained insulated within 
their institutions, supported by state and national law. Since about 30,000 of the 
documented involuntary sterilizations within the United States took place after the 
Skinner case and after the Second World War, it seems reasonable to estimate that the 
phenomenon of ‘shadow continuity’ accounts for more than one-third of the documented 
sterilizations in America during the twentieth century.  
In response to the Holocaust, former American eugenicists made efforts to 
distance themselves from coercive eugenics and focus instead on promoting the 
reproduction of the fit.  Harry Laughlin avoided this problem.  After his epileptic seizures 
became too debilitating to continue working for the Eugenics Records Office, he was 
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forced to retire in the late 1930s and died at the age of 62 in 1943.201   Renouncing any 
interest in funding research on eugenics, the Carnegie Institute shortly thereafter closed 
the Eugenics Records Office during the height of World War II, leaving behind the 
largest collection of genealogical records in the United States.202  The eugenic 
organizations that managed to survive past the Second World War took ‘eugenics’ out of 
their names, and replaced the term with ‘genetics’ if they concentrated on scientific 
research, or with references to ‘family planning’ and ‘population control’ if they focused 
on public and political outreach.   
In this vein, a well-known sterilization advocate in California, Paul Popenoe 
would go on to build a new career in positive eugenics as a public marriage counselor, 
writing regular articles for the American Institute of Family Relations.  Popenoe 
“achieved fame and popularity in the mainstream media,” for writing a series for The 
Ladies’ Home Journal in the 1950s called “Can This Marriage Be Saved?”—featuring 
success stories about couples who had turned to the Institute for help and subsequently 
revitalized their marriage.203  While his motive was still eugenic, Popenoe framed it in 
terms of promoting marital happiness.  He even emphasized the importance of husbands 
taking the time to sexually pleasure their wives, because “marriage is not complete 
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without children.”204  Popenoe also set out to educate young people about how important 
the family is, stating that, “social and racially, [it is necessary in America to] provide a 
citizenship that will work and vote intelligently for the conservation of the family.”205  
For eugenicists like Popenoe, the advent of the postwar “baby boom” was a cause for 
celebration.  Although, in my view, economic explanations seem most persuasive in 
explaining the “baby boom,” Wendy Kline attributes the post war turn to marriage and 
parenthood in part to positive pronatalist propaganda by eugenicists, which is a 
fascinating hypothesis considering their efforts to encourage marriage and birth during 
this time.206  Regardless of whether or not she is correct, what is most important for our 
purposes here is that eugenicists made a concerted move from publicly supporting 
negative polices toward switching to marriage and family counseling as their most 
prominent strategy for strengthening American citizenship.   
 
10. Civil Rights and the Expansion of Welfare 
Although the primary goal of this chapter is to introduce the dominant fitter-families 
civic lineage regime of the Progressive Era, it is both informative and shocking to draw 
attention in this last section to the fact that a strong public backlash against eugenic 
sterilization in America did not happen until the 1970s (i.e. long after the eugenic civic 
lineage ideal was eclipsed by another civic lineage regime as we shall see in subsequent 
chapters).  From World War II until the 1960s, the practice of ‘involuntary sterilization’ 
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appears to have continued behind the doors of state institutions throughout America, with 
little popular awareness of the phenomenon. The population affected by these policies 
was, for obvious reasons, dependent upon the individuals the state had access to within 
these institutions, which tended to be poor white women and men. Due to racial 
discrimination in the form of Jim Crow segregation, African Americans and other people 
of color were excluded from most governmental aid programs in the United States and 
therefore not generally targets for eugenic sterilization during the Progressive Era.207  But 
with the many gains of the Civil Rights Movement and Feminist Movement in the realm 
of antidiscrimination law and reproductive rights, the government finally extended its 
programs to incorporate people of color in the name of equal protection.208 Ultimately, 
when local government officials gained access to people of color within institutions and 
hospitals, they increasingly targeting women of color.209   
Let me briefly explain the (largely unintended) role of federal policy in this, and 
particularly the role of anti-poverty measures, which were ironically meant (mainly) to 
help the poor by expanding the reproductive opportunities and choices available to them. 
Under the Johnson Administration’s War on Poverty, federal funding for family planning 
rose markedly in the 1960s, and the Nixon Administration continued to expand 
government funding for family planning in the early 1970s.210 The Johnson 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 See e.g., Steven Noll, “Southern Strategies for Handling the Black Feeble-Minded: from Social Control 
to Profound Indifference,” Journal of Policy History 2, no. 3 (1991): 130-51. 
208 On the exclusion of blacks from welfare programs, see Robert C. Liebermann, Shifting the Color Line: 
Race and the American Welfare State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
209 Rebecca M. Kluchin, Fit to Be Tied: Sterilization and Reproductive Rights in America 1950-1980 (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 74. 
210 Martha J. Bailey and Sheldon Danziger, eds., Legacies of the War on Poverty (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2013); Annelise Orleck and Lisa Gayle Hazirjian, eds., The War on Poverty: A New 
Grassroots History, 1964–1980 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2011); Irwin Unger, The Best of 
99	  
	  
Administration formed the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to oversee and 
administer most of its programs associated with its War on Poverty, and along with the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) these two agencies sponsored 
family planning education programs to millions of women. In 1971, the OEO began 
funding voluntary sterilization through anti-poverty programs aimed at civic 
responsibility and arming poor women with the ability to control and limit their fertility. 
This was part of a broader push to foster population control, but the legislative emphasis 
was on voluntarism.211 During the same time, the federal government announced that 
Medicaid would reimburse up to 90% for sterilization procedures performed to qualifying 
poor women in hospitals.212  (Note: Chapter 5 addresses Medicaid and reproductive 
policy in detail, focusing on birth control and abortion.) While it is important to 
emphasize that Medicaid funded sterilization as an “elective procedure” (i.e. with an 
emphasis on choice and consent), in practice this was not always the case.213 After these 
federal developments, the rate of sterilizations covered by the government was 100,000 to 
150,000 annually, and it is difficult to disentangle which of these count as elective 
procedures.214  In theory, the advent of reproductive health programs and education about 
family planning could provide millions of women (and men) access to birth control and 
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reproductive information, but many local bureacrats and doctors sought to discourage 
procreation among poor Americans—not to maximize their decisional opportunities.  
The most infamous instance of the abuse of sterilization under this government 
policy is the case of Relf v. Weinberger, which came out of Alabama in the early 
1970s.215 Two African American sisters, aged 12 and 14, lived in Montgomery with their 
disabled father, illiterate mother, and older sister in government subsidized housing.216 
The family subsisted almost entirely off food stamps and welfare payments, receiving 
regular visits from social workers. On June 13, 1973, their mother Minnie Relf greeted 
two local welfare officials, who escorted her and her two younger daughters to a nearby 
hospital and asked her to sign forms consenting to what she believed would be routine 
inoculations for her girls. She placed an X on the form as her signature, without knowing 
that the document she signed was actually a consent form for the surgical sterilization of 
both her underage daughters.217 After learning about the sterilizations two weeks later, 
the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) filed a lawsuit for $1 million on behalf of the 
Relf family, and spearheaded a media campaign about the frequency of coercive 
sterilization under welfare programs.218 The public learned that African Americans were 
being selected for sterilization at alarming rates across the nation. For instance, while 
African Americans made up 23 percent of the sterilizations in North Carolina in the mid-
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1930s, the numbers of blacks sterilized in North Carolina skyrocketed to around 65 
percent of all sterilizations by the mid-1960s.219  In the words of Gregory Michael Dorr, 
“Before the year ended, Americans learned that doctors and overzealous social workers 
had been targeting poor women, and especially poor women of color, in a nationwide 
epidemic of sterilization.”220  
In the midst of this controversy, another lawsuit was filed in California charging 
doctors with a pattern of coercion to sterilize Spanish-speaking Mexican women in Los 
Angeles. 221  The women initiating the Madrigal v. Quilligan lawsuit in 1975 claimed that 
they were duped into consenting while they were in labor and given forms printed only in 
English.222 Reports of sterilization abuse also surfaced in Puerto Rico.223 Since the 1937 
passage of a eugenic sterilization law in Puerto Rico during the tail end of the “eugenics 
craze,” federally-funded family planning programs on the island touted sterilization to 
Puerto Ricans as the best (and generally only) method of contraception.224 In 1965, a 
survey of Puerto Rican residents found that about one-third of all women of childbearing 
age were sterilized, and many incidents did not involve informed consent, but instead 
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occurred as routine practice during childbirth in hospitals.225 Puerto Rican women were 
ten times more likely to be sterilized than women living on the mainland United States.  
The procedure was so common that Puerto Ricans on the island referred to it as simply 
“la operacion.”226   
Although it is important to note that many of the women who underwent 
sterilization surely did so by choice—benefiting from the federal funding of this method 
of birth control—all too often consent was ambiguous, perfunctory, coerced, or 
nonexistent. With eugenic sterilization laws still on the books, empowering doctors to use 
them at their own discretion, reproductive choice and coercion came into conflict in 
welfare programs aimed at population control.227 Bluntly put, while these operations were 
no longer being performed under the auspices of purifying the gene pool of undesirable 
traits (as in Buck), the policies were justified using reworked (neo-eugenic) arguments 
that focused instead on environmental factors, such as the popular idea that poverty 
begets poverty, and (discussed in more detail in chapter 6) that women on welfare have 
no business giving birth.228 In effect, the allegory of the “degenerate” side of Goddard’s 
Kallikak family was retold with a new more explicitly Malthusian economic frame, 
highlighting the culture of poverty and implying that children of poor women would 
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inevitably live like parasites off society as the “underclass.” Regardless of whether the 
cause of this “cycle of poverty” was cultural instead of hereditary, the conclusion was the 
same: These are not the people that state officials wanted to reproduce the next 
generation of American citizens, so their fertility should be regulated by the state in the 
name of civic fitness.   
The Native American case is particularly disturbing given the limited size of the 
indigenous population in the United States.  The Indian Health Service (IHS), organized 
and funded by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 
and the Public Health Service, began offering family planning services to Native 
American families as part of the War on Poverty in 1965.229  Less than decade later in 
1974, Dr. Connie Uri wrote an article expressing her shock that several of her patients in 
an Oklahoma IHS facility were sterilized without their informed consent.230  In response, 
Senator James Abourzek of North Dakota, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
Indian Affairs, asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to launch an economic 
investigation of federal funding of sterilizations at IHS facilities.231  The investigators 
focused on four Native American facilities in different regions of the country, and 
concluded that none of these facilities complied with IHS regulations.  This GAO study 
revealed that many tribal women believed that they would lose Bureau of Indian Affairs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Brint Dillingham, “American Indian Women and IHS Sterilization Practices,” American Indian Journal 
3 (Jan. 1977): 27-28; Jane Lawrence, “The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American 
Women,” American Indian Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2000): 400-19; See also: American Indian Journal of the 
Institute for the Development of Indian Law, February 1977; Janet Karston Larson, “And Then There Were 
None,” Christian Century 26 (January 1977). 
230 “Sterilization of Young Native Women Alleged at Indian Hospital—48 Operations in July 1974 Alone,” 
Akwesasne Notes, Summer 1972; “Killing Our Future: Sterilization and Experiments,” Akwesasne Notes, 
Spring 1977; see also: Gail Mark Jarvis, “The Theft of Life,” Akwesasne Notes, September 1977.  
231 Dillingham, “American Indian Women,” 27-28. 
104	  
	  
(BIA) federal benefits, access to governmental services, or custody over their existing 
children if they refused to submit to sterilization.232 According to the report, 3406 Native 
American women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four were sterilized at these 
facilities in just three years, between 1973 and 1976.233 Senator Abourezk noted that: 
“Given the small American Indian population, the 3,400 Indian sterilization figure would 
be compared to sterilizing 452,000 non-Indian women [out of 55,000 Indian women of 
childbearing age,]” but the Senator failed to realize that the numbers only reflected a 
fraction (four total) of the IHS facilities, so the actual numbers would likely be three to 
four times his estimate!  These statistics suggest at least 25% of Native American women 
of childbearing age were sterilized.234 While Dr. Connie Uri defined the actions of the 
IHS as “genocide of the Indian people” in her original article, the federal government 
(IHS and BIA) instead labeled these actions as “tragic anomalies,” because the 
sterilizations did not spring from any coordinated state plan to exterminate Native 
Americans as a group.235   
These sterilizations happened at the local bureaucratic level from “the warped 
thinking of doctors,” many of whom decided on their own that “the solution to poverty is 
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not to allow people to be born.”236 In other words, federally funded doctors decided to 
“take matters into their own hands,” focusing on the high poverty levels and birthrates 
among Native Americans in the context of the federal push towards population control.237 
There is no doubt that their actions have curbed the number of children born into poverty 
on Indian reservations, and in the process they have also dramatically reduced the 
numbers of indigenous children and tribal membership in the United States.  
Let us now return to the Relf case.  The sterilization of the two Relf girls spurred 
lasting change in federal policy.  In Relf v. Weinberger, U.S. federal Judge Gerhard 
Gesell confirmed that the evidence pointed to the fact that “an indefinite number of poor 
people have been improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization operation.”  
Acknowledging that the problem arose “during a rapid change in the field of birth 
control,” and that contraception and family planning education was now “widely 
accepted,” Judge Gesell nonetheless emphasized the blurry area between reproductive 
choice and state efforts to control “the specter of overpopulation.”238  In his words, 
“Surely the Federal Government must move cautiously in this area, under well-defined 
policies determined by Congress after full consideration of constitutional and far-
reaching social implications. The line between family planning and eugenics is murky” 
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[italics mine].”239  Gesell stated that the program set the stage for a “drift into a policy 
that has unfathomed implications and which permanently deprives unwilling or immature 
citizens their ability to procreate…[italics mine].”240  He struck down the sterilization 
guidelines issued by HEW and ordered the agency to create new rules with better 
safeguards limiting federal funds only to voluntary sterilizations procedures in the future.  
In 1978, HEW issued official guidelines requiring a mandatory 30-day waiting period for 
all federally funded sterilizations and the provision of language translators when 
necessary.  These new guidelines also banned doctors getting patients to sign consent 
while under the duress of labor, childbirth, or an abortion, and required a statement that 
the patient’s government benefits would not be influenced by their decision about 
whether or not to undergo sterilization.241  
The Relf case never made it to the Supreme Court.  Just as the gains of the Civil 
Rights Movement placed minorities at risk for sterilization in the first place (i.e. due to 
more inclusive government programs), it also provided an infrastructure of rights 
advocates and public interest groups that soon challenged these differential outcomes in 
court. Interestingly, the role of the local bureaucrat in this story closely parallels the 
influence of the superintendent under the older eugenic sterilization policies at the state 
level, but the federal policy targeted a much broader range of Americans, and particularly 
people of color.  
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This raises an important point. When we think about ‘eugenics’ today, the concept 
tends to evoke ideas about racial bigotry associated with selective breeding projects 
coordinated by the state. While much of this association is due to the atrocities Nazi 
Germany, as I argue above, the idea of race (in its many iterations) also played a central 
role in the American eugenics movement. Yet, for practical purposes, the targets of 
eugenic sterilization laws during the Progressive Era were people housed within 
institutions, because they were under the control of government agents.  Due to racial 
segregation and exclusion from government programs, African Americans and other 
people of color were not generally targets for eugenic sterilization during the Progressive 
Era.242 But with the rise of the Civil Rights Movement and Lyndon Johnson’s War on 
Poverty, the government finally incorporated people of color into federal assistance 
programs; this, in turn, meant that people of color were vulnerable to new forms of abuse 
by local officials, bureacrats, and doctors.243 Thankfully, this tragic exposure of an 
inhumane practice (after decades of ‘shadow continuity’) inspired political and legal 
backlash against it, yet the broader pattern of vulnerability to abuse within government 
programs is clear. Although the War on Poverty was initially introduced to help the worst 
off in society, the initial lack of oversight over these federal “family planning” programs 
proved particularly damaging to minority groups.  Already disproportionately 
impoverished—as a result of centuries of discrimination, persecution, and forms of ethnic 
and racial segregation from mainstream society—the marginalized status of minority 
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women made them even more vulnerable to governmental abuse from programs 
professing to offer health and financial assistance to needy families.  
How do these later events connect to the fitter families civic lineage regime of the 
Progressive Era? Clearly long after the political demise of the organized eugenics 
movement, we encounter a nexus of old and new laws promoting an ideal of good 
citizenship (i.e. of a white, middle-class, responsible “citizen-mother”), which continues 
to share many similarities with the winners the Fitter Families contests in state fairs 
during the Progressive Era. In the chapters that follow, we will see that—while different 
civic lineage regimes rise and fall several times during the twentieth century—they each 
tend to idealize many of the same demographic features of good citizenship, including 
being white, middle-class to wealthy, Christian, able-bodied, married, and making 
responsible sexual and procreative decisions depending upon the mainstream 
expectations of the day.   
 
Conclusion: 
In the name of protecting the welfare of society, the Court in Buck v. Bell ruled that it is 
constitutionally permissible for the state to coercively sterilize “defective” citizens. The 
American government, as I argue throughout this dissertation, has often engaged in state-
building efforts aimed at shaping the composition and character of its polity across 
generations by regulating the actual birth of American citizens.  The Buck case is a 
harrowing example of this broader phenomenon in American political development, and 
it also more specifically illustrates a turn inward toward domestic efforts at population 
control and social engineering during the Progressive Era. In the words of Paul 
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Lombardo, “The legal high point of the eugenics movement was the 1927 U.S. Supreme 
Court case of Buck v. Bell.”244  The rhetoric of this case makes it clear that the justices 
viewed coercive sterilization as first-and-foremost about maintaining a robust civic 
lineage regime in America, which I have labeled as the fitter families civic lineage 
regime associated with the Progressive Era during the early twentieth century.   
The agenda of eugenic sterilization began as an elite driven policy (or set of 
policies), pushed by scientists, bureaucrats, and legislators, who evoked national anxieties 
about declining birthrates among native-born Anglo-Americans and raised dire concerns 
about the rising tide of immigration from less popular “inferior” groups.  Importantly, for 
individuals like Carrie Buck, the Court’s ruling in this case empowered local bureaucrats 
in mental institutions, prisons, and hospitals throughout the nation to take eugenic policy 
“into their own hands,” resulting in a distinct type of path dependency (i.e. persistence by 
neglect), which I have termed ‘shadow continuity.’  These practices continued behind the 
closed doors (in the shadows) of institutions, thereby allowing involuntary sterilization to 
persist outside the public eye long after the withering of its popularity following World 
War II.  Given the design of the policy to encourage local dispersion and bureaucratic 
autonomy—combined with the approval of the Supreme Court—this policy agenda of the 
eugenic movement effectively became codified in law, and frozen in political time for 
most of the twentieth century.  Eugenic sterilization played a surprisingly prominent role 
in population control policies for over fifty years, and this, as I have argued above, was 
largely made possible by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell.   
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So, what happened to the precedent set in Buck v. Bell?  On a local level, the last 
sterilizations at the Virginia Colony occurred in 1979.  After the nationwide publicization 
of sterilization abuse, during the mid-1970s, the state of Virginia decided to repeal all 
laws condoning coercive sterilization.245  Moreover, following media attention to the 
Buck family during this time, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) urged 
Virginia to identify and names people who had been involuntarily sterilized, sometimes 
without their knowledge.246  Facing resistance, the ACLU filed a class action lawsuit 
against Virginia in 1980 on behalf of four unnamed victims (and others who stepped 
forward during the process).  One of the unnamed plaintiffs in this lawsuit was Doris 
Buck, the younger sister of Carrie Buck, who was sterilized by the Virginia Colony, 
shortly after Carrie, at the age of thirteen.247  Designed specifically to overturn Buck v. 
Bell, the plaintiffs in Poe v. Lynchburg Training School and Hospital did not ask for any 
money for damages from Virginia, but instead simply requested their involuntary 
sterilizations to be declared unconstitutional.  Since many of the victims of compulsory 
sterilization were never informed (even retrospectively) that they had been sterilized, the 
plaintiffs also requested that the state notify all those who had been involuntary sterilized 
and offer them free medical and mental health care.  Most of the unnamed petitioners had 
been sterilized as teenagers, and often multiple family members were sterilized.  The 
ACLU assembled a detailed set of interviews and depositions from the victims of the 
policy.  But Virginia had already repealed its eugenic sterilization law, so the federal 
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court ruled that it could offer no retrospective relief to the victims.  Their case rested 
upon tenuous legal standing from the outset, because the Supreme Court settled the 
constitutionality of this repealed Virginia law in Buck v. Bell.248  Virginia agreed to a 
modest settlement in 1985, which included a media campaign and health assistance to the 
victims.249  To this day, the precedent of Buck v. Bell remains the law of the land.  The 
Supreme Court has never overruled it. 
This case serves as the zenith of the Court’s treatment of reproduction as a public 
matter.  In contrast, in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942), we see the Court beginning to make a 
path-breaking transition towards framing reproduction as a fundamental right, which 
would later culminate in the birth control and abortion cases of Griswold v. Connecticut 
(1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), and Roe v. Wade (1973), protecting reproduction 
through a fundamental constitutional “right to privacy.”  In less than fifty years, 
reproduction went from being labeled by the Supreme Court as public to private under 
constitutional law.  In theory, this ought to protect individuals from government invasions 
into their reproductive autonomy, but in practice the story is more complex.  For instance, 
as we saw in the last section of this Chapter, after the successes of the Civil Rights and 
Feminist Movements, the expansion of federal programs to hitherto excluded groups 
introduced new forms of government coercion into the reproductive lives of hundreds of 
thousands of minority women.  For those dependent upon government programs and 
within the ready grasp of agents of the state, the promise of a reproductive “right to 
privacy” can sometimes seem elusive, a point which Chapters 5 and 6 focus on.   
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Moreover, the transition to classifying reproduction as private has significant 
ambiguities and limits.  For instance, many scholars view Roe v. Wade as the ultimate 
statement on reproductive privacy, because it guaranteed women the right to make their 
own decisions about whether or not to seek an abortion in the first two trimesters of a 
pregnancy, but as Chapter 4 discusses, Justice Harry Blackmun cites Buck v. Bell in his 
Roe opinion to emphasize that the Court still denies, “the claim…that one has an 
unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases.”250  The Court’s move to approach 
issues concerning reproduction as private rather than public under the Constitution 
ushered in a new civic lineage alignment during the late twentieth century, and yet in path 
dependent fashion both Skinner and Roe explicitly upheld the Court’s earlier Buck v. Bell 
ruling as “good law.”  
In sum, during the Progressive Era, the government endorsed a civic lineage 
regime that publicly supported coercive regulation of reproduction in the name of 
entrenching numerous forms of civic exclusion and marginalization, including 
unabashedly discriminating on the basis of gender, disability, class, race, ethnicity, 
religion, and presumed sexual promiscuity. The ideal of citizenship promoted by this 
fitter family regime, as I have argued, is captured in the archival photographs from Fitter-
Families Eugenics Contests at state and county fairs across the country.  Based on 
photographs of the “fittest” gold metal-winning families in these eugenic contests, this 
ideal of citizenship was quite specific: the families are invariably white, large with 
multiple generations, many children, middle class, able-bodied and healthy, displaying 
traditional gender norms, and abiding by Christian family values. The fitter families civic 
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lineage regime was built upon the presumption that the government should promote and 
regulate the reproduction of good citizenship through both positive and negative eugenics 
policies; most strikingly, this included laws allowing doctors to coercively sterilize 
citizens, like Carrie Buck, deemed eugenically unfit to procreate. Ultimately, in the name 
of breeding a “better” citizenry in the future, the federal government and state 
governments during the Progressive Era actively regulated the reproduction of its citizens 





















Birth Control in the Shade of Eugenics: 
Family Planning, Public Health, and Doctor’s Rights 
 
Introduction 
Margaret Sanger opened the first birth control clinic in the United States on October 16, 
1916 in Brooklyn, New York. A trained nurse who crusaded passionately for “voluntary 
motherhood” and “family planning” during a time in which contraception was illegal, yet 
many women died in childbirth and child mortality was high throughout the nation, 
Sanger spearheaded the early birth control movement in America and founded the 
organization Planned Parenthood.251 Her first birth control clinic in Brooklyn was raided 
by police and forcefully shut down just ten days after it opened its doors to the public.252  
Sanger and two coworkers were arrested and imprisoned to await trial for violating a 
New York anti-contraception law, modeled after the federal 1873 Comstock Act, which 
prohibited circulating information and distributing devices that “could be used or applied 
for preventing contraception.”253 Although public opinion increasingly supported access 
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to contraceptives for married couples during the twentieth century, Sanger and her allies 
in the birth control movement were unsuccessful in their goal to overturn the Comstock 
laws at the national level and instead won piecemeal victories in courts and at the state 
level for nearly fifty years.254  Finally, in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme 
Court struck down a similar Connecticut anti-contraceptive law from the 1870s used by 
police to arrest the director and doctor of a local Planned Parenthood clinic providing 
contraceptives to married women.255  Finding a fundamental constitutional right to 
privacy that protects the choice of married couples to use contraception, this famous 
Supreme Court ruling is considered the backbone of the subsequent reproductive privacy 
decisions, including the right to use contraception to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt 
v. Baird (1972) and for women to seek an abortion in Roe v. Wade (1973).256    
 This is the first of two chapters on the topic of the government’s regulation of 
birth control during twentieth century America.  So, before proceeding, I want to 
emphasize that laws targeting birth control—or “the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child,” to quote the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt—are always an important part of the 
civic lineage regime. Not only does access to contraception influence women’s 
opportunities in society, both economically and politically, but the governmental policies 
that structure contraceptive choices (or lack thereof) also shapes the broader context in 
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which citizens are (and are not) born.257 By regulating the domain of fertility, birth 
control laws impact the nation’s changing demographic composition over time through 
shaping factors such as: who in society bears children, whether babies are planned or 
unplanned, the number of children mothers bear and raise, and the opportunities and 
resources parents have to provide for their children.  These laws are about the citizenship 
or civic status of women.  And, by targeting the fertility of women, they also shape the 
birth of future generations of citizens and the opportunities and status accorded to them.  
(These two aspects of citizenship—the status and participatory experience of potential 
mothers and the standing of children—go hand in hand.) As I have argued, the broad set 
of laws targeting birth together make up what I term the ‘civic lineage regime’ at any 
given political moment.  This includes laws both prohibiting and endorsing contraception 
and family planning, for such policies seek to shape procreation in ways that invariably 
end up treating the reproduction of citizens unequally based on issues such as gender, 
class, race, disability, sexuality, and the list goes on.  Since the institutional and policy 
design of regulations targeting fertility, conception, and birth almost always affects 
groups differently, these laws serve as important governmental avenues for creating and 
perpetuating group-based inequalities in citizenship and civic status.   
 In the next two chapters, I examine birth control politics as a key part of the civic 
lineage landscape in the United States. This chapter focuses on the early birth control 
movement in the United States and its emphasis on public health during the Eugenics 
Period, and the next focuses on Griswold v. Connecticut and the development of the right 
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to reproductive privacy.  The Griswold decision, as I argue in these chapters, was in 
many ways the culmination of a clash between two civic lineage agendas, one a relic of 
Victorian Era morality ensconced in federal and state law by the anti-vice movement 
during the Gilded Age, and the other challenging anti-contraceptive laws by rallying for 
the legalization of birth control during the Progressive Era.  Specifically, the trajectory of 
contraceptive legislation in the early twentieth century is exemplified by the political 
agendas of two key reformers: Anthony Comstock and Margaret Sanger.  Anthony 
Comstock was a Civil War veteran who sought to enshrine Victorian morality in law by 
making contraception illegal throughout the 1870s and enforcing the “Comstock Laws” 
until his death in 1915.258  In contrast, Sanger—who was young enough to be Comstock’s 
granddaughter and born in 1879—burst onto the political scene in 1914 and sought 
throughout her life to challenge the Comstock Laws, winning her most substantial 
victories in the 1930s.259  Each exemplifies a prominent civic lineage alliance during his 
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or her time, with Comstock crusading to protect social purity against moral vice, and 
Sanger championing the legalization of birth control in the name of women’s health and 
liberation.  As I argue in this chapter, both Comstock and Sanger frequently articulated 
their agenda by expressing their hopes and fears about the future of national identity and 
citizenship in the United States.   
 This chapter consists of three parts. In Part 1, I examine the Comstock Laws of 
the Gilded Age, and what I term the Comstockian “moral purity” ideal of the 
reproduction of good citizenship within the family. Part 2 turns to Margaret Sanger’s 
challenges to the Comstock laws through civil disobedience and in court.  Sanger and her 
early birth control movement were successful in getting many of Comstock’s anti-
contraception laws abolished, but her victories against Comstock were won using the 
dominant discourse of the eugenics period: Public health. Part 3 examines the early birth 
control movement’s connection to the eugenics movement. Appropriating the popular 
discourse of the eugenics movement and sometimes forming alliances with eugenicists 
and doctors, Sanger successfully challenged many of these anti-contraceptive laws in 
court by focusing on public health concerns and lobbying for “doctor’s rights” to treat 
patients.  In her more radical writings, Sanger also proposed an alternative civic lineage 
ideal (voluntary motherhood), which directly conflicted with the ideal of the dominant 
fitter families civic lineage regime of the Progressive Era. Sanger’s voluntary 
motherhood ideal, as I shall argue, never became a mainstream civic lineage regime in 
America precisely because it clashed with the dominant fitter families ideal, which at the 
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beginning of the twentieth century took the place of Comstock’s moral purity regime as 
the dominant ideal of good citizenship.   
However, in less than fifty years, the Supreme Court moved from supporting 
involuntary eugenic sterilization, in the name of the public interest of the entire 
community in Buck v Bell, to ruling that the use of birth control is protected by a 
“fundamental right to privacy” for married couples in Griswold.  Since Sanger never 
supported a right to privacy, this raises a fascinating question: How can we explain this 
apparent reversal in judicial doctrine, with reproduction framed first as a public matter 
and later as a private right by the Supreme Court?  Moreover, is the right to privacy 
actually a repudiation of eugenics, or is it a separate line of jurisprudence?  And, most 
importantly for my purposes here, what does the birth control movement and the 
development of reproductive privacy jurisprudence mean when it comes to restructuring 
the configuration of the civic lineage regime?  These questions are the focus of this 
chapter and the next, beginning with Sanger’s public health challenges to Anthony 
Comstock’s anti-contraception laws in this chapter.   
The answers to these questions, as we shall see in the next two chapters, rest in 
the rise of a new dominant civic lineage regime after the Second World War (i.e. the 
postwar white picket fence regime), which idealized a small nuclear family and placed 
great value on privacy between husband and wife within marriage. With the end of the 
eugenics public health movement of the Progressive Era and the advent of a different 
ideal of citizenship during the Postwar Period, the Supreme Court constructed a separate 
line of constitutional jurisprudence recognizing a fundamental right to reproductive 
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privacy. For now, however, let us turn to the early birth control movement with its 
(unrealized) ideal of voluntary motherhood. 
 
1. The Comstock Laws 
The topic of contraception became a major issue in the press and American political 
discourse when Margaret Sanger was arrested twice for violating the Comstock Act, first 
in 1914 and then in 1916.  This section introduces the Comstock Act, not only as 
important background to the Griswold case, in which the Supreme Court finally declared 
such anti-contraceptive laws unconstitutional based on a right to privacy, but also as a 
centerpiece of the dominant civic lineage order at the outset of the twentieth century.  
Before the fitter families ideal, as I shall argue below, the civic lineage landscape was 
marked by a “moral purity” ideal of the family and childrearing that constituted the 
dominant civic lineage regime during the Gilded Age and lasted until the Eugenics 
Movement gained sufficient popularity in the early 1900s to eclipse these moral 
regulations in the name of public health during the Progressive Era.  This raises an 
important point: At the same time that involuntary eugenic sterilization was becoming 
routine and enshrined in most state laws, the voluntary use of contraceptive devices and 
abortion to prevent unwanted pregnancy remained illegal in most states and under federal 
law.  The birth control movement, which was far less successful in its political influence 
than the eugenics movement prior to the Second World War, highlights a striking tension 
between widespread support for involuntary sterilization, examined in the previous 
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chapter, and governmental opposition towards voluntary motherhood during the 
Progressive Era.  This section begins by focusing on Anthony Comstock and his 
nineteenth century “moral purity” ideal of civic reproduction. 
 What was the Comstock Act?  Named after Anthony Comstock, this 1873 
amendment to the U.S postal code, passed by Congress, made it illegal for any “obscene, 
lewd or lascivious” material to be delivered by U.S. mail, in addition to prohibiting any 
method of production or publication of information pertaining to the prevention of 
contraception or procurement of an abortion.260  Comstock not only successfully lobbied 
Congress, with the full support of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and 
anti-vice organizations in New York, to pass this legislation, but he also managed to 
convince Congress to appoint him as a special agent or “inspector” for the Post Office, 
with the authority to investigate potential violations of the law and arrest individuals he 
determined were sending obscene items through the mail.261 Comstock held this position 
until his death in 1915, and with the blessing of Congress, he proceeded to conduct his 
own raids for the next 42 years as a “policeman” of public and private morals, 
confiscating tens of thousands of pounds of materials, ranging from literature to “rubber 
articles” (i.e. condoms and diaphragms), and also arresting thousands of individuals, 
including physicians and journalists.262 He became a household name in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s for crusading in a zealous public manner against the evils and vices he 
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found in society.263  In this manner, prior to the dominant fitter families eugenic order of 
the Progressive Era, Comstock became the face of its predecessor—or what I term the 
“moral purity” ideal of good citizenship.  Both the eugenics movement and birth control 
advocates waged intersecting battles against this regime, and the eugenics ideal prevailed 
from the early 1900s until World War II.  We have already examined the eugenic “fitter 
families” ideal in the last chapter, so what did this earlier “moral purity” ideal look like at 
the dawn of the century? 
The Comstock Act was an anti-obscenity law that banned almost everything 
having to do with sex from escaping the bedroom and becoming public. Comstock’s idea 
of what might be “obscene, lewd or lascivious” was astoundingly broad. For this reason, 
The New York Times coined the term “Comstockery” in 1895 to refer to his extreme and 
sweeping censorship of anything perceived to be obscene, including banning one of 
George Barnard Shaw’s plays in 1905.264 After Congress passed the federal Comstock 
Act, there were proposals in state legislatures across the nation to enact similar 
restrictions on “obscene materials” (broadly defined). These additional state laws were 
referred to as the “little Comstock laws,” and they also banned various forms of 
obscenity, including information about preventing unwanted pregnancies and the 
circulation or sale of contraceptive materials.265 The New York prohibition of obscenity, 
under which Margret Sanger was convicted in 1916 for opening the first birth control 
clinic, was such a law.  Likewise, the 1879 Connecticut legislation in question in 
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Griswold was another little Comstock law, and both state laws adopted similar language 
to the original federal Comstock Act. Whereas the use of contraception was rarely 
regulated or prohibited by the government before Comstock—for it was considered to be 
a private matter and beyond the reach of public law enforcement—Comstock transformed 
these previously personal decisions into political “problems” of great consequence to 
society, making them a legitimate area of widespread government criminalization.266 In 
the words of Craig LaMay, “Anthony Comstock is known, if at all [today], as America’s 
most formidable prude and energetic censor during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.”267 
Given the damaging effect the Comstock Laws had on women’s reproductive 
freedom, it is understandable that scholars often portray these laws as an attempt to 
control women by forcing them to bear and rear children.268 But interestingly, 
Comstock’s speeches and writing portray his primary concern as about protecting the 
moral purity of children.  Comstock famously stated that, “the world’s the devil’s hunting 
ground, and children are his choicest game.”269 In a groundbreaking analysis of 
Comstock’s language and references throughout his career, Nicola Beisel documents that 
Comstock and his supporters again and again emphasized protecting children from 
corruption as their main concern and rarely mentioned the impact of his laws on 
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women.270 And in my own overview of many of Comstock’s statements and speeches on 
the subject, I can add that he expressed virtually no anxieties about the national birthrate 
or differential group-based fertility.271  While the outcome of the law clearly had the 
effect of controlling the reproductive lives of women, these laws were intended to shape 
the reproduction of citizenship by targeting childrearing and ensuring the proper 
development of children into good citizens. In fact, they reveal a new avenue for the 
reproduction of citizenship.  By focusing on the moral development of children, 
Comstock sought to shape future generations of citizens and strengthen the nation 
through the avenue of the family.   
Comstock was immensely concerned about the state’s regulation of civic lineage, 
but his focus was on preserving a Victorian ideal of the family.  He maintained that 
families were the seedbeds of good moral character and upright citizenship. In his book, 
Traps for the Young, Comstock presented a puritanical (Protestant Christian) argument 
that parents have the religious duty to protect children from the “Household Traps” of 
“lewd literature” and to “nourish” the younger “generation” of Americans on “noble 
things.”272 He connected this to “good citizenship.” In this vein, Comstock compared 
lewd literature and public forms of obscenity to “a contagious disease…imported to this 
shore,” stating that it was his personal mission “to send a message in advance to parents, 
so that they may avert from their homes a worse evil than yellow fever or small-pox”—a 
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concern of “every good citizen.”273 Since there are “grand possibilities locked up in the 
future of every child, if kept pure [of illicit passions],” it follows that good Christian 
parents who are also “good citizens” have the “responsibility for the future welfare of 
their offspring” to ensure that they neither corrupt or are corrupted by “the 
community.”274 Speaking of the importance of the home to the health of the future 
generation, he writes: 
It is in the home that we must look for [a child’s] first impressions. Here is 
foundation of the character of the future man or woman is laid. Here the parent 
exerts an incalculable influence upon the offspring. Associations of good or evil 
nature are thus fixed in the mind in almost permanent character…Why rob the 
future ages of the high order of men and women, which would of necessity appear 
if the children of today were properly cared for and developed in keenest intellect 
and highest morals?275  
 
Comstock recognized that the reproduction of good citizens is a process that occurs 
within families, and that parents traditionally engaged in a range of caring, educational, 
and policing activities to ensure proper child development.  But the power that operates 
within the family is not simply that of parents over children or husbands over wives, it 
was also a power of the state over the family itself.276 Hence, his mission was political: to 
pass and enforce anti-obscenity laws within government. To save America’s youth from 
corruption and make upright citizens out of them, Comstock focused on keeping homes 
morally pure by governmental intervention into the labors (both figuratively and literally) 
of motherhood.  
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This brings me to an important (yet generally overlooked) point regarding 
Comstock’s argument against birth control.  Rather than opposing the private use of 
contraceptives per se, Comstock’s primary concern was the mass commercialization of 
contraceptives on the economic market.277  The marketization of the devices opened new 
avenues for information about sex to negatively impact the moral development of 
children.  Comstock appears to have been particularly worried about the impact of two 
major technological developments, which together spurred the mass commercialization of 
contraceptive literature and devices during his day: The vulcanization of rubber in the 
mid-nineteenth century, leading to innovations in the creation and mass production of 
condoms and diaphragms, and the completion of the Transcontinental Railroad following 
the Civil War, which fostered the centralization of the U.S. Postal Service in a manner 
that allowed these rubber products to be advertised openly as “rubbers,” “pessaries,” 
“womb veils,” and “female protectors” across the nation through mail order.278  In his 
view, the task “of reproducing a moral citizenry” was threatened by the mass 
marketization and commercialization of obscene “rubber materials.”279  This distain for 
the marketization of a swath of purportedly “obscene” items appears to be the crux of 
Comstock’s crusade against birth control.  As Andrea Tone puts it, “Comstock’s 
demonization of contraceptives was a direct response to their newfound commercial 
visibility, not their invention or use.”280  Echoing similar concerns about the emergence 
of these new technologies and markets, Representative Clinton Merriam of New York, 
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who introduced the original Comstock Act in Congress, defended his proposed bill on the 
grounds that the rise of these new markets of prurient information and materials posed a 
danger to the future vitality of the nation because it “threatened to destroy the future of 
this Republic by making merchandise of the morals of our youth.”281  
It follows that Comstock was not, as is typically assumed, opposed to birth 
control in principle.  Rather than focusing on private behaviors, he set out to curtail 
public advertisement and the mass distribution of these devices.  The most direct support 
for this interpretation comes from the mouth of Anthony Comstock himself.  In a 1915 
interview published in Harper’s Weekly, not long before he died, Comstock spoke plainly 
about his opposition to the mass commercialization of these “obscene” devices to the 
public, which he distinguished from the private use of contraception.282   In fact, when the 
author of the article, Mary Alden Hopkins, asked Comstock if “these laws handicap 
physicians?”, his response was that “They do not.”283  Comstock emphasized that he did 
not oppose private physicians advising married couples on contraceptives or performing 
abortions when a woman’s health was in danger.  In his words, “No reputable physician 
has ever been prosecuted under these laws…Only infamous doctors who advertise or 
send their foul matter by mail.”284  In fact, private physicians often advised married 
couples on birth control in the early twentieth century, but they avoided doing so 
publicly: “A reputable doctor may tell his office what is necessary, and a druggist may 
sell on a doctor’s written prescription drugs which he would not be allowed to sell 
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otherwise.”285  He also noted that “A doctor is allowed to bring on an abortion in cases 
where a woman’s life is in danger,” and there is nothing in the laws that “forbids a doctor 
from telling a woman that pregnancy must not occur for a curtain length of time or at 
all.”286  In sum, the Comstock laws focused on curtailing public advertisement—
particularly mail and the mass distribution of these devices—but not on private 
behaviors.  
The rhetoric Comstock used was replete with religious imagery.  Yet, contrary to 
standard interpretations focusing purely on the control of the reproductive capacities of 
women, Comstock’s crusade was waged in the name of saving the souls and civic 
integrity of children.287  Comstock utilized the power of the state to reach into the home 
to shape the development of the nation’s youth by “reforming [the] family.”288  These 
laws were civic lineage policies, both through their intent and outcome.289  By steering 
the development of children into proper moral citizens within the family, the Comstock 
provisions sought to protect an already imperiled Victorian ideal of the family from 
broader changes in the economic market and society.  Somewhat ironically, Comstock 
called upon the state to use its power to protect the separate sphere of the family from the 
corrupt public influence of the economic market.  His reason for doing so was nothing 
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less than to save the soul of the nation through ensuring that the next generation of 
citizens remained morally pure as the foundation of national strength.     
 
The Comstockian “Moral Purity” Ideal of Civic Reproduction: 
It follows that, prior to the eugenic fitter families ideal of civic reproduction, we 
encounter a popular (and legally successful!) anti-vice crusade, which passed laws to 
regulate the family in the name of protecting a pseudo-Victorian ideal of citizenship 
aimed at directing the development of children.  At the start of the twentieth century, 
prior to political successes of the Eugenics Movement, the dominant civic lineage regime 
appears to have endorsed an ideal of the “morally pure” family and citizen.  When this 
ideal came into conflict with eugenic ideas in the early twentieth century, it was eclipsed 
by the new eugenic fitter families ideal of citizenship.  Moreover, as we shall see, neither 
of these two ideals fully meshed with Margaret Sanger’s crusade for “voluntary 
motherhood” and the legalization of birth control.   
The birth control movement, led by Margaret Sanger (and others), took on 
Comstock’s anti-contraceptive laws. Sanger also had a complex relationship to eugenics.  
Appropriating the popular discourse of the eugenics movement and sometimes forming 
alliances with eugenicists and doctors, Sanger successfully overcame many of the 
Comstock laws in court by focusing on public health concerns and lobbying for “doctor’s 
rights.  In her speeches and writings, Sanger also proposed her own alternative civic 
lineage ideal (voluntary motherhood), which directly conflicted with the fitter families 
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ideal and never became a mainstream ideal of citizenship in America during the 
Progressive Era for that reason.  Campaigning to strike down the Comstock laws in the 
heyday of eugenics, Sanger could only form alliances with the negative (not positive) 
goals of the Eugenics Movement.  Sanger never saw her own ideal become the dominant 
civic lineage order (on her terms).  To win victories, Sanger focused on issues of public 
health and tried to build alliances with eugenicists and doctors.  In other words, she set 
out to tear down the civic lineage order of moral purity sponsored by Anthony Comstock.  
Hence, while she presented “voluntary motherhood” as an alternative idea during her 
assault on the Comstockian regime, Sanger’s alternative vision of civic reproduction 
never became the dominant civic lineage regime and instead won victories using the 
popular eugenicist discourse of the day—that is, Sanger won her victories in the name of 
public health. 
 
2. Margaret Sanger & The Birth Control Movement  
Margaret Sanger was the key figure and leader of the birth control movement in the 
United States—indeed, she invented the term ‘birth control.’290  Whereas Anthony 
Comstock’s mission was passing laws to restrict everything he classified as obscene, 
including the marketization of information about sex and the sale of contraceptive 
devices, Margaret Sanger’s quest conversely was to make information about preventing 
unwanted pregnancies available to all women.  Sanger became one of the few “sex 
radicals” during the Progressive Era, as they were termed, who dared to openly challenge 
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the Comstock laws.291  Although private physicians sometimes advised married couples 
in confidence about birth control options in the early twentieth century, a phenomenon 
which Comstock condoned in private (according to his excerpted statement above), 
doctors avoided publishing on the topic or consulting patients in public venues.  The 
penalties of the Comstock laws were an effective deterrent, for few doctors wanted to 
spend time in prison or a workhouse.  In contrast, Sanger challenged these laws through 
direct civil disobedience, which brought her everything from regular hate mail to stints in 
prison.292  She expressed particular dismay that these laws disproportionately 
disadvantaged poor women, who could not afford their own private doctors yet were 
most in need of help with limiting their family size to make ends meet and care for 
existing children.  Her goal of “voluntary motherhood,” Sanger realized, required the 
demise of the Comstock laws.  For over fifty years, she dedicated her life to challenging 
them by crusading to “free women from incessant childbearing…[and] undesired 
pregnancy.”293   
A nurse in Manhattan, Sanger came face to face with the toll that unwanted and 
frequent pregnancies caused on women’s health.  In her speeches and writing, Sanger 
often spoke of the story of a young immigrant woman named Sadie Sachs as a defining 
moment in her career.294  Already a mother of multiple children at the age of twenty-eight 
and lacking the funds to provide for another, Sadie became dangerously ill following a 
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botched five-dollar (illegal) abortion.  Sanger was called to accompany a doctor treating 
Sadie’s infection.  While recovering, the young woman asked the presiding doctor what 
she could do to avoid getting pregnant in the future?  Instead of offering useful 
information, the doctor chided his patient for the question and joked that “It can’t be 
done,” unless you tell your husband “to sleep on the roof.”295  When Sanger saw Sadie 
three months later, the young woman was suffering from fatal septicemia as a 
consequence of a self-inflicted abortion.  Sanger watched Sadie die in the grieving 
company of her husband and children.  Although the authenticity of the Sadie Sachs story 
has never been confirmed, Sanger used this story as an allegory to dramatize the plight of 
poor women seeking to avoid pregnancy and to highlight the needless deaths to women 
and children, which resulted from the lack of information and availability of 
contraceptives.296  Largely an opponent of abortion (except as a last resort), Sanger 
believed that birth control could solve the rise in unsafe abortions by preventing 
pregnancy in the first place.  After the tragic death of Sadie Sachs, writes Sanger, “I 
resolved that women should have the knowledge of contraception…I would tell the world 
what was going on in the lives of these poor women….No matter what the cost, I would 
be heard.”297   
She called this her “Great Awakening.”298  The Comstock laws provided the 
opportunity for women who could afford their own personal physician, to receive 
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information about contraception and obtain access to these devices (i.e. middle-class and 
wealthy women).  But the privatization of contraception made information and access to 
birth control nearly impossible for poor women to procure.  Since they did not have the 
luxury of hiring their own private doctors, Sanger emphasized that indigent women were 
disproportionately burdened by the costs of frequent childbirth, ranging from the toll it 
took on their health to difficulties providing for existing children.  Condemning these 
laws as an unjust limitation on women’s freedom and anathema to public health, Sanger 
proclaimed: “Against the State, against the Church, against the silence of the medical 
profession, against the whole machinery of dead institutions of the past, the woman today 
arises.”299  From that point forward, she began writing about sex and birth control in 
newspapers and journals.  This brought Sanger directly into conflict with Anthony 
Comstock when he discovered her column “What Every Girl Should Know,” which 
openly discussed sex and reproduction.  Now an elderly man in his seventies, Comstock 
still served as chief U.S. Post office censor. He banned the column. In response, the paper 
printed a blank space in place of the article with the headline: What Every Girl Should 
Know—Nothing; by order of the U.S. Post Office.”300 
Here it is important to note that Sanger’s publications were more than merely 
“obscene” under Comstock’s laws, her ideas about “family planning” posed a blatant 
threat to Comstock’s increasingly anachronistic (pseudo-Victorian) family model and 
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moral purity ideal of good citizenship.  Whereas Comstock argued that the state ought to 
use its power to “protect” a Victorian ideal under assault from emerging markets of 
obscene materials, Sanger attacked the Comstock laws by arguing that the state ought to 
instead use its power to ensure that information and advice about birth control was 
available to all women.  She framed this as a matter of public health and liberated 
motherhood, but also argued that smaller families would produce better American 
citizens. In contrast to Comstock’s claim to be protecting children from corrupting their 
future through encounters with obscene materials outside the home, Margaret Sanger 
relied on more direct references to the role of women in (physically) reproducing the 
nation’s future generations of citizens. Sanger rarely discussed birth control without 
making broader civic lineage statements about its significance to citizenship and to the 
future of the nation. For instance, in 1940 during World War II, Sanger wrote that birth 
control has implications “far beyond” the situation of “individual parents,” for 
contraception was vital “to this democratic nation.”301 Likewise, speaking of the potential 
for poor women to raise good citizens with the help of family planning, she writes: “Give 
the woman of the poorer classes a chance to limit and control their families, and it will be 
found that in very many cases the material is equally good. The difference is that, like 
plants crowded too close together in poor soil, there is no chance to develop and the 
whole families are left impoverished in mind and body.  Give room for each [to] grow 
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and all may become fine and healthy American citizens.”302  (Sanger can be legitimately 
accused of encouraging the poor, immigrants, and people of color to have fewer children, 
but she also assumed that they would want to voluntarily practice family planning if 
given the opportunities already available to middle-class women.)  With fewer children, 
she argued that poor women, and other marginalized women in America, might have the 
time and resources to devote to children so that “all may become fine and healthy 
American citizens.”303  In her capacity as birth control advocate, Sanger offered an 
alternative vision for what the American family should look like and suggested that 
“family planning” would strengthen the nation.   
Not long after her first encounter with Comstock, Sanger started her own radical 
monthly paper in 1914, which she named Woman Rebel.304  The banner across the first 
issue boldly proclaimed: “No Gods, No Masters.”305  In her paper, Sanger attacked the 
Comstock laws directly.  Sanger’s writings in Woman Rebel were strongly influenced by 
her socialist and anarchist ties in her radical circles in Manhattan, stating, “deep down in 
woman’s nature lies slumbering the spirit of revolt.”306  Like her early mentor Emma 
Goldman, the anarchist and radical feminist, Sanger criticized the patriarchal elements in 
everything from marriage to motherhood, but she consistently emphasized that control 
over their reproductive capacities was key for women to have the ability to achieve full 
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citizenship and break the shackles of patriarchy.  In her words, “I believe that woman is 
enslaved by the world machine, by sex conventions, by motherhood and its present 
necessary child-rearing, by wage-slavery, by middle-class morality, by customs, laws and 
superstitions.”307   After the first issue of Woman Rebel, Sanger was warned by the post 
office to stop publishing it.  When she ignored the warning, Sanger was charged with 
violating the Comstock laws by using mail to circulate “obscene” information.  Facing 
multiple charges, with a penalty of up to twenty years in prison, Sanger fled to Europe to 
study population control and plan a stronger strategy for combating the Comstock laws.   
 
2.1 The Clinic Plan 
During her time in Europe, Sanger embraced what I call her “clinic plan.”  Birth control, 
she decided, was more than simply a First Amendment issue of being able to teach 
women about sexuality in published articles, as she did in her popular educational 
pamphlet on Family Limitation.308  In addition to the importance of distributing 
information manuals, she took a new proactive stance that the goal of effective birth 
control required opening public clinics like those she visited in Holland; a nation, which 
provided actual face-to-face contraceptive advice by professionals, fitted women for 
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diaphragms with individual care, and successfully reduced the mortality rates of mothers 
in childbirth through proper gynecological and prenatal healthcare. As she prepared to 
defy the law by opening up public clinics throughout America (i.e. via direct civil 
disobedience), she also appears to have strategically refined her rhetoric into a less 
radical tone; perhaps hoping to win over public opinion and change the minds of 
lawmakers.  Of particular note, rather than attacking institutions like marriage and 
motherhood as beyond salvation from the stain of patriarchy, Sanger began citing the 
value of these treasured cultural and political institutions to defend her cause by 
articulating a more free and equal (i.e. reformed) vision of them.  In this vein, Sanger’s 
ultimate success stems not from her early radical (anarchist and socialist positions in 
favor of “free sex”) but rather her ability to tailor her agenda to the ideational constraints 
of her time—or what Carole McCann calls “a refinement of her rhetoric to fit the 
discursive horizons of class-consciousness and feminist politics, rather than the 
abandonment of those politics.”309  But during the Progressive Era, as we shall see, this 
meant trying to form alliances with eugenicists and doctors, and prioritizing concerns 
about public health over women’s equality in the political arena. 
When Sanger returned to America from Europe, she opened her first clinic in 
Brooklyn.  After she was convicted for violating the Comstock law, she served thirty 
days in prison and became famous for her civil disobedience. Following her release from 
prison, Sanger earned her first major legal victory in 1918 when she appealed her 
conviction for opening the clinic, and a court ruled that physicians were exempt from the 
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law.  Without striking down the entire law, this ruling held that contraceptive devices 
could be prescribed by doctors and sold by pharmacists for prevention of disease and to 
protect public health in the state of New York.  Sanger exploited the new loophole by 
establishing the Clinical Research Bureau (CRB) in lower Manhattan in 1923, operated 
by an entirely female medical staff, which was the first legal birth control clinic in the 
United States.310  But since the American Medical Association (AMA) was clear that it 
“would not endorse birth control until” it was legal for doctors to prescribe 
contraceptives and “removed the taint of obscenity,” Sanger faced a serious impediment 
to her goal of establishing public clinics across the nation.311 So, in addition to lobbying 
Congress to change the broad language and application of the obscenity law, she set out 
to challenge the federal anti-contraceptive law in court.  
To attack the federal Comstock law, Sanger sought the legal advice and assistance 
of Morris Ernst, an eminent civil rights litigator, who had successfully challenged an 
obscenity ban against the distribution of James Joyce’s novel Ulysses, overturning the 
Comstockian prohibition on provocative literature.312 Ernst suggested arranging a legal 
test case—similar to his well-known Ulysses case—to chip away at the federal law 
against distributing information about birth control and contraceptive devices by mail.313 
The goal, as Ernst explained in a 1932 article in The Nation, was to use the courts to rule 
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that birth control prescribed by doctors was not banned by anti-obscenity laws, because 
devices that foster public health are, like good literature, simply could not be properly 
labeled as ‘obscene.’ Even if Congress refused to abolish the outdated Comstock law, 
Ernst argued that Sanger could use the judicial process to, in his words, “nullify” the anti-
obscenity law’s application to doctor-prescribed contraceptives, thereby making birth 
control widely accessible to most women through public clinics for the poor and private 
physicians for those who could afford them.  
Morris Ernst’s legal strategy at the time worked. Sanger ordered a package of 
diaphragms from Japan to be delivered to Dr. Hannah Stone, director of her CRB 
clinic.314  When the package was seized by U.S. customs under its authority to confiscate 
“obscene articles,” Ernst then challenged the seizure of the “rubber pessaries” on behalf 
of Dr. Stone. At the initial trial, the Judge and the jury listened to a series of respected 
doctors in New York testify on the side of Dr. Stone that they prescribed birth control for 
child-spacing, mental health problems, and to prevent disease. Then, the chief medical 
witness called by the government, Dr. Frederic Wolcott Bancroft, a renowned surgeon in 
New York, surprised everyone in the courtroom by admitting that he too “prescribed the 
diaphragm to address medical needs, including a number of diseases, neurological 
disorders, insanity, epilepsy and venereal diseases.”315 In a telegram to Sanger, who was 
traveling abroad during the trial, her friend Florence Rose reported that Dr. Bancroft was 
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“so helpful to our side that one wondered whose witness he really was!!”316 Dr. Stone 
won her jury trial, an unexpected victory at this early stage of the litigation process, and 
the government appealed the case to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.   
In United States v. One Package, Morris Ernst—recruited by Sanger and 
representing Dr. Stone—won a sweeping medical exemption in the federal law from the 
Second Circuit in 1936, again with an emphasis on public health.317 Avoiding any 
discussion of whether the articles were obscene or not, Judge Augustus Hand, simply 
deferred entirely to the medical authority of doctors to promote and protect the health of 
their patients. In his words,  
The Comstock law’s design, in our opinion, was not to prevent the importation, 
sale, or carriage by mail of things which might intelligently be employed by 
conscientious and competent physicians for the purpose of saving life or 
promoting the well-being of their patients.318  
 
Although Comstock had often targeted doctors as dealers in illicit materials—ranging 
from contraceptives to anatomy textbooks—he was no longer alive to challenge this re-
interpretation of his law.  This ruling by the Second Circuit in One Package was taken by 
many in the press as a signal of the end of the reign of Comstockery.  Shortly thereafter, 
true to its word, the American Medical Association (AMA) Committee on Contraceptive 
Practices cited the One Package decision as a reason in 1937 for adopting a favorable 
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stance towards the “dissemination and teaching of the best methods of birth control.”319 
When the government decided not to appeal the case to the Supreme Court, Sanger 
herself called it “an emancipation proclamation to the motherhood of America.”320 After 
One Package, she was confident that this federal precedent meant that women would be 
able to obtain birth control from doctors under her ongoing clinic plan. Ultimately, this 
federal public health ruling all-but signaled the death knell of the moral purity civic 
lineage ideal of citizenship, garnering widespread public acceptance for the use of birth 
control in the name of public health. 
 In 1921, Sanger founded an organization named the American Birth Control 
League, which would later change its name to Planned Parenthood Federation of America 
in 1942.321  By 1945, Planned Parenthood Federation of America documented that 
American birth control movement has succeeded in establishing more than eight hundred 
clinics nationwide.322  Sanger’s “clinic plan” proved to be a success.  But, in reality, 
Sanger’s victories were not entirely on her terms.  
 In her writing and speeches, Sanger framed birth control as vital for the freedom 
of all women and also defended birth control as a matter of women’s liberation, equality, 
bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and pleasure without anxiety. In her words: “No 
woman can call herself free who does not own and control her body.  No woman can call 
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herself free until she can choose consciously whether she will or will not be a mother.”323  
For Sanger, birth control was a feminist issue, and she emphasized that women needed 
access to contraceptives in order to become liberated from male tyranny and control their 
own bodies and lives: Reworking the terms of possessive individualism, she argued that 
the “woman” must “fight for the right to own and control her own body, for the 
ownership of her body to do with it as she desires…and it is no [one else’s] business what 
those desires might be.”324  Against this backdrop, it is striking that the vast majority of 
her political victories depended upon the willingness of the courts to make exceptions in 
the Comstock laws for doctors and medical professionals, rather than ruling that birth 
control was an issue of women’s rights of any sort.  Sanger won piecemeal victories that 
chipped away at these laws as part of her “clinic plan,” but the discourse that persuaded 
judges was not her goal of empowering women.  Rather, Sanger’s message was most 
successful in the political arena when framed in terms of public health.  The courts 
proved willing to undermine the anti-contraceptive laws, but only by deferring to the 
professional expertise and rights of doctors with little consideration to the sexual and 
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3. Was Margaret Sanger a Eugenicist?  
Voluntary Motherhood vs. Fitter Families 
 
Sanger maintained a complicated and vexed relationship with the eugenics movement, 
and is sometimes given the label ‘eugenicist.’325  So, was she a eugenicist?  At first 
glance, one might intuitively assume that eugenicists would support birth control, 
particularly to limit the procreation of less desirable members of society.  During a time 
in which virtually everyone (but Catholics) supported eugenic ideas, Sanger sought to 
form alliances with eugenicists.  Appealing to their mutual interests in controlling fertility 
to promote public health, the journal she founded in 1917, Birth Control Review, included 
numerous articles that spoke favorably of eugenics, some written by Sanger herself.326  
As she put it, “eugenics without birth control seemed to me to a house built upon 
sands.”327  Like most during the Progressive Era, Margret Sanger was indeed a 
eugenicist.  Nonetheless, Gerald V. O’Brien has emphasized that she was “a tangential 
figure who sought, and largely failed, to co-opt the growing eugenics movement as a 
means of supporting her efforts to increase support for the birth control movement.”328  
Sanger stated that she only accepted part of their “philosophy.”  In fact, by arguing that 
all citizens, including the wealthy, ought to have access to birth control and family 
planning, she presented a vision of civic reproduction that clashed with the positive fitter 
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families eugenic ideal of citizenship.  Her relationship with eugenics in many ways points 
to a tension in her own civic lineage goals during the Progressive Era.   
 Sanger spoke out in favor of negative eugenics for the grossly “defective,” 
something for which she is justly criticized today, but her position was more nuanced and 
contradictory than that of the mainstream the eugenics movement.  Even when speaking 
about the disadvantaged in society, Sanger argued that poverty and a lack of education 
was usually environmental (not hereditary), and expressed hopes that birth control would 
help poor women voluntarily limit their families like their wealthier counterparts so they 
too could focus on raising their children as good citizens.  Although eugenicists 
sometimes supported the use of birth control to limit procreation of the unfit (something 
Sanger emphasized to establish common ground), raising anxieties about “race suicide,” 
eugenicists were quick to express concerns that the wealthiest and most educated women 
were having fewer children.  These were the women who were more likely to gain access 
to contraceptives from their private doctors, and they were the women that Theodore 
Roosevelt called traitors to the American race, addressed in the last chapter, because they 
would not bear children out of a patriotic duty to strengthen the vitality of the nation.329  
Supporting some eugenics ideas, Sanger stuck by her stance of “voluntary motherhood,” 
except for the truly feebleminded, which she agreed ought to be sterilized by the state if 
incapable of using birth control.  But though she supported many eugenic principles, 
neither Sanger nor her birth control agenda were accepted as part of the agenda of the 
eugenics movement.  This is because she generally refused to support birth control based 
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purely on the basis of class, wealth, education, heritage, or race, and instead argued in 
favor of granting women more control over their own fertility.  She suggested that access 
to voluntary contraceptives would help all women keep their families at a more 
manageable size, including middle class women.  Her opposition to positive eugenics 
sparked an uncomfortable rift between her birth control movement and leaders of 
eugenics groups, such as Laughlin and Davenport at the Eugenics Records Office.  Yet as 
Ellen Chesler has argued in her groundbreaking biography of Margaret Sanger, Sanger’s 
ambitious goals of birth control legalization, sex education, and later infertility assistance 
would have had no political chance without her appealing to the mainstream rhetoric and 
ideals of the time, which included groups with unsavory agendas.330 
 Just as Sanger was an ambivalent eugenicist, the eugenics movement was 
ambivalent about her birth control movement.  Eugenicists generally did not trust 
allowing people of questionable “stock” to voluntarily practice family limitation, 
preferring an emphasis on state coercion via forced sterilization; nor did they support the 
proposal that women of “good stock” be allowed the choice to practice family limitation 
through birth control.  They were generally skeptical of voluntarism concerning 
reproductive matters, and maintained that reproduction was of national import and thus 
ought to be open to state control.  Moreover, while Sanger supported certain negative 
eugenic ideas either out of personal conviction or brute political tactics (and probably a 
mix of both), her very vision of the role of birth control in the American family was 
interpreted by many eugenicists as posing a direct threat to the eugenic fitter families 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 Chesler, Woman of Valor, 15. 
146	  
	  
ideal of citizenship.  On this point, they were correct.  Her advocacy of birth control 
sought to replace the “fitter families” ideal with a smaller and more equitable family 
defined by “voluntary motherhood,” which rejected the positive eugenic ideal of the fitter 
families.  Despite noteworthy matters of agreement and intersection between the two 
movements, the vision of civic lineage that Sanger supported was eclipsed by the 
dominant eugenics fitter families regime during her day.   
 Out of step with her time, Sanger had difficulty courting allies to oppose the 
dominant fitter families ideal.  Somewhat surprisingly, this includes suffragettes. While 
the eugenicists managed to garner support from the League of Women voters for 
involuntary sterilization as a “woman’s issues,” Sanger failed in her attempts to persuade 
these mainstream suffragettes to support birth control as a general political concern of 
women in America.331  In rejecting birth control as a political issue that ought to concern 
most American women, the LWV’s Citizenship Committee specifically cited their 
dedication to “the family” and their value as “upright mothers” as a reason for not taking 
up Sanger’s controversial cause of birth control.332   
 Sanger’s (sometimes successful but often failed) attempts to build alliances with 
eugenicists and doctors reveals a great deal about the civic lineage policies and ideals she 
supported; and perhaps most importantly, to what extent she diverged from the dominant 
eugenics fitter families order of the Progressive Era.  Like the most avid eugenicists, 
Sanger framed her birth control agenda explicitly in terms of civic lineage—or the 
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reproduction of the nation through influencing the birth of the “right” type of citizens.  
Her political and legal activism chipped away at the Comstock laws, and an important 
reason for her victories was the fact that the eugenicists were successful in transforming 
reproductive issues into a public concern of the state, thereby replacing the moral purity 
ideal of the family and good citizenship.  But unlike the eugenicists, neither her rationale 
nor her political agenda of birth control for all women was accepted by the public or 
codified in law during the Progressive Era.  A talented organizer and leader, Sanger won 
victories though her confrontational tactics and built the foundation for more sweeping 
changes in the future.  But before the Second World War, the dominant civic lineage 
alliance was the eugenics ideal of the fitter families, and Sanger’s birth control movement 
won victories only to the extent that she appealed to cross-cutting goals with eugenicists 
and experts in the medical profession.  This meant that her focus on public health 
eclipsed her emphasis on women’s liberation, and national betterment overshadowed the 
role of birth control in women’s equality as a politically salient issue.  Deplorable as her 
attempts to unite with eugenicists is from our modern viewpoint—indeed her comments 
about eugenics have become the focus of contemporary scholarship on Sanger—the 
victories she won happened in large part because she worked through mainstream 
channels of the medical establishment and framed contraception as a matter of eugenic 
values such as public health and its impact on national identity.  
Conclusion 
 This has been a transitional chapter.  I began by discussing the Anthony Comstock’s 
anti-contraceptive laws, and the ideal of civic reproduction he championed at the dawn of 
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the twentieth century.  The Comstockian “moral purity” ideal, as I have argued, focused 
on molding proper citizens out of children by promoting Victorian norms of sexuality and 
striving to keep the economic market of “obscene materials” from corrupting the private 
sphere of the family.  Not only did Margaret Sanger, as the most prominent leader in the 
early birth control movement, set out to uproot Comstock’s anti-contraception laws, but 
the eugenics movement also clashed with Comstock’s notion that everything sexual was 
obscene when discussed in public.  Before the development of a fundamental right to 
privacy protecting the use of contraceptives by married couples in Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965), addressed in the next chapter, the eugenics and birth control 
movements existed side by side (sometimes in conflict and at other times in cooperation) 
in American politics.  Together, these movements shaped the Progressive Era’s civic 
lineage regime, with the eugenics movement having more influence than the birth control 
movement on the set of policies that comprised the dominant civic lineage regime during 
this political period.  This raises an important question: how did we get from the 
dominant eugenics fitter families ideal, which framed reproductive matters in terms of 
public health, to Griswold and the development of a right to reproductive privacy?   
Sanger never framed her argument for birth control in terms of a right to privacy.  When 
she wasn’t citing public health and citizenship, she spoke of women’s liberation and 
equality.  She made it clear that birth control was a “public issue,” stating, “I believe that 
these things which enslave women [in the private sphere as mothers without reproductive 
control or choice] must be fought openly, fearlessly, consciously.”333  
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This is part of what makes the Griswold ruling so interesting.  Conventional 
wisdom holds that the Griswold case is the culmination of Sanger’s work, insofar as the 
case was organized and spearheaded by Planned Parenthood in the name of overturning 
the Comstock law.  But this does not mean that Sanger’s vision of the American family 
and citizenship prevailed in Griswold.  Although the legalization of birth control goes 
against the fitter families positive eugenics ideal and supports some version of “family 
planning,” as we shall see, the Court in Griswold speaks little of public health, 
citizenship, national identity, women’s liberation, or gender equality.  Instead, Justice 
Douglas’s majority opinion waxes nostalgic about the sanctity of marriage and grounds 
this right in privacy.  Sanger spent her career repudiating Comstock’s Victorian 
conception of family privacy and his moral purity ideal of citizenship by trying to make 
birth control a legitimate “public issue” and by establishing public clinics as key 
institutions of voluntary motherhood.  Indeed, although the eugenic fitter families ideal 
replaced the moral purity ideal, it was the birth control movement, as opposed to the 
eugenics movement, that fought to tear down the anti-contraceptive laws instituted by the 
Comstockian civic lineage regime.  As I have argued, Sanger’s campaign won using the 
mainstream civic lineage discourse of the Progressive Era: Public health.  Her own ideal 
(voluntary motherhood) never gained significant popular support in the shade of the 
much more popular eugenics agenda.  So what are we to make of the fact that the Court 
finally ruled to strike down all Comstockian anti-contraceptive laws as unconstitutional 
based on a constitutional right in the privacy of marriage?  Where did this right to privacy 
come from if not from Sanger herself?  And when the Supreme Court selected “a right to 
privacy” (over other options) as the rationale for protecting access to contraception and 
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later abortion, how did this jurisprudential choice shape the path of civic lineage policy 























From Griswold to Roe: 




In November 1961, two police officers arrived at the new Planned Parenthood clinic in 
New Haven, Connecticut to conduct a search for evidence of any violation of the state’s 
anti-contraceptive statute, which had been in effect since the 1870s. The director of the 
clinic, Estelle Griswold, a distinguished woman in her sixties, met the detectives at the 
entrance and announced that she was violating the law.334  Next, she took Detectives John 
Blazi and Harold Berg on a tour of the Planned Parenthood birth control clinic she 
opened just ten days earlier.  The head doctor was the chief gynecologist at Yale Medical 
School, Dr. Charles Lee Buxton.  This clinic, Estelle Griswold explained, only served 
married women and focused purely on contraception, but this was a “criminal” 
establishment in the state of Connecticut. Taking the time to carefully point out the 
contraceptives they dispensed to patients and explaining how the devices worked during 
her tour, Griswold told the detectives that she hoped that they would arrest her, so she 
could challenge the constitutionality of the outdated anti-contraceptive law before the 
Supreme Court.  Many years later, Detective Berg recalled that, “It was one of the easiest 
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types of investigations you could get involved in.  It wasn’t one of those investigations 
where you had to dig out the information…It was sort of ‘Here it is; here we are; take us 
in.”335  Both the clinic’s executive director, Estelle Griswold, and medical director, Dr. 
Charles Buxton were arrested and charged by the New Haven police department for 
violating Connecticut’s 1879 anti-contraceptive law the same month, and the two 
defendants began preparing to challenge the law in court.336 
 By the 1960s, ten states in the nation—Connecticut, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Washington—still had 
laws on their books that forbid doctors from prescribing contraceptives even when 
medically necessary to protect the health of their patients.337 The law in Connecticut was 
the most stringent of these, because it banned disseminating information about birth 
control to anyone (married or single), in addition to outlawing both the distribution and 
the use of contraceptives even in cases in which pregnancy posed a threat to a married 
woman’s health or life.  Ironically, although birth control was officially illegal in 
Connecticut, it was nonetheless widely available.338  Not only did many private doctors 
ignore the law and prescribe it to their patients anyway, but also most drugstores sold 
condoms under the counter for “the prevention of disease” (not birth control). As a result, 
the people hurt the most by the law were poor women, who did not have access to private 
physicians willing to prescribe other methods of contraception such as the diaphragm or 
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birth control pill, the latter of which was approved by the FDA in 1960.339  Poor women 
also had the most difficulty traveling to nearby states such as New York and Rhode 
Island, which by the 1960s had already legalized family planning services and birth 
control clinics.340  Yet these were the very citizens who most needed public clinics like 
the New Haven Planned Parenthood clinic, which had a sliding scale (income-based) 
payment plan for services to accommodate clients who normally could not afford such 
healthcare from private physicians.  
This chapter traces the development of a right to privacy in reproduction and its 
impact on the political development of America’s civic lineage regime during the 
twentieth century.  Broadly, this chapter consists of five parts.  In Part 1, I begin with a 
case study of the birth control movement in Connecticut during the 1930s, which as we 
shall see championed Margaret Sanger’s “clinic plan,” discussed in the last chapter, but 
later failed in Connecticut due to political backlash from the Catholic Church. Indeed, as 
the last chapter addressed, during its early stages the birth control movement won court 
victories by opening public clinics and challenging the Comstock laws in the name of 
public health and “doctors rights.”  In Part 2, I turn to the landmark case of Griswold v. 
Connecticut, in which the Supreme Court in 1965 finally overturned Connecticut’s 
Comstock law by ruling that a right to privacy protects the use of contraception for 
married people.341  As Part 3 discusses, one of the factors that makes this case so 
important is that the Court decided to strike down the Comstock law by developing a new 
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line of constitutional jurisprudence—in the form of finding a fundamental right to marital 
privacy that protects the use of contraception by marriage couples—and grounded its 
decision in the “sacred” institution of “traditional marriage” in American society.  
However, rather than ruling in favor of equal protection for women, or based upon 
socioeconomic status and the role that class plays in structuring unequal access to birth 
control for low-income women, the Court chose instead to champion a rather 
conservative ideal of marriage in Griswold.   
I argue in Part 4 that the concept of marriage celebrated by the majority of the 
Court in Griswold is the postwar ideal of the homemaker mother and breadwinner father 
in the 1940s and 1950s. Somewhat ironically, this civic lineage regime was already under 
assault on multiple fronts in the 1960s, including from the civil rights movement, the 
emerging women’s movement, and the counterculture “sexual revolution” on college 
campuses.  I call this the “white picket fence” ideal of the family and good civic 
reproduction. Like the fitter families eugenic photographs prior to the Second World 
War, the ideal promoted by the postwar civic lineage regime is preserved on film: in 
popular 1950s television shows in postwar America, including “Father Knows Best” and 
“Leave it to Beaver.” Although it replaced the inegalitarian eugenic fitter families 
eugenic ideal as the dominant civic lineage order during postwar America, this regime 
also—like its predecessor—supported a highly gendered, racialized, and classist model of 
the reproduction of citizenship. In this regard, as I shall argue, the original Griswold 
ruling was, at first glance, a conservative celebration of an increasingly outdated ideal of 
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“traditional marriage,” not a radical declaration of a right to reproductive or sexual 
liberty.  
 With the rise of the “sexual revolution” during the 1960s and 70s, Part 5 explores 
how the Court extended the right to privacy in reproduction, first established in Griswold, 
to cover birth control for unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1971) and a 
woman’s choice to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade (1973).342 Given the fact that the 
Court began expanding its new reproductive privacy doctrine over such a short period of 
time to cover the right of individuals to use birth control and obtain an abortion, I suggest 
that the Court’s celebration of traditional marriage in Griswold is a fascinating example 
of the judiciary relying on a form of “camouflage conservatism” to expand reproductive 
rights in the name of traditional “family values.” Moreover, expanding the right to 
privacy in Griswold in a path dependent fashion, which ignored other constitutional 
possibilities for deciding these cases, the Court engaged in a process of doctrinal 
extension which I term “patchwork constitutionalism.”  These cases have not only 
increased women’s reproductive options and choices in America, but they have had 
lasting repercussions on civic lineage alliances in American politics and continue to 
shape our civic lineage regime today.  I conclude by emphasizing that the rise of the right 
to privacy in late twentieth century in no way signals a weakening of the state’s 
involvement of the regulation of reproduction.  Rather, it indicates a transition from one 
dominant civic lineage regime to another.  As we shall see, the fact that the Court 
grounded these civic lineage decisions in privacy and not equal protection has helped to 
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foster the rise of a new civic lineage order.  In the next chapter, I will further examine this 
contemporary neoliberal civic lineage regime.  For now, let us take a closer look at the 
development and trajectory of the right to privacy in reproduction, focusing on Griswold 
v. Connecticut.   
 
1. Connecticut Case Study 
To understand the context leading up to the case of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), it is 
useful to begin with a case study of the early birth control movement in Connecticut.  Not 
only does a more detailed examination of the legal challenges to the Comstock law in 
Connecticut during the 1930s and 1940s shed important light on the background factors 
leading up to Griswold, but more specifically it does so by revealing two major 
transitions in the politics of birth control in the United States during the twentieth 
century.  Margaret Sanger, and the early birth control movement more generally, 
succeeded in reframing birth control as a matter of public health matter as opposed to an 
issue of moral purity, but the movement nonetheless hit a political wall (in the form of 
opposition from the Catholic Church) in some states like Connecticut.  Framed primarily 
as a “public health” issue before the Second World War, birth control advocates recast 
access to contraception as an issue of civil rights by the 1960s. In 1965 in Griswold, a 
majority of the Supreme Court would embrace this argument and endorse a right to 
privacy for married persons in reproduction.  Let us examine this transition, starting with 
the emphasis on “public health” before the 1950s, which won important victories for 
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reproductive rights in many areas of the nation, by shifting the law away from 
Comstock’s emphasis on moral purity to “doctors rights.”  As we shall see in the sections 
that follow, the transition from being labeled as a “public health” to a “civil liberties” 
issue serves as critical juncture in the development of civic lineage politics in the United 
States.   
 The first birth control clinic in Connecticut opened in Hartford, the capital of the 
state, in 1935, to provide birth control services on a sliding pay scale to married women, 
who were not already getting similar services from their own private physician.343  By 
opening this clinic in the 1930s, the Connecticut Birth Control League (CBCL)—the 
precursor of Planned Parenthood—decided to follow Margaret Sanger’s “clinic strategy” 
and break the law.  If the state prosecuted them under Connecticut’s own Comstock-
based anti-contraception law, the CBCL would simply turn to the courts to try to win a 
judicial exception for “doctors rights.”  (Margaret Sanger was already operating 
successful clinics through the doctor’s loophole established in the One Package decision, 
so the plan was to do the same thing in Connecticut.344)  The clinic was a success.  They 
remained in operation for several years without negative action from law enforcement, 
and the CBCL opened additional clinics across Connecticut.  The President of the 
Connecticut Birth Control League (CBCL), Sallie Pease, began to wonder if the law was 
a “dead duck” because the state was turning a blind eye to the clinics.345  But when a 
local newspaper in Waterbury, a predominately working-class Catholic town, printed a 
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front-page headline announcing, “Birth Control Clinic Is Operating in City,” the clergy of 
the local Catholic Church drafted a resolution against the clinic, which was read from the 
pulpit of every Catholic Church in Waterbury.346  The State’s Attorney in Waterbury, 
William Fitzgerald, heard the resolution from the pews on Sunday in Church.347   
Recognizing that it was his duty to enforce the laws, Fitzgerald promptly applied for a 
search warrant for any “books, records, registers, instruments, apparatus and appliances” 
used and kept for the purpose of violating the criminal law” at the clinic.348  When 
detectives seized a large stock of contraceptives, the city’s Police Department decided to 
enforce the old 1879 anti-contraception statute by arresting the clinic’s directors in 
1939.349   
 This brings us to the case of the State of Connecticut v. Nelson (1940).350  After 
the staff physicians, Roger Nelson and William Goodrich, and the founder and director of 
the clinic, Clara Lee McTernan, a certified nurse, were charged under the 1879 law, the 
Connecticut Birth Control League (CBCL) retained the legal council and services of 
Warren Upson.   A Yale Law School graduate and junior partner in one of Waterbury’s 
top law firms, Upson’s mission was to use Sanger’s victory in One Package as a model 
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for establishing a doctor’s exception to the Connecticut law. He filed a demurer on behalf 
of his clients, and put together an impressive brief.351  (A demurer is a legal claim in 
which a defendant admits to the facts of the case being used against them, but argues that 
there are legal reasons why they are not guilty even if those facts are true.)  In his brief, 
which was over fifty pages long, Upson argued that that the main reason his clients were 
not guilty was because the Comstock statute violated the liberty of the defendants 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in addition to 
analogous provisions in Connecticut’s own state Constitution.352  For the law to be 
constitutional, Upson emphasized, it needed to grant an exception for licensed medical 
professionals to give their best professional advice regarding the health of the women 
visiting the Waterbury clinic.  Upson also argued that Comstock’s primary concern was 
banning obscene literature and photographs, and that the dissemination of information 
about contraceptives to adult married women by medical professionals should not qualify 
as obscene and was simply a public health matter.353   
Persuaded by the public health argument but not willing to strike down the entire 
law, Judge Wayne in the initial trial followed the One Package precedent to rule in favor 
of the clinic staff.354  However, on appeal to the highest court of the state, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court voted 3-2 to overturn the lower court ruling in State v. Nelson.355 The 
court emphasized that this was not a dead law left by the legislature to languish in 
outdated books since 1879, rather the legislature had actively addressed and rejected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Upson, “Brief on Demurrer,” State of Connecticut v. Roger B. Nelson, July 25, 1939. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Garrow, Liberty & Sexuality, 69-70. 
355 State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 11 A. 2d 856 (1940). 
160	  
	  
proposals by birth control advocates for a health exception to be added to the law on 
several occasions in the 1920s and 1930s.  If the democratic lawmakers had intended for 
such an exception to exist, reasoned the judges, then the Connecticut representatives 
would not have voted against it.  The state’s highest court upheld the Waterbury 
convictions, and the CBCL felt that its only option was to close down all of the clinics 
operating in Connecticut to avoid further prosecution.356 
 
1.2 The Significance of Nelson: The Public Health Frame 
The State v. Nelson ruling was a major blow to the birth control movement in 
Connecticut.  When the CBCL appealed the Nelson ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Court declined to hear the case just as it had in the similar Massachusetts case of 
Commonwealth v. Gardner (1938).357  In the aftermath of Nelson, the Connecticut Birth 
Control League changed its name to Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut 
following the national name change in the early1940s.  The change was an attempt to 
seem less radical in order to win political support for “family planning” nationwide.  In 
the meantime, The Connecticut Planned Parenthood continued to prioritize getting a 
doctor’s exemption to the law.  The issue of public health remained the primary concern 
throughout the 1940s.  Hence, in 1941, the Connecticut Planned Parenthood League 
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decided to return to court to apply for a “declaratory judgment” as to whether the 1879 
state law prohibited Dr. Wilder Tileston from prescribing contraceptives to married 
women in cases in which pregnancy would endanger their health and pose a risk to their 
lives. The case was fatally flawed on a procedural level and the Supreme Court ruled in 
1943 that Dr. Tileston lacked standing because his patients, not he, were claiming injury 
from the law.358  With back-to-back judicial losses in Nelson and Tileston, the birth 
control movement in Connecticut was at a standstill for almost twenty years.  Clinics 
remained closed throughout the state, and local activists focused unsuccessfully on 
continuing to repeal the law at each session of the Connecticut assembly from 1941 to 
1963.359   
 Upon analysis, what is striking about the early Connecticut birth control 
movement is how closely it conformed with Sanger’s “clinic plan,” and focused on the 
goal of getting a medical exemption—or winning “doctor’s rights.”  There is no mention 
of privacy in any of these early cases, and nor is there an emphasis on women’s liberation 
or equality (i.e. the more feminist prongs of Sanger’s arguments).  Nonetheless, while 
largely ignored by the courts, it is important to note that Upson’s brief in Nelson included 
a powerful section invoking civic lineage issues by theorizing about the relationship 
between citizenship and reproductive rights.  He argued that the right to use 
contraceptives was a natural right, protected by the U.S. Constitution as prior to the 
sociopolitical order and hence, he argued, a right of citizens protected by the American 
political system.  As Upson puts it, “The power to commence a pregnancy is one of the 
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inalienable rights of the citizens of Connecticut.”360 Upson was willing to grant that the 
state retained the power to “control abortions,” but he emphasized that “in the attempt to 
control conception, the State interferes with a natural right which inheres in its 
citizens…the decision as to whether or not a married couple shall have children is a 
decision peculiarly their own…”361  Upson (ahead of his time) forcefully proclaimed that, 
“If the people of Connecticut have any natural rights whatsoever, one of them certainly is 
the right to decide whether or not they shall have children…”362  This part of the 
constitutional argument presented in State v. Nelson typically gets lost in discussions 
about the development of reproductive privacy rights.  And when Upson filed his brief 
the argument fell on deaf ears, but he nonetheless sketched out a foundation for future 
civic lineage arguments that the right to use contraceptive devices is a right of 
citizenship, which he argued was fundamental both to the marriage relationship and to an 
individual’s bodily integrity.363   
 The fact that Upson’s “natural rights” argument went largely unnoticed by both 
judges and activists alike is telling, particularly with respect to how birth control was 
conceptualized during this time. At this point, birth control was considered a doctor’s 
right—perhaps a matter of public health and national welfare—but not ranked as a 
broader civil liberties concern even by groups like the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU).  Aware of the limitations of “doctor’s exceptions,” Margaret Sanger, in a series 
of speeches and articles in the early 1940s titled, “Birth Control and Civil Liberties,” 
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sought to establish a firmer connection between the birth control movement and civil 
liberties. Aimed to create alliances with groups like the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) she urged civil liberties advocates to recognize that birth control was 
fundamental to American freedom, which, Sanger emphasized, must include “the right of 
free men and free women to control, as best they may, their own destiny on earth, their 
right to undertake the deep and satisfying act of parenthood, not by chance or in 
ignorance, but in full knowledge of their responsibility—to the child, to themselves and 
to their nation.”364  Drawing a connection between childbirth and national strength, 
Sanger threw her support behind an alternative conception of civic lineage that endorsed 
parental choice and family planning as a vital component of American freedom.  
Although Sanger’s speeches did not change either ACLU or government policy at the 
time, she helped to spark a cross-pollination of ideas between lawyers working on both 
birth control and civil liberties.365  Almost two decades later in the 1960s, the ACLU 
would work with Planned Parenthood on defending contraception as a civil liberty and 
developing “a right to privacy.”366  
 During the early 1940s, however, the idea that birth control might be a civil 
liberty—or not just a public health issue but also a right or even duty of citizenship—
garnered little support from either activist groups or the government.  Upson faced the 
hurdle that birth control was still considered a public health matter by the government 
and not an issue of civil liberties.  The eugenics movement dominated ideas about the 
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relationship between the State and the reproduction of citizens, prior to the United States 
joining the Second World War.  As we have seen in previous chapters, the eugenics 
movement held that the procreation of citizens ought to be influenced and controlled by 
the state in the broader interests of national identity and welfare.  This way of framing the 
reproduction of citizenship—and its corresponding civic lineage discourse and public 
policies—rejected any notion that procreation and marriage was somehow a natural right 
possessed by people prior to the State or that it was essential to the freedom and equality 
of citizens within the state.  Under the eugenic fitter families regime of citizenship, the 
future of national identity was dependent upon proper reproductive politics and laws 
targeting human breeding.  Upson’s natural rights argument didn’t speak in terms of the 
dominant civic lineage discourse of the times, and was ignored by the courts. Conversely, 
his public health argument and support for “doctor’s rights” did have a chance, but lost 
by one vote in a state supreme court controlled by former legislatures who had voted for 
the very law he was challenging while they were serving in the State Assembly.367 
Although birth control had already made the transition from a moral to a medical issue 
(under the federal law), in order for birth control to qualify as a right of citizenship, it had 
to next transform from being labeled as a predominately medical issue to a civil rights 
issue in America.   
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2. Griswold & Privacy 
Let us now return to Estelle Griswold and her New Haven birth control clinic.  When 
Griswold became executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut 
(PPLC) in the 1950s, her mission was to revive the nearly dead birth control movement in 
the state and challenge its Comstock law.368  First, she attempted to get the Court to issue 
a declaratory judgment overturning the Connecticut law. She recruited Yale law 
Professor Fowler Harper and civil liberties attorney Catherine Roraback to represent Dr. 
Charles Buxton and several of his married patients—in particular, women whose health 
and lives might be imperiled by pregnancy—in Poe v. Ullman (1961).369  But in a 5-4 
vote, the majority of the Supreme Court ruled to dismiss the case on the grounds that it 
was not ripe, because the plaintiffs had not been charged by the state for violating the 
law.  The majority opinion, written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, sent the clear message to 
the PPLC that it needed to prove that the Connecticut law was still actively enforced by 
the state and more than merely a “harmless empty shadow.”370   
In his concurring opinion, Justice William Brennan sympathetically informed the 
plaintiffs that they would have a properly pressing controversy if they opened a public 
clinic and the state acted against the clinic as it had twenty years earlier in Nelson.371  So, 
Estelle Griswold immediately began organizing to open a clinic “and get arrested” to 
challenge the law before the Court.  After Estelle Griswold successfully started a public 
clinic in New Haven and was arrested along with Dr. Buxton, there was already an 
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organized network of lawyers and interest groups, which had united in Poe v. Ullman 
(1961) to support them.   Despite the loss in Poe, Estelle Griswold’s Planned Parenthood 
state branch—with the national Planned Parenthood and ACLU united behind them—
were buoyed by the fact that both Justices Harlan and Douglas wrote passionate dissents 
in support of a right to privacy (mentioned in the Poe brief along with public health).372  
They now had a live case to bring before the Court, and several Justices appeared 
receptive to idea that a right to privacy justified overturning the old Comstock law. 
 
2.1 The Decision 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, decided in June 1965, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that 
Connecticut’s ban on contraception was unconstitutional.373  After over twenty years of 
failed challenges to Connecticut’s Comstock law, the majority overturned the 
Connecticut law on the grounds that it violated a “right to privacy.”  The fact that the 
Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy makes this reasoning particularly 
interesting.  This marks several key changes from the Nelson years.  First, it is 
noteworthy that every justice—even the dissenters—expressed their opinion that the 
Connecticut Comstock law was absurd irrespective of their opinion of its 
constitutionality.  Second, seven of the justices readily framed married couples using 
contraceptives as a civil right.  Finally, out of all the ways they could have justified this 
as a civil right, the majority gravitated towards theorizing a new right to privacy in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 Ibid., Douglas dissent at 510, and Harlan dissent at 523. 
373 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
167	  
	  
marriage to support this rights claim.  No longer focusing on issues of public health or 
social welfare, the Court turned its jurisprudential gaze to privacy.  So, how did this 
happen?  Let us examine these opinions in more detail, before proceeding to the civic 
lineage questions it raises: namely, how did reproduction transition from being a purely 
public health issue to a civil right?  And what does viewing it as protected by privacy 
rights mean for civic lineage politics then and now?    
 
2.2 The Opinions 
Just over six pages in length, Justice Douglas’ majority opinion is remarkably short for a 
landmark decision.  According to Douglas, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give” the right to 
privacy “life and substance.”374  Douglass argued that the right to privacy is implicit in a 
number of Amendments, including the First Amendment’s freedom of speech, religion, 
and association, the Third Amendment’s prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 
protecting the privacy of the home, the Fourth Amendment’s right of the people to be 
secure in their persons and home, the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination, 
and the Ninth Amendment’s proclamation that the people retain unenumerated rights.  
Echoing Upson’s “natural rights” argument, Douglas writes:  
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than political 
parties, older than our school system.  Marriage is a coming together for better or 
for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It is an 
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not 
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political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an 
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.375   
 
To give the right to privacy the veneer of historical basis and legitimacy in the American 
constitutional tradition, Douglas relied on past Supreme Court precedent, emphasizing 
cases concerning reproduction such as his own majority opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma 
(1942), and cases focusing on raising children with a particular emphasis on Meyer v. 
Nebraska (1923) and Pierce v. Society Sisters (1925).376  These latter two cases, Douglas 
argued, show that the Court had already ruled that the Constitution protects privacy in the 
home and family, including the right to “marry, establish a home and bring up 
children.”377 He concludes his opinion with the specter of the state intruding upon 
married couples on a most intimate level: “Would we allow the police to search the 
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The 
very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marital relationship.”378   
 The first concurrence, which was twice as long as Douglas’s majority opinion, 
was issued by Arthur J. Goldberg and joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice William 
Brennan. (It is worth noting that Goldberg’s clerk, Stephen Breyer, researched and wrote 
the first draft, and in 1994 Stephen Breyer became the 108th Justice on the Supreme 
Court, appointed by President Bill Clinton.379)  Justice Goldberg’s concurrence focused 
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on the Ninth Amendment concerning rights retained by the People not specifically 
enumerated in the text of the Constitution. He asserted that the “concept of liberty” 
protects some fundamental rights, including a right to privacy in marriage, that are not 
specifically enumerated in the text of the Bill of Rights.”380  Justice Douglas referred to 
the Ninth Amendment, but did not focus on it.  In contrast, Goldberg made this the heart 
of his defense of a right to marital privacy.  He emphasized that the Ninth Amendment 
demonstrated that the framers of the Bill of Rights believed that the rights of the people 
went beyond those enumerated in the Constitution and encompassed a right to privacy.  
As he put it,  
Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words of the right to privacy 
in marriage, I cannot believe that it offers these fundamental rights no protection.  
The fact that no particular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State 
from disrupting the traditional relation of the family –a relation as old and as 
fundamental as our entire civilization—surely does not show that the Government 
was meant to have the power to do so.  Rather as the Ninth Amendment expressly 
recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as this one, which are 
protected from abridgement by the Government though not specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution.381 
 
By speaking about marital privacy as a right because it was “a relation as old and as 
fundamental as our entire civilization,” Goldberg, arguably even more so than Douglas, 
relies on a natural rights argument (akin to Upson’s) to suggest that this was exactly the 
type of right the Framers meant to protect when drafting the Ninth Amendment.382   
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 Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote the second concurring opinion.  The grandson 
of the famous dissenting Justice against racial segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 
the younger Harlan authored the most important dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman in 
support of the right to privacy for married couples.383  (Poe, as mentioned earlier, was the 
most recent failed Connecticut Planned Parenthood case against the Comstock law and 
paved the way for the Griswold case a few years later.)  Harlan’s dissent in Poe was 
much longer, and he referred to it in his concurrence in Griswold.  In fact, Harlan’s 
dissent in Poe made him, along with Douglas, one of the founding voices of reproductive 
privacy.  Longer than all the other opinions combined in Poe, Harlan’s dissent 
vehemently supported the existence of a constitutional right to privacy, grounding it in 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and defining it as a “rational 
continuum” that encompasses “freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and 
purposeless restraints.”384  Citing scores of cases to defend this broad conception of 
privacy, he went far beyond any of the briefs in discussing this new right as a matter of 
jurisprudential continuity.  Harlan placed emphasis on Douglas’s majority opinion in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942), discussed earlier in Chapter 2, as establishing a right to 
bodily privacy and reproductive integrity from intrusion by the state.  To Harlan, the state 
of Connecticut violated the privacy of the sacrosanct institution of marriage, and this was 
unacceptable.  He maintained that, “the sweep of the Court’s decisions, under both the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments amply shows that the Constitution protects the 
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privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion whatever character.”385  Noting 
that laws targeting procreation determine “when the sexual powers may be used and the 
legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up,” Harlan emphasized 
that these civic lineage policies form “a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of 
our social life that any constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.”386 
 In his concurrence in Griswold, Harlan cited his Poe dissent and briefly repeated 
his due process support for a right to marital privacy.  Unlike Douglas, Harlan did not 
feel the need to examine the Bill of Rights for any “penumbras,” but rather he believed 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment endorsed a broad enough 
concept of liberty to protect a right to privacy in marriage.  Given that Harlan had the 
reputation for being an advocate of judicial restraint and was widely viewed as the 
principled conservative on the Warren Court, his passionate support for a right to privacy 
is interesting given the conservative backlash against the right to privacy today.  As 
Harlan put it, “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stands, in my 
opinion, on its own bottom.”387   
 Justice Byron White wrote the third and final concurrence.  He attacked the law 
on more narrow grounds, emphasizing that the state’s purpose for enacting the law—
which the attorney for Connecticut named was to discourage illicit sexual relations—was 
not rationally sufficient to justify the scope of the state to cover married couples.  
Focusing on due process, he argued that the statute arbitrarily denied married people a 
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key liberty without due process of law.388  His argument is not explicitly grounded in a 
right to privacy, but it is rooted in a related concept of marital liberty that shares much in 
common with the idea of marital privacy. 
 Finally, the two dissenting Justices, Hugo Black and Potter Stewart, admitted that 
they did not agree with the law and found it downright absurd, but they could not find 
anything in the text of the Constitution that forbid state’s from passing “stupid laws.”389  
Speaking of the majority’s emphasis on a right to privacy, Justice Black wrote:  
The Court talks about a constitutional “right to privacy” as though there is some 
constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which 
might abridge “privacy” of individuals. But there is not…I get nowhere in this 
case by talk about a constitutional “right to privacy” as an emanation from one or 
more constitutional provision.  I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am 
nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless 
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.390   
 
Accusing Douglas of sloppy jurisprudence, Black raised the dreaded ghost of Lochner v. 
New York (1905) and the specter of judges making rather than simply interpreting the 
law: “For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic 
Guardians…”391  Likewise, in his separate dissent, Potter Stewart wrote that the 
Connecticut statute was, in his view, an “uncommonly silly law,” but there was nothing 
in the Constitution to use to strike it down.392  Endorsing privacy as a political ideal and 
not a judicial prerogative, he wrote that “I believe the use of contraceptives in the 
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relationship of marriage should be left to personal and private choice,” and he 
emphasized that he supported the idea that “professional counsel about methods of birth 
control should be available to all.”393  But since the right to privacy was not protected by 
the Constitution in the realm of birth control, he argued that the people of Connecticut 
were charged with repealing the law through the normal democratic process in their 
Assembly.   
 
2.3 Analysis: 
What are we to make of these six separate opinions in this landmark case on birth 
control?  Although the Court in Griswold fractured into numerous opinions, it is 
interesting to note that several factors stand out as striking points of consensus.   For 
instance, it appears that each of the nine justices—yes, every single one—makes it clear 
that he politically disagrees with Connecticut’s anti-Contraception law and supports the 
legalization of birth control for married couples.  When compared to the Court that 
refused to hear Nelson and Gardner twenty years earlier, this represents a remarkable 
point of political consensus, despite their doctrinal points of disagreement over 
constitutional interpretation.  Likewise, it is interesting to note that the public health 
argument, which dominated the birth control debate throughout the 1920s to the 1950s, is 
eclipsed by a completely different debate about a fundamental right to marital privacy in 
Griswold.  Indeed, out of all the ways the Court could have justified striking down the 
law, the justices in the majority gravitated towards theorizing a new right to privacy in 
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marriage to support this right.  What at first appears to be an unusually fractured Court in 
Griswold is actually a Court that found a surprising degree of agreement before 
splintering over where in the Constitution to locate a right to marital privacy.  This 
political consensus over the desirability of legalized birth control for married couples—
despite disagreement among the justices about whether or not it is protected by the 
Constitution (or where it is protected in the Constitution)—indicates, as I shall argue 
below a significant shift in the civic lineage order associated with the rise of a right to 
privacy in reproduction.   
 
3. Why Privacy? 
This section focuses on the significance of the Court’s decision to articulate a right to 
marital privacy in Griswold.  The Court’s emphasis on a fundamental right to marital 
privacy in Griswold, protecting birth control use by married couples, represents a 
fascinating civic lineage development.  No longer focusing on issues of public health or 
social welfare, the idea that reproductive matters qualify as a civil liberty is a pivotal 
moment in the development of civic lineage politics in America. This raises a set of 
important questions: Why did the Court endorse a right to marital privacy when there 
were other options for constitutionally overturning the Connecticut law?  And what does 
the advent of a right to marital privacy in Griswold indicate about the trajectory of civic 
lineage politics during this time?  Finally, in particular, does Griswold represent a 
loosening of the civic lineage regime, with the state stepping back in the name of 
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preserving the privacy of citizens from state interference?  Or does it represent support 
for a new dominant civic lineage regime? As I argue below, it does indicate support for a 
new dominant postwar civic lineage regime. 
 In a law review article, titled “Nine Justices In Search of a Doctrine,” which 
Thomas Emerson, also a professor of at Yale Law, published shortly after arguing and 
winning the Griswold case, he noted that there were at least five ways the Court could 
have chosen to strike down the Connecticut law.394  Acknowledging that “privacy” was 
by no means the only or inevitable outcome of the case, he wrote, “The case of Griswold 
v. Connecticut, like few others in recent times, presented the United States Supreme 
Court with a hopelessly unsupportable piece of state legislation and an unusual variety of 
possible doctrinal solutions.”395  According to Emerson, the five options the Court could 
have followed to strike down the law were as follows: (1) the Court could have relied on 
the equal protection clause, (2) the First Amendment, (3) substantive due process, (4) the 
right to privacy, or (5) the Ninth Amendment.  But while the “Connecticut law as a 
matter of social policy, had little or nothing to be said for it…and remained as a relic of a 
Comstockian philosophy which had long since ceased to be widely held,” Emerson 
emphasizes the “problem with the case was that the issue did not readily fit into any 
existing legal pigeonhole.”396  To put it another way, the difficulty that the Court faced in 
Griswold was that there was no clear Supreme Court precedent addressing the matter of 
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birth control as a civil right, nor does the Constitution ever explicitly mention issues of 
sexuality, reproduction, or contraception in its text.  This meant that “whatever course the 
court took,” the path would not be simple, because it would “be forced to enter uncharted 
waters [and] its action was bound to be pregnant with possibilities crucial to the 
development of the law in a vital area of American life.”397  In sum, Emerson suggests 
that each of the five options the Court could apply to this case would spur an alternate 
path in constitutional development, which would in turn shape the future trajectory of 
reproductive law.  
 So, what does it mean for the civic lineage regime that the Court chose privacy to 
overturn Connecticut’s anti-contraception law over alternative routes?  Of all five options 
mentioned by Emerson, the fact that the Court chose privacy over equal protection serves 
as a noteworthy critical juncture in the development of civic lineage policy.  This 
decision would have important ramifications in the future.  In Griswold, rather than 
striking down the Connecticut law in the name of equality—whether it be the right of a 
woman to determine the timing and number of her pregnancies or even the class 
distinction of the state only going after public clinics that served low-income women—
the Court based its decision on the grounds of a married couples right to privacy.  Unlike 
a right to privacy, which is not mentioned in the text of the Constitution, equal protection 
has the benefit of being an enumerated right under the Fourteenth Amendment.  But 
although the Warren Court had begun extending equal protection to racial discrimination 
during the black civil rights movement, the idea of extending equal protection on the 




basis of sex or class in this case would have paved new ground in 1965.  The Court had 
the opportunity to consider using equal protection doctrine in Griswold as an alternative 
to privacy, but consciously chose to reject this path.  Let us briefly examine why the 
Court chose privacy over equal protection, before turning to the civic lineage 
implications of this important decision. 
 During the Griswold case, John Hart Ely, one of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 
clerks and later a law professor at Yale, wrote a memo to the Chief Justice on precisely 
this topic.398 Ely first took aim at the idea of a right to privacy in his memo, stating that 
he disagreed with the arguments made by Emerson, Planned Parenthood, and the ACLU 
that a right to privacy can be considered a fundamental right enumerated in the 
Constitution.399  But in my view, the most interesting aspect of this memo is that Ely 
recommended that the Court use equal protection doctrine to strike down the Connecticut 
law. Noting that the law has only been enforced against public clinics serving poorer 
members of the community and not against private physicians or individual women, Ely 
encouraged the Chief Justice to focus on the inequitable enforcement of the law against 
low-income women.  “Although this argument takes up little in the appellants’ brief,” 
which focuses on privacy, wrote Ely, the equal protection argument “is one which to me 
seems very important.”400 Addressing the amicus curie briefs in his memo, Ely also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 John Hart Ely, Clerk to Justice Earl Warren, Memo on Griswold v. Connecticut, February 26, 1965.  
399 Against privacy, Ely wrote: Just as I think the Court should vigorously enforce every clause in the 
Constitution, I do not think the Court should enforce clauses, which are not there.  No matter how strong a 
dislike for a piece of legislation may be, it is dangerous precedent to read into the Constitution guarantees 
that are not there.  Despite Justice Brandeis’s lifelong crusade for a right to privacy, and despite the 
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(Summarized in Johnson, Griswold v. Connecticut: Birth Control, 136-7).  
400 Ely, Memo on Griswold (1965).  
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discussed the brief by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), noting that its shorter 
discussion of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment seemed stronger than its 
longer privacy argument.  Concluding that the anti-contraceptive law was being 
selectively enforced in an invidious manner, he drew a parallel between the Connecticut 
law and an Asian discrimination case in California from 1885 called Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins.401  The Court in Yick Wo found an equal protection problem with a California 
law, which used building codes to discriminate against Chinese laundry businesses.  In 
the words of the Yick Wo Court, the law might “be fair on its face and impartial in 
appearance,” but it was nonetheless applied “with an evil eye and an unequal hand.”  Ely 
recommended to the Chief Justice that the Connecticut law be overturned “on the ground 
that the law is administered so as to hurt only the ill-informed or poor.”402   
 Although Ely flagged this equal protection argument, this line of justification was 
an uphill battle in the Griswold case for two reasons.  First, the issue of sex 
discrimination was off the table.  Although the Court would later recognize in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey in 1992 that, to quote Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, “The ability of 
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been 
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives,” the Supreme Court did not 
extend the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to women until the 
1970s.403  Despite the fact that pregnancy uniquely impacts women compared to men, 
Emerson never raised the issue of sex discrimination in his entire Griswold argument, 
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reflecting the general lack of support during this time for equal protection for women.404  
He never mentioned the Nineteenth Amendment’s guarantee of voting rights to women to 
ground equality, or tried to extend the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
to sex in this case.  Unlike his privacy argument, the idea of equal protection for women 
was simply not ripe for the time.  In fact, the first time the Court struck down a law as 
unconstitutional for discriminating against women, using the equal protection clause, was 
not until Reed v. Reed in 1971.405  This happened over half a decade after the women’s 
movement gained momentum following Griswold.  Conversely, Emerson, Ely, and the 
ACLU all discussed concerns about equal protection based on socioeconomic status, but 
as Emerson acknowledged in his law review essay afterwards, an equal protection ruling 
based upon class would have been a much more radical decision than one based on 
marital privacy.  In his words, “It will not be easy to reconcile such equal protection 
theories with the economic and social laissez-faire assumptions and practices upon which 
our society has operated over many years and to which it still largely adheres.”406  
Whereas equal protection for women was beyond the reasonable ideational scope of 
constitutional argument at the time, equal protection based on socioeconomic 
disadvantage threatened to destabilize the economic foundation of American society.  
Marriage, in contrast, was a widely held traditional value in society.  As Emerson 
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portrays the situation, privacy was a much more narrow and less radical position for the 
Court.407 
 By rejecting equal protection, the Court closed one path and opened another. 
Griswold v. Connecticut is ranked among the most important landmark decisions in the 
twentieth century.  The first time that the Court articulated that a right to privacy 
protecting reproduction within marriage, what makes the Griswold decision particularly 
significant is that it marks the beginning of a line of politically controversial 
constitutional jurisprudence on the right to privacy regarding a range of procreative and 
sexual matters.  The right to privacy would later be used by the Court to justify the 
abortion decisions of Roe v. Wade (1973) and Doe v. Bolton (1973), which have eclipsed 
in many respects the original establishment of the right with its focus on marriage in 
Griswold.408  But despite the ongoing assault on constitutional privacy doctrine from the 
political right today, I want to emphasize that the original Griswold ruling was rather 
conservative in its scope and political implications.  The majority’s emphasis on marital 
privacy was the heart of the opinion.  “We deal with a right to privacy older than the Bill 
of Rights,” wrote Justice Douglas, “Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”409  By celebrating what it 
viewed as “traditional marriage,” the Court made no gestures towards altering marriage 
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or women’s place in it.  Rather than ruling in a manner that might restructure traditional 
domesticity or give women birth control in the name of women’s liberation—for indeed 
birth control could liberate women to pursue their ambitions, thereby reordering the 
meaning and structure of marriage—the Court ruled in favor of marital privacy in a way 
that celebrated marriage in its patriarchal sense without challenging either the 
socioeconomic or gendered landscape of the American family or society.410 Given the 
political controversies associated with topics relating to non-marital sex, focusing on the 
sanctity of marriage was a successful strategy on Douglas’s part for deflecting political 
opposition to Griswold. 
Douglas has received a great deal of criticism for his vague use of the term 
“penumbra” to establish a fundamental right.  However, in the months following the 
Griswold decision, virtually every legal commentator who analyzed the case agreed that 
the Court made the correct decision by striking down the Connecticut law.411  While 
many criticized the “nebulous language” and “muddy reasoning” in the majority opinion 
by Douglas, the anti-contraceptive statutes seemed to most Americans as inappropriate 
and unacceptable invasions of their personal liberty in an intimate dimension of their 
lives by the state.412  They were happy to see the Court step in and strike it down.  By 
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1965, national public opinion polls revealed that more than 80 percent of women 
supported the use of birth control by married women and most married woman had used 
birth control at one point or another (Johnson 20).413  Moreover, on May 9, 1960, the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) officially approved an oral 
contraceptive pill marketed by G.D. Searle and Company under the brand name, 
Enovid.414  Soon known simply as “the Pill”—probably stemming from women 
requesting it from their doctors in vague and discrete terms—almost 6.5 million women 
in America were taking oral contraceptives by the time Griswold v. Connecticut was 
argued before the Supreme Court in 1965.   
Just as importantly, World War II marks the end of “popular eugenics” in 
America, and the beginning of a global endorsement of human rights after the atrocities 
committed by Nazi Germany in the name of state-controlled eugenics.  In the televised 
Nuremberg trials, presided over by Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the nation 
witnessed war criminals being tried for the eugenic atrocities of the Third Reich. Fitter 
Families eugenic contests ended at state and country fairs.  As ‘eugenics’ became a bad 
word in America, a new discourse of “human rights” began to inspire ideas about civil 
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rights and equal citizenship both at home and abroad.415  By the 1950s, fears of “race 
suicide” gave way to different anxieties about global overpopulation.  The latter, like the 
former, was a highly racialized discourse about the wrong people (poor people of color) 
having too many children, but it lacked the positive eugenic push for the “right” citizens 
to have more children.  In 1952, John D. Rockefeller III founded the Population Council, 
and within the next decade, the United States government began sponsoring policies to 
educate and advocate “family planning” both globally and domestically.416  By 1965, 
President Lyndon Johnson endorsed the use of birth control in family planning policy in 
both his domestic State of the Union address and in a speech before the United Nations.  
During the Court’s debate about the merits of the Griswold case during the same year, the 
Justices were aware that Johnson’s War on Poverty incorporated family planning and 
birth control services into its plan, and American foreign aid programs started offering 
funding for education about contraceptive devices to combat world poverty.417  
Federal policy played a major role in normalizing the use of birth control.  Given 
the trajectory of “federal contraceptive policy” during the twentieth century, briefly 
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outlined above, it is no wonder that all of the justices thought the Connecticut Comstock 
law was “uncommonly silly.” 418  With its conservative praise of traditional marriage, 
Griswold sparked criticism about its constitutional analysis but little opposition from the 
public or even the legal world regarding the outcome of the case.  In fact, one of the right 
of privacy’s staunchest opponents, Robert H. Bork wrote in a 1968 law review article that 
Griswold was an excellent example of how “the idea of deriving new rights from old is 
valid and valuable,” because “the first eight amendments…may properly be taken as 
specific examples of the general set of natural rights contemplated” by the framers of the 
Constitution.419  He would later change his stance on Griswold in the 1970s, becoming 
one of its most trenchant and famous critics.  Bork’s change of heart coincided with a 
movement among lawyers to push for more sweeping privacy rights such as abortion, and 
he ominously wrote that the opinion provided “no idea of the sweep of the right to 
privacy and hence no notion of the cases to which it may or may not be applied in the 
future.”420 
 In the case declaring the Comstock laws as unconstitutional, the Court ironically 
relied on a rhapsody on the sanctity of traditional marriage to justify the marketization of 
contraceptives in pharmacies and public clinics, thereby coming close to turning 
Comstockian values on their head.  Moreover, rather than speaking about citizenship 
explicitly, Griswold established a relational right to privacy dependent upon the marital 
relationship and not possessed by the individual outside this relationship.  Indeed, 
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whereas Griswold legalized birth control for married couples as a relational right, insofar 
as it is dependent upon marriage rather than automatically possessed by the individual, 
after the case, millions of unmarried women in 26 states were still denied access to birth 
control.421  By framing access to birth control in this manner, it went to great lengths to 
appear to be judicially endorsing a particular vision of the reproduction of citizenship 
within a “traditional family.” Douglas’s opinion in Griswold is, in the words of David 
Garrow, “an enthusiastic paean to the importance of marriage in American life.”422  His 
reasoning touches on a host of amendments, but his focus is on praising the “sacred” 
institution of marriage and justifying its protection from undue state interference in 
marital privacy. The Court framed the right to privacy as a conservative avenue of 
judicial reasoning rooted in the traditional family, but the right would very shortly expand 
to the later more controversial privacy cases of Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) and Roe v. 
Wade (1973).  For this reason, I argue that Griswold ought to be recognized as an 
example of “camouflage conservativism” in judicial doctrinal development during the 
twentieth century.   
 The Court’s discussion of marriage is idealized, myopic, nostalgic, and wrapped 
in fiction.  But in this fiction, we locate something important.  The initial development of 
a right to privacy was not indicative of a withering of the civic lineage regime—with the 
state stepping back to let individual citizens make their own choices about matters of 
procreation and birth—rather Griswold is a decision in which the Court actively endorsed 
a specific civic lineage order.  This order is rooted in a particular inegalitarian conception 
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of marriage, and it was actually a lot more recent than Douglas suggests.  The idea of 
privacy in marriage is associated with the Victorian Era of separate spheres, which is not 
older than the state or the constitution, and was reworked, in postwar America into a new 
family ideal.423  With the fitter family ideal of eugenic citizenship weakening with the 
rise of the Great Depression and meeting its final demise during the Second World War, a 
new postwar ideal of the family and good citizenship emerged to fill the gap.  (Good 
citizenship was about conforming to these traditional norms as parents, and about raising 
your children as good citizens, and it was premised upon a particular idea of the postwar 
nuclear family.) Let us briefly examine what this ideal looked like in the following 
section, before turning to the later more controversial privacy cases of Eisenstadt v. Baird 
(1972) and Roe v. Wade (1973), which together signify the end of the postwar civic 
lineage order.424 
 
4. The “White Picket Fence” Ideal: 1950s Postwar Family and Citizenship 
What Justice Douglas labeled as traditional marriage, which he called older than the 
Constitution itself, actually had its origins in the aftermath of World War II and was a 
concept of marriage backed by federal policy.  The war opened unprecedented 
opportunities for women, particularly after the Great Depression in which work was 
scarce and good jobs nearly nonexistent.  During World War II while men were serving 
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in the military overseas, the government launched campaigns for women, married or 
single, to take on well-paying jobs that would have previously been considered “men’s 
work” in the name of national patriotism and the war effort.  Courted by the government 
via glamorized posters of the patriotic female worker in industrial jobs on the home 
front—most famously, the feminine yet muscular “Rosie the Riveter”—women became 
mechanics, welders, carpenters, lathe operators, truck drivers, factory workers, and 
indeed riveters, increasing the female labor force by almost 60 percent.425  But after the 
war ended, more than 3 million women lost their wartime jobs and were replaced by 
returning veterans.426  In response, the media and government together assured the 
women that they would actually be happier not working—all they had to do was find an 
eligible man to marry.  A 1944 article in Ladies Home Journal told women workers that: 
“If the American woman can find a man she wants to marry, who will support her, a job 
fades into insignificance beside the vital business of staying at home and raising a 
family.”427  The marriage rate had been low during the Great Depression, and the 
birthrate plummeted across the nation.  Now, the joys of courtship and marriage offered a 
ready solution to finding a new purpose and place in life for returning soldiers and 
displaced female workers after the war.  The ideal of “traditional marriage” became a 
mantra in postwar America.  In the words of Sociologist Willard Waller during this time, 
it is vital for the nation that “women must bear and rear children; husbands must support 
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them.”428  Echoing similar sentiments, J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, stated that a 
woman’s civic duty to the nation was marriage and motherhood: “Her patriotic duty is 
not the factory front.  It is on the home front!”429   
This was the backbone of civic lineage policy during the postwar period.  
Focusing on integrating returning veterans into civilian life and paving a path to a middle 
class lifestyle, domestic policy during this time created a welfare state ripe with 
opportunities for young veterans to build a better life for themselves and their family—
including the G.I. Bill, with educational and housing opportunities and a national 
employment policy that supported the idea of a breadwinning head of household.430  The 
GI Bill was incredibly successful at paving a path to the middle class for returning 
veterans.  Paying all the tuition of veterans that enrolled in college and a living stipend 
that increased if a man had a family, by the end of the 1940s veterans made up nearly half 
the student bodies at most colleges and universities.431  However, from a proportional 
standpoint, the GI Bill primarily benefited white men.432  African American veterans 
faced widespread discrimination in housing, ranging from overt violence to more subtle 
forms of racism such as redlining, which often pushed them out of middle-class suburban 
neighborhoods.  Likewise, racial segregation in education often stymied their abilities to 
take full advantage of these federal benefits.  This was also a highly gendered set of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 Quoted in Coontz, A Strange Stirring, 49. 
429 Ibid., 47. 
430 See Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  See also, Robert O. Self, All In The Family: The Realignment of 
American Democracy since the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), 17-46. 
431 Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History: How Love Conquered Marriage (New York: Penguin Books, 
2005), 223. 
432 See Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Actions Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-Century America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006). 
189	  
	  
government benefits: only 2 percent of returning veterans were women, and they received 
less than their male counterparts with penalties for having a spouse to “support them” that 
were not applicable to men in school with working wives.433  Across the board, federal 
policy actively sought to encourage a subset of privileged American citizens to conform 
to a new civic lineage ideal, comprised of a married couple with a breadwinner husband 
and a homemaker wife, and indeed in 1948 the U.S. federal income tax was changed to 
favor married couples that had only one primary earner.434 (While both the previous 
moral purity and fitter families civic lineage regimes were based upon gendered ordering 
within the household and racial segregation in society, but what is different during this 
postwar period is the national effort to use strong economic incentives through public 
policy to restore this order after the War.) Through federal policy, whites and blacks were 
given different opportunities, and the government encouraged women—especially white 
middle-class women—to stay home and bear and raise children for their breadwinner 
husbands.  This was a highly effective and far-reaching civic lineage policy, which 
successfully promoted the rise of a new postwar civic lineage regime, which focused on 
restoring the traditional family. 
Marriage rates rose sharply and reached all time highs in this postwar period.  
After the Second World War, Americans began to marry at a younger age, and family 
size increased dramatically with the advent of the postwar “baby boom.”435  In fact, 
between 1940 and 1960, the number of families with three children doubled, and the 
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number with four quadrupled with a peak in 1957 of 3.77 children born to the average 
American woman.436 I would venture to suggest that the “baby boom” itself, which lasted 
far longer than demographers would normally predict such an increase in birthrate after a 
war, was in part the product of government civic lineage policies, including those like the 
GI Bill bolstering economic security and pushing women out of the workplace and into 
the role of full time wives and mothers.        
 Like the fitter families of the eugenics era, we a have pictures of what this ideal of 
the family and good citizenship looked like in the 1950s.  In fact, this ideal continues to 
evoke nostalgia in segments of American culture today. When American families 
gathered in their living rooms to watch the most popular shows on television, they 
witnessed elegant homemakers such as June Cleaver, Donna Reed, and Harriet Nelson, 
married to breadwinner husbands, with houses in the suburbs, automobiles and two car 
garages, two to four children, and their home perfectly enclosed by a white picket fence.  
Ironically, when the birthrate was lower and “race suicide” was a widespread national 
concern, the (large) fitter families was the ideal promoted to the public as an example of 
good citizenship on two levels: Good citizens had many children, and their eugenically 
“fit” children would later grow up to become good citizens.  With the baby boom, 
however, the ideal was much smaller.  The ideal family conformed to an unspoken white 
Anglo-Saxon norm, with diversity almost completely absent from these popular 
television shows.  Moreover, as “Father Knows Best” reminded us, men were the heads 
of the household, with its extremely gendered ordering.   




 The postwar 1950s family ideal, like the eugenic fitter families ideal 
discriminated on the basis of race, gender, class, sexuality, disabilities, and the list goes 
on.  But the family ideal was now a nuclear one: Good citizens got married and had 2-4 
children, which they raised with great care to become good American citizens in the 
future.  Perhaps most interestingly, for my purposes here, is the symbolic significance of 
“the home” enclosed and protected behind an iconic “white picket fence.” During this 
time, the idealized home became shrouded in an aura of “privacy” in a manner that it had 
not before.  “A good wife,” according to the Saturday Evening Post in December 1962, 
“makes every effort to keep their home…a restful haven” for her husband.437  Even Dr. 
Benjamin Spock, the parenting advice author, maintained in the 1960s that: “women were 
made to be concerned first and foremost with childcare, husband care, and home care.”438 
From looking at these nostalgic pictures of the “White Picket Fence” family ideal of what 
good citizenship entailed in the realm of civic reproduction within the family, we learn a 
great deal about the civic lineage regime of the postwar era, both by what the ideals 
included and what was, by omission, absent from the screen.   
Importantly from a civic lineage standpoint, this new postwar white picket fence 
ideal of the family treated the act of sex between husband and wife as natural and 
necessary for a healthy marriage.  Having children was the patriotic thing for a couple to 
do, but the duty was fulfilled at smaller number of children than before and family 
planning was now widely considered healthier than abstinence for a happy and lasting 
marriage.  The normalization of sex—and media discussions of Freud—made the idea of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




birth control within the institution marriage an important part of the new ideal of the 
reproduction of citizenship. Indeed, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, many eugenicists 
like Paul Popenoe abandoned the sinking ship of eugenics advocacy and instead 
became—of all things—marriage counselors.  In particular, Popenoe authored numerous 
books on marriage advice and was nationally famous for a particularly popular column, 
“Can This Marriage Be Saved?” which he wrote for the Ladies Home Journal (i.e. one of 
the most widely circulated women’s magazines of the day).  His marriage column was 
based on case histories from his Institute of Family Relations, where he met with couples 
having difficulty in their marriage.439  In each article, he would describe how he saved 
rocky marriages by teaching young couples to appreciate each other in their roles as 
husband and wife.  In this vein, he often counseled women to control their bossiness, 
become less “frigid” in bed, and make their husbands feel more “manly” as the head of 
the family.  Significantly, he also wrote about counseling husbands on the importance of 
pleasuring their wives in bed and spoke openly about women’s sexual needs within the 
marital relationship.  He often ended his column with the joy of pregnancy (or the birth of 
a child), which signified that the marriage had been saved.440   
 Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that this is the very “feminine 
mystique” that Betty Friedan took aim at in her bestselling book in 1963.441  In her book, 
Friedan described the housewife who dropped out of college to marry and raise four 
children, but felt trapped in the home by “the problem that has no name”—namely, “as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 Molly Ladd-Taylor, “Eugenics, Sterilization and Modern Marriage: The Strange Career of Paul 
Popenoe,” Gender & History 13 (August 2001): 298-327. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963: repr., New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013). 
193	  
	  
she made beds, shopped for groceries…she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent 
question—‘Is this all?”442  Criticizing Freud’s theories about women and sexuality in her 
discussion of their role in the family and society, she suggested that the solution to the 
housewife’s malaise and lack of purpose in life was to pursue a career.  While The 
Feminine Mystique resonated powerfully among upper middle-class homemakers, by 
focusing on this ideal as if it was the norm, Friedan overlooked the interests of 
marginalized groups, such as women of color, who often found racism more constraining 
and experienced different forms of sexism than her description of the discontented upper 
middle-class housewife, and poor women, who were not socioeconomically well off 
enough not to work while raising their children.  Nonetheless, with the black civil rights 
movement in full force in 1965 and Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique on the best sellers 
list of books, it is peculiar to note that the very ideal that the Supreme Court embraced in 
its Griswold opinion was under assault from multiple fronts.  Not only did the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act finally include sex as a protected category against invidious discrimination 
(i.e. along with race, color, religion, and national origin), but in 1966 Friedan co-founded 
the National Organization for Women (NOW), which aimed to bring women “into the 
mainstream of American society now [in] fully equal partnership with men.”443   
The postwar ideal was in transition at the very time that Douglas drafted his 
Griswold opinion for the majority. Somewhat ironically, at the same time the postwar 
“White Picket Fence” civic lineage regime began to buckle under the weight of attacks 
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from multiple fronts—including the women’s movement, black civil rights movement, 
and youth counterculture on college campuses—the Court articulated an unenumerated 
right to marital privacy.  By the late 1960s, a common theme in the media was that 
traditional marriage was eroding with the rise of the “sexual revolution.”  Young people 
were increasingly having sex before marriage.  Birthrates in America began to fall.  The 
divorce rate increased to a record high.  (In fact, Douglas himself had already gone 
through multiple divorces and remarriages during his long service on the Court by the 
time he praised the sanctity of marriage in Griswold.444)  The eugenic anxiety of “race 
suicide” was no longer a popular public concern, but the worldwide population explosion 
was on the front pages of newspapers.  The Johnson Administration was launching its 
War on Poverty.445  In sum, the ideal family and the norms of civic reproduction that 
accompanied this ideal seemed to be in flux during the 1960s and 1970s, which brings us 
to the cases of Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) and Roe v. Wade (1973). 
 
5. Privacy for Individuals 
Albeit decided at the heart of the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s, the Court in Griswold 
officially grounded (and camouflaged) its protection of the use of birth control in a 
facially conservative right to marital privacy.446  Given that it was grounded in marriage, 
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could the idea of privacy protect individual decision-making regarding procreative 
issues?  This section focuses on the development of an individual right to birth control in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird and to abortion in Roe v. Wade, which would together dramatically 
change the landscape of the reproduction of citizenship.  As we shall see, this is a classic 
story of path dependency and policy feedback.  In his analysis of Griswold after the case, 
Emerson presciently suggested that it “is conceivable that sometime in the future, as 
mores change and knowledge of the problem grows, all sexual activities of two 
consenting adults in private will be brought within the right to privacy,” and even briefly 
mentioned the possibility of it extending to cover abortion.447  And in the aftermath of 
Griswold, there was a network of civil rights lawyers ready to test how far the Court 
would extend the concept of privacy with respect to birth control and abortion.448  Not 
only did Griswold play a vital role in mobilizing activists to challenge laws relating to 
procreation and sexuality, thereby creating a new political civic lineage agenda through 
policy feedback, but rather than focusing on prioritizing other constitutional arguments 
(such as equal protection), lawyers now gravitated towards testing the scope of the new 
right to privacy in cases involving issues of sexuality in a path dependent fashion.  The 
question was: Would the Court accept the challenge to extend the right to privacy beyond 
the institution of marriage? 
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5.1 Eisenstadt v. Baird 
Let us begin chronologically with Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972).449  William Baird, a former 
medical student turned birth control activist, was charged with a felony after distributing 
condoms and contraceptive foam at a lecture on birth control at Boston College.  Baird 
intentionally set out to challenge the Massachusetts state law, which the legislature 
amended after Griswold to allow only registered doctors and pharmacists to distribute 
birth control to married people. After personally handing a package of Emko 
contraceptive foam to a 19-year-old women at his lecture before 2,000 students, Baird 
announced to police officers stationed in the lecture hall that he just broke the law and 
dared them to arrest him so he could take his case to court.450  He was arrested and 
convicted to three months prison for disseminating contraceptives to an unmarried 
person.  After Baird challenged his conviction at both the state and federal levels, the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.  The question of whether the Court would extend 
the right to privacy to individuals was answered in this case.  In a 6-1 decision (Justices 
Rehnquist and Powell were not sworn in on time to participate in the case) in Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, the Supreme Court ruled that Baird had the right to distribute contraceptives to 
unmarried adults, thereby extending the right to privacy to unmarried individuals.451   
Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan spent most of his opinion 
discussing the lack of rational basis for the Massachusetts state law.452  He pointed out 
that Baird was arrested for committing a felony by simply distributing something 
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available at most drugstores and pharmacies.  The state also could not justify the law in 
the name of public health, because the same health concerns would logically apply to 
both unmarried and married persons. Yet the law allowed married people to use birth 
control.  Moreover, in response to Griswold and changing social norms, the federal 
Comstock laws were redrafted in 1970 to remove birth control material from its obscene 
materials classification.  Near the end of his opinion in Eisenstadt, Brennan linked the 
Court’s ruling to the right to privacy. Without theorizing the origin of the right to privacy 
anew on a different basis, Brennan simply used the equal protection clause to extend the 
right to unmarried people by sleight of hand and sweep of pen.  “It is true,” wrote 
Brennan, “that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital 
relationship.”453  He then proceeded to remove the relational aspect of the right’s 
foundation from the equation in Eisenstadt, noting, “the marital couple is not an 
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals 
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup” [italics mine]. Since married 
individuals had been extended the constitutional right to use contraceptives in Griswold, 
Brennan found that the denial of the same right—already established in Griswold as 
fundamental—to unmarried individuals violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In his now famous words, “If the right to privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single to be free from unwanted 
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governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child” [italics in original].454   
 This is a striking example of what I term ‘patchwork constitutionalism.’ Recall 
that, in Griswold, the right to privacy was established as explicitly protecting “the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms.”455 The Eisenstadt decision never challenged this 
doctrinal foundation of reproductive privacy in the institution of marriage or rearticulated 
a right to privacy that did not depend upon marriage from a doctrinal standpoint.  Rather 
than justify privacy rights for individuals independently, Justice Brennan built a 
patchwork extension onto the preexisting right (akin to an architect designing an addition 
to a house), thereby extending the right beyond its original foundation in marriage but 
nonetheless relying on this foundation as a (counterintuitive) steppingstone to achieve 
this new construction.  While Brennan acknowledged that Griswold established that “the 
right to privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship,” he overcame that 
limitation by proclaiming that what applied to married persons must also apply to 
individuals under the equal protection clause of the Constitution: “whatever the right of 
the individual to access to contraceptive may be, the rights must be the same for the 
unmarried and the married alike.”456  Eisenstadt accepted the right as already established 
earlier (in Griswold), and once the Court recognized privacy as a fundamental right 
applying to married individuals, then Brennan argued that this secondary patchwork logic 
in turn extended the same right to unmarried individuals.  What had been a relational 
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right was now recast as an individual right.  In her analysis of Eisenstadt, Mary Ann 
Glendon criticized Brennan for “abruptly severed the privacy right from its attachment to 
marriage and the family.”457  But what is interesting is that Brennan never fully detached 
the right to privacy from its foundation in family and marriage in the first instance.  
Leaving the logical foundations of privacy in marriage in tact in the case, Brennan 
divorced the right from privacy from its application only to marriage in a manner that 
supports Glendon’s interpretation in the end.  This is an interesting moment in 
constitutional development, and as we shall see it would have important civic lineage 
implications.  
 
5.2 Roe v. Wade: 
Decided by the Court just ten months later, Roe v. Wade (1973) has proven to be the 
much more provocative and politically contentious opinion.458  Few Americans—the 
justices on the Supreme Court included—anticipated the depth and intensity of the 
reactions to Roe.  At the time of the ruling abortion had not been a mainstream political 
(legislative) issue in national politics.  By ruling on the case, the Court unwittingly raised 
the issue of abortion to the national political agenda and spurred a larger political struggle 
over the topic of abortion within the country, which continues to this day.  This is a 
classic example of policy feedback, or how certain policies create new forms of 
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politics.459  The Court’s ruling in Roe created new political alliances, interest groups, and 
agendas—such that the identifications of “pro-choice” and “pro-life” now possess strong 
political meaning—and abortion has proven extremely divisive within American politics.  
In the words of Jack Balkin: “Roe energized new social movements that eventually 
divided the two major political parties over abortion rights and reshaped their respective 
coalition.  Securing and expanding the right to abortion became a central concern of the 
women’s movement, while opposition to Roe v. Wade awakened the sleeping giant of 
religious conservatives, who in turn helped shape the contemporary Republican Party.  In 
the process, Roe v. Wade became a central issue in federal judicial nominations, 
symbolizing not only the issue of reproduction freedom but also the larger question of the 
proper role of courts in a democratic society.”460  The emotional and religious 
attachments to this case are beyond the scope of my analysis here, for my focus is on the 
effects of government policy targeting procreation and birth and its connection to 
citizenship.  As we shall see in the next chapter, this ruling and the politics that followed 
it, dramatically altered the configuration of our civic lineage policies and landscape in 
America.  For now, let us briefly examine the Roe. v. Wade ruling by the Court in 1973.   
Roe v. Wade struck down a Texas law prohibiting abortion, dating from 1854.  
Roe was argued together with a companion case, Doe v. Bolton, which challenged 
Georgia’s less stringent abortion reform statute from 1968, based on the American Law 
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institute’s Model Penal Code.461  Since Roe v. Wade became the more important of the 
two cases because it dealt with the broader questions about abortion under the 
Constitution, I focus on Roe in this section.  In Roe, attorney Sarah Weddington, 
representing a twenty-two-year-old woman, Norma McCorvey (under the pseudonym 
Jane Roe), challenged the state of Texas’s anti-abortion statute on the grounds that it 
violated McCorvey’s rights to privacy and equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  McCorvey unsuccessfully sought an abortion in Texas after already giving 
birth to two children (one raised by her mother and the other adopted), but she did not 
know how to obtain an abortion “performed by a competent, licensed physician, under 
safe, clinical conditions” in Texas.462  Nor could she afford to travel out of state for the 
procedure, because she lacked a stable income.  The lawyer, who arranged her adoption, 
introduced her to Sarah Weddington and Linda Coffee, two lawyers, who were looking 
for a test case to use to challenge Texas’s strict anti-abortion law.463  McCorvey became 
“Jane Roe” and the district attorney for Dallas County, Henry Wade, defended the law for 
the state of Texas.   
In Roe v. Wade (1973), the Court ruled 7-2 that the right to privacy extended to a 
woman’s decision to have an abortion, but that this right must be balanced against the 
state’s two legitimate interests in regulating abortions: protecting women’s health and 
protecting potential human life.464  Harry Blackman’s majority opinion in Roe was 51 
pages long, more than 7 times longer than Douglas’s opinion in Griswold.   Blackmun 
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spent the bulk of the opinion summarizing the history of abortion laws in the United 
States, discussing the fact that the medical profession now supported abortion in the name 
of public health and family planning, and emphasizing that public opinion polls revealed 
that a majority of Americans now supported the legalization of abortion.  But when he 
finally turned to the constitutional issues involved in the case, he spent just a fraction of 
the opinion on doctrinal issues.  The foundation for the decision was the right to privacy 
established in Griswold, and modified in Eisenstadt.  In the words of Blackmun, “The 
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy or guarantee of certain zones of 
privacy does exist under the constitution.”465  In a moment of noteworthy equivocation, 
however, Blackmun groups all the concurring opinions in Griswold together to suggest 
that the right to privacy could be found in a number of places without influencing the 
Court’s Roe decision.  As he puts it, “The right to privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as 
we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation 
of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not 
to terminate her pregnancy.”466 Interestingly, a close reading of this sentence reveals that 
the majority of the Court in Roe is endorsing Justice Harlan’s recommendation for 
locating privacy in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than 
Douglas’s “emanations and penumbras” opinion, but hedging their due process support 
by saying that the location of the right is less important than the fact that a majority of the 
Court agrees the right exists (wherever it may be).  To support the majority opinion, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Ibid. 
466 Roe v. Wade, at 153. 
203	  
	  
Blackmun emphasizes that after Griswold an extensive number of abortion cases citing 
the right to privacy made their way to lower courts between 1970 and 1973, and “most of 
these courts have agreed that the right to privacy, however based, is broad enough to 
cover the abortion decision.”467   
 But this right is not an absolute right.  Although “the right of personal privacy 
includes the abortion decision,” Blackmun added that, “this right is not unqualified and 
must be considered against important state interests in regulation…and is subject to some 
limitations; and at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical 
standards, and prenatal life, become dominant…”468  Balancing a woman’s right to have 
an abortion against the state’s interest in public health, Blackmun introduces “the 
trimester system” in Roe.  (This no longer guides the Court’s approach to abortion today.) 
Blackmun originally circulated an opinion among the justices that would have extended 
constitutional protection to abortion only up to the end of the first trimester of the 
pregnancy and left the other trimesters to the states to determine whether (and how) to 
regulate abortion, but several of his fellow justices and their clerks lobbied him to extend 
the right up to fetal viability measured at approximately the end of the second 
trimester.469  Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, in particular, argued that limiting 
abortion to the first trimester didn’t give a woman reasonable time to discover she was 
pregnant, locate a doctor to provide an abortion, and take other key steps to arrange to 
have the procedure—from gathering necessary funds to getting time off work.  Marshall 
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was concerned that such a narrow timeline would disproportionately burden low-income 
and minority women, who already faced structural disadvantages in healthcare.  This 
convinced Blackmun to extend the timeframe.470 Dividing pregnancy into three 
trimesters, Blackmun devised a formula for determining when the state could regulate or 
ban abortion entirely.471  In the first trimester, a woman can make her own choice with 
the advice of her doctor whether or not to have an abortion.  In the second trimester, the 
state can pass regulations aimed at protecting the woman’s heath.  And in the final 
trimester, states can prohibit abortion in the interest of potential fetal life unless the 
woman’s health or life is at stake.  In this manner, the Court attempted to respond to the 
state’s interest in protecting public health, in addition to mitigating socioeconomic 
disadvantages some women might experience—through structural forms of inequality—
as serious hurdles to having an abortion. 
 
5.3 Would a Right to Privacy Protect Carrie Buck? 
The Court’s discussion of public health in Roe raises an interesting question about the 
scope of reproductive rights for vulnerable citizens like Carrie Buck, the young woman in 
Virginia who was involuntarily sterilized by her doctor following the Court’s ruling in 
Buck v. Bell.472   Although the Court has never officially overruled Buck v. Bell, most 
who are familiar with this case assume that it is simply a remnant of a different era, and 
has not been overruled because a similar case has not made it to the high court during the 
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second half of the twentieth century.  Surely a right to privacy would have protected 
Carrie Buck from involuntary eugenic sterilization?  It seems intuitive to assume that 
privacy in reproduction, protecting the decision “whether to bear or beget a child,” marks 
a complete and final rejection of eugenic principles by the Supreme Court.  If a 
fundamental constitutional right of individuals to reproductive choice had been 
recognized during Carrie’s day, this would have trumped the state of Virginia’s professed 
interest in protecting public health and social welfare—right?   
Surprisingly, the answer to this question is not entirely clear.  In a moment rarely 
discussed in Roe, Justice Blackmun not only asserts that the right to abortion is not 
absolute (and must be balanced against state interest in public health), but he also writes 
that, “it is not clear to us that the claim…that one has an unlimited right to do with one’s 
body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously 
articulated in the Court’s decisions.”  Then, explicitly citing Buck v. Bell (1927) as an 
example of a case in which the right to privacy did not protect bodily integrity, Blackmun 
bluntly states, “The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the 
past.”473  In short, the Roe Court references Buck v. Bell as a case in which a right to 
privacy would probably not protect reproductive choice over public health.  A surprising 
place to find support for eugenic sterilization, the Roe opinion casts doubt on the scope of 
this right to protect a young woman like Carrie Buck from being involuntarily sterilized 
in the name of the state’s interest in protecting public health and social welfare.  Of 
course we can surmise that the Court would probably rule differently in a case like Buck 
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today, given the shocking facts we now know about the case, addressed in chapter 2, but 
this guess is based on the presumption that civil liberties groups would rally to Carrie’s 
side and ensure that she received proper representation in Court.  As we shall see in the 
next chapter on Medicaid and family planning, the right to privacy does not always 
protect poor and marginalized women from state coercion in practice or ensure that they 
can realistically exercise their reproductive rights.  
 
5.4 Privacy and Civic Lineage Politics  
This brings me to the role of “equal citizenship” for women. The women’s movement 
gained increasing power in the 1970s and made control over women’s reproductive 
capacities a central part of its agenda.  For instance, the National Organization for 
Women (NOW) included abortion access on its “Bill of Rights for Women,” labeling 
reproductive choice as necessary for the full and equal citizenship of women.474  
However, in Roe, the Supreme Court opted to extend its new reproductive privacy 
doctrine to cover abortion, rather than pave new ground in the arena of constitutional 
equal protection for women.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, appointed by Bill Clinton to 
the Supreme Court in 1993 and a staunch supporter of abortion rights, has argued that the 
Court should have decided the case based on equal protection for women because the 
right to privacy weakens the force of the decision by diluting the true weight of the rights 
at stake.  In 1984, at the time on the U.S Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia, 
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Ginsburg expressed disappointment that the court “had treated reproductive autonomy 
under a substantive due process/personal autonomy headline not expressly linked to 
discrimination against women,” because control of her reproductive capacities is vital for 
a woman’s “ability to stand in relation to man, society, and the state as an independent, 
self-sustaining, equal citizen.”475  Likewise, Reva Siegel argues that abortion is a 
constitutional right necessary to achieve women’s equal citizenship to men, and that 
focusing on the state’s value of “unborn life” as Texas did in Roe is a way of using 
“criminal law to coerce and intimidate women into performing the work of motherhood” 
and treating women as “mothers—citizens who exist for the purpose of rearing children, 
citizens who are expected to perform the work of parenting as dependents and 
nonparticipants in the citizenship activities in which men are engaged.”476  In a society in 
which women continue to bear the most significant share of responsibility for the birth of 
children and their rearing, anti-abortion laws have the effect of compelling pregnant 
women into life-altering obligations, which restrict their present and future liberty and 
citizenship status in a profound way, perpetuating “second-class citizenship for 
women.”477    
 What is striking about the use of equal protection arguments in the context of 
reproduction, is their tendency to evoke the language of “citizenship” and the role that the 
regulation of reproduction has on shaping women’s access to (or lack there of) full 
citizenship.  The above quote by Justice Ginsberg is an excellent example.  She 
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emphasizes the role of reproductive choice in shaping the status of a woman as “an 
independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.”  Language like this leaves no question that 
these laws target civic lineage and are fundamentally about citizenship, but arguments 
based upon privacy, as we see in Blackmun’s opinion in Roe, tend to speak more broadly 
about the rights of “persons” and “individuals,” rather than about how access to such 
choices shape citizenship and civic status.  Indeed, directly taking aim at the right to 
privacy, feminist Catherine MacKinnon in 1983 stated that “A right to privacy looks like 
an injury got up as a gift,” noting that “the privacy doctrine reaffirms and reinforces what 
feminist critique of sexuality criticizes: the public/private split.”478  Although privacy was 
doing important work in terms of opening reproductive choices for women, it nonetheless 
evoked traditional notions women’s place within the family and implied on one level that 
women’s sexuality and control over their procreative capacities was NOT a properly 
public matter.  Rather than inviting state protection in the name of equality, it built a wall 
against state intrusion.  But although the legal “privacy frame” puts the state at a 
metaphorical distance, ironically it does so through state action: That is, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued the Roe ruling and it did so in dialogue with the other levels of 
state and federal government, which in turn responded by decriminalizing the procedure 
and then seeking to test how far legislatures could go when it came to making it more 
difficult for women to obtain an abortion.  While the language used by the Court seems to 
imply that the right to privacy exists prior to citizenship or is akin to a natural right 
(wherever it may be found in the Constitution), the story is rife with state action.  Both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Eisenstadt and Roe use the concept of privacy to do a great deal of civic lineage work, 
but this time the right to privacy seems to support different civic lineage goals than the 
idea of marital privacy in Griswold.  
 The most important point that I want to emphasize here is that these laws, based 
on reproductive privacy doctrine, are central components of the broader civic lineage 
regime today.  Irrespective of how one feels about the right to privacy and its political 
consequences, the fact that these are civic lineage laws is, in my view, fairly 
straightforward.  For instance, those who oppose abortion would be quick to point out 
that the National Right to Life Committee estimates that 58 million abortions have been 
performed in the 43 years between the Roe ruling and the beginning of 2016.479  This 
suggests that a lot fewer citizens were born as a consequence of legalized abortion in 
America.  Yet one can make similar claims about the role of birth control in preventing 
pregnancy in the first place, changing sexual norms and family expectations, and even the 
impact of women’s changing role in society and entrance into the workforce in large 
numbers since the 1970s.  Hence. I would argue that, rather than counting the numbers of 
abortions performed in the United States, the more significant question from the 
perspective of civic reproduction in this country concerns how access to reproductive 
choice—and subjection to coercion—is distributed across various groups within 
American society?  Do different groups experience diverging degrees or forms of 
choice/coercion in the realm of reproductive choice?  If so, then do they in turn give birth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




to children who are differently situated and have diverging experiences of civic status and 
political agency in America?   
 The answer is “yes.”  As we shall see in the next two chapters on abortion 
defunding under Medicaid and welfare reform, these laws treat potential and actual 
mothers of various groups differently in ways that structure the civic status of these 
women and the birth and standing of their children unequally in the United States.  As 
Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out in the (behind the scenes debates) in Roe, laws 
regulating reproduction have a tendency to create inequalities of civic status, birthrates, 
and childrearing opportunities between women of different demographic groups.480  
When civic lineage laws impact women unequally, on the basis of race or class for 
instance, these policies invariably shape both the birth of citizens (children) and the 
experience of citizenship (the status of these women and their children) in a manner that 
perpetuates and reinforces group-based inequalities through reproductive laws.  
 
Conclusion: 
In this chapter, I have focused on the Supreme Court’s development of a fundamental 
right to reproductive privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, and expansions in the 
privacy doctrine that followed this landmark case.  With the demise of the eugenic fitter 
family ideal during the Second World War, this chapter has discussed the advent of a new 
postwar white picket fence ideal of civic reproduction during the 1940s and 1950s.  
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Supported by government policies—ranging from the GI bill to tax reform offering 
benefits to married men—this ideal of the nuclear family with a breadwinning father and 
homemaker mother dominated the media and public policy for approximately two 
decades.  While different from the large multigenerational eugenic family ideal, the new 
smaller nuclear ideal nonetheless promoted a highly gendered, racially “whitewashed,” 
heteronormative, consumerist, and classist idealization of the proper American family.  
By extension, it provides us with a picture of the standards of civic lineage during this 
time—or, more specifically, the ways in which patriotic American citizens were expected 
to bring up the next generation of good American citizens and what this norm of 
citizenship both included and excluded in its romanticized form.   
Although birthrates actually increased during this time with the “baby boom,” the 
new ideal of the family was smaller. Postwar American culture emphasized a gendered 
division of labor within the family, accepted non-procreative sex between husband and 
wife as healthy for marriage, and placed a special value on the concept of privacy within 
the home.  Griswold, as I have argued, gives us a fascinating glimpse into one of the 
strongest state endorsements of this postwar ideal of marriage. Yet ironically, when the 
Court decided Griswold in 1965, this ideal was already cracking under the pressure of the 
civil rights movement, early women’s movement, and the sexual revolution of the sixties. 
For this reason, I have argued that the case of Griswold serves as an instance of 
“camouflage conservatism” by the Court, for this new privacy doctrine was pregnant with 
possibilities far beyond its rhapsody on the sanctity “traditional” marriage.  In less than a 
decade, the Court soon expanded the right to reproductive privacy to cover the right of 
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unmarried individuals to obtain birth control and choose whether or not to have an 
abortion.   
 The Court’s decision to detach privacy from its original grounding in marriage in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1971) and Roe v. Wade (1973) was an important sign that the 
postwar civic lineage order was in the mist of a radical transition.  No longer the 
dominant order, newspapers bemoaned the crisis in the American family and culture with 
the demise of the postwar ideal.  In the aftermath of the Court’s birth control and abortion 
decisions and in the center of rapidly changing sexual norms, the next decade would be 
marked by contestation over competing civic lineage orders.  This contestation would 
involve issues of the place of women in society, welfare racism, heterosexism, deep 
anxieties about the changing mores of sexuality, and the place of the family in American 
society (among other things).  Moreover, the fact that the Court placed individual sexual 
and reproductive rights solidly in the domain of privacy jurisprudence during the 1970s, 
rather than equal protection, would make reproductive rights vulnerable to a set of 
challenges at the state and federal levels. While the Court fully acknowledged that class 
was a major consideration in the opinions, analyzed above—for instance, poor people in 
Griswold needed public clinics to obtain birth control, and poor women in Roe were 
burdened by laws that compelled them to travel to another state to obtain an abortion—
the Court said nothing in either decision about whether or not the state had a duty to help 
ensure that poor people had access to birth control and abortion through the support and 
funding of public clinics for low-income people.  This raises an important set of 
questions about the meaning and scope of reproductive rights in American constitutional 
213	  
	  
law: What did a right to privacy require of the government for those who could not afford 
medical services like birth control or abortion and who were receiving Medicaid to cover 
basic medical care?  Does this right require positive aid to help low-income women 
receiving Medicaid exercise their right in a meaningful manner, or is it merely a negative 
right to be let alone by the state to make one’s decision?   Given the role that 
socioeconomic concerns played in both Griswold and Roe, these questions were not 
merely theoretical, yet how would the state and federal government respond?   
 I turn to this issue in the next chapter by looking at the advent of Medicaid health 
insurance and the funding (and defunding) of abortion for poor women by the 
government during the 1970s.  In the aftermath of these reproductive privacy cases, we 
witness a new civic lineage order emerging in the United States, which remains dominant 
to this day.  As I shall argue, this “neoliberal” civic lineage regime uses the right to 
privacy as a cover for effectively “privatizing” reproduction by pushing it out of the 
public sector into the economic marketplace, thereby placing certain groups of woman at 
severe disadvantages when it comes to exercising their reproductive rights.  The right to 
privacy, and the sexual and reproductive freedoms it now protects, has become a 
prominent battleground for diverging civic lineage alliances in the aftermath of Roe v. 
Wade.  These laws are unequivocally a part of America’s civic lineage regime.  But as we 
shall see in the next chapter, the reproductive victories, addressed in this chapter, did not 
result in a simple story of progress.  Their impact on the reproduction of citizenship is a 
story of the expansion of access to new reproductive choices for some, and comparatively 
more restrictive opportunities for others in a manner that creates and reinforces both old 
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and new forms of inequality in citizenship.  Let us now examine the roots of our 

























 The Birth of Neoliberal Citizenship 
 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court, as the previous chapter examines, developed and expanded a 
fundamental constitutional right to privacy in reproduction over a relatively short period 
of time, from birth control for married couples in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965 to the 
right of individuals to obtain birth control and abortion by 1973 in Roe v. Wade. 
Importantly, like all major legal developments, these Court rulings occurred within a 
larger political arena, and would invariably interact with a host of different government 
policies, including the new program of Medicaid.  During the same year that the Court 
issued its reproductive privacy ruling in Griswold in 1965, Congress passed President 
Lyndon Johnson’s proposed “War on Poverty” healthcare Amendments to the Social 
Security Act (i.e. Medicaid and Medicare), and Medicaid subsequently became the first 
public health insurance program in the United States for poor families.481  President 
Richard Nixon went further in 1970 with the passage of the Title X Family Planning 
Program, dedicated solely to providing individuals with family planning services in part 
through the establishment and funding of public clinics for the poor.482  Given that these 
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policies were enacted separately yet roughly during the same period of time, how would 
Medicaid and the Court’s new reproductive privacy doctrine fit together?  Would 
Medicaid support birth control and abortion as part of the government’s new family 
planning focus?  Or would the two come into conflict?   
 This chapter focuses on abortion defunding under Medicaid in the aftermath of 
Roe v. Wade and the beginnings of a neoliberal civic lineage regime during the mid to 
late 1970s.  The question of how far the new constitutional “right to privacy in 
reproduction” extended remained unanswered by the Court in Roe.  Hence, a number of 
political paths were open at this juncture, including the possibility of the Court linking 
abortion to equal protection and bolstering federal funding for family planning in the 
process.  But with the rise of the anti-abortion movement, a string of cases made their 
way to the Supreme Court between 1977 and 1991, which I broadly refer to here as the 
‘abortion defunding cases.’ As we shall see, the Court used the initial framing of abortion 
rights in terms of privacy (not equal protection) to effectively privatize abortion by 
allowing states and the federal government to withdraw public funding for abortion 
services for poor women under Medicaid.  Rather than framing abortion as a right 
necessary for women to achieve standing as equal citizens in America, the Court cast it 
instead as a private decision that requires no public (positive) support on behalf of the 
government, including states that fund childbirth through Medicaid.  Ultimately, as I shall 
argue, the abortion defunding cases offer a glimpse into the early development of our 
contemporary neoliberal civic lineage regime, which treats devices and procedures aimed 
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at expanding women’s control over their fertility as market commodities, thereby 
perpetuating a host of entrenched civic inequalities in the reproduction of citizenship.  
 This chapter is divided into eight parts.  Part 1 examines a series of expansive 
civic lineage developments from 1965 to 1973, including the advent of the Medicaid 
program and government funding of family planning.483  With the rise of the women’s 
and civil rights movements, I argue in Part 2 that a more egalitarian version of the ideal 
of voluntary motherhood appeared to be a genuine possibility.  However, it fell short 
once again from becoming the dominant ideal.  Part 3 turns to the rise of a different civic 
lineage ideal: Neoliberalism.  Here I focus on the advent of our American neoliberal civic 
lineage regime—incorporating and fostering a series of “homegrown” systemic 
inequalities pertaining to class, gender, sexuality, and race.  Pointing to evidence that this 
regime gained traction as a backlash against the victories of the women’s and civil rights 
movements (with abortion and poverty issues front and center), I begin to trace our 
contemporary neoliberal ideal of citizenship.  In Part 5, I turn to the Hyde Amendment, 
which was a rider introduced to the 1976 appropriations bill to ban federal funding for 
abortion under Medicaid.  Congress passed the Hyde Amendment by forming a new 
alliance between members of the religious right, anti-big government politicians, and 
those who opposed welfare and anti-poverty programs like Medicaid.  This coalition 
brought about the rise of our contemporary neoliberal civic lineage regime by redefining 
reproductive rights as consumer privileges to access “goods and services” like 
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contraception and abortion on the market.  Next, I examine almost twenty years of 
Supreme Court abortion defunding cases, from the 1970s to the 1990s.  These cases 
narrowed the scope of Roe and recast the purportedly fundamental right to reproductive 
privacy as purely a negative right against the state.  As I shall argue, the neoliberal ideal 
espoused by the Court in these cases is that of a self-sufficient citizen, who is wealthy 
enough to function as an independent and responsible market actor by paying for her own 
prudent reproductive choices on the economic market.  Finally, I end by examining the 
early dissents in these abortion-defunding cases and the objections of the dissenting 
justices to what they viewed as a disingenuous use of the market to foster civic 
inequalities, indeed hierarchy, in America.  We see the accuracy of their predictions 
today. 
 
1. The Development of Medicaid:  
With the rise of the women’s movement and civil right’s movement, the postwar white 
picket fence ideal of citizenship was under assault from multiple fronts.  What civic 
lineage order would replace it?  The rapid expansion of the welfare state to include 
“reproductive choice” for poor and minority women is a political moment in which 
Margaret Sanger’s ideal of voluntary motherhood seems in hindsight as if it was on the 
verge of becoming the dominant civic lineage order in America.  But with the advent of 
the anti-abortion movement, this alternative of ‘voluntary motherhood’ became an 
incompletely realized possibility yet again.  So, before examining the abortion defunding 
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cases under Medicaid, which took aim at these new reproductive policies and re-
characterized reproductive choice as a mere market opportunity (accessible only to those 
who can afford it), it would be useful to first examine the development of Medicaid and 
the federal government’s endorsement of family planning. 
 Let’s begin with the development of Medicaid, and some of the factors that 
contributed to the establishment of the program.  Prior to the Court’s decision in Roe v. 
Wade—declaring abortion a constitutionally protected right covered by privacy 
throughout the nation in 1973—Congress followed the Johnson Administration’s 
recommendation to amend the Social Security Act to pass Medicaid, thereby offering 
public insurance to poor people; particularly women and children on welfare.484  By 
1970, Medicaid covered family planning services, and the Nixon Administration 
expanded family planning for low-income women.485  Against this backdrop, the fact that 
the Court in Roe said nothing about whether or not the state had a duty to help ensure that 
low income women had access to abortion through public funding and clinics became a 
serious cause of contention within the Medicaid program.  Since the Medicaid program, 
discussed in this section, empowered states to establish their own public insurance plans 
with a great deal of state autonomy and discretion, the design of the policy left the door 
open to a variety of state responses—including the outright refusal to fund abortion while 
covering childbirth.  This would in turn require judicial clarification from the Court on 
the scope and meaning of the right to privacy: What precisely did a right to privacy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 Medicaid was passed in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security. Online history provided by 
Medicaid.gov at: https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/program-history/index.html 
485 Bailey, “Fifty Years,” 341-409. 
220	  
	  
require of the government for those who could not afford medical services like birth 
control or abortion and who were receiving Medicaid?  Did privacy require positive 
public aid and funding from the government to help poor women, receiving Medicaid, 
exercise their right to choose abortion over childbirth in a meaningful manner?  Or was it 
simply a negative right against government intrusion?  The answers to these questions 
would shape the reproduction of citizenship in ways that created and reinforced both old 
and new forms of civic hierarchy—particularly regarding class inequality and its 
intersection with race and gender in American politics.  
 During the 1950s and 1960s, Americans had the “highest mass standard of living 
in world history,” with the gross national product of the United States increasing by a 
factor of five from 1940 to 1960.486  This economic growth was due in part to the success 
of American corporate products both domestically and abroad (as much of the globe 
recovered from the Second World War), and the growth of the “military industrial 
complex” during the Cold War.487  In 1958, John Kenneth Galbraith, an economist, 
published “The Affluent Society,” in which he described the growing reach and strength 
of American corporations, their ability to create consumer demand through new targeted 
mass advertising, and the growth of a new professional class which now enjoyed more 
than “the rich rejoiced in a century before.”488  But shortly thereafter, in 1962, Michael 
Harrington, a socialist critic, countered with evidence about the “Other America” defined 
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by a “culture of poverty.”489  In addition to being a land of prosperity, Harrington argued 
that America was also a land of great numbers of people living in poverty yet largely 
invisible to the rest of American society (i.e. between 40,000,000 and 50,000,000), 
representing unskilled workers, migrant-laborers on farms, part-time jobs in the service 
sector, and people who existed in the shadows of the nation.490  These were the other 
American citizens, many of whom were minorities and woman, and Harrington argued 
that it was indecent that such an affluent society turned a blind eye to their poverty.491 
 In response to this debate about poverty in America, President Lyndon Johnson 
launched an “unconditional war on poverty.”492  In his State of the Union Address in 
1964, the President offered proposals to significantly expand federal support for social 
welfare on multiple fronts, including healthcare.  In his War on Poverty speeches, it is 
also worth noting that President Johnson specifically used the language of citizenship to 
rally national support for his program.  In his words, 
We are citizens of the richest and most fortunate nation in the history of the 
world…[We] have never lost sight of our goal: an America in which every man 
has a chance to advance his welfare to the limit of his capacities…There are 
millions of Americans—one fifth of our people—who have not shared in the 
abundance which has been granted to most of us, and on whom the gates of 
opportunity have been closed…[The War on poverty] Is an effort to allow them to 
develop and use their capacities as we have been allowed to develop and use ours, 
so that they can share as others share, in the promise of the nation.493 
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President Johnson emphasized that one of the centerpieces of the War on Poverty was 
public health insurance for the poor and the elderly, which he presented as “an 
opportunity and obligation—to prove the success of our [American] system.”494  These 
programs were intended and designed to help every American poor enough to qualify, 
and as part of his civil rights agenda, Johnson explicitly promised to extend his anti-
poverty programs to historically marginalized minority groups, including African 
Americans.  The creation of Medicaid, in turn, spurred legislation that offered new 
reproductive opportunities and options for the poorest citizens in America.  Medicaid, 
discussed below, is the most important of these programs when it comes to shaping 
women’s access to medical care relating to birth control and pregnancy—particularly 
poor women and children on welfare. 
 In 1965 Congress enacted Title XIX of the Social Security Act, which is 
commonly referred to as Medicaid.  The Medicaid program is a federal-state cost sharing 
program designed to fund the medical care for most welfare recipients and other low-
income individuals. Although participation in the jointly funded governmental program 
was completely optional for states, Title XIX authorized the federal government to 
reimburse states for expenditures covering a broad range of medical services for the 
needy at a guarantee of $1 of federal funds for every $1 spent by the state (and often 
more).  States could establish their own Medicaid plans, and would in turn have broad 
discretion over determining the extent and duration of the services it provided.  However, 
if they agreed to participate in the program, each state merely had to satisfy certain basic 
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statutory guidelines and regulations that met with federal approval.  In particular, as 
Laura Crocker summarized the requirements in 1981, Title XIX “requires that states (1) 
establish reasonable standards for determining the extent of the coverage; (2) fund similar 
services in equal amounts; (3) provide qualified recipients with equal duration and scope 
of services; and (4) act consistently with the stated objectives of Title XIX which is to 
provide medical assistance for those whose “income and resources are insufficient to 
meet the costs of necessary medical services.””495  Aside from these stipulations, the 
grants were generous and open-ended.  Filtered through federalism into fifty different 
state programs—thereby empowering states to pursue different plans and offer different 
opportunities to their poorest (Medicaid eligible) citizens—Medicaid became the primary 
mechanism of healthcare for women and children on welfare.  
 The advent of Medicaid was coupled with another major civic lineage 
development.  During the same period of time, the United States government also began 
to actively support family planning, both domestically and internationally.  In a Special 
Message to the Congress in 1966 on Domestic Health and Education, President Lyndon 
Johnson championed federal support for family planning and expanded healthcare 
associated with childbirth and childrearing as a means to strengthen the nation.  As he put 
it, “A nation’s greatness is measured by its concern for the health and welfare of its 
people.”496  Johnson called for increased funding for “maternal and infant care,” adding, 
“it is essential that all families have access to information and services that will allow 
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freedom to choose the number and spacing of their children within the dictates of 
individual conscience.”497  During this period, family planning was an issue of bipartisan 
consensus.  After Johnson, a Democrat, bowed out of the presidential race in 1968 in the 
midst of the increasingly controversial Vietnam War, the next President, Richard M. 
Nixon, a Republican, continued this dimension of the domestic War on Poverty in 1970 
by successfully supporting the Title X Family Planning Program, as part of the Public 
Health Service Act.498  Nixon was careful and strategic about maintaining many of the 
social policies of the Great Society while trying to use the new programs and funding to 
encourage more conservative goals like population control and family planning, 
announcing “we are all Keynesians now.”499  (In a nutshell, the Keynesian state is 
premised on the idea of an economy that manages business cycles using fiscal and 
monetary tools and limits impact of downturns and inequalities with a basic social safety 
net.)   
 Nixon’s Title X Family Planning Program—which is not part of Medicaid and 
serves a broader group of low-income people—is the only federal grant program 
dedicated purely to providing individuals with comprehensive family planning and 
related preventative health services.500  Rather than matching state funds under the 
Medicaid scheme, this program—with explicit civic lineage aims for the government to 
increase the access poor women have to information about birth control and to 
contraceptive devices—instead focuses on supporting and funding public clinics to 
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provide services to low-income individuals who might not otherwise have access to them.  
Speaking of the program in 1969, President Nixon stated: “ It is my view that no 
American woman should be denied access to family planning assistance because of her 
economic condition…This we have the capacity to do.”501  Additionally, using language 
consistent with Margaret Sanger’s public health framing of family planning associated 
with her “clinic plan,” the primary sponsor of the Title X statute in Congress, then-
Representative George H. W. Bush, expressed his strong support for the Act as both 
voluntary for women and a matter of public health:  
We need to make population and family planning household words.  We need to 
take sensationalism out of this topic so that it can no longer be used by militants 
who have no real knowledge of the voluntary nature of the program but, rather are 
using it as a political stepping stone.  If family planning is anything, it is a public 
health matter.502   
 
During the Nixon Administration in 1972, Congress also Amended the Medicaid 
Program to establish family planning for Medicaid beneficiaries nationwide by requiring 
participating states to include “family planning services and supplies furnished (directly 
or under arrangements with others) to individuals of child-bearing age (including minors 
who can be considered to be sexually active) who are eligible under the state plan and 
who desire such services and supplies.”503  In this bill, passed by Congress just one year 
before the Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade, the federal government offered an additional 
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incentive to states for complying with its family planning program by increasing the 
matching rate in all states to 90% federal funds for family planning services and 
supplies.504  Through policies like this, the government appeared to be acknowledging the 
importance of the reproduction of American citizenship across generations, and actively 
designing laws aimed at reducing inequality in reproductive choice. 
 In sum, during a short period of time—from 1965 to 1973—different branches of 
the federal government enacted a number of programs and public policies relating to 
pregnancy and childbirth.  Addressing intersecting issues concerning fertility and 
reproduction, these separate civic lineage developments would inevitably interact with 
each other in the political arena.  First, Medicaid used public provisions to fund medically 
necessary treatment for the poorest members of society, including covering family 
planning, prenatal care, and childbirth.  Second, Title X established public clinics to 
provide information and healthcare for poor women.  And, finally, in Roe v. Wade and 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court declared that individuals possessed a fundamental 
constitutional right to reproductive privacy, which encompassed a woman’s decision in 
correspondence with their doctor whether or not to seek out birth control or have an 
abortion during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.  With so many parallel civic lineage 
developments happening in tandem during the 1960s through the mid-1970s, would the 
different policies work together in a complementary manner?  Or would they produce 
new forms of political friction and conflict?  Given that this appears to be a transitional 
period in civic lineage politics in America, how would the development of Medicaid and 




the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade fit together?  And, finally, how would the 
interaction between these policies impact civic lineage politics in the United States?   
 The Court in Roe didn’t mention Medicaid, and the Medicaid program likewise 
made no reference to abortion.  This is normal for public policies of that scope, but the 
broad language nonetheless opened the space for contestation over how the two would fit 
together.  Since there was no inevitable contradiction between these policy developments, 
the practical matter of whether or not they worked together smoothly would depend upon 
the actions of legislatures and courts. The federal government initially assumed that 
Medicaid would cover abortion procedures for poor women receiving Medicaid.  Shortly 
after the Roe decision, during the Nixon Administration, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) began to reimburse states for abortion expenditures 
provided to indigent women under Medicaid.505  This federal decision reflects the 
administration’s initial recognition that abortion, after the Court’s decision in Roe, 
constituted a legitimate medical treatment in the context of the Medicaid program.  In 
addition to providing other family planning devices and services like birth control, from 
1973 until 1977, state and federal Medicaid plans funded between 250,000 and 300,000 
abortions for indigent women each year.506  Although Medicaid did not mention abortion 
specifically even in its family planning Amendments in 1972 (established prior to Roe), 
the procedure was widely assumed, after the Court’s Roe ruling, to qualify as part of 
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Medicaid and a matter of family planning.  As a result, Medicaid paid for almost one-
third of all abortions annually, during this time, in the United States.507  
 
2. The Triumph of the Voluntary Motherhood Ideal? 
In this political climate of rapid change, it is valuable to take stock of the political 
moment.508 During this extraordinary time in American politics, the idea that the 
government had a responsibility to actively combat poverty and inequality through anti-
poverty legislation was becoming institutionalized in public policy in ways that extended 
to reproductive rights.  With President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society,” and in 
particular his War on Poverty programs, the Keynesian economic ideals of a managed 
economy—which partly inspired Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Social Security Act of 1935 (in 
response to the Great Depression)—not only remained the dominant economic paradigm 
but received renewed political support. This was not a mere blip on the political radar, 
rather it was a prolonged transitional period of nearly a decade in which the future of 
civic lineage policy remained uncertain but appeared increasingly hopeful—from an 
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egalitarian feminist standpoint. Given that the U.S. government rapidly began to embrace 
reproductive freedom (and even took the initiative of funding public clinics for the poor), 
this raises the question of whether this was a sign that Margaret Sanger’s ideal of 
voluntary motherhood finally triumphed?  
 Although this new version of voluntary motherhood was not identical to the one 
espoused by Sanger in the 1920s, it appears to share many of the same premises in its 
revised 1970s version.  Sanger’s ideal of voluntary motherhood, as discussed previously, 
involved a woman having the freedom to “control her own body,” for “No women can 
call herself free until she can choose consciously whether she will or will not be a 
mother.”509  As this quote illustrates, Sanger viewed voluntary motherhood as first-and-
foremost about women’s freedom and equality as citizens in the United States.  
Admittedly Sanger did not align with the political cause of abortion when she 
spearheaded the early birth control movement against the Comstock Laws in the early 
twentieth century.  When any form of contraception was illegal during the 1920s and 
1930s, she spoke of access to birth control as sufficiently revolutionary.  Later, Sanger’s 
ideal of voluntary motherhood was extended by the same organization she founded, 
Planned Parenthood, to include abortion along with birth control as key for empowering 
women to choose whether and when they wished to become mothers.510  So, during this 
time, we encounter the real and tangible possibility that something resembling Margaret 
Sanger’s ideal of voluntary motherhood might finally be on the horizon (and in broader 
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and more egalitarian terms than she herself first articulated it half a century earlier).  
Consider Sanger’s emphasis on the importance of establishing public clinics for the poor 
in her “clinic plan.”  Reframing this plan on as egalitarian terms as possible, Planned 
Parenthood and other civil liberties organizations followed her agenda for years without 
much assistance (and often strong opposition) from the government.  Finally, in Title X 
in 1970, Congress passed Richard Nixon’s proposed legislation that focused specifically 
on the issue of establishing public (government-funded) reproductive health clinics to 
serve poor women across the nation and provided large amounts of federal funding to 
Planned Parenthood clinics for providing expanded services to the poor. In the face of 
these rapid and sweeping changes in public civic lineage policy, it is worth asking 
ourselves whether this signals a new or impending dominance of a voluntary motherhood 
ideal of the reproduction of citizenship? 
 The short answer is no.  Once again, this is a story of missed opportunities and 
unrealized possibilities from the standpoint of the voluntary motherhood ideal.  While 
there was a time in which an alliance supporting a revised voluntary motherhood ideal 
seemed to be on the verge of victory, as we shall see, the Keynesian economic values and 
political ideas that supported these increasingly egalitarian civic lineage policies were 
shortly thereafter eclipsed by a new increasingly powerful economic ideology in 





3. Neoliberalism & Civic Lineage: 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the abortion defunding cases and tracing the rise of 
our contemporary neoliberal civic lineage regime, it would be useful to first clarify what I 
mean by ‘neoliberalism.’  The rise of neoliberalism is rarely discussed in terms of 
reproductive policy, which has allowed an important transition in contemporary 
citizenship to remain largely overlooked.  The restrictions on federal funds for abortion 
under Medicaid in the 1970s, examined in this chapter, not only went hand-in-hand with 
a neoliberal attack on the welfare state, but they also played an arguably pivotal role in 
the rise of early neoliberalism in America. In this section, I specify how I am using this 
term in the context of reproductive policy. I maintain that neoliberalism shaped civic 
lineage policy, ushering in a new dominant civic lineage regime in contemporary 
America.  This neoliberal discourse and policy package appears to have gained political 
traction in part as a conservative backlash against the aforementioned victories of the 
civil rights and women’s movements, along with adverse economic conditions in the 
1970s that many blamed on Great Society policies. As the Court outlawed the formal 
legal subordination of women and minorities for being unconstitutional in America, the 
“pro-traditional family” religious right, fiscal conservatives, and racial conservatives 
(now supporting colorblind racial policies) united to create an alliance supporting a new 
mechanism of creating and maintaining civic inequalities through the regulation of 
reproduction and birth: The private market.511     
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 What is neoliberalism?  A notoriously difficult concept to pin down, 
‘neoliberalism’ has become a signifier for a variety of global and domestic political 
trends involving economic deregulation, the privatization of traditionally public services, 
expanding market relations and mass marketization, subsidizing private companies, and 
the increasing commercialization of virtually all aspects of human life.512  As Loïc 
Wacquant puts it, “Neoliberalism is an elusive and contested notion, a hybrid term 
awkwardly suspended between the lay idiom of political debate and the technical 
terminology of social science.”513  For many, the idea of “neoliberal citizenship” may at 
first glance appear to be a contradiction in terms.  In international politics, for instance, 
the ideology and practice of “neoliberalism” is often portrayed as undermining the 
significance of the modern nation-state in an increasingly globalized world.514  This, by 
extension, lessens the import of national citizenship in the face of a global economy and 
transnational corporations.  Yet, as I shall argue, the American brand of neoliberalism 
supports a “strong state,” on a domestic level, at the same time it reorganizes statecraft 
according to market ideals and privatization. 
 The most widely accepted account of the origins of neoliberalism, elaborated in 
David Harvey’s Brief History of Neoliberalism and Manfred Steger and Ravi Roy’s 
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Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction, locates the roots of this ideology in Cold War 
critics of the social welfare state, such as Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman.  Aimed 
at dismantling the Keynesian welfare state and promoting free market ideology, these 
ideas subsequently developed into a post-Keynesian economic orthodoxy, as they 
penetrated a growing network of sympathetic right-wing think-tanks, such as the 
American Enterprise Institute.515  In conservative think-tanks, the intellectual ideas were 
transformed into practical political agendas and policy packages, which we have come to 
associate with the celebration of free markets, low taxes, the deregulation of trade, the 
privatization of public assets and traditionally public services, an attack on labor unions, 
and the retrenchment of the welfare state.516  The elections of Margaret Thatcher in Great 
Britain in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the United States in 1980 are widely viewed as 
ushering in the formal period of neoliberal dominance in political and economic policy in 
Britain and the United States, with both leaders deriding Keynesianism and setting out to 
weaken their nation’s respective labor movements and social safety nets.517  As the 
examples of Reagan and Thatcher illustrate, there is both a global and a domestic politics 
of neoliberalism.518  Thus, while neoliberalism is often associated with the globalization 
of economic markets, it also functions as an ideological program of domestic governance 
and the reorganization of statecraft according to laissez-faire free market ideals.  
Importantly, as I shall argue, a neoliberal state requires “neoliberal citizens.” 
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 Here I focus on a uniquely American neoliberal regime.519  In practice, no 
ideology comes in a “one size fits all” package, and hence neoliberalism, as a system of 
statecraft in U.S. domestic policy, incorporated and reworked preexisting civic 
hierarchies of race, gender, and sexuality in the United States.  Whereas conventional 
wisdom typically credits the demise of official Keynesianism and rise of neoliberalism to 
the OPEC oil crisis and economic recession of 1973-1974, this is an incomplete and 
partial explanation for the domestic ascent of neoliberalism and the specifically 
“American” configurations it followed.520  Missing from this explanation is the fact that 
the doctrine gained much of its political strength in America during the mid-1970s as a 
reactionary backlash against the successes of the progressive left social movements of the 
1960s and 70s.  In the aftermath of the civil rights victories of the Great Society and its 
War on Poverty, a burgeoning neoliberal conservative opposition to the welfare state 
found important allies in the newly mobilized religious right, which sought to return to 
the “traditional” family—or what Robert O. Self calls the male “breadwinner” family.  
Nostalgia for this “white picket fence” ideal (i.e. under siege by feminism, civil rights, 
and the early gay rights movement) provided a point of “coming together” for new allies 
in the political arena.521  As Thomas Palley notes, “Throughout the period of Keynesian 
dominance, there remained deep conservative opposition within the United States that 
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provided a base from which to launch a neoliberal revival.”522  The “family values” 
religious right advocates, racial conservatives, and fiscal conservatives formed a tight 
political alliance based upon their mutual interest in dismantling the welfare state.  Far 
from being strange bedfellows, as is often assumed, the “pro-family” politicians and 
fiscal (spending-cutback) conservatives during the 1970s and 1980s, these groups each 
eschewed the welfare state and celebrated the (mythological) idea of the self-sufficient 
“head of household” citizen who exercised freedom on the market without dependency 
on the state. This, as I shall argue, is evident in the discourse surrounding abortion 
defunding under Medicaid—which condemned welfare dependency as part of its attack 
on the Medicaid program and blamed poor women for making irresponsible reproductive 
choices.   
 The abortion defunding cases, examined throughout this chapter, endorsed the 
market privatization of the right to reproductive privacy. When the Court in the early 
reproductive rights cases of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe elaborated a fundamental right 
to reproductive choice in a “right to privacy” under the Constitution, there is good reason 
to believe that many of the Justices in the majority viewed the right as fundamental and 
robust: Justice Blackmun, the author of the majority opinion in Roe, would later 
emphasize this point.523  However, the Court in Roe did not specify what affirmative 
duties the right might require from the states under programs like Medicaid, or the scope 
of privacy in this context.  With privatization and marketization assuming a more central 
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role in governance in America during the mid-1970s, the Court’s earlier decision to 
ground reproductive rights in “a right to privacy” opened up a fairly easy path of attack 
for its opponents seeking to limit reproductive choice.  While a right to privacy could be 
conceived broadly as providing protection for reproductive autonomy, decision-making, 
and bodily integrity (all ideas consistent with voluntary motherhood), it could also refer 
to the classical idea of liberty as a narrow negative right against state interference and 
nothing more (neoliberal retrenchment).  Under the second of these alternative 
formulations of privacy rights, the state has no affirmative obligation to ensure that 
women have access to meaningful reproductive choice when they lacked the economic 
capabilities to exercise their reproductive choices on the private market.  Focusing on the 
market gave this a thin veneer of equality.  Since the women’s movement and civil rights 
movements were largely successful in their goals to eliminate formal legal discrimination 
under the law by the end of the 1970s, the subordination of women and minorities was no 
longer explicitly built into the law yet remained a prominent part of the American 
landscape and private decision-making on the economic market.  Under this neoliberal 
model, women and people of color could function as primary breadwinners, opening new 
doors for some hitherto excluded individuals to access reproductive opportunities on the 
market. However, when overt legal discrimination disappears, the next most effective 
way to enforce historically salient civic hierarchies is by privatizing discrimination 
through making it subject to the whims of the private market, a market in which 




 For instance, Susan Braedley and Meg Luxton describe neoliberalism as a 
“gendered regime” writing that, “neoliberalism’s core theoretical premise and its practice 
in conjunction with the prevailing sex/gender divisions of labor” has actually fostered a 
“decline in women’s positions and material well-being” on a broader level.524  Even with 
laws forbidding overt workplace discrimination, women are typically paid lower salaries 
than their male counterparts in similar positions in the private market.525  They are also 
responsible for more of the unpaid work of raising children and sustaining families that 
gets done in private households.526   By transforming reproductive choice into a market 
choice more than a civil right, the privatization of a right to privacy from the outset 
targeted non-affluent single mothers, disproportionately minorities, who were the least 
able members of society to express their civic freedom as consumers on the private 
market.  In this respect, neoliberalism was fueled by the legal successes of the civil rights 
and women’s movements, but this alliance used the end of formal subordination to foster 
a backlash against policies aimed to rectify the past ills of discrimination.  This twist to 
the story of the “right to privacy” played a pivotal role in the development of our 
contemporary civic lineage regime, which uses the commercialization, commodification, 
and marketization of reproductive technologies and services on the private market to 
perpetuate and sometimes deepen a landscape of civic inequality in America today.  
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When the government actively privatizes public services by pushing them onto the 
market, the state’s decision to privatize remains a consequence of state action and public 
policy, and state action then enforces market choices.  This in turn alters the reproductive 
opportunities available to different citizens based upon the ways in which past civic 
hierarchies map onto class inequality in the United States today, intertwining with race 
and gender inequalities.   
 Wendy Brown has recently pointed out the ways in which neoliberalism 
penetrates all aspects of political life, including transforming private relations into 
commoditized encounters and undermining democratic citizenship.527  However, the idea 
that neoliberalism offers its own “ideal of citizenship” remains largely overlooked and 
under-developed in political science.  This makes sense because neoliberalism appears to 
undermine the many of the most cherished values associated with democratic citizenship, 
replacing an emphasis on engaged political participation and civil rights with a culture 
and practice of mass consumerism.  Nonetheless, while neoliberalism depoliticizes civic 
membership in important ways—by transforming traditional civil rights into consumer 
protections, commercializing collective concerns, and privatizing public services—I 
nonetheless seek to document ways in which neoliberalism also ironically restructures 
citizenship by fostering a distinctively neoliberal ideal of citizenship that offers a picture 
of the type of body politic (or people) necessary for the state to function smoothly 
according to a politicized market.  Here I argue that there is a neoliberal ideal of 
citizenship, and a neoliberal civic lineage regime aimed at structuring the reproduction of 
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citizens across generations.  Indeed, a neoliberal nation requires a population of properly 
neoliberal citizens to make the system work—that is, a populace which accepts the norms 
of neoliberalism, including its emphasis on personal responsibility and its theory of the 
individual as finding true freedom through consumerism and market choices.  (I will 
discuss the precise configurations of this neoliberal regime—and what this ideal of good 
citizenship and civic reproduction looks like—throughout the rest of this chapter and the 
next.)  For now, the important task at hand is to trace the mechanisms by which this civic 
lineage regime skyrocketed to prominence in the mid to late 1970s, and did so in part via 
targeting reproductive policy.   
 The fact that the Supreme Court grounded birth control and abortion in a right to 
privacy was the ideal opportunity for an alliance between the religious right, racial 
conservatives, and the new neoliberal market fundamentalists.  This provided an opening 
for reframing reproductive rights for the poor under Medicaid as a consumer protection 
rather than a civil right. Ultimately, the fact that Roe was founded on a fundamental right 
to privacy provided an opening for a burgeoning neoliberal alliance to form tighter ties 
and redefine terms like “privacy” and “choice,” according to their market ideology and 
the rhetoric of consumerism under Medicaid.  Let us turn now to the origins of these 
early “abortion defunding” efforts, which, as we shall see, offer a unique glimpse into the 





4. Federalism: Abortion Defunding in the States 
In the aftermath of the Court’s decision in Roe, we immediately encounter friction at the 
state level over whether or not the voluntary motherhood ideal ought to apply in the 
context of Medicaid.  With the federal courts compelling states to fund abortion under 
Medicaid and the federal government matching their funds under the program, the 
possibility of voluntary motherhood appeared to be on the horizon.  However, in a matter 
of a few years, we encounter a national shift away from voluntary motherhood towards a 
neoliberal approach to civic reproduction.   
 The initial response of the Nixon Administration to the Court’s ruling in Roe v. 
Wade was simply to incorporate abortion, as a medical procedure concerning pregnancy, 
into the existing program of Medicaid.  The Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare did this swiftly and effectively (at the federal level), treating the legalization of 
abortion as consistent with the goals of Medicaid. But the design of the Medicaid 
program soon complicated the relationship between abortion and Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act.  Medicaid, as mentioned above, was designed to empower the state 
governments to determine the meaning of what procedures qualified as medically 
necessary.528 As long as they abided by a few basic federal guidelines, each state could 
tailor its own program with significant latitude. The program itself encouraged a system 
of state control that meant that what California covered would, for instance, almost 
certainly be different from Arkansas, Texas, or New York. The federal government in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




turn would provide matching funds based on what the states decided to fund.  By filtering 
Medicaid through American federalism, Title XIX of the Social Security Act offered a 
political opening for opponents of abortion to attempt to defund it at the state level by 
excluding it from their own Medicaid plans.529  And if the states didn’t pay for a 
procedure like abortion, then the program provided no matching funds from the federal 
government.  This in turn led to a series of federal court cases, which would later be 
appealed to and heard by the Supreme Court in 1977 as the “abortion defunding cases” 
under Medicaid.  
 In the aftermath of Roe, the anti-abortion movement—empowered by strong 
support from the Catholic Church— mobilized and began to lobby both state and federal 
legislatures to oppose spending tax money on financing abortion through Medicaid.530   
Over a dozen states passed legislation denying state funding under Medicaid for abortion. 
Of particular note, Pennsylvania and Connecticut outlawed public funding for what they 
framed as elective (or optional) abortions, but permitted funding for abortions deemed 
“medically necessary.”  In addition to a host of similar laws regulating Medicaid at the 
state level, the Mayor of St. Louis, Missouri issued a directive banning municipal 
hospitals from performing abortions, except when doing so is necessary to either save the 
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life of the pregnant woman or protect her from grave physical injury.  (The Missouri 
directive was not attached to a state Medicaid program, and would apply to all women 
seeking an abortion by prohibiting public hospitals from providing abortion services—
hence it too was an instance of public regulation at the state level.)  These states defended 
their decision to cut funding for abortion by emphasizing that the Medicaid Statute 
limited payments to “medically necessary” services and gave states a great deal of 
discretion to determine which services qualified as “medically necessary.”  Faced with 
states withdrawing funding for abortion, the federal Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare announced that the national government would continue to contribute its 
share of matching funds to states covering abortion, but did not require states to pay for 
abortions that were not classified by those states as “medically necessary.”531  Ultimately, 
by failing to set national guidelines on the issue and allowing states to determine the 
meaning and scope of what qualified as a “medical necessity,” the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare punted the issue to the courts. 
  The attempts by the states to cut funding for abortion under Medicaid failed in 
the lower federal courts, so both the states and federal government continued to pay for 
the procedure under the program.  Before the topic came before the Supreme Court, the 
lower federal courts heard a string of Medicaid defunding cases from 1973 to 1977, 
including challenges to the laws of Pennsylvania and Connecticut.  In a vast majority of 
these cases, the federal court in question concluded that Medicaid required states to fund 
all abortions after Roe.  Since pregnancy required some form of medical intervention—
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either childbirth or abortion—a consensus seemed to be forming among the judiciary that 
abortion (when stripped of its moral controversy and viewed as simply a legal question) 
was one of two possible “medically necessary” responses to pregnancy.  In the wake of 
Roe, these lower federal courts almost all concluded that states needed to fund both 
abortion and childbirth.  For instance, in Doe v. Rampton in 1973, the Utah district Court 
concluded that a “[s]tate may not so use its Medicaid program to limit abortions” because 
it would curtail the ability of poor women to exercise the right to an abortion in all 
trimesters “for reasons having no apparent connection to [the] health of the mother or 
child.”532  In its interpretation of Roe, the Utah court concluded that a limitation on public 
funding for abortion under Medicaid was no different than limiting the right of the 
poorest Americans to choose abortion over pregnancy.  Using similar reasoning, the 
Second Circuit Court in Maher overturned Connecticut’s law as unconstitutional.  The 
Circuit Court noted that requiring burdensome proof of “medical necessity” made a 
mockery of the fundamental right affirmed in Roe v. Wade.  It also sided with the 
argument that abortion restrictions violated equal protection.  Since states have no 
affirmative obligation to fund childbirth (but can opt to do so through Medicaid), then the 
state cannot make certain services contingent upon a woman forfeiting her constitutional 
right to choose abortion because she is poor.  In another example, the federal court of 
appeals in Beal, struck down Pennsylvania’s law for violating the spirit of the federal act 
in a statutory sense.533  By funding childbirth but not abortion it forced “pregnant women 
to use the least voluntary method of treatment, while not imposing similar requirement on 
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other persons who qualify for aid” for medical conditions besides pregnancy [italics 
mine].534  
 The lower federal court rulings, as illustrated in the quotes above, almost all 
overturned the state legislation aimed at limiting abortion funding for violating the 
Court’s ruling that a woman had a right to choose abortion in Roe v. Wade and often also 
emphasized the egalitarian spirit of the Medicaid program.  Indeed, the federal court of 
appeals in Beal, overruled the Pennsylvania law for violating voluntarism and choice 
within the Medicaid program—echoing what sounds a lot like the ideal of voluntary 
motherhood.535  The key question was: would the Supreme Court concur with this 
interpretation?    
 
5. The Hyde Amendment: 
This brings us to the Hyde Amendment.  Before the Supreme Court reviewed these lower 
court cases, Congress acted to defund abortion under the Hyde Amendment.  These 
legislative debates revolved around arguments about what can reasonably be termed 
“voluntary motherhood” versus “neoliberalism,” as two contradictory civic lineage 
ideals, but neither of which was yet a dominant civic lineage regime.  When this later 
sparked the Supreme Court to weigh in on the topic of abortion defunding and the Hyde 
Amendment, as we shall see, the Justices also split along similar ideological lines, with a 
bare majority pushing narrow (market-based) access to abortion and an outspoken 
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minority arguing for a more robust notion of reproductive rights.  By 1976, the 
contemporary neoliberal reproductive alliance was coalescing around the goal of denying 
government funding for women to choose abortion under Medicaid. In fact, the debate 
over the Hyde Amendment was dominated by discussions of the irresponsible choices 
that poor women purportedly make when it comes to childbearing, and discussions of 
pregnant women as market actors who can purchase their own abortions if they don’t 
wish to carry their pregnancy to term.  This legislation portrayed pregnant women as 
consumers (or consumer-citizens) as opposed to rights-bearing citizens.  Let us examine 
this debate and shift in rhetoric away from voluntary motherhood to an emerging 
neoliberal civic lineage ideal in the context of the first debate over the Hyde Amendment 
in Congress. 
 In fall 1976, a freshman Congressman from Illinois, Henry Hyde, spearheaded an 
effort in the House of Representatives to abolish federal funding for all abortion.536  
Although the anti-abortion movement’s larger goal of a Constitutional Human Life 
Amendment to protect unborn fetuses failed to gain sufficient political traction, Hyde 
found increasing support for defunding abortion for poor women by targeting Medicaid.  
Circumventing the normal legislative process to amend the Medicaid statute, Hyde 
attached a provision in the form of a “rider” to the Department of Labor, Health, 
Education, and Welfare Appropriations Bill for 1977.  Now known as the “Hyde 
Amendment,” the purpose of the rider was to end federal Medicaid funding for abortion 
by using the appropriations process as a “backdoor” mechanism for accomplishing 
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controversial legislation, which was unlikely to pass through the traditional legislative 
process.  During the congressional debates over the Hyde Amendment, as we shall see in 
quotes below, members of Congress spoke openly and directly about their goals of 
transforming abortion from an issue of “rights” and “public health,” to a private choice 
available to those who could afford to purchase the procedure from a private doctor.  
Praising personal responsibility and self-sufficiency as the mark of good citizenship, in 
the Hyde debates, we witness an alliance forming in Congress in support of this new civic 
lineage policy, aimed at regulating the reproductive opportunities of poor women—or 
more broadly what I call “a neoliberal ideal of citizenship.”  
 The most vocal supporters of the Hyde Amendment relied almost exclusively on 
religious rhetoric, making frequent references to the slaughter of “defenseless” fetuses 
and “innocent” souls.  But Henry Hyde’s appropriations rider to restrict federal support 
for poor women’s abortions under Medicaid was successful because it was able to garner 
support—building key alliances—outside the religious right.  By 1976, the religious right 
and anti-abortion movement had emerged as an increasingly powerful force in politics, 
and successfully helped get pro-life candidates elected to Congress.537 These 
representatives proved to be the most stalwart supporters of the Hyde Amendment, which 
is a classic example of policy feedback involving a political backlash against the Roe 
decision.  However, the anti-abortion proponents could not push the Hyde Amendment 
through Congress without building a broader crosscutting coalition.  They recruited fiscal 
conservatives on the promise to stymie misuse of public funding by irresponsible citizens 
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and curtail the welfare state.538  This is why the Hyde Amendment denied protections to 
poor women and only poor women.  Hyde targeted this group purely because it was 
vulnerable, and because he could form a coalition around the cause.  Explaining his true 
motives, Representative Hyde said during the debate on the floor of the House, “I would 
certainly like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a 
middle class woman, or a poor woman.  Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the 
HEW Medicaid bill.”539  The commodification of abortion was strategic for the religious 
right.  The attack on Medicaid funding for abortion drew support from representatives 
who opposed big-government and sought to constrict federal funding for social programs 
and federal bureaucracy.  It also attracted the votes of those who opposed welfare as 
government handouts for “underserving” Americans, and viewed government spending 
on programs to help poor families—such as welfare and Medicaid—as supporting lazy 
and promiscuous women who made “irresponsible” reproductive decisions. (The topic of 
welfare reform is discussed in detail in the next and last “case study” chapter.) 
Ultimately, as we shall see, this alliance between fiscal conservatives and the pro-
traditional family religious right, joined by racial conservatives from the south, would 
prove an enduring civic lineage coalition.  This political alliance would, among other 
things, play a central role in the development of our contemporary neoliberal civic 
lineage regime.    
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 The proponents of the rider sought to reframe abortion as just another service that 
a consumer-citizen could purchase on the market. Representative Charles Grassley Iowa 
explicitly made the case for framing abortion as more like “goods and services,” than as a 
necessary medical procedure or a civil right.  In his words, while “some argue that the 
Hyde Amendment [unfairly] deprives poor women of something that more affluent 
women can pay for,” there is nothing wrong with that since the same rule applies to all 
other market services.540  At the same time that Grassley sought to frame abortion as just 
another customer service that is naturally subject to the rules of supply and demand of the 
economic market, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah equated the poor woman seeking an 
abortion as akin to a traditional consumer, who could carefully save small amounts of 
money over time (i.e. putting aside “five” to “ten” dollars every couple days) like she 
would save for any other private good.  As Hatch put it, “There us nothing to prevent 
[any women, including poor women]…from exercising increased self-restraint, or from 
sacrificing on some item or other for a month or two to afford [her] own abortion.”541   
 This coalition declared that abortion was no different than other goods and 
services.  The pregnant woman was merely another type of consumer.  They turned a 
blind eye to the reality that abortion was a time sensitive medical procedure, which 
distinguished it from a traditional good or service.  The women who sought abortion 
under Medicaid did not, by definition of qualifying for Medicaid insurance in the first 
place, have the resources to function as self-reliant citizen-consumers when it came to 
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shopping around on the private market.  Unlike typical consumers seeking goods and 
services, a pregnant woman had finite time and money to pay for an abortion.  The longer 
she waited, the more expensive and dangerous the procedure became for her.  As public 
health officials put it, “the risk of death [from abortion], though small, increases by 
almost 30 percent with each week of gestation over eight weeks, and the risk of other 
major complications increases by about 20 percent with each additional week past the 
eighth.”542  When we add poverty to the equation, the combination of time and resources 
might prove to be an insurmountable obstacle for a pregnant woman seeking to obtain an 
abortion.543  When the Hyde Amendment became law, the cost of an abortion in the 
United States was forty-four dollars more than the average monthly AFDC welfare check 
for an entire family.544  Thus, a poor woman on welfare could only pay for her own 
abortion by sacrificing basic necessities such as “food and shelter for themselves and 
their children.”545  
 During the Hyde Amendment debates in the1970s, it is worth noting that there 
remained strong and vocal support at this time for the voluntary motherhood ideal in 
Congress.  These members of Congress argued that the new right’s attack on the 
reproductive opportunities of poor women was a backhanded means to the end of 
circumscribing abortion for the most vulnerable members of society.  For instance, 
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Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, a Republican senator and vigorous champion 
of abortion rights in the 1970s, spoke on the Senate floor in 1975 about his concerns 
regarding the trend in the states to limit Medicaid funding for the poor.  Brooke, the 
nation’s first African American Senator since Reconstruction, warned that funding 
restrictions within the Medicaid program could “put an economic test on the question of 
abortion,” which would discriminate against vulnerable (poor) women who sought to 
exercise their right even during the first trimester.546  Likewise, Senator Jacob Javits 
argued that denying federal funds for poor women to have abortions “eliminates all 
decision-making and exercise of choice on the part of women who are poor, thereby 
infringing upon their civil rights and personal freedom.”547  Expressing his concerns 
about an the impending class dichotomy in abortion, New York Republican Senator 
Jacob Javits emphasized his fear that: “The poor [will] use coat hangers and the wealthy 
go to clinics.”548  But these more expansive arguments in favor of reproductive freedom 
and equality lost the vote over the Hyde Amendment.  
 By seeking to transform abortion from an (accessible) fundamental constitutional 
right into merely a permissible though undesirable consumer choice, the members of this 
newly forming neoliberal civic lineage order reclassified a right to reproductive privacy 
and choice as merely a consumer protection.  This right was now available only to those 
with the economic resources to purchase abortion services on the (reproductive) 
marketplace.  Turning Comstock’s “moral purity” crusade against the commodification 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





of reproductive technologies on its head while at the same time taking aim at the ideal of 
voluntary motherhood, this was not a simple return to the old ideals of the “moral purity” 
regime that dominated American politics one hundred years before.  Unlike the 
“traditional family” advocates of the past, the neoliberal “pro-traditional family” religious 
right formed a tight link with a market-based agenda, which contradicted Comstock’s 
former concerns about the commodification of birth control and abortion corrupting the 
youth (or the next generation of citizens).  But this was not a total break from the past 
either, for the ideal citizen advocated through these policies (in practice) continued to be 
the white middle to upper-middle class citizen—the same “picture” of the ideal citizen 
encouraged via civic lineage policies throughout the twentieth century. 
  The Hyde Amendment’s success was deeply intertwined with the growing 
backlash against welfare during the 1970s.  As the next (and last) “case study” chapter on 
welfare reform discusses, after the inclusion of people of color in AFDC following the 
end of formal segregation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, these policies not only 
targeted the poor but also disproportionately affected minority women.  Filtered through 
a neoliberal prism, this resurgent discourse against welfare relied upon (intersecting) 
negative stereotypes about gender, race, class, and sexuality in the United States.  For 
instance, during the same year that the Hyde Amendment first came before Congress, 
Ronald Reagan, in his 1976 unsuccessful bid for the Republican Party’s nomination for 
President, popularized the now-familiar stereotype of the “welfare queen.” As we shall 
see in the next chapter, this narrative elicited white racial resentment aimed at inner-city 
blacks, and helped fuel a nationwide animus against welfare focusing on the purportedly 
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“pathological” (irresponsible) reproductive and motherhood behaviors of poor women of 
color. The Hyde Amendment cannot be disconnected from this concomitant conservative 
condemnation of welfare (and Medicaid), which in turn incorporated and deployed 
specious racial stereotypes such as the welfare queen to call into question the ability of 
poor women to make proper reproductive choices and function as morally upright 
citizens.   
Indeed, according to this neoliberal conception of civic reproduction, a proper 
citizen ought to be self-sufficient, properly self-disciplined and frugal, not dependent on 
state financial support, and in turn make reproductive choices that matched her economic 
means—having only so many children as her family could afford to raise without 
government assistance.)  The idea that the state would use public funding to bankroll the 
(private) reproductive choices of potentially irresponsible and untrustworthy members of 
society—women, people of color, and the poor—was absurd according the supporters of 
the Hyde Amendment.  And, as Rickie Sollinger emphasizes, “a critical mass of 
Americans did not approve of associating the sexual behavior of poor women, 
particularly minorities” with a “freedom of choice” when their (bad) choices would be 
funded by (responsible) taxpayer dollars.549  Just as good citizens made responsible 
choices, even if it required sacrifice, the implication was that “bad” citizens didn’t 
deserve government assistance due to their irresponsible choices and lack of self-
discipline.  The argument that tax dollars should not go towards “cleaning up the 
mistakes of careless, oversexed women” of color resonated with large numbers of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549 Solinger, Beggars and Choosers,14. 
253	  
	  
American public, who believed that these women should take financial responsibility for 
their own choices and self-created problems.550   
 Not anticipated by the Court in Roe, this strategy of privatization and market 
choice became a powerful avenue of attack against abortion.  Here we see the alliance 
forming in favor of neoliberal citizenship and a neoliberal civic lineage order.  The attack 
on abortion began as an attack on the trustworthiness of the poor to make responsible 
reproductive decisions, and it reframed the potential mother as first-and-foremost a 
consumer.  The good citizen made her own reproductive decisions from a position of 
“independence” and economic self-sufficiency rather than dependence upon the state.  
The proper consumer citizen could afford to make her own choices about fertility and 
birth, but the woman too poor to have such an engaged relationship to the market was not 
a legitimate “choice maker,” and thus not proper neoliberal citizen.  The former (good 
citizen) was stereotyped as white and middle-class under the neoliberal regime, and the 
latter (bad citizen) was conversely portrayed as a poor woman of color on welfare.  In the 
next chapter, I will examine and interrogate these stereotypes of good and bad neoliberal 
citizenship in more detail, but for now let us turn to the Supreme Court “abortion 
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6. The Abortion Defunding Supreme Court Cases: 
Let us turn now to the abortion defunding cases. Before the Hyde Amendment was 
scheduled to go into effect on September 30, 1976, a federal Judge in the Eastern District 
of New York, Judge Dooling, issued an injunction with nationwide effect requiring 
Medicaid payment to continue from the federal government “for all abortions provided to 
Medicaid-eligible women by certified Medicaid providers…”551  The same Judge later 
declared the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional and in violation of Roe v. Wade. 552 
Although Representative Hyde and other members of Congress appealed this injunction 
to the Supreme Court, the Court chose to take no action on the case at the time and 
focused instead on deciding the three earlier state rather than federal “abortion defunding 
cases” before it in 1977.  In the aftermath of the Court’s Roe ruling, the federal courts 
almost all took the position that the states were subsequently required to include abortion 
(along with childbirth) in their Medicaid programs. Would the Court agree in these cases 
and continue to expand its privacy doctrine through a sweeping ruling as it had in the 
past?  Or would it constrict it for the first time since Griswold?  More specifically, would 
the discourse of these opinions support the voluntary motherhood ideal or the neoliberal 
ideal of civic reproduction?  As we shall see, a neoliberal majority began to emerge on 
the Court in favor of supporting decisions by both states and the federal government to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630. 742 (E.D.N.Y) (1980): Judge Dooling. For an excellent 
discussion of this case, see: Copelon and Law, “Nearly Allied to Her Right to Be.”  
552 The day before the Hyde Amendment was scheduled to go into effect on September 30, 1976, a 
coalition of advocate groups filed suit in federal Court in the Eastern District of New York, challenging the 
constitutionality of the Hyde restriction on abortion. The case was filed as a class action lawsuit in the 
name of Medicaid eligible pregnant women wishing to have an abortion, and abortion clinic providers, 
including Planned Parenthood.  
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defund abortion under Medicaid and transform the right to reproductive privacy into a 
market commodity. 
 The Supreme Court finally weighed in on the topic in the cases Beal v. Doe, 
Maher v. Roe, and Poelker v. Doe, three “abortion defunding decisions” decided together 
in 1977. Here we see the Court moving in a distinctly neoliberal direction.  In these three 
cases in 1977 on the public funding of abortion, the Supreme Court reversed the decision 
of the federal court’s ruling below it. In the first case, Beal v. Doe, the Court held that 
states participating in the Medicaid program had the discretion under Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act to decide whether or not to fund abortions that were not medically 
necessary.553  The Court focused on the statutory question in this case and overturned the 
Pennsylvania federal court’s ruling that Medicaid required state’s to fund abortion.  In 
Poelker v. Doe, the Court held that states and cities had no obligation to provide public 
employees or facilities—including access to municipal hospitals—to perform abortions 
that were not “medically necessary” to save the life or protect the health of the pregnant 
woman.554  But Maher is by far the most significant of these three abortion (state-
funding) cases of 1977, because it went beyond the statutory issue in Beal, by directly 
addressing the constitutionality of defunding abortion under Medicaid.555  The Maher 
Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims, stating that 
indigence was not a suspect classification.  So, before turning to the Hyde Amendment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
554 Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
555 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
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challenge in McRae, let us briefly examine the Court’s majority opinion in Maher, 
because it has served as controlling precedent in subsequent abortion defunding cases.  
 In Maher, the Court ruled that it was constitutionally permissible for states 
participating in the Medicaid program to refuse to fund elective abortions while at the 
same time funding childbirth.  According to the Maher Court, privacy was a purely 
negative right against state interference.  It required no positive support from the state.  In 
fact, Connecticut could favor childbirth over abortion—and place obstacles in the path of 
a woman achieving an abortion—as long as it did not “unduly burden” her choice.  
Writing for the majority of the Court in a 6-3 decision in Maher, Justice Powell 
maintained that the District Court “misconceived of the nature and scope of the 
fundamental right recognized in Roe.”556 Emphasizing the difference between the 
freedom to purchase abortion services on the private market versus having the state 
publicly pay for it under Medicaid, Powell states:  
Roe didn’t declare an unqualified “constitutional right to an abortion,” as the 
District Court seemed to think.  Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her 
pregnancy.  It implies no limitation on the authority of the State to make a value 
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by 
the allocation of public funds…An indigent woman who desires an abortion 
suffers no disadvantages as a consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund 
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the 
service she desires [italics mine].557   
 
Powell’s use of the terms “private sources” contrasted with “public funds” in the 
paragraph above starkly highlights the Maher Court’s narrow interpretation of the right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556 Ibid., at 471. 
557 Ibid., at 473-474. 
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privacy.  This market-based public/private dichotomy echoes the same language of 
privatization cited previously in the debate over the Hyde Amendment in Congress.  
Connecticut’s policy, according to Powell, “places no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—
in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.  Although the “State may have made 
childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s decision,” 
Powell countered that this does not constitute an unconstitutional limitation on her right, 
for “it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there. The 
indigency that may make it difficult—and in some cases, perhaps impossible—for some 
women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut 
regulation.”558  Since any women who can afford an abortion can purchase one under the 
law, the assumption of the Court appears to be that her market freedom as a consumer 
remains in tact.   
 To help explain the reasoning in Maher, it is interesting to consider Justice Lewis 
Powell’s early connection to neoliberal policy.  In addition to authoring all three of these 
1977 majority opinions regarding abortion defunding, Justice Powell was also one of the 
first members of government—shortly before he became a member of the Supreme 
Court—to advocate a neoliberal “takeover” of statecraft in America.  In fact, David 
Harvey, in his analysis of the origins of neoliberalism in American public policy, lists 
Powell as one of the earliest proponents of neoliberal policy in U.S. government.  The 
neoliberal turn in the United States, Harvey suggests, can be most clearly traced to “a 
confidential memo sent by Lewis Powell to the US Chamber of Commerce in August 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 Maher v. Roe (1977), at 473-74. 
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1971.”559  Harvey’s description of Powell’s memo draws a revealing link between Justice 
Powell’s endorsement of the privatization of abortion under Medicaid and his role as an 
early advocate of domestic neoliberal economic policy.  
In this memo, Powell argues that the government ought to step back and to allow 
“the U.S. free market” and “the wisdom, ingenuity, and resources of American business 
to be marshalled” against forces that would replace it with public services.560 As Harvey 
puts it, in defense of private market solutions rather than public government intervention 
in social institutions, “[t]he National Chamber of Commerce,” argued Powell, “should 
lead an assault upon the major institutions—universities, schools, the media, publishing, 
the courts—in order to change how individuals think ‘about the corporation, the law, the 
culture, the individual.’”561 An early advocate of neoliberal ideas, Powell’s memo is more 
than simply a pro-business statement, it also sounds a lot like he was sketching a strategy 
for changing both the relationship between government and business and how this, in 
turn, shapes the meaning of citizenship.  (Powell, quite literally, sought to change the way 
people think about the “connections between law, individuals, and society.”)  Sketching a 
long-term economic plan, the growth of American businesses meant privatizing 
traditionally public governmental services to Powell in the memo. This is precisely what 
the Court upheld in his opinion for the majority in Maher. Here Justice Powell 
emphasized that any woman could exercise her right to have an abortion during the first 
two trimesters of her pregnancy, but she could do so only in her private capacity as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





consumer of “goods and services” on the market not by relying on government assistance 
to exercise her right.562  In theory, this applies to all women.  In practice, this creates and 
reinforces a strict dichotomy between the poor and the middle-class. After Maher, 
abortion became a service that a woman could purchase on a burgeoning “reproductive 
marketplace.”  
 We thus witness the rise of an ideal of neoliberal citizenship when it comes to 
civic lineage policy.  This negative interpretation of privacy, advanced by the Court, 
effectively drained abortion of any robust connection to gender equality—or concerns 
about class and racial disparity under Medicaid—and instead reframed the procedure as 
first-and-foremost a market good.  As the Court quite literally put it, while poor people 
may not be able to afford abortions under the state’s funding restriction, there remains 
“nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or services.”  Rejecting the lower 
court’s equal protection argument in Maher, Justice Powell describes the constraints of 
poverty regarding reproductive choice as if it has little to do with the state or the ways in 
which government policies structure and create political landscapes of civic inequality in 
society.  The Court’s opinion in Maher gives us an inside glimpse of the rhetoric and 
reasoning driving an increasingly dominant neoliberal civic lineage regime in American 
law and public policy. With the Hyde Amendment still on hold in the federal courts at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 Not opposed to abortion in principle or a member of the religious right, it is interesting to note that 
Powell supported Roe against restrictions that what he viewed as undermining the individual private market 
freedom of pregnant women.  For instance, in the Court’s tight ruling in Thornburgh v. American College 
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (1986), Powell was the deciding “pro-choice” vote in this 5-4 decision to 
strike down a Pennsylvania law that required (among other things) for all women seeking an abortion at 
any clinic to hear a state-scripted speech designed to convince them to carry their pregnancy to term.   
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time of the decision, Maher was a key turning point in civic lineage politics in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century.  
 Following the Court’s new Maher and Beal precedents in 1977, the federal 
district Court—which had initially ruled against the Hyde Amendment—was compelled 
to lift its nationwide injunction on the federal funding ban. 563 The Supreme Court took 
the case in the same year.564  Since it involved the federal Hyde Amendment, the 
resulting case of Harris v. McRae (1980) is typically ranked as more significant than 
Maher when it comes to reproductive policy in the United States.  However, the Supreme 
Court’s majority opinion treated McRae in exactly the same manner as Maher.565  In 
Harris, Justice Stewart writing for a 5-4 majority—joined by Chief Justice Burger, 
Rehnquist, Powell, and White—stated that “The principle recognized in Wade and later 
cases—protecting a woman’s freedom of choice—did not translate into a constitutional 
obligation” to subsidize abortions (i.e. even medically necessary ones under the public 
health program of Medicaid).566 Despite their similarities, this is an important point, 
which Harris clarified and expanded upon from Maher.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 In McRae v. Matthews, Judge Dooling ruled that the Hyde Amendment was unconstitutional based on 
both equal protection and privacy grounds. 
564 The case against the Hyde Amendment was tried again in the same District Court under a much 
narrower frame in McRae v Califano (1980), focusing simply on the lack of an exemption for medically 
necessary abortions in the federal law.  (Since exemptions for “medically necessary” cases were included in 
both the Connecticut and Pennsylvania laws upheld by the Court in Maher and Beal, this was a narrow 
health-based challenge many assumed would prevail on narrow grounds.)  With over a year’s worth of 
research and medical testimony, Judge Dooling pronounced again that the Hyde Amendment was 
unconstitutional because a) Medicaid focused on protecting health abortion and b) abortion was protected 
by Roe as vital part of women’s healthcare.  He issued the longest opinion of his career in 1980—
presenting 328 pages defending his ruling that the Hyde Amendment violated the Constitution.   
565 Since exemptions for “medically necessary” abortions were included in both the Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania laws upheld by the Court in Maher and Beal, it was widely assumed that the health-based 
challenge would prevail on narrow grounds. 
566 Harris, 448 U.S. at 315. 
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 Like Powell in Maher, Justice Stewart in Harris painted the pregnant woman’s 
right to privacy as a negative right against state interference.  She could purchase 
reproductive services on the market in the same way that parents can choose whether or 
not to “send their children to private schools,” but a poor women is not entitled to public 
assistance by the state even if it pays for all other medically necessary procedures under 
Medicaid.567   Holding that the Hyde Amendment affects but does not intend to harm any 
suspect class and raises no equal protection concerns under the Constitution, Justice 
Stewart referenced Maher at length as controlling precedent in the case.  In his words: 
The Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in Maher, 
places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate 
her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and 
other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public 
interest…regardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate 
her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due 
process liberty recognized in Wade it simply does not follow that a woman’s 
freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial 
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.  The reason why 
was explained in Maher: although government may not place obstacles in the path 
of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of 
its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category. The financial constraints 
that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally 
protected freedom of choice are the product not of the governmental restrictions 
on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.  Although Congress has opted 
to subsidize medically necessary services generally, but not certain medically 
necessary abortions, the fact remains that the Hyde Amendment leaves an 
indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to 
obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had 
chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all [italics mine].568   
 
The judicial retreat from support of “voluntary motherhood” as a possible civic lineage 
ideal began with Maher and Beal.  Then, just seven years after the Court’s landmark 
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ruling in Roe v. Wade, the Court in McRae took its earlier ruling in Maher and extended 
it further to uphold the Hyde Amendment.  As I shall discuss in the next section of this 
chapter, the dissenting justices in the aforementioned “abortion defunding cases” openly 
expressed concern that these market-based rulings would foster past civic hierarchies and 
make reproductive rights unattainable for many poor women, but before turning to these 
prescient dissents, let me wrap up this section by tracing the neoliberal direction that 
abortion cases took in the aftermath of these decisions.  Indeed, the cases above paved the 
way for additional defunding cases in the last two decades of the twentieth century.   
 For instance, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services in 1989, the Court 
upheld a ban in the state of Missouri on the use of all public employees and facilities for 
performing abortion.569  Despite the fact that this ruling placed a woman’s ability to 
obtain an abortion in a precarious position in many of the poorest and most rural areas of 
Missouri—in which healthcare was provided primarily at public hospitals by public 
employees—in a 5-4 ruling, the Court ruled that the Missouri law was consistent with its 
past rulings in Maher and McRae.  In Webster, the Missouri law took the idea of 
defunding to the extreme by banning ALL public employees and government-funded 
facilities from participating in performing abortion.  This applied to public hospitals in 
areas without private abortion clinics, and it even extended to any public employees who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
569 The change of tide was swift.  In his majority opinion in Thornburgh v. American College of 
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decision—with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Row—whether to end her 
pregnancy. A women’s right to make that choice freely is fundamental.” Blackmun comes out clearly on 
the voluntary motherhood side in Thornburgh, but by Webster in 1989 he was in the minority and speaking 
about ominous change.   
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volunteered time or worked second jobs at private women’s health clinics.  The Court 
upheld an extreme divide between the market and the state, despite the fact that both were 
deeply intertwined in practice in the healthcare of citizens.  With Justice Antonin Scalia 
recommending overturning Roe and three other Justices suggesting reconsidering the 
decision, Justice Blackmun ended his dissent in Webster on an ominous tone: “I fear for 
the liberty and equality of the millions of women who have lived and come of age in the 
16 years since Roe was decided…a chill wind blows.”570  
 By Rust v. Sullivan in 1991, the backlash against public funding for abortion 
reached its pinnacle.  This case involved the constitutionality of regulations sponsored by 
the Reagan Administration from the Department of Health and Human Services, which 
cut all Title X Family Planning funds from going to any organization that counsels 
women seeking advice on family planning about abortion.  Under the new Executive 
Department’s rules, recipients of Title X Family Planning funds were prohibited from 
discussing the option with women at their clinics—including counseling or advising 
clients in a neutral manner.  Going against the very idea of informed family planning and 
(according to dissenting Justices) curtailing freedom of speech, these regulations—known 
as “the gag rule”—were challenged in Court.  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the intent of Congress in enacting Title X was ambiguous with regard to abortion 
counseling and that it was therefore constitutional and statutorily permissible for the 
administrative agency to regulate it.571  Just because the Government subsidizes family 
planning, argued the majority, does not mean that it must subsidize a controversial aspect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), 539. 
571 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
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of family planning, such as providing information about abortion. Relying on the McRae 
precedent, the Court held that the Executive Branch of the federal government could 
prevent Title X funds from doing anything to “encourage, promote, or advocate abortion 
as a method of Family Planning.”572  While the right to have an abortion would remain 
available for women who could seek out a private provider and afford to take advantage 
of her buying power on the reproductive market, poor women who received family 
planning services from the government could not even legally request information at 
public family planning clinics about the full range of legal options available to them in 
order to make an informed reproductive decision. 
Above all, I would argue that this ban on the distribution of information at family 
planning clinics marks the end of voluntary motherhood as a robust ideal in American 
politics and the weakening of left voices in support of more egalitarian notions of civic 
reproduction. The dissenters viewed this not only as a violation of a right to privacy 
under Roe, but also as a violation of the freedom of speech and of the economic 
professional rights of family planning counselors, who were prohibited under the law 
from discussing the topic of abortion with women seeking family planning advice at 
publicly-funded clinics—even if the woman brought the topic up first and asked for 
names of private doctors. Importantly, this shows how the “homegrown” neoliberal 
alliance in the United States lacked what one might term “neoliberal ideological purity,” 
if such a thing exists, for fiscal conservatives were willing to reject certain patently 
libertarian claims about professional rights—even economically libertarian claims—to 




satisfy the religious right, which remained critical to the broader neoliberal alliance 
upholding this new civic lineage regime. In other words, the neoliberal coalition in 
America depended on coalition politics that mixed economic goals with other national 
and moral values in a manner that was distinctly American. (I will describe our distinctly 
American neoliberal civic lineage regime in greater detail in the next chapter.)   
 These “abortion defunding” cases supported the reframing of the abortion debate 
in state legislatures and Congress as a matter of market principles.  This approach 
transformed pregnant women into market actors, which was increasingly becoming the 
new neoliberal avenue for practicing “American citizenship” through responsible forms 
of market consumption—as opposed to exercising civil or political rights.  By holding 
that “the Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the same range of 
choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have 
had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all”—and arguing that it 
was permissible for abortion to be the only medically necessary procedure for the 
national government to refuse to fund because it preferred childbirth even in cases that 
would harm the health of a poor woman on Medicaid—the Court in McRae sided firmly 
with the neoliberal arguments of members of Congress supporting the Hyde 
Amendment.573  This became a stepping-stone for the complete defunding of abortion, 
including the advent of the “gag rule” in Rust v. Sullivan.  According to this formulation 
of civic lineage, a pregnant woman exercised her citizenship rights as a consumer, 
through her relationship to the (reproductive) marketplace.  If she had access to the 
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resources necessary to buy an abortion from a private doctor, then her right as a consumer 
was protected under the Constitution.  But if she lacked the resources to purchase an 
abortion on her own, then the state offered no recourse or way for her to access this right.  
In the words of the Court in McRae, “The financial constraints that restrict an indigent 
woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice 
are the product not of the governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of 
her indigency.”574  Poverty was an individual problem—probably an individual failure—
rather than a collective political concern of the state.   
7. The Dissents: Concerns About Civic Hierarchy  
What does this neoliberal regime mean for U.S. citizenship?  Although the majority 
opinions avoided the language of citizenship and instead sought to frame abortion as a 
market commodity rather than a state-provided (public) service, the dissenting Justices in 
contrast focused more directly on concerns about civic hierarchy.  The dissenters pointed 
to the inegalitarian underbelly of this “financial” shift in privacy jurisprudence.  In the 5-
4 case of Harris v. McRae (1980), the four dissenting justices rejected the Court’s 
market-based interpretation of privacy by pointing to the civic hierarchies it would 
reinforce in the realm of reproduction.  Calling the majority’s claims of neutrality and 
egalitarianism disingenuous, the dissenters emphasized that the market ideals of self-
sufficiency and independence itself produces and reproduces civic inequalities—
particularly among those who are economically dependent and poor. It does so 
particularly because poverty intersects with the already uneven, and substantially state-
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constructed, socioeconomic landscape of race, gender, and ethnicity in the United States.  
At a time in which the struggle between two conceptions of civic lineage policy 
(voluntary motherhood versus neoliberalism) were in open dispute, the dissenting justices 
in the early abortion defunding cases were clear about the connection between the rise of 
this neoliberal civic lineage regime and the hierarchies in citizenship that this order 
would likely foster in the future.   
 For instance, in the main dissent in McRae, Justice Brennan—joined by Justices 
Blackman and Marshall—flatly condemned the Hyde Amendment as a backhanded 
attack on Roe, which targeted the most vulnerable women in society. As he put it, the 
Hyde Amendment “serves to coerce indigent pregnant women to bear children that they 
otherwise elect not to have…[it] is nothing less than an attempt by Congress to 
circumvent the dictates of the Constitution and achieve indirectly what Roe v. Wade said 
it could not do directly” [italics mine].575  Pregnancy, Brennan points out, is a condition 
that requires medical services, and in most cases the two options are either childbirth or 
abortion.  While acknowledging that Roe did not automatically require the state to assure 
financial access to abortion, Brennan argues that the key distinction is that the state 
decided to adopt the Medicaid program in the first place.  If the state funds childbirth 
under Medicaid, then it is also required to fund abortion and remain neutral regarding a 
woman’s decision to become a mother during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.  To 
do otherwise, surmounts to a form of state coercion.  He emphasizes that, for a poor 
women, funding one procedure and not the other is a very real form of coercion.  Spelling 
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out this “theory” versus “practice” (or abstract/outcome) distinction as clearly and 
forcefully as possible, he writes: “the reality of the situation is that the Hyde Amendment 
has effectively removed this choice from the indigent woman’s hands. By funding all of 
the expenses associated with childbirth and none of the expenses incurred in terminating 
pregnancy, the Government literally makes an offer that the indigent woman cannot 
afford to refuse.”576  Worst of all, according to Brennan, this policy harms the most 
politically powerless members of society: “the Hyde Amendment does not foist that 
majoritarian viewpoint with equal measure upon everyone in our Nation, rich and poor 
alike; rather, it imposes that viewpoint only upon that segment of society which, because 
of its position of political powerlessness, is least able to defend its privacy rights from the 
encroachments of state-mandated morality.”577  Focusing on class issues and their role in 
shaping opportunity and fairness in “our Nation,” Brennan presents a trenchant critique 
of the false neutrality behind the abortion defunding laws, arguing that they target and 
limit the opportunities of poorest women in America.   
 Whereas Brennan focused almost exclusively on concerns about poverty and 
equal citizenship, Justice Thurgood Marshall addressed the ways in which poverty 
intersects with gender and race to shape the status and opportunities of Americans.  He 
offers the most eloquent argument for equal protection in McRae and the earlier cases 
such as Beal and Maher.  In his 1977 Beal dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall spoke 
bluntly about the discriminatory impact of the state defunding legislation.  Highlighting 
the connections between gender, class, and race in the case—and emphasizing the fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




that the children of poor and minority women have fewer opportunities and lower civic 
status in America in the first place—Marshall pressed his concerns about civic hierarchy 
and labeled the policies as a form of unconstitutional discrimination against a particularly 
vulnerable class of Americans:  
 
The impact of the regulations here falls tragically upon those among us least able 
to help or defend themselves.  As the Court well knows, these regulations 
inevitably will have the practical effect of preventing nearly all poor women from 
obtaining safe and legal abortions.  The enactments challenged here brutally 
coerce poor women to bear children whom society will scorn for every day of 
their lives.  Many thousands of unwanted minority and mixed race children now 
spend blighted lives in foster homes, orphanages, and “reform” schools.  Many 
children of the poor, sadly, will attend second-rate segregated schools.  And 
opposition remains strong against increasing Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children benefits for impoverished mothers and children, so that there is little 
chance for the children to grow up in a decent environment. I am appalled by the 
ethical bankruptcy of those who preach “right to life” that means, under present 
social policies, a bare existence in utter misery for so many poor women and their 
children…The Court’s insensitivity to the human dimension of these decisions is 
particularly obvious in its cursory discussion of appellees equal protection” 
[italics mine].578   
 
Noting that the Hyde Amendment targets the most vulnerable citizens in America, 
Marshall calls for a heightened scrutiny because “The class burdened by the Hyde 
Amendment consists of indigent women, a substantial proportion of whom are members 
of minority races.” Marshall concludes, “I do not believe that a Constitution committed to 
the equal protection of the laws can tolerate this result.”579 Even if the strongly disparate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, at 455-457. 
579 Ibid., at 348. It is interesting and important to note that, while there is a lot of “equal protection” 
language here, it is not explicitly about citizenship. While equal protection tends to focus on the broader 
theoretical concept of human rights as opposed to national citizenship as an abstract juridical principle, this 
in no way means that the link is not there as a practical matter. In fact, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg makes 
this link—often explicitly—then as a litigator, now as a Associate Justice on the Supreme Court. 
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racial impact does not alone violate the Equal Protection Clause…”at some point, a 
showing that state action has a devastating impact on the lives of minority racial groups 
must be relevant.”580  Likewise in McRae, Marshall writes: “The legislation before us…is 
a form of discrimination repugnant to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Constitution.”581 
 Justice Blackmun, the original author of Roe v. Wade in 1973, also issued a series 
of passionate dissents in the early abortion defunding cases, in which he argues these 
policies create and reinforce invidious forms of civic hierarchy not consistent with the 
Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade.  Taking aim at Justice Powell’s neoliberal analysis of 
reproductive rights—or what he termed, Powell’s “financial argument”—Blackmun 
emphasized that a poor woman is not a traditional consumer.582  In Beal, he labeled 
Justice Powell’s financial approach as both disingenuous and cruel to those without the 
means to exercise their reproductive rights on the private market. 
The Court concedes the existence of a constitutional right, but denies the 
realization and enjoyment of that right on the ground that existence and 
realization are separate and distinct.  For the individual woman concerned, 
indigent and financially helpless, as the Court’s opinions in the three cases 
concede her to be, the result is punitive and tragic.  Implicit in the Court’s holding 
is the condescension that she may go elsewhere for her abortion.  I find that 
disingenuous and alarming, almost reminiscent of “Let them eat cake…There is 
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581 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), 338. 
582 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), at 462-63. 
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another world “out there,” the existence of which the Court, I suspect, either 
chooses to ignore of fears to recognize.  And so the cancer of poverty will 
continue to grow. This is a sad day for those who regard the Constitution as a 
force that would serve justice to all evenhandedly and, in so doing, would better 
the lot of the poorest among us.583     
 
Blackmun’s initial position seemed to be that equal protection was unnecessary, because 
he conceived the right to privacy in reproduction, developed in Roe, as broad enough to 
compel the state to cover abortion and childbirth evenhandedly under Medicaid.  Yet his 
language was very much about the importance of the equal and impartial protection of the 
law.  By McRae in 1980, Blackmun simply issued a short one-paragraph dissent, piecing 
together a series of quotes from his much longer dissents in the 1977 state defunding 
cases.  Blackmun’s uncharacteristically perfunctory dissent in McRae appears to serve as 
an acknowledgement that the neoliberal regime had won the prolonged debate over 
abortion defunding by this point, and that writing a new dissent on the topic was futile in 
the same context.   
 So what does this mean for citizenship? In Brennan’s critique of the majority’s 
position in the case, he writes: “Implicit in the Court’s reasoning is the notion that, as 
long as the Government is not obligated to provide its citizens with certain benefits and 
privileges, it may condition the grant of such benefits on the recipient’s relinquishment of 
his constitutional rights.”584  As mentioned in the last chapter, whereas pure privacy 
rulings tend to emphasize individual and personal choice above citizenship (even when 
doing a great deal of “civic lineage work” in practice), equal protection jurisprudence 
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584 Ibid., at 344. (Italics added.) 
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tends to focus on human rights and equality in a much more explicit way (also doing 
civic lineage work). The explicit references to protecting the public health of citizens no 
longer guides the Court’s decisions, as it did during the fitter families regime of the 
Progressive Era. But, as the concerns expressed by the dissenters in these cases reveal, 
these cases are just as much about the reproduction of citizenship as those of the previous 
regimes. Whereas Marshall and Blackmun emphasized issues of state coercion and its 
impact on civic equality, Justice Stevens in his dissent in McRae also refers to national 
membership and concerns about equality. As he put it, “in my judgment, these 
Amendments constitute an unjustifiable, and indeed blatant, violation of the sovereign’s 
duty to govern impartially.”  In sum, although the majority framed their decisions as 
having little to do with citizenship—using the language of free-market individualism and 
private choice—the dissenting justices conversely pointed to the civic inequalities that 
the majority position was likely foster. While it is important to emphasize that equal 
protection is about the rights of persons not formal citizens in constitutional law, these 
dissents are noteworthy because they tease out its civic lineage implications and offer a 
trenchant critique of the marketization of reproductive choice and its damaging impact on 
vulnerable citizens in America. Indeed, although the brute concept of ‘citizenship’ 
admittedly does not play a central role in their “equal protection” reasoning, the 
dissenting justices nonetheless highlight the practical impact this move will have on the 
reproductive choices of vulnerable Americans, thereby supporting my civic lineage 
interpretation of this case. 
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 The Maher and McRae decisions reveal the weaknesses of the original privacy 
framework.  The very thing that originally helped Griswold to succeed without much 
immediate backlash—that privacy seemed like a fairly conservative negative liberty to 
protect the sanctity of the marital bedroom against state interference—is precisely what 
made the Court’s path dependent choice of this doctrine to ground birth control and 
abortion rights in later cases susceptible to attack on the grounds that privacy was, 
according to the new majority on the Court, a purely negative right.  Given the fact that 
both Brennan and Blackmun (the original authors of Eisenstadt and Roe) so vehemently 
objected to the narrow interpretation of the right, it is clear that this was not an inevitable 
consequence of the privacy doctrine.  However, the fact remains that the very reason the 
Court picked privacy in Griswold (it’s camouflaged conservatism to appeal to less radical 
and more traditional values) ended up providing an opening for dramatically limiting the 
scope of reproductive rights and voluntary motherhood in later cases.  In each of these 
major reproductive privacy cases, the topic of equal protection was present, but it 
remained a path not taken.  Instead, the privacy doctrine became an avenue for pushing 
state-provided services into the private sector, and transforming many of the most 
important reproductive freedoms and choices into mere consumer protections on the 
market.  Ironically, this defies both Comstock’s crusade against the commercialization of 
reproductive technologies and Sanger’s goal of voluntary motherhood through access to 
public clinics for the poorest citizens.   
 The neoliberal advocates cloaked state coercion in the deceptively neutral 
language of the market.  Meanwhile, their opponents pointed to the real-world outcomes 
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the privatization and commodification of reproductive choice would have on the civic 
landscape in America.  In the era of the new woman, the career woman, we see the rise of 
a new regime allowing women who can afford reproductive technologies and devices to 
gain access to greater choices on the economic market.  In contrast, low-income women 
encountered increasingly coercive and invasive reproductive policies from the state, 
which interfered with their choices regarding motherhood by using state funding to 
attempt to encourage childbirth and even inhibit knowledge about abortion options, while 
at the same time cutting back funding for childrearing.  (This paradox, as I shall argue in 
the next chapter on welfare reform, lies at the heart of neoliberal ideal of civic 
reproduction.)  By the time the Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment in 1980 in 
McRae, public funding of any kind was almost completely disconnected from abortion 
under the Constitution.  This located most funding issues at the state level, resulting in 
fifty different regimes of Medicaid with diverging policies in each state about whether 
(and under what circumstances) abortion would be covered by the state with no help from 
the federal government.  No longer pertinent to welfare or Medicaid, we witness the 
advent of reproduction as a market choice that was increasingly more difficult for poor 
women to obtain and easier for wealthier women to access.  
 
8. The Reproductive Marketplace:  
This trend in civic lineage continued throughout the rest of the twentieth century. In fact, 
by the time the Court heard Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
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in 1992, many believed that Roe v. Wade would be overturned.  It was then a surprise to 
Supreme Court prognosticators, when on June 29, 1992, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Anthony M. Kennedy, and David Souter read their coauthored opinion—which they 
claimed upheld the basic tenets of Roe—from the bench.585  Although Casey did not 
concern the Medicaid/public funding issue, which had been laid to rest in the cases 
preceding it, the compromise in Casey was fundamentally neoliberal in both theory and 
outcome.  With Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s plurality opinion invoking sweeping 
rhetoric about the importance of reproductive freedom to gender equality and personal 
liberty, Casey acknowledges the importance of abortion for women’s equal citizenship.  
However, it also limits the accessibility of this choice to the poorest and most vulnerable 
Americans by replacing Roe’s trimester system with an “undue burden” framework, first 
articulated by Justice Powell in Maher, designed to permit more invasive restrictions at 
the state and federal levels.586  Hence, Casey ironically transfers reproductive rights—
which it recognizes as vital for women’s equal citizenship—to the states to restrict in 
more stringent ways and pushes onto the economic market, rather than protecting 
reproductive rights under state law in the name of equal citizenship.587  By doing so, it 
gives middle-class and wealthy women a chance at civic equality, and effectively denies 
equal opportunity to those who are economically disadvantaged. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 Wawrose, Griswold v. Connecticut, 126. 
586 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
587 Indeed, applying the new (much weaker) “undue burden” test to the Pennsylvania statute, the plurality 
upheld all of the limits except for the spousal notification requirement.  It is interesting to note that the 
spousal notification requirement is also the one requirement that goes against the concept of a self-
sufficient and independent adult market actor making an informed decision on her own about what she 
wishes to do with her body.  In other words, the one provision that the plurality struck down in the 
Pennsylvania law was the provision least consistent with the neoliberal ideal of a woman functioning as an 
individual market actor on the reproductive marketplace.    
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 This raises the question of how the feminist movement and women’s rights 
groups responded to the erosion of abortion rights. The short answer is that they were 
taken by surprise.  Between 1976 and 1980, it appears that mainstream women’s groups 
were taken off-guard by the success of the Hyde Amendment so soon after its victory in 
Roe.  For instance, NOW and NARAL circulated memos suggesting that they did not 
know how to respond to these “reactionary forces,” which were thwarting the nation’s 
pro-choice majority confirmed in the polls.588 Not fully understanding how to combat the 
strategies of the National Pro-Life Political Action Committee (NPLPAC) and the Life 
Amendment Political Action Committee (LAPAC), NOW and NARAL nonetheless 
spearheaded their own grassroots and lobbying campaigns in support of “choice.” While 
they succeeded in halting the proposed human life amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
introduced to Congress in 1981 by Republican Senator Orren Hatch of Utah, they were 
too late in to change the tide on the funding issue.589   
By Webster (1989) and Casey (1992), these organizations were above-all just 
fighting to keep abortion legal (in its already attenuated form).590 In response to 
unexpected early losses, the mainstream feminist organizations largely abandoned the 
active fight for reproductive rights for poor women, having already lost that battle in the 
courts.  They focused defensively on preventing further erosion of abortion rights, which 
largely meant retaining the consumer freedom to purchase an abortion on the private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 “Call to Action for Reproductive Rights,” NOW Memo, September 14, 1979; “Reproductive Rights 
Alerts,” NOW Memo, cited in Self, All In the Family, 375.  
589 Introduced by Orren Hatch (R-Utah) on September 21, 1981 unde S.J. Res. 110. See also “April ‘Must 
Do’ Activities to Stop HLA/HLB,” March 20, 1981 on the urgency of stopping the human life amendment.  
590 See e.g., National Abortion Rights Action League Amicus Brief for Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services. Online at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=yjll 
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market.591 Given their defensive memos and early losses, they appear to have done this 
primarily as a practical and strategic matter in defense of what was left of Roe.592  For 
this reason, rather than emphasizing its role in “saving abortion” by refusing to declare it 
unconstitutional, I instead suggest that Casey marks the culmination of the neoliberal 
civic lineage regime in the realm of abortion.  To preserve abortion as an option on the 
private market, many mainstream feminists, however reluctantly, appealed to this 
discourse to save what was left of Roe so that career women and those in the middle-class 
could still take advantage of this consumer right.   
 Casey allowed states to pass increasingly restrictive laws regulating abortion, 
which has had a major impact on the availability of abortion across the United States.  By 
opening abortion regulation to massive decentralization, through federalism, the Court 
has helped make reproductive rights far from universal in America, and thrust the costs of 
unwanted pregnancy to the private pocketbooks of individual women.  This in turn 
reinforces the dichotomy between those with and without the means to exercise their 
right.  Many impoverished women are now stuck in a similar position as Jane Roe 
(Norma McCorvey) in Texas, the original plaintiff in Roe v. Wade (1973), who could not 
afford to travel to another state to safely and legally terminate her unwanted pregnancy.  
In the words of Robert O. Self, “By the first decade of the twenty-first century, across the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591 On the defensive, states increasingly placed limits on abortion rights, and the Supreme Court had settled 
the issue for poor women in the “Medicaid defunding cases.” After Webster, NARAL” circulated a memo, 
“Where do we go from here?” in July 1983, arguing that supporters should not become complacent with the 
victory in Webster and “continue to take the power of the opposition seriously” [italics in original]. The 
irony here is that, from the standpoint of poor women, the opposition had already won significant victories. 
592 Importantly, Planned Parenthood, with its clinics and sliding-scale (income based) payments does not 
conform to this. Unlike the others, it depends on government funding through Title X and Medicaid and has 
always placed an emphasis on serving everyone seeking family planning advice and medical assistance, 
especially low-income women. 
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United States, one-third fewer counties had an abortion provider than in the late 
1970s.”593  In 2005, a whopping 87 percent of counties in the United States have no place 
to go to obtain a legal abortion, which meant that 35 percent of women in America had to 
travel to other areas if they sought to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.594 If a woman 
can afford a train or plane ticket to get an abortion in a different region than she lives, 
then she has access to reproductive choice.  She can buy the right to exercise her liberty.  
But if a woman is already strapped for money, then this is another difficult hurdle in her 
path towards exercising a right that the Court in Casey acknowledged as a precondition 
for women’s equal citizenship.  Speaking of women’s unequal access to privacy rights 
based upon their socioeconomic status, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated in an 
interview in the New York Times in 2009, “There will never be a woman of means 
without choice anymore.  That just seems to me so obvious.  The state that changed their 
abortion laws before Roe are not going to change back. So, we have a policy that only 
effects poor women.”595   
 This has tremendously inegalitarian consequences.  Today, more than two-thirds 
(69%) of women who have abortions are economically disadvantaged, with nearly half 
living below the poverty line.596  Since poor women have less reliable access to 
contraceptive services than middle-class women, the rate of unintended pregnancies 
among poor women, according to a Guttmacher study, is more than five times higher than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
593 Self, All in the Family, 423. 
594 Ibid., 423. 
595 Interview with Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Bazelon, “The Place of Women on the Court.” 
596 Amanda Marcotte, “The Demographics of Abortion: It’s Not What You Think,” The American 




their middle-class counterparts.597  They are also more likely to have difficulty procuring 
an abortion due to financial hardship, because they cannot pay for an abortion out of 
pocket.  In fact, one in four Medicaid-eligible women, who seek an abortion, must carry 
the child to term, because she is unable to raise the money for the procedure.598 In 
interviews with patients, the Guttmacher Institute documents that indigent women who 
live paycheck to paycheck are often compelled to make serious sacrifices to raise the 
money to have an abortion. These women report delaying paying essential bills like 
electricity or rent, taking payday loans, pawning valued possessions, borrowing from 
multiple friends and relatives, and cutting back on food and necessities for themselves 
and their children.599  
 Due to how challenging it can be to raise the funds, poor women tend to get their 
abortions two to three weeks later than their more affluent counterparts.  Two-thirds of 
them say that they wanted to get the procedure earlier, but name the financial costs as the 
primary reason for delay.600  Since the price of abortion increase steadily over time, the 
later a woman gets into her pregnancy, the greater financial burden it poses for those who 
can least afford it.  Moreover, in the process of delaying to gather funds, some of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597 “Unintended Pregnancy in the United States,” Guttmacher Institute, September 2016. Online at: 
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states  
598 See e.g., the University of California, San Francisco’s ongoing “Turnaway Study,” examining how 
being denied access to abortion impacts women’s choices and lives throughout her pregnancy and beyond: 
Online at: https://www.ansirh.org/research/turnaway-study; Linda Goler Blount, “Poor Women Suffer 
Most From Restrictive Abortion Policies,” Rewire, May 14, 2015. Online at: 
https://rewire.news/article/2015/05/14/poor-women-suffer-restrictive-abortion-policies/ 
599 Heather D. Boonstra, “Abortion in the Lives of Women Struggling Financially: Why Insurance 
Coverage Matters,” Guttmacher Policy Review 19, July 14, 2016. Online at: 
https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2016/07/abortion-lives-women-struggling-financially-why-insurance-
coverage-matters  
600 Maya Dusenbery, “Poor Women in the United States Don’t Have Abortion Rights,” Pacific Standard, 




women arrive at the clinic past her gestational limit and are turned away.  The cost of 
raising a child until the age of 18 is now over 240,000 dollars, according to a recent 
report from the department of Agriculture.601  When a low-income woman is able to plan 
her pregnancies, she is much more likely to establish a good career and provide for her 
children.  But when she cannot get an abortion after deciding that is her best option, she 
is three times more likely to become or remain in poverty in the future.  With cuts in 
funding for childrearing (discussed in the next chapter), this has severe consequences for 
both the actual birth of children in the United States and for the status of these citizens.  
The disparity created by this policy clearly shapes the civic status of these women and the 
standing and opportunities of their children in ways that reinforce economic inequality in 
the United States.  Furthermore, given the fact that poverty intersects with gender and 
race so significantly in America, we end up with a civic lineage order that reinforces a 
host of different civic inequalities through the indirect mechanism of turning public 
services over to the private market.  In hindsight, this evidence confirms that the dire 
predictions of the dissenting Justices in Maher and McRae.  In their dissents, Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens argued presciently that the marketization and 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





In this chapter, I have focused on the early rise of the neoliberal civic lineage regime in 
the United States.  During an extraordinarily political moment, we encounter rapid 
changes in the role of women and people of color in society (coupled with the War on 
Poverty).  As I have argued, this trend could have inspired the rise of a new more 
egalitarian civic lineage regime, akin to a contemporary version of the voluntary 
motherhood ideal.  However, the white picket fence regime was instead replaced by 
another inegalitarian civic lineage regime, which I have termed the ‘neoliberal civic 
lineage regime.’  This civic lineage regime transfers many dimensions of reproduction 
and childbirth to the whims of the economic free-market.   
 This chapter highlights the role of abortion and reproductive rights as a 
battleground in the formation of the early neoliberal coalition.  The rise of neoliberalism 
on a domestic level is typically associated with the OPEC oil crisis in the West in the 
1970s, and the subsequent backlash against Keynesian economics due to its failure to 
swiftly remedy the situation.  While there is a great deal of truth in this explanation, here 
I have documented another important yet frequently overlooked dimension of the early 
story of the advent of this ideology and policy package in U.S. politics.  In addition to 
this more straightforward global economic explanation, I suggest that a backlash against 
the successes and gains of the Women’s and the Civil Rights Movements also played a 
key role in shaping the rise of America’s uniquely homegrown neoliberal free-market 
dogma.  In opposition to the gains of the War on Poverty and changes in the “traditional” 
white picket-fence ideal of the family, the politics of civic lineage—and specifically its 
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application to gender, sexuality, race, class, and the family—appear to have inspired and 
shaped the rise of the new neoliberal domestic agenda in America.  In the words of 
Robert O. Self, 
Observers have far less often recognized that the politics of gender, sexuality, and 
the family shaped the rise of neoliberal free-market orthodoxy.  In a nation that 
imagines that individuals rise solely by their own merits and the market follows 
its “natural” course, there is little room for an expanded social contract in which 
new gender and sexual rights—or increasingly, even hard-won race-based 
rights—are guaranteed by the state…Rather [family] policies have been one of 
the central grounds on which this public life itself has been constituted.602   
 
To this, I would add that the issues of fertility and birth have served as a prominent arena 
for the development of these neoliberal laws and public policies, precisely because they 
shape the transmission of American citizenship from one generation to the next.  When it 
comes to the state’s regulation of reproduction and birth, both in practice and outcome, 
the key civic lineage questions inspiring these laws appear to be: Who ought to become 
part of the future generation of American citizens?  What citizens should the government 
encourage and discourage from reproducing and contributing to the future generation of 
Americans?  Under what terms and by what mechanisms should the government 
intervene to encourage or discourage childbirth? And, finally, what status should 
different groups of citizens and their children occupy in the United States? 
 The civic lineage ideal—embraced by the Court’s majority in the “abortion 
defunding” cases discussed above—is that of the woman as a citizen consumer.  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




new “ideal” portrays a person who makes responsible choices, is an “independent” 
market actor, and enjoys her rights of citizenship based on her relationship to the 
(reproductive) market.  The new woman might be a career woman, or a housewife; but 
she was not dependent on the state for welfare.  She was middle to upper middle-class, 
tended to be white, and displayed an ethic of self-reliance and personal responsibility.  
She was responsible for taking control over her reproductive capacities in the same 
manner that she shopped for her favorite brand of shampoo or blue jeans.  Her 
reproductive options and her choice to become a mother were increasingly market 
choices, but they were tied to a new approach to reproductive “choice” as a practice of 
consumerism.  This would become even more pronounced with the expansion of new 
reproductive technologies, but the defunding of abortion offers one of the first and most 
striking examples of the growth of the newly dominant neoliberal civic lineage regime.  
The “good” citizen was self-sufficient enough to function as an independent market actor 
and have only as many children as she and her spouse could afford to raise according to 
middle-class norms.  Conversely, the “bad” citizen was the woman who was irresponsible 
enough to get pregnant when she could not afford to pay for an abortion or raise her child 
without becoming dependent on state funding and assistance.   
 This neoliberal civic lineage regime therefore supports a neoliberal ideal of 
citizenship, which links proper citizenship with appropriate reproductive behaviors and 
choices and maps civic practice onto market consumerism in the realm of reproduction 
and birth.  While it is important to note that the neoliberal emphasis on “the consumer” 
and the “private market” militates against the language of citizenship, as we have 
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witnessed in the post-Roe Supreme Court majority opinions examined in this chapter, this 
is no less a civic lineage regime than those that preceded it. In fact, through the avenues 
of governmental law and public policy, this neoliberal civic lineage regime (somewhat 
counterintuitively) relies on statecraft to cultivate consumer citizens by compelling 
women to turn to the private market to exercise their constitutional reproductive rights. 
Although the face of the new ideal of citizenship looks a lot like the one reinforced 
throughout the twentieth century, with class, race, and gender intersecting to produce a 
similar landscape of civic inequality, the main difference is that the neoliberal state 
empowers the private market to do a large part of this civic lineage work on behalf of the 
















The End of Welfare: 




In this final case study, I turn to the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), commonly referred to as “the end of welfare.”603 Passed 
by a Republican-controlled Congress and signed into law by President Bill Clinton, this 
bipartisan bill abolished the sixty-year old federal “welfare” assistance program for 
impoverished children first established by the Social Security Act in 1935.604 Part of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal response to widespread poverty during the Great 
Depression, the original Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) welfare program was 
renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962.605  During the civil 
rights movement and the Great Society, the Supreme Court labeled AFDC as a “statutory 
entitlement” for all who met the qualifications for government assistance for 
impoverished children under AFDC, but this Supreme Court (statutory) doctrine became 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603 This bill was enacted as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Public Law Number 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). The Act was codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.   
604 Title IV of the 1935 Social Security Act (SSA) established Aid to Dependent Children, which provided 
matching grants to states to provide support for impoverished dependent children, so they could stay with 
their mothers in their own home. Social Security Act of 1935, Title IV, § 401. 
605 Social Security Act Amendments of 1962 (Congress amended Title IV of the SSA in 1962, changing the 
name to: Aid to Dependent Families and Children, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1962). 
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moot with the end of the law. A triumph for the neoliberal civic lineage alliance, 
PRWORA combined stringent requirements for work participation with the “family 
values” agenda of the religious right, replacing AFDC with a much more restrictive block 
grant program titled Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The welfare 
reform law also broke from AFDC by instituting a strict civic lineage distinction between 
citizens and noncitizens, barring most legal immigrants from access to public assistance 
for their first five years residing in the United States. As I shall argue, the replacement of 
AFDC with PRWORA in the nineties reveals a great deal about the texture of our 
neoliberal civic lineage regime at the end of the twentieth century.  Not only has the 
government continued to target both citizens and non-citizens deemed deviant for harsher 
treatment in the realms of fertility and childrearing, thereby reinforcing a landscape of 
civic inequality linked to birth, but—as my examination of the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program highlights—it now does so in ways that institutionalize 
a distinctively American neoliberal ideal of citizenship.    
This chapter consists of eight parts.  Part 1 begins by introducing the key elements 
of the TANF program. Whereas AFDC applied to all legal residents, whether citizens or 
not, PRWORA excludes most immigrants, including legal permanent residents, from 
receiving welfare benefits for their first five years of residence in the United States. 
Drawing a sharp distinction between citizens and noncitizens in a civic lineage policy, 
TANF enforces national boundaries of citizenship in government policy pertaining to the 
reproduction of citizenship. Moreover, by explicitly mandating work and promoting 
marriage to counteract the dependency of needy mothers on government assistance, 
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TANF institutionalizes a neoliberal vision of what counts as proper childbearing and 
family formation in the United States. After introducing TANF as a prominent neoliberal 
civic lineage policy, I turn in Part 2 to important background information: addressing 
some of the key welfare laws and policies that preceded PRWORA, including Mother’s 
Pensions and AFDC.606  As these prior programs reveal, throughout the twentieth century 
“welfare” in America functioned as a means through which the government coercively 
intervened through public policy in the birth and rearing of the nation’s future generation 
of citizens, making it an influential part of each civic lineage regime.  
After examining a series of Supreme Court cases expanding welfare access to 
AFDC during the civil rights movement and the Great Society’s War on Poverty in Part 
3, I turn in Part 4 to the political backlash against welfare and the stigmatization of 
welfare recipients.  Of particular note, the negative stereotype of the “welfare queen” 
invoked racialized fears reminiscent of the “unfit” citizen of the early twentieth century, 
and played an integral symbolic role in the political drive to “end welfare” at the end of 
the century, as we shall see in the discourse surrounding this bipartisan agreement in 
1996, examined in Part 5.  However, just as we have an image of irresponsible civic 
reproduction, we also have a neoliberal ideal of “responsible” citizenship. During 1996, 
the same year as the passage of TANF, we witness the rise of the “Soccer Mom” as the 
ideal middle-class mother and key swing consumer and voter in the 1996 Presidential 
election.  In part 6, comparing the most prominent female stereotypes of the 1996 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 Note: In American parlance, the term “welfare” continues to be used to describe public assistance 
programs, including both AFDC and TANF.  Hence, in this chapter, I use the term to refer to public 
assistance, past and present. 
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election—the “welfare queen” versus the “soccer mom”—uncovers the exclusionary 
underbelly of neoliberal citizenship.  With the ideal neoliberal citizen in mind, Part 7 
returns to the connections between neoliberalism and welfare reform under PRWORA by 
examining features of TANF directly targeting fertility and family formation, including 
marriage promotion, child caps, mandatory paternity tests, abstinence education, prenatal 
drug testing, and family planning services that endorse semi-permanent forms of birth 
control like Norplant and Depo Provera.  
Finally, Part 8 turns to the concept of neoliberal citizenship.  I end by examining 
the complex and sometimes contradictory texture of the neoliberal civic lineage regime at 
the end of the twentieth century.  My aim in this last part is to offer the beginnings of a 
domestic theory of neoliberal citizenship that is responsive to the particular national 
values, principles, and institutional configurations of the United States.  Through 
statecraft and public policy, as I shall argue, our civic lineage regime fosters two tracts of 
neoliberal citizens, “responsible” and “deviant,” which continues to reinforce inequality 
among the most vulnerable groups in society.  This, in turn, raises serious concerns about 
the complicity of the American government in actively using public policy to maintain 
hierarchies in the reproduction of citizenship.  
Before proceeding to an introduction of the main policies and purposes of the 
TANF program in Part 1, it is important to first acknowledge at the outset that there is a 
weighty paradox resting at the center our contemporary neoliberal regime’s approach to 
childbirth and childrearing.  Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his dissent in the Beal case, 
discussed in the last chapter, drew attention to this tension by asking how a nation could 
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rationally opt to encourage childbirth among its poorest and most disadvantaged citizens 
by funding only childbirth and not abortion under Medicaid, while simultaneously cutting 
back on welfare funding for impoverished mothers to raise their children.607  If the 
government is so invested in poor women having babies, then it seems to logically follow 
that a nation as wealthy as the United States would also seek to ensure that their children 
have access to the basic resources and opportunities to grow up to become upstanding 
and productive members of society.  This tension appears to rest at the heart of our 
contemporary civic lineage regime.  How have these seemingly contradictory policies 
managed to coexist in our civic lineage regime for so long?  I emphasize two factors.   
First, this puzzle draws attention to the fact that the broad set of policies and laws 
that comprise this regime are at root the inconsistent product of three agendas within the 
neoliberal alliance: The small-state fiscal conservatives, racial conservatives, and the 
religious right.  As discussed in the preceding chapter, a new civic lineage coalition 
gained early political traction in the 1970s, illustrated by the Hyde Amendment in the last 
chapter, through a powerful political alliance between fiscal conservatives, opposed to 
government spending on welfare and anti-poverty initiatives, and the newly mobilized 
religious right, which championed “family values” in the political arena, including 
opposition to abortion and support of the “traditional” ideal of the nuclear family.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), Thurgood Marshall dissenting (The majority in Beal ruled that states 
participating in the Medicaid program were not required by Title XIX of the Social Security Act or under 
Roe v. Wade to fund elective abortion, Marshall dissented on the grounds that “Medicaid recipients are, 
almost by definition, "completely unable to pay for" abortions, and are thereby completely denied "a 
meaningful opportunity" to obtain them.” If unable to obtain an abortion under Medicaid, then “Absent 
day-care facilities, she will be forced into full-time child care for years to come; she will be unable to work 
so that her family can break out of the welfare system or the lowest income brackets. If she already has 
children, another infant to feed and clothe may well stretch the budget past the breaking point. All chance 
to control the direction of her own life will have been lost.” 
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Additionally, in the aftermath of the civil rights movement, racial conservatives 
mobilized on behalf of “color-blind” racial policies to avoid aiding minorities through 
new “color-conscious” efforts fostering affirmative action for the members of historically 
disadvantaged groups. (This backlash against civil rights efforts was particularly 
prevalent among southern Democrats, many of whom switched to the Republican Party 
in the 1970s.) The alliance between these groups reshaped civic lineage policy in the 
United States by linking “family values,” race-neutral “colorblind” approaches, and free 
market ideals (whenever possible), particularly in policies and laws governing the lives of 
poor women, often women of color, reliant on government assistance for basic 
necessities.  Although these three groups sometimes support differing civic lineage 
goals—such as, for example, promoting childbirth (i.e. a family values goal) and 
opposing government-funded child support for the poor (i.e. a commitment of fiscal 
conservatives)— TANF reveals the triumph of this sometimes inconsistent but distinctly 
American neoliberal civic lineage regime.  Notably, on the issue of restricting welfare 
funds for poor women, disproportionately women of color, all three groups could find 
common ground in the PROWRA “welfare reform” legislation.    
 Second, the neoliberal state is a powerfully coercive and interventionist state 
when it comes to regulating citizens deemed deviant, marshaling both public state 
coercion and private market forces to intercede in the lives of “dependent” citizens.  
Specifically, I suggest that the neoliberal American state is a muscularly interventionist, 
often punitive, state in its interactions with citizens who fall short of conforming to the 
neoliberal idea of proper civic (and economic) responsibility.  This, as I argue below, 
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makes political room for a “family values” agenda targeting deviant citizens through 
direct governmental coercion, rather than merely relying on the market.  As opposed to 
functioning as a so-called “small state”—which the champions of economic 
neoliberalism often emphasize—the neoliberal state is what I term a “strong state.”  This 
interventionist and disciplinary aspect of American neoliberal statecraft is demonstrated 
through the growing surveillance and coercion associated with the exploding criminal 
justice system in the United States, as scholars have recently argued, but it also extends to 
reproductive behavior and welfare.  Our strong state uses interventionist policies to 
sponsor a disciplinary regime of citizenship, which seeks to mold productive neoliberal 
citizens out of members of the “underclass,” or citizens deemed deviant, by assigning 
market roles and various degrees of civic status too them.  The neoliberal disciplinary 
regime uses both public state coercion and private market forces, such as the transition of 
welfare to mandated “workfare,” to create and reinforce a host of civic inequalities in the 
realms of class, race, sexual behavior, and gender. In fact, as I shall argue at the end of 
this chapter, the inconsistencies and contradictions within programs like TANF—
including the central place of “family values” in our contemporary neoliberal civic 
lineage regime—makes the regime all the more coercive and stratifying in its control of 
the procreative lives of poor women and the civic status of their children.  Let us turn 
now to the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, as a pivotal 





1. Introducing PRWORA  
The purpose of this section is to introduce and outline the main provisions of the 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which 
the Clinton Administration maintained would transition parents off government 
assistance and into jobs by “mak[ing] work pay.”608  Through combining an emphasis on 
mandatory market work with provisions promoting “family values” like marriage, I argue 
that PRWORA was a bipartisan effort to enshrine a uniquely American vision of what 
constitutes proper neoliberal citizenship within the civic lineage policies of “welfare 
reform.”609  Indeed, the drafters and supporters of PRWORA in Congress argued that the 
reform aimed to incentivize changes in the reproductive and market behavior of poor 
mothers, which would in turn strengthen families by promoting personal responsibility 
and independence through work instead of a pathological dependence on the 
government.610  As Parvin Huda emphasizes, “the text repeatedly extols work, family, 
personal responsibility and self-sufficiency.”611  These, of course, are central tenets of the 
neoliberal theory of the individual, or the responsible market actor, who practices 
(negative) freedom and attains self-sufficiency and success through hard work on the 
private market.  Ultimately, as I argue below, we encounter a national vision—mixed 
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with American values of civic reproduction—of what constitutes the ideal neoliberal 
citizen in PRWORA at the close of the twentieth century.   
In the last chapter, I introduced neoliberalism as an economic policy that rose to 
prominence in the 1970s, becoming “the Washington Consensus” and gaining dominance 
under President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.612  Neoliberalism is best known as an 
economic approach that involves an emphasis on “free trade” in a globalized world, but it 
also focuses on a nation’s domestic economy by deregulating businesses and financial 
markets, cutting back on social support and public benefit programs, and transferring 
public programs onto private markets.613  In the words of Frances Fox Piven, “In the 
name of individualism and unfettered markets, the [neoliberal] campaign called for 
deregulation of corporations, and particularly financial institutions; the rollback of public 
services and benefit programs; curbing labor unions; “free trade” policies that would pry 
open foreign markets; and wherever possible the replacement of public programs with 
private markets.”614  This radical reorganization of the state from a Keynesian to a 
neoliberal economy, as Wendy Brown has suggested, aims to infiltrate and shape all 
aspects of contemporary American society according to its market logic, along with the 
political system itself.615  As a result, I have argued that a neoliberal state depends upon 
the political cultivation of what might be called ‘neoliberal citizenship’—or a body 
politic that accepts these market norms and in which members function as productive 
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participants in neoliberal society.  As the previous chapter addresses, the idea of a 
neoliberal civic ideal—or civic lineage regime—may, at first glance, appear to be a 
contradiction in terms, because the ideology and practice of neoliberalism tends to 
undermine the economic significance of the modern nation-state by valorizing the free 
market in an increasingly globalized world.  But that is only a partial snapshot of the 
politics of neoliberalism, for it fails to address the way these neoliberal values—of 
negative freedom, self-reliance, personal responsibility, privatization, market 
participation, and consumerism—shape domestic laws regulating the reproduction of 
citizenship in a homegrown” manner in all nations, including the United States.  A 
neoliberal state requires a domestic population of properly neoliberal citizens to make the 
system work smoothly, which in turn means that it has a political investment in 
harnessing public policy to cultivate neoliberal citizenship.  Given the intimate 
connection of social welfare policy with both the labor market and the actual 
reproduction of citizens, it is no wonder that “welfare reform” became a unifying part of 
the domestic agenda of the dominant U.S. civic lineage alliance at the end of the 
twentieth century. 
What did this neoliberal policy look like? From a civic lineage standpoint, the 
first place to begin is its hostility towards immigrants. Under AFDC, legal noncitizens 
such as legal permanent residents were able to qualify for a wide range of government 
assistance benefits. In fact, AFDC forbid states from restricting or denying access to 
federal welfare based upon the status of citizenship.  In the words of Michael Fix and 
Ron Haskins, “This access was based on the principle that non-citizens come to 
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America,” and become legal residents, in order “to participate in the full range of 
American social, economic, and political life and that, with modest exceptions, they 
should be treated like other Americans.”616  Since the vast majority of the children of 
non-citizens are citizens themselves, as a consequence of U.S. birthright citizenship law, 
the inclusion of most legal noncitizens in the program allowed thousands of needy 
citizen-children to receive government assistance.617 Breaking with the recent AFDC 
past, PRWORA explicitly reversed this policy.618  After the 1996 enactment of welfare 
reform, most citizens were not eligible to receive means-tested anti-poverty benefits from 
the government during their first five years in the United States, including TANF, 
Medicaid, and food stamps.619 Hence, while welfare reform slashed benefits for citizens, 
it was even more restrictive and exclusionary in its treatment of non-citizens, including 
those with citizen children. Although the United States did not restrict the legal admission 
of immigrants during this time, which was unusually high during the 1990s, PRWORA 
“cut back sharply on the public benefits that immigrants could receive, even as it reduced 
the social rights of its citizens somewhat less severely.”620 Interestingly, these dramatic 
cuts in aid to immigrants nonetheless managed to serve the “work first” goal of TANF.  
As Rogers Smith points out, these dramatic reductions in benefits to immigrants “made it 
more likely that aliens would take any jobs on any terms offered; and if they failed to find 
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employment, the laws made it easier to deport them.”621 Drawing sharp lines between 
citizens and legal non-citizens, there are distinctively nationalistic concerns resting at the 
heart of TANF, which is also a neoliberal policy, focusing on promoting work, markets, 
privatization, and self-sufficiency.  
Let us turn now to the central place of mandatory work in welfare reform. 
Whereas AFDC was a joint federal and state program, in which the national government 
agreed to match state expenditures to everyone who qualified for assistance (subject to 
federal oversight), TANF allocates funds through block grants to states to develop their 
own assistance programs, thereby shifting oversight to the states.622  These block grants 
give increased flexibility to states to design their state welfare programs based on their 
own policy priorities.  But to qualify for the block grants, the state programs must meet 
the basic requirements of PRWORA.623  These priorities, as we might expect, emphasize 
the importance of moving recipients off government assistance and into the workforce as 
soon as possible.  Unlike AFDC, which offered benefits based on need with no cut-off as 
long as a family still met the qualifications, TANF recipients face a lifetime limit of five 
years total of government assistance. With welfare no longer a statutory entitlement 
based upon need, after one member of a household reaches this limit, typically the 
mother, the entire family becomes ineligible for aid as long as the expired member lives 
in the household.  (The lifetime limit applies even if the family remains in poverty, and 
irrespective of the level of need.)  In addition to the five-year (or 60 month) lifetime limit, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621 Ibid., 6. 
622 42 U.S.C.A. § 617 (1996). Excluding areas where Congress expressly reserved power, PRWORA 




TANF requires recipients to engage in a work activity within two years of receiving their 
first assistance check, and stipulates a minimum number of hours that recipients must 
work.624  During its first year in 1996, TANF set the minimum hours a recipient must 
engage in an approved work activity outside her household at twenty hours a week. Later, 
after states presumably had sufficient time to develop their work programs in accordance 
with TANF, the hourly work requirement for such recipients would steadily increase to 
twenty-five hours in 1999 and thirty hours a week in 2000.625  
Based on the description of the work provisions in TANF above, one might (at 
first glance) conclude that the birth and rearing of children seems secondary to the 
government’s efforts to push impoverished parents into low-wage jobs.  Yet this is only 
half the story.  In addition to its focus on work, “equally embedded in the law is a vision 
of socially desirable family formation, expressed in terms of individual sexual, 
reproductive and childrearing goals.”626  Indeed, in its four purposes of TANF, Congress 
lists a series of civic lineage goals.  To combat a “crisis in our Nation”—explicitly 
attributed by Congress to teenage pregnancy, unwed motherhood, and birth out-of-
wedlock in its “findings” section of in the Act’s introduction—the purpose of TANF is to 
provide block grants to states to design their own welfare program that meets the 
following goals, 
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1. Provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their 
own homes or in the homes of relatives; 
2. End the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting 
job preparation, work, and marriage; 
3. Prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish 
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these 
pregnancies; and 
4.   Encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.627  
 
As Congress clearly outlines in the purposes of TANF, listed verbatim above, the 
legislation aims to combine both work and family values to “end the dependence of 
needy parents on government.”628 This, in turn, sheds light on the texture of our 
American neoliberal civic lineage regime. As mentioned earlier, no ideology comes in a 
one-size-fits-all policy package when a nation uses it to shape its civic lineage laws. In 
TANF, we encounter the economization of a complex set of “American values” 
pertaining to fertility, sexual behavior, family formation, and parenthood.629 In fact, 
PRWORA denied benefits to non-citizens far more substantially than it did to citizens, 
and it did so in a manner that sharply reinforced distinctions in national status and 
membership in a way that is neoliberal in its emphasis on markets and also attentive to 
the domestic concerns and moral values of the United States. 
 Before ending this introduction to PRWORA, it is useful to touch on the role of 
“new federalism” in the bill.  At the center of PRWORA is an emphasis on “state 
devolution,” or the transfer of power over welfare programs from the national 
government to the states.  In fact, perhaps the most significant way in which PRWORA 
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altered the structure of welfare under AFDC was through the advent of its block (lump 
sum) grants to the states to organize their own welfare programs.630  In the Supreme 
Court’s first important welfare rights ruling in King v. Smith in 1968, the Court described 
AFDC as an example of “cooperative federalism” to refer to the fact that it was a joint 
federal and state program in which the states could voluntarily opt-in to the federal 
program and receive matching funds in return for abiding by the federal rules.  In 
contrast, PRWORA is an example of “new federalism,” in which Congress grants greater 
degrees of autonomy and flexibility to the states with less federal oversight.  This in 
effect creates fifty different welfare programs only loosely united around certain common 
federal goals outlined in TANF, some more generous or more punitive than others.631 In 
fact, since few conditions are placed on their block grants, states can choose to be less 
generous in their programs.632  While they cannot extend the generosity of their state 
assistance beyond the federal requirements, TANF explicitly permits them to create 
harsher policies and sanctions, including shorter lifetime limits and more stringent work 
requirements.  This intentional shift in the locus of authority over government assistance 
to the poor, in turn fostered a plethora of different state policies aimed at regulating 
fertility and family formation. Through economic incentives and disincentives, each of 
these programs relies upon coercive mechanisms—“the carrot or the stick”—to shape 
reproductive and market labor among their poorest residents.  Depending upon the state, 
these coercive civic lineage policies include: A variety of ways to promote marriage, caps 
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on assistance to additional children born while receiving assistance, mandatory paternity 
tests, family planning classes, advocacy of semi-permanent forms of birth control, 
abstinence-only education, drug tests with the risk of losing child custody, and efforts to 
decrease out-of-wedlock births and teenage motherhood.633  I will examine some of the 
most noteworthy of these state policies later in this chapter, but the main point is that the 
law mandated the devolution of authority to the states, resulting in fifty different regimes 
connected through the broader TANF requirements.  
There are features both old and new about the role of federalism in the design of 
TANF.  On the one hand, the increase in state flexibility has noteworthy commonalities 
with what we saw during the Progressive Era, at a time in which states designed their 
own eugenics and mother’s pension programs with a nod from the federal government.  
Yet this was not a return to the past.  Not only did the law’s central features, such as 
mandatory work requirements for women with dependent children point to a different 
role of women and the family in American political culture, but also the structure of 
TANF encouraged privatization within state programs in a distinctively neoliberal 
way.634  Since the overall amount of federal funding for needy families went down under 
the fixed (lump sum) block grants and this switch happened suddenly, many states turned 
to private companies to professionally design and oversee their welfare programs as 
efficiently as possible based upon the new TANF regulations.  In this regard, the end of 
the AFDC program and swift devolution of oversight to the states created incentives for 
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state and local governments to engage in privatization of these new state-based (public) 
welfare programs.  A hallmark of neoliberal statecraft, I will examine this trend towards 
privatization of public services and social programs—including its impact on 
citizenship—in more detail at the end of the chapter.    
This, then, is a brief outline of the neoliberal landscape of anti-poverty social 
policy that we encounter at the end of the twentieth century.  Throughout this chapter, I 
will examine these specific neoliberal civic lineage policies in more detail—and subject 
these policies to critical assessment for their role in perpetuating civic inequality among 
vulnerable groups in America based upon birth—but next I turn first to the political 
background leading to this juncture in the government’s decision to slash benefits to the 
poor.  Indeed, to fully grasp this neoliberal civic lineage regime, it is useful to address the 
question of how we got here?  Why did the national government compromise across party 
lines to end the sixty-year old AFDC policy and replace it with TANF?  And what was 
the role of the courts in this process?   
 
2. Background: The Development of Welfare in America 
Although the neoliberal ideal of citizenship is a contemporary phenomenon, the 
government’s use of state-coercion through welfare policy to mold citizens and enforce 
prevailing civic ideals is not new.  From its earliest days, social programs for poor 
mothers in America have functioned as a means through which the state coercively 
intervenes via public policy in the birth and rearing of the nation’s future generation of 
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citizens.  The government does this by specifically targeting mothers and children for aid, 
and in turn attaching various requirements for families to receive government aid for their 
children.  We see this at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the Progressive Era’s 
Mother’s Pensions movement.  We also see this in the rise and expansion of the Aid to 
Dependent Children program under the 1935 Social Security Act prior to its replacement 
by TANF. This section touches upon the ways in which “welfare” has always functioned 
as a civic lineage policy endorsing the dominant ideals of the reproduction of citizenship 
of its day. The next section traces the development of AFDC as a “statutory entitlement” 
to all qualifying individuals, with a focus on the welfare rights rulings by the Court 
during the civil rights movement.    
The first widespread effort to create modern welfare system, prior to the Social 
Security Act of 1935, was the Mother’s Pensions movement during the Progressive 
era.635  These civic lineage policies fit squarely within the Fitter Families ideal of the day.  
A part of the broader Progressive Era reform agenda, the concept of Mother’s Pensions 
began with support from private charities but later expanded into a wider call for the 
government to provide public relief to impoverished mothers and their young children.  
Between 1911 and 1920, a total of forty states enacted mother’s pension programs, 
thereby establishing the first expansive public aid programs for single mothers.636  These 
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programs targeted certain mothers as morally upright and deserving of aid, offering a 
sharp contrast between mothers deemed eugenically deviant and those ranked as 
deserving of state support.  In particular, Mother’s Pension programs focused on white 
widows as their beneficiaries.  African American women and immigrants from unpopular 
groups, as Molly Ladd-Taylor argues, were widely excluded from Mother’s Pensions.637  
In the early 1900s, reformers emphasized that a mother and her children, through no 
deficiency or fault of their own, could be thrust into poverty following the loss of their 
breadwinning husbands/fathers.638 The victims of bad luck as opposed to personal failure, 
rather than treat their children in the same manner as the unfit, the focus of public policy 
ought to be raising the next generation of citizens in the “suitable homes” of their own 
mothers to develop proper civic character. For instance, in a White House Conference on 
the Care of Dependent Children in 1909, conference participants issued the following 
resolution about the importance of ensuring that parents of “worthy character” could care 
for their children: 
 
Home life is the highest and finest product of civilization.  It is the great molding 
force of mind and character.  Children should not be deprived of it except for 
compelling and urgent reasons.  Children of parents of worthy character [i.e. not 
the children of individuals like Carrie Buck], suffering from temporary misfortune 
and children of reasonable efficient and deserving mothers who are without the 
support of the normal breadwinner, should as a rule, be kept with their parents, 
such aid being given as may be necessary to maintain suitable homes for the 
rearing of children.639 
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Passed as state laws during the same time as the “eugenics craze,” Mother’s Pensions 
were aimed at advancing the Fitter-Families civic lineage (positive eugenics) ideal of the 
Progressive Era.   
Likewise, driven by the same forces that mobilized in support of mother’s 
pensions, the Sheppard-Towner bill of 1921—frequently called the Maternity Act—
provided significant federal funding “to reduce maternal and infant mortality.”640  The 
Sheppard-Towner bill passed both Houses of Congress easily, and was signed into law by 
President Warren G. Harding.641  Part of a Progressive Era (eugenic) movement called 
“scientific mothering”—or applying the principles of science to improve the health of 
infants and children and to educate poor mothers—the bill was designed to provide 
federal funds to encourage states to develop their own programs to provide better medical 
care to mothers and young children: childbirth remained the leading cause of death for 
women, and around one-third of all children died within their first five years, which was 
higher than in other industrialized countries.642 Administered by the Children’s Bureau, 
the program provided dollar for dollar matching funds, based on population, for states to 
decide how to use the money to serve the goals of the program (if they opted in).643  As 
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Alexandra Stern emphasizes, the Sheppard-Towner Act allowed for the convergence of 
state (Mother’s Pensions) and federal “infant and maternal hygiene programs,” and many 
states used the federal funds to tailor “Americanization campaigns of cleanliness and 
citizenship.”644  Whereas deviant mothers, such as Carrie Buck could not approximate 
this ideal and were considered “lost causes” warranting sterilization, these Progressive 
Era programs sought to school worthy recipients in the moral values and mainstream 
behaviors of middle-class American society.645  They were part of the political agenda of 
positive eugenics and central features of the fitter-family civic lineage regime of the day. 
646   
This brings us to the New Deal.  By 1929, the state funding for Mother’s Pensions 
dried up and Congress ceased funding the Sheppard-Towner Act in large part due to the 
financial emergency caused by the Great Depression.647  In the face of economic crisis 
and widespread poverty, Franklin D. Roosevelt, as part of his New Deal program, 
championed the Social Security Act (SSA).  The foundation for the modern welfare state 
in America, the Social Security Act of 1935 included provisions for the elderly, the 
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unemployed, and impoverished children “to provid[e] a modicum of income security to 
working-class families and a minimal safety net for the urban and rural poor.”648  The 
1935 Social Security Act (SSA) created the first U.S. national welfare program, Aid to 
Dependent Children (ADC), which was expanded over time, becoming Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the 1962.649 Although the stipends to mothers were 
often small and difficult for a family to survive on, the purpose of the funding was to 
keep respectable women out of workhouses and poorhouses and allow them to raise their 
children with dignity in their own home.650  
The original Aid to Dependent Children program in the 1935 SSA garnered early 
respectability due to its association with the “deserving” (white) widows of working 
men.651 This soon disappeared. Shortly before the United States entered World War II, 
Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1939 so that widows would no longer be 
stuck within a means-tested (state-run) program and would instead receive direct 
survivors benefits for their children.  In the words of Stephen Sugarman, “From that date 
forward their assistance was to be generous and unstigmatizing.  Under the amended 
regime, these new benefits could be characterized, in effect, as life insurance annuities 
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August 14, 1935.  In 1962, the SSA was amended by Congress in Public Law 87-543, transforming ADC to 
AFDC, signed by President John F. Kennedy. 
650 Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled, 298. According to Linda Gordon, poor women often had to work to 
support their families, but they had to enter the labor force covertly: If they were caught working by social 
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paid for by the deceased father through his social security contributions.”652  While this 
improved the lot of the widows of workingmen, both in terms of financial security and 
status, this amendment was damaging for the public image of welfare.  By removing the 
most sympathetic and respectable recipients (widows and their children) and transitioning 
them into a completely different and more generous annuity program based upon the 
work contributions of their deceased spouse, “Congress effectively left behind those 
single mothers who are generally viewed by society as less deserving” in AFDC.653 This 
created a separation between the most stereotypically deserving recipients and mothers at 
the margins, increasingly labeled as “undeserving.”654  In postwar American society, the 
AFDC program gained the reputation for funding the irresponsible and deviant behaviors 
of single mothers.655   
During this time, caseworkers in many states and localities began to more strictly 
enforce “suitable home” and “substitute parent” rules.  They often applied these rules in a 
relatively arbitrary manner to exclude women of color from the welfare rolls.656 
Likewise, despite a 1961 proclamation issued by the secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare against it, welfare caseworkers persisted in conducting surprise visits to homes 
(called “midnight raids”) to police “man in the house” rules.  These rules stipulated that 
unmarried women with men in their beds should not receive assistance.  (According to 
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this logic, if the relationship was legitimate and serious then the man ought to provide for 
the family, but if the relationship was not serious, then the woman was morally unfit and 
the household did not meet the “suitable home” requirements for aid.)  In the words of 
Kaaryn Gustafson, “The unstated but underlying goals of the rules were to police and 
punish the sexuality of single mothers, to close off the indirect access to government 
support of able-bodied men, to winnow the welfare rolls, and to reinforce the idea that 
families receiving aid were entitled to no more than near desperate living standards.”657  
In the 1960s—at the same time the Supreme Court was praising the white picket fence 
(postwar) ideal of the family in Griswold—welfare caseworkers policed the sexual 
behavior and childrearing of poor women, not conforming to the postwar ideal, through 
the AFDC program.658   
This brings us to the War on Poverty.  The same year that President Lyndon B. 
Johnson signed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, he also launched a War on Poverty, calling for 
Congress to pass legislation expanding of the safety net for poor Americans.  In the 
words of President Johnson in his first State of the Union Address to Congress in 1964:  
Let this session of Congress be known as the session which did more for civil 
rights than the last hundred sessions combined…as the session which declared an 
all-out-war on  human poverty and unemployment in the United 
States…Unfortunately, many Americans live on the out outskirts of hope—some 
because of their poverty, and some because of their color, and all too many 
because of both. Our task is to help replace their despair with opportunity…This 
administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in 
America.  I urge this Congress and all Americans to join me in that effort. It will 
not be a short or easy struggle, no single weapon will suffice, but we shall not rest 
until that war is won.  The richest Nation on earth can afford to win it. We cannot 
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afford to lose it…Poverty is a national problem, requiring improved national 
organization and support.  But this attack, to be effective, must also be organized 
at the State and local level…It must be won in every private home, in every public 
office, from the courthouse to the White House.659 
 
From today’s vantage point, the idea of the government spearheading an effort to end 
poverty in America altogether seems remarkable—perhaps even quixotic—for a 
President’s State of the Union Address.  However, following this speech, Congress 
responded by passing the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which created a series of 
educational, employment, and anti-discrimination programs, including Jobs Corps, Head 
Start, Legal Services, and the Community Action Program.660  Congress also expanded 
nutrition programs in the Food Stamps Act of 1964, which later became the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and passed the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 increasing educational opportunities and aiming to lessen 
achievement gaps in schools.661  Furthermore, as part of its War on Poverty legislation, 
Congress added the health insurance programs of Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid 
for the poor as amendments to the Social Security Act (SSA) in 1965.662   
 This impressive list of accomplishments begs the question: What did the War on 
Poverty mean for AFDC? Despite supporting a host of anti-poverty initiatives, it might 
seem surprising that Congress chose not to expand federal funding of AFDC as part of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964 State of the Union Address, Joint Session of Congress (January 8, 1964). 
660 See Gareth Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society 
Liberalism (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1996); Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty 
to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2016). 
661 United States Department of Agriculture, “A Short History of SNAP: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program.” Available online at: https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap [last visited July 5, 2017]. 
662 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle against Poverty in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 153-65. 
310	  
	  
the War on Poverty.  In fact, when the Johnson Administration proposed welfare reforms 
that would have merely required states to raise their cash assistance benefits under AFDC 
to keep pace with changes over time in the cost of living (i.e. meet the calculated baseline 
of standard of need in the state), Congress rejected this basic increase in funding and 
instead added additional work-related requirements in the 1967 Amendments to the 
SSA.663  The incorporation of work-based initiatives was not new.  In response to 
concerns that welfare discouraged marriage and encouraged unwed motherhood, the 
original Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) was renamed Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) in 1962 and incentives for poor husbands to work became part of the 
program.664  In 1964, Congress rejected any increase in generosity in favor of a work-
focused direction, with increased job training opportunities, primarily for men, in the 
Work Experience and Training Program, citing the rising costs associated with the spike 
in caseloads.  In her revisionist account of the “workfare state,” Eva Bertram presents 
detailed and convincing evidence that conservative southern Democrats spearheaded 
work requirements during the 1960s and throughout the War on Poverty, making the 
move to work requirements a bipartisan project long before Bill Clinton and a Republican 
Congress passed TANF.665  Nonetheless, since the focus of these early AFDC work 
programs aimed to encourage the formation of nuclear families, over single motherhood, 
and offered incentives for fathers to provide for their families as traditional male 
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breadwinners, these early work requirements appear largely in keeping with the postwar 
white picket fence ideal of citizenship and civic reproduction.   
 Although the War on Poverty did little to expand AFDC legislatively, it 
contributed to the growth of the welfare program in other ways—particularly judicially.  
Most importantly, the Johnson Administration helped make AFDC more accessible for 
qualifying families, including hitherto excluded African Americans.666 With the end of 
formal legal racial discrimination, African Americans—who had suffered higher rates of 
poverty than whites throughout the program but were regularly excluded from receiving 
AFDC at the state and local level—were no longer systematically excluded from AFDC.  
Furthermore, in her analysis of the welfare rights movement during the 1960s, Kaaryn 
Gustafson notes that the Johnson Administration played a key role in “funneling money 
into legal services for the poor,” including giving federal government money to the Legal 
Aid Society in “handling both minor individual cases and broader actions challenging 
government policies” that were arbitrary or racially discriminatory.667  These efforts to 
use the courts to improve the welfare system sought to end racial discrimination in AFDC 
and grant due process access to all those who qualified under the statute, resulting in 
court cases addressed below.   
  To summarize: The early ADC policy, like the state-run Mother’s Pensions 
programs before it, was built around the Progressive Era Fitter Families ideal of 
citizenship.  The AFDC program later sought to encourage nuclear families in a manner 
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consistent with the White Picket Fence ideal of citizenship of postwar America.  
However, as we shall see below, AFDC took a distinctively neoliberal turn beginning in 
the 1970s.  Importantly, the Supreme Court played a key role in first expanding the 
policy to be more inclusive, and later providing policymakers with the legal leeway to 
reshape the program in a manner consistent with the advent of a neoliberal civic lineage 
regime. 
 
3. Expansion and Retrenchment: The Supreme Court’s AFDC Cases  
This brings us to the role of the Supreme Court in expanding welfare rights during the 
1960s and early 1970s.  Fueled by the activism associated with the civil rights and 
feminist movements and funding from the Johnson Administration, as part of the War on 
Poverty, lawyers increasingly identified arbitrary practices from caseworkers and brought 
“welfare rights” cases to court.668  This section begins by examining three Supreme Court 
cases that expanded and streamlined procedural access to welfare, even suggesting 
(briefly) that the Court might be headed in the direction of determining that welfare was a 
right, but the Court soon retreated from these feminist egalitarian implications and took a 
distinctively neoliberal turn in its jurisprudence.  The tensions in these AFDC cases, 
timed close together, are fascinating and indicative of a larger political struggle over civic 
lineage and welfare policy in the nation.  Like we saw in the last chapter, at a time of 
transition between civic lineage regimes, it appears that the Court was in the process of 
“trying to figure out” how the jurisprudence on the topic ought to pan out.  In the end, as 
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we shall see, the Court first expanded procedural access to welfare, but soon fell in a 
neoliberal civic lineage direction when it came to the benefits given by the government to 
recipients within the program.   
Let us begin with the role of the Supreme Court in expanding access to welfare.  
In a triad of cases, between 1968 and 1970, the Supreme Court expanded welfare rights.  
The first of these “welfare rights” cases was King v. Smith (1968) in which the Court 
overturned the state of Alabama’s man-in-the-house rule, which had thrown an African 
American widow and mother of four off the welfare rolls for not having a “suitable 
home” because she had a sexual relationship with a married man.669 In a unanimous 
opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren, the Court held that the Alabama rule violated 
the federal Social Security Act on the grounds that “the category [of dependent] singled 
out for welfare assistance by AFDC is the “dependent child,” defined as “an age-qualified 
needy child,” not the mother.670  The SSA protected dependent children, and was not 
intended to punish children for the sins of their mothers. 671   Hence, “Under the “scheme 
of cooperative federalism,” Alabama is required to follow the statutory requirements of 
the SSA and “provide economic security for children” not mothers.672  Second, in 
Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), the Court issued a 5-4 ruling that a state could not deny the 
application of a qualified women for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
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because she recently changed her residence and relocated from another state.673 Although 
the Constitution does not specifically mention a right to travel, the majority opinion by 
Justice Brennan struck down a Connecticut state law requiring that a mother live in the 
state for one year before applying for assistance under AFDC, because this waiting period 
for government aid violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving newcomers of "the 
ability . . . to obtain the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and [the] other necessities of 
life.'”674 
Then, in Goldberg v. Kelly (1970)—arguably the most important of the AFDC 
welfare rights cases—the Supreme Court ruled 5-3 (with the vacancy of Abe Fortas) that 
“Welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive 
them.”675  As a result, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
the government offer procedural due process through a fair evidentiary hearing before 
depriving a recipient of benefits.676  Whereas states such as New York previously would 
remove recipients from welfare rolls suddenly and in a relatively arbitrary fashion, 
leaving recipients not only without necessary funds to survive but also without recourse 
to challenge this decision, the Goldberg Court determined that recipients were entitled to 
notice of the decision before their benefits were reduced or ended and that they could 
challenge negative actions before a neutral arbitrator.  This case set the guidelines for 
how procedural due process applies when dealing with the termination of a government 
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benefit or entitlement.  Even more interestingly, Justice Brennan writing for the majority, 
cited a law review article by Charles Reich, “The New Property,” to argue that the 
expansion of the welfare state and government subsidies—including subsidies to 
corporations, farms and small agriculture, government pensions, professional licenses, 
and social welfare to impoverished citizens—constituted something akin to “new 
property” in the changing economic system.677  This, as scholars like Gwendolyn Mink 
have emphasized, suggested at the time that welfare might be closer to a right than a 
privilege, and as Brennan argued, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is 
triggered when a person is deprived of property without the due process of law.678  A 
person has a property interest in government payments she depends upon to survive and 
raise her family, which makes AFDC a statutory entitlement to those who qualify for the 
program.  
In a similar manner to the Medicaid cases on abortion defunding, addressed in the 
last chapter, the Goldberg case reveals a brief moment in time in which a voluntary 
motherhood civic lineage regime was one possible direction that the Supreme Court and 
the other branches of government might follow.  In Goldberg, Justice Brennan suggests 
through dicta that bearing and raising a child with rudimentary support from the 
government for sustenance might be a social right of citizenship protected by the 
Constitution.679  As a result of the short-lived welfare rights movement and its court 
victories during the War on Poverty, AFDC became a much bigger civic lineage program 
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affecting more and more American children. the welfare rolls more than doubled in the 
short time between 1964 and 1970, swelling from 4.2 to 9.7 million.680 With AFDC more 
widely accessible to qualifying families during the Johnson Administration’s War on 
Poverty, Gustafson concludes, “More and more of the poor realized they were eligible for 
assistance and applied for welfare…The sheer volume of applications was 
overwhelming…”681 The number of recipients enrolled in the program continued to 
expand into the 1970s, with help from the Court’s favorable rulings.   
The courts played an important role in opening the doors of AFDC for hitherto 
excluded groups and streamlining procedural access to benefits, which made the program 
much less arbitrary and more administrative.  But although AFDC remained a “statutory 
entitlement” after Goldberg, the more sweepingly egalitarian aspects of Justice Brennan’s 
“new property” argument did not stick.  The Supreme Court increasingly favored 
neoliberal theories of individual choice and reproduction in its AFDC jurisprudence 
during the 1970s after Goldberg. However, while the courts expanded access, the states 
and federal government constricted benefits and reshaped the program in a more work-
focused direction.  Let us examine the Supreme Court’s neoliberal turn in welfare 
jurisprudence.   
 After briefly flirting with making welfare a social right, the Court in the mid-
1970s determined that states could impose significant limitations—such as maximum 
payments or child caps and limitations that fell short of the calculated standard of need of 
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recipients—irrespective of whether children and their family failed to receive the funds 
required for basic subsistence. For instance, in Dandridge v. Williams (1970), the Court 
ruled that states could cap the maximum grants offered to welfare recipients based upon 
family size, cutting off benefits when “additional” children are born.682  Likewise, in a 
strong repudiation of the notion that welfare payments are “new property,” the Court held 
in Wyman v. James (1971) that an individual’s Fourth Amendment protections against 
unwarranted searches do not apply to the homes of people receiving welfare support.683 
While the majority acknowledged that a person is normally free from unwarranted 
government intrusion in her home under the Fourth Amendment, they waved this 
protection for caseworker visits for welfare recipients.  Labeling welfare as a privilege 
not a right in the majority opinion in Wyman, Justice Blackmun held that home visits 
from government officials was a reasonable tradeoff for the privilege of receiving AFDC 
benefits.684  If a person didn’t want a caseworker to visit her home, then she could simply 
decide not to receive assistance from the government.  By participating in the need-based 
AFDC program, she effectively relinquished her Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
government officials visiting (read: searching) her home in exchange for the program’s 
benefits.  To put it another way, she sold this right to the government when she signed up 
for welfare.   
This is a classic neoliberal ruling during the 1970s.  Specifically, Wyman 
transforms government assistance for poor women to support dependent children into a 
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matter of free choice, thereby sidelining the ways in which their options are limited by 
poverty.  A mother relying on welfare to support her children cannot refuse a caseworker 
access to her home without sacrificing basic necessities.  By exercising her Fourth 
Amendment right, she might even place her home at risk by not meeting rent. In fact, this 
is precisely what Justice Douglas implies in his Wyman dissent.685 He went directly for 
the jugular of the majority’s cramped notion of choice and its double-standard for poor 
mothers compared to businessmen.  As Douglas put it, “Whatever the semantics, the 
central question is whether the government by force of its largesse had the power to “buy 
up” rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”686  By offering benefits with traditionally 
unconstitutional stipulations attached to the funding, which an impoverished person 
simply cannot afford to refuse (and therefore has no genuine choice), Douglas accuses the 
Court’s Majority of allowing the government to essentially purchase by eminent domain 
a poor person’s normal Fourth Amendment protection.  
Importantly, the Wyman decision in 1970 is premised upon the neoliberal theory 
of the individual.  If a woman is financially independent enough to reject government 
assistance, then she can exercise her constitutional right to privacy.  The government 
program is a privilege.  So, irrespective of poverty the need of her children, her reliance 
on government assistance is a free choice. This Fourth Amendment privacy case sounds a 
lot like the Court’s approach to reproductive privacy rights under Medicaid.  In both, the 
solution for the woman who wants to access her fundamental constitutional right in 
question is to become a self-sufficient market actor, who does not rely on the government 
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for basic necessities.  Ironically—yet in line with neoliberal market ideology—the Court 
treats government subsidies to businesses and corporations completely differently when it 
comes to the effect of assistance on fundamental rights.  As Douglas points out in his 
Wyman dissent, while government assistance given to an impoverished mother can buy 
up her fundamental rights, the government does not attach such requirements to the “new 
property” given to businesses through subsidies. In his words, “There is not the slightest 
hint [in the Court’s majority opinion]…that the Government could condition a business 
license on the “consent” of the licensee to the administrative searches we held violated 
the Fourth Amendment.” He continues, “it is a strange jurisprudence indeed which 
safeguards the businessman at his place of work from warrantless searches but will not do 
the same for the mother in her home…It is the precincts of the home that the Fourth 
Amendment protects; and their privacy is as important to the lowly as to the mighty.”687   
Written in response to a general shift in jurisprudence on the Court, this is an 
important dissent because it points to the fact that in just a few years the Court went from 
viewing welfare as potentially a “new property” right to falling in a different (neoliberal) 
direction—which favored businesses over poor mothers and undermines redistributive 
social policy.  With a neoliberal theory of the individual and the idea that welfare is a 
privilege not a right, we encounter a patchwork jurisprudence that ensured qualified 
individuals could enter the program, while at the same time the Court permitted states to 
offer less generous benefits.  In practice, states could cut funding in a variety of ways for 
program beneficiaries, especially in the interest of saving money or encouraging work.  
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For instance, the Court refused to apply equal protection to harmful distinctions 
between categories of poor within assistance programs in Jefferson v. Hackney (1972).688   
Ruling that it was constitutionally permissible for the state of Texas to provide higher 
benefits to disability and old-age programs comprised primarily of white and elderly 
beneficiaries while meeting a fraction of the needs of AFDC recipients, who were 
overwhelmingly people of color and young, the majority of the Court in Jefferson 
permitted Texas to slash welfare benefits in a manner that disproportionately harmed 
needy blacks and Latinos with children in the state.  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that the Texas system was both statutorily and constitutionally 
acceptable because it treated everyone within the AFDC program alike, and instead made 
distinctions between different SSA aid programs.  Labeling the racial disparity between 
the programs as merely statistical with no evidence of invidious discrimination, 
Rehnquist argued that Texas had rational reasons to want to offer meager benefits to 
people on welfare because the young have the ability “of improving their situation,” 
presumably through work.689  Responding to the narrow reasoning of the majority, Justice 
Marshall, echoing his dissents in the last chapter on Medicaid, accused the Court of 
adopting a misguided approach to the nexus of reproduction, poverty, and citizenship.  In 
his words, “All of us with children know that it costs as much if not more to rear children 
in health, decency, and self-respect than to maintain an adult. It is surely no less 
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important to make this investment in our future citizens than it is to provide decently for 
those who have retired.”690     
Despite the fact that the Court cultivated a more ambivalent “welfare rights” 
jurisprudence after 1970, the fact remains that AFDC was a “statutory entitlement” under 
federal law for all who qualified under Goldberg.  It remained so until “the end of 
welfare,” and replacement of AFDC with TANF, in 1996.  This meant that recipients had 
access to benefits with due process protections, but it also meant that states could apply a 
variety of different limitations on funding within the program.  Perhaps most importantly, 
when the question before the Court involved a class of dependent children, the Court 
almost always ruled in favor of dependent children as the intended beneficiaries of the 
statute.  (The Court consistently prohibited the total exclusion of categories of dependent 
children using equal protection, including illegitimate children and military orphans.691)  
However, this was a thin approach to equal protection, which granted access but not any 
semblance of substantive equality, and made room for policing of mothers within the 
program.  Indeed, when the question in a case centered around the mother, as it was 
framed in Dandridge and Wyman—note: this is primarily a matter of framing because the 
child is, by definition, dependent—then the Court was apt to rule against the mother to 
the detriment of the child.  While the dissenters maintained that this obviously harmed 
the child, the majority focused more narrowly on the mother or entire family, not the 
individual dependent child.  This distinction between the dependent child and parent is a 
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noteworthy pattern in these AFDC cases, and the Court appeared increasingly willing to 
punish the mother, which in turn harmed the child.   
In sum, the political backlash against welfare shares much in common with the 
retrenchment of funding for abortion and reproductive choice under Medicaid for poor 
women in the 1970s, examined in the last chapter.  On the heels of the civil rights and 
women’s movements, we see evidence of the beginnings of a neoliberal civic lineage 
regime emerging in another policy arena: Namely, welfare.  The tensions in these AFDC 
cases, timed close together, is fascinating and indicative of a larger political struggle over 
civic lineage and welfare policy in the nation.  As we saw in the last chapter, at a time of 
transition between civic lineage regimes, it appears that the Court was in the process of 
“trying to figure out” how the jurisprudence on the topic ought to pan out.  What we get 
is a narrow view of equal protection focusing on thin procedural access to the program as 
opposed to a thicker notion of social equality.  In the end, the Court—as Justice Douglas 
intimates above—fell in a neoliberal civic lineage direction.  Moreover, as Justice 
Thurgood Marshall emphasizes, these decisions were likely to foster inequality among 
future generations of citizens. 
 
4. Deviant Citizenship & the Welfare Queen Stereotype 
Ironically, this was “soft” neoliberalism compared to what would follow twenty years 
later in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA). Not only did “welfare reform” entirely abolish cash assistance as a 
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“statutory entitlement” to all impoverished dependent children who qualified, but it also 
redesigned welfare via TANF to operate as fixed federal block grants to states, banned 
most legal non-citizens from receiving public assistance for five years, required 
mandatory work from caregiving recipients after two years, strict lifetime limits of 
benefits irrespective of need, and a series of “family values” provisions coercively 
regulating family formation and promoting marriage.692  How, then, did we get from this 
“soft” to “hard” neoliberalism in welfare policy?   
The explanation is neither simple nor direct.  In her recent analysis of the 
development of the “workfare state,” Eva Bertram persuasively challenges the traditional 
narrative that credits the Republican Party with the retrenchment of New Deal and Great 
Society welfare programs, the latter of which were sponsored by the liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party.693  Against the classic story that suggests that welfare expanded under 
the War on Poverty until the Republican war against the poor under the Reagan 
Administration in the 1980s, Bertram documents the legislative battles waged by 
conservative southern Democrats, largely within their own party without public attention, 
to introduce work programs for AFDC welfare recipients in the 1960s and 1970s.  When 
the courts struck down overt racial discrimination within social programs and made 
welfare more accessible, this in turn increased the welfare rolls and gave the false 
impression that the government was more generous within AFDC.  In contrast, according 
to Bertram, southern Democrats responded at both the state and national level by seeking 
to reshape the New Deal “welfare” program into a less generous “workfare” system. 
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Bertram’s evidence strongly suggests that southern Democrats spearheaded these policy 
innovations supporting low-income work rather than government cash handouts to 
preserve the (hierarchical) economic status quo of the South.694  Using race-neutral 
language to highlight work to thwart economic mobility among people of color and poor 
whites and keep them in the low-end labor market, these leaders were able to quietly 
sponsor a shift in the shape of the welfare state that helped to preserve southern racial and 
socioeconomic inequalities in the face of the legal victories of the civil rights and 
women’s movement.   
Bertram’s account of the role of workfare in reinforcing civic inequality, first as a 
southern response to civil rights within the Democratic Party and later as a bipartisan 
project, points to the non-accidental timing of this backlash against welfare in the wake 
of the civil rights movement.  This, in turn, highlights the unequal underbelly of 
neoliberal citizenship at an early policy-making stage.  That said, an important part of the 
neoliberal backlash against welfare involves the American public’s ideological 
acceptance of a neoliberal ideal of citizenship.  In this regard, Ronald Reagan played a 
key discursive role in the shift towards neoliberal civic lineage policy in the 1970s and 
1980s.  Widely credited with the economic triumph of neoliberalism in the United States 
(just as Margaret Thatcher was in Britain), Ronald Reagan’s rhetorical approach to 
“market fundamentalism” often utilized discourse on civic lineage to garner public 
support for dismantling social programs.695  Indeed, a key piece of the puzzle from a civic 
lineage standpoint is captured in Ronald Reagan’s demonization of the “welfare queen” 
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as a trope for engaging in irresponsible reproduction and bad motherhood to take 
advantage of the welfare system.696  Combining invidious historical stereotypes about the 
reckless fertility and irresponsible reproduction of both blacks and poor women, Reagan 
mixed existing prejudices with a contemporary neoliberal picture of a deviant citizen. 
Akin to the political backlash against the eugenically unfit citizen of the Progressive 
Era—who was also cast as overly fertile and dangerous for the nation’s future generation 
of citizens—the “welfare queen” would become the face of welfare during Ronald 
Reagan’s campaign for the presidency.697  From an ideological standpoint, Ronald 
Reagan articulated—and in hindsight convincingly sold—a distinctively American 
(neoliberal) picture of the unfit citizen to the wider American public in his efforts to 
attack and dismantle government aid programs in favor of an increasingly unrestrained 
“trickle down” market economy.   
During his (unsuccessful) 1976 campaign for the Republican presidential 
nomination, Reagan launched a full-blown assault on the social programs of the New 
Deal and the Great Society.  In particular, accusing anti-poverty programs like AFDC and 
Food Stamps as rife with fraud—stealing hard earned money from taxpayers to fund 
unworthy civic reproduction and pathological parenthood—Reagan introduced the 
“Welfare Queen” to the American public, crowning her as the face of welfare.  As he put 
it in a campaign speech, “There’s a woman in Chicago.  She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 
15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security veterans’ benefits for four 
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nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare [which she collects under each 
of these names]. Her tax-free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a year.”698   
This was a powerful story.  It also had some basis in reality.  In 1974, Congress 
amended the Social Security Act to require AFDC beneficiaries to report their Social 
Security numbers with their annual paperwork for their application, and “computers 
began being used routinely to monitor for fraud.”699  As we might expect, a few AFDC 
cheaters were uncovered during this time, but they pilfered much less money than those 
engaged in white-collar tax or corporate fraud.700  The first case of welfare fraud to make 
national headlines was a Chicago mother in her forties, named Linda Taylor, who was 
engaged in a host of egregious criminal activities, including welfare fraud, and whom the 
Chicago Tribune and Jet Magazine both dubbed “the Welfare Queen.”701  This is the first 
time the term appears in the press, and Reagan coopted it.  The fact that Taylor was 
convicted for stealing much less from the government ($8,000) was not important. Rather 
than treating the fraud she committed as an anomaly and applying a more appropriate 
criminal narrative to Taylor’s case, Reagan instead combined her story with other 
accounts of AFDC scam artists to create a legendary political myth of poor mothers (in 
mass) abusing the system in outrageous ways.702  Through lurid tales of “welfare 
queens,” Reagan transformed Taylor (who remained nameless in his accounts) into a 
symbol of the entire AFDC program.  Reagan described the Welfare Queen as decked out 
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in jewelry and furs, infamously driving her pink Cadillac to pick up booze and cigarettes 
with food stamps, and cashing her welfare check while at the Liquor Store.703   
In his 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan continued to condemn welfare by 
focusing on the “welfare queen” as a normative description of mothers receiving AFDC 
government assistance. After becoming President, he sought to translate his “market 
fundamentalism” into public policy by slashing programs for the poor and favoring the 
market.  While distinctions between “worthy” and “unworthy” recipients have always 
been a part of welfare policies, as noted earlier, what makes this stereotype so powerful is 
its attempt to merge historical prejudices against the reproductive behaviors of African 
Americans, women, and the lower classes with a vitriolic neoliberal discourse about what 
it means to be a responsible market actor.704  Using racially coded language to conjure up 
a picture of urban decay and black female criminality in the wake of the civil rights 
movement, the welfare queen stereotype refers to a woman, invariably African American 
and from the inner-city, who intentionally profits off the system through her reckless, 
calculated, and fraudulent reproductive behaviors and motherhood.705 Describing the 
historical basis of this stereotype, Dorothy Roberts defines the “welfare queen” as a 
stereotype of “the lazy mother on public assistance who deliberates breeds children at the 
expense of taxpayers to fatten her monthly check.”706 Roberts further notes that this 
“picture of reckless black fertility is made all the more frightening by a more devious 
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notion of Black women’s childbearing.  Poor Black mothers do not simply procreate 
irresponsibly; they purposefully have more and more children to manipulate taxpayers 
into giving them more money.”707  As Roberts notes, this line of attack on welfare policy 
merges presumptions about irresponsible fertility and childbearing with irresponsible 
market behavior and dependency on the government.708 This stereotype appears to have 
struck a chord with the American public, and the face of welfare in America has, ever 
since this time, been both black and female.709  
 To grasp why the welfare queen stereotype was so salient, it is useful to briefly 
address the role of the Moynihan Report during the War on Poverty.  After the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
Johnson’s Assistant Secretary of Labor, released a confidential report White House 
officials in March 1965 (The Negro Family: The Case for National Action), commonly 
known as simply the “Moynihan Report,” arguing that racial equality required more than 
civil rights legislation.710  A promoter of the War on Poverty, Moynihan contended that 
poverty in the black urban community wasn’t merely the consequence of a lack of jobs, 
but rather stemmed from the “matriarchal structure” of the family in poor black 
communities, which “is so out of line with the rest of American society” that it 
constituted a “tangle of pathology.”711  Relying heavily on statistics concerning poverty 
among African Americans living in the inner-city, Moynihan explicitly cited welfare as a 
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measure of this problem: “The steady expansion of welfare programs can be taken as a 
measure of the steady disintegration of the Negro family structure over the past 
generation.”712 Moynihan defined the “tangle of pathology” as a problem that was 
“capable of perpetuating itself without assistance from the white world.”713  Since so 
many “Negro Families are Headed by Females,” he concluded that this “weakness of the 
family structure…now serves to perpetuate the cycle of poverty and deprivation” from 
mother to child, across generations.  Speaking of the intergenerational manner of this 
pathological (matriarchal) family structure, he wrote: “Many of those who escape do so 
for one generation only: as things now are, their children may have to run the gauntlet all 
over again…The matriarchal pattern of so many Negro families reinforces itself over the 
generations.”714   
 Moynihan’s analysis was a scathing patriarchal condemnation of unwed and 
single motherhood, as feminists have noted, particularly within the inner-city black 
community.715  Even worse, the Moynihan Report communicates a message—cloaked in 
the legitimacy of the government and using the statistical tools of social science—that 
low-income unwed African American mothers pose a threat to the nation, because the 
data suggests that they disproportionately give birth to and raise children who do not 
escape the ghetto underclass marked by welfare dependency among women and 
criminality among men. While Moynihan intended his analysis to help “the Negro 
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American to full and equal sharing in the responsibilities of citizenship” during the War 
on Poverty, his Report has provided racialized ammunition to those who oppose 
welfare.716  
 In subsequent years, conservative scholars used Moynihan’s Report to support a 
neoliberal attack on the cultural and reproductive behaviors of welfare recipients, often 
framing them as “pathological.”  For instance, using Moynihan’s analysis of “the culture 
of poverty” as a starting point, Charles Murray in 1984 focused on the idea of “welfare 
dependency” in his popular book, Losing Ground.717 Murray labeled welfare as a 
personal choice, arguing that the government was providing the wrong incentives to poor 
people by allowing them to choose not to work.  Since the most respectable poor citizens 
preferred work, according to Murray, he accused the social programs of the New Deal 
and Great Society of rewarding the least capable and most deviant members of society, 
which redistributed economic resources from “the most law-abiding to the least law-
abiding, and from the most responsible to the least responsible.”718  Arguing that all 
government aid to the poor made low-wage work less attractive and less dignified—
particularly since he admitted that one cannot always survive on the income of an 
unskilled worker in a low-wage economy—Murray blamed welfare for the culture of 
poverty and intergenerational dependency.  
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Murray’s attack on welfare didn’t stop there: He argued that programs like AFDC 
also provided a safety net for the wrong citizens to reproduce, weakening the gene pool in 
the United States.  In their popular book, The Bell Curve, Richard Herrnstein and Charles 
Murray in 1994 took aim at the ways in which civic lineage policy at the time encouraged 
the least fit members of society to bear children.719  In their words, “The United States 
already has policies that inadvertently social engineer who has babies, and it is 
encouraging the wrong women…The technically precise description of America’s 
fertility policy is that it subsidizes births among poor women, who are disproportionately 
at the low end of the intelligence distribution.”720  Far more commonly, opponents of 
AFDC, such as Lawrence Mead, argued that welfare promoted a “culture of 
dependency,” rather than suggesting there was a genetic twist to the story.721 But it is 
noteworthy that many attacks on welfare recipients during this time echoed earlier 
eugenic concerns about unfit civic reproduction in the Progressive Era (whether framed 
as genetic or cultural in its transmission across generations), yet mixed those resurgent 
concerns with distinctively neoliberal policy recommendations; for instance, Murray 
advocated scaling back all government anti-poverty programs in order to let the “invisible 
hand” of the free market reward the most qualified and capable citizens, thereby 
effectively “sorting the wheat from the chaff.”   
 Martin Gilens has documented that public opinion viewed welfare as racially 
coded from the late 1960s through the 1990s, and this he argues is part of the reason that 
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“Americans Hate Welfare.”722  The significance of the welfare queen stereotype is that it 
negatively colored public perceptions and discourse about welfare.  It did so by 
combining and merging a host of racial, gender, class, urban, and cultural tropes, and by 
distilling welfare discussions to the neoliberal dichotomies between “dependent” and 
“independent,” “hard working” and “lazy,” “irresponsible” and “responsible.”  The irony 
is that the stereotype was not descriptively accurate, and indeed few AFDC recipients 
actually conformed much at all to the “welfare queen” stereotype.  As Stephen Page and 
Mary Larner put it, “The profile of the typical family receiving AFDC differs in many 
respects from the popular image of a welfare family.”723   Most recipients are not African 
Americans from the inner-city.  A majority of recipients were white, including large 
numbers of rural whites. Specifically, Page and Larner document that in “1992, some 
39% of the parents who received AFDC were white, 37% were black, and 18% were 
Hispanic.”724  Additionally, they found that most mothers on welfare actually have fewer 
children than the average in the country; 43% of families on welfare consisted of merely 
a single child.725  Most impoverished parents only signed up for AFDC as a last resort out 
of financial desperation.  Since the program was simultaneously meager and socially 
stigmatizing, it was hardly an attractive alternative to most paid work.  
The welfare queen, defined by her “pathological” fertility, is an important part of 
the ideology of neoliberal citizenship.  Deeply embedded in American folklore about 
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welfare, the stereotype would continue to be a catchphrase as part of the discourse on 
welfare reform during the Clinton Administration.  This stereotype took on a life of its 
own in much the same way as the eugenically unfit citizen during the Progressive Era, 
who threatened to “sap the nation of its strength” by weakening the gene pool.  Reagan 
compared her to a parasite on the system, leaching the hard-earned money of taxpayers 
and intentionally giving birth to large numbers of children who would follow in the 
pathological footsteps of their mother. Like Henry Goddard’s notorious Kallikak family 
of the Eugenic Craze, with a photograph altered so that even the children appeared 
“feeble-minded” (in an unending cycle of intergenerational mental retardation, disability, 
and criminality), the “welfare queen” and the “culture of poverty” became a powerful 
civic lineage myth about presumed intergenerational pathology, which in turn drove 
public policy and was used to fuel a political assault on AFDC.726  In the welfare queen, 
we get a picture of the unfit citizen, whose reproduction is not only irresponsible, but 
whose fraudulent behavior—defined by uncontrolled fertility and a penchant for 
criminality—is passed to her children.  In the words of Patricia Hill Collins, the welfare 
queen “is portrayed as being content to sit around and collect welfare, shunning work and 
passing her bad values to her offspring.  The welfare mother represents a woman of low 
morals and uncontrolled sexuality.”727   
This, of course, is the worst kind of citizen for a neoliberal free market economy, 
because she undermines its entire logic of work and consumption, supply and demand.  
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The woman on welfare, according to this popular account, exploits the neoliberal market 
system by violating almost every social and economic tenet it is based upon: She is 
neither married nor works, takes advantage of those taxpayers who play by the rules, 
consumes extravagantly using other people’s money, opts for dependency on the state 
over the independence of work, prefers promiscuity to a nuclear family, reproduces 
uncontrollably without having the means to support her children on her own, and 
transmits her beliefs and behaviors to her children to continue the same profligate abuse 
of the system across generations.  Part of the reason this trope is so powerful is that it 
envisions large numbers of deviant members of society who together pose a threat to the 
very logic of market fundamentalism.  Indeed, why should a person work hard, laboring 
at a grueling and often low-paying job, when some people appear to thrive by not 
working and breaking the rules?  For the free market to function properly in a neoliberal 
nation guided by market norms, the nation’s citizens must accept this market logic and 
play by its market rules.  While the ideal neoliberal citizen is independent, hardworking, 
responsible, and self-sufficient, the welfare queen threatens the foundation of neoliberal 
statecraft through her deviant fertility and lavish exploitation of the system.  
 
5. The End of Welfare 
Our discussion above is key to understanding the rise of TANF in the late 1990s.  
Draconian by design, “welfare reform” is premised upon the stereotype of the 
irresponsible and reckless fertility of the welfare queen and her dependency on 
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government, which the TANF legislation aims to abolish by uniting the workfare and 
family values agendas.  During the presidential race of 1992, Democratic candidate Bill 
Clinton included a promise to make welfare benefits temporary and “end welfare as we 
know it.”728 As I demonstrate in this section, “welfare reform” in 1996 was a bipartisan 
compromise that centered around classic neoliberal rhetoric about the dignity of work and 
on the religious right promoting “family values” as part of this distinctively American 
neoliberal civic lineage coalition.  Let us turn to role of neoliberalism in the debates 
leading up to TANF. 
In his State if the Union address in 1993, President Clinton told Congress and the 
nation that a major goal of his administration was to “end welfare as a way of life, and 
make it a path to independence and dignity.”729  Listening to Bill Clinton speak about his 
plan for welfare reform, it appears that he viewed the role of welfare as a temporary 
pathway to market self-sufficiency.  Since the good citizen shouldn’t need to rely on the 
government for assistance in raising his or her children, it followed that family providers 
should work for wages on the market. Two years before, as Governor of Arkansas, 
Clinton extolled the federal Family Support Act of 1988 for making room for additional 
state flexibility to include work provisions in their AFDC systems.  His remarks speak 
directly about connections he perceived between work, family, and the reproduction of 
citizenship:  
One of the most valuable things about this program [in Arkansas] is that it will 
change the values underlying the system and the way the American government 
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relates to the people who are on welfare.  The program says to everybody, “We 
don’t want to maintain you. We don’t think you have a right to anything other 
than assistance in return for your best efforts and we believe in you enough to 
believe that you can become independent…and when your child sees you at night 
[after you return from education, job training or working], your child will know 
that you’re out there trying to amount something, trying to be a productive citizen 
and make life better for him.730 
 
Clinton’s plank to do away with welfare functioned as a popular consensus-building part 
of his campaign.  Unlike Reagan, Clinton did not focus on spearheading an ideological 
attack on welfare by creating a myth of the “welfare queen.”  That had already been done.  
As Martin Gilens and Franklin Gilliam have both emphasized in separate studies on the 
relationship between public opinion and welfare perceptions among Americans, the trope 
of the “welfare queen” was deeply embedded in the public’s negative perceptions of 
AFDC.731  Clinton merely repeated what had become a mantra about welfare causing a 
cycle of dependency and interfering with the dignity of work.  For instance, in an 
interview during the campaign, Clinton stated bluntly: “What I am in favor of doing is 
breaking the chain of dependency through putting more people to work.”732  
 In 1994, Donna Shalala, the Secretary of Health and Human Services for the 
Clinton Administration, presented the President’s welfare reform proposal to the Ways 
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and Means Committee of the House of Representatives.733  Importantly, the three main 
planks of the proposal included 1) Work, 2) Responsibility, and 3) Reaching the Next 
Generation. President Clinton explicitly framed welfare as a civic lineage concern about 
raising responsible future generations of Americans, who valued work above-all as a 
duty—in fact one might even call it a civic duty—to their family, society, and the nation.  
The Clinton Administration argued that welfare ought to become “a transitional system 
leading to work,” and connected this duty to work to “parents [responsibility] for their 
children.”734  Although the Clinton Administration’s 1994 version of welfare reform died 
in Congress—in part due to its “generous” government spending proposals for mandatory 
education and job training to prepare people for better jobs to “make work pay”—it 
nonetheless offered a neoliberal articulation by the Clinton Administration of the link 
between work, family, poverty, and civic reproduction across generations.  The proposed 
Act presented by Secretary Shalala demonstrates that the Clinton Administration linked 
market participation to good citizenship and explicitly sought to use welfare as an avenue 
for training the next generation of citizens in these market expectations.  Expressing 
concern about the next generation of Americans, the proposal stated, “It is absolutely 
critical that our reforms send a strong message to the next generation.  All young people 
must understand the importance of staying in school, living at home, preparing to work, 
and building a real future.”735  
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Nonetheless, rejecting the bill, a new generation of conservative Republicans in 
Congress sought to take “market fundamentalism” up a notch by slashing government 
funding for dependent children more dramatically than Clinton’s proposal.  During the 
1994 midterm campaign, Republicans in the House of Representatives released their own 
plank on welfare reform in The Contract with America.736   Among their main provisions 
in this neoliberal treatise on the future of American government, Republican Members of 
the House promised the American voters that they would put an end to “big government,” 
restore fiscal responsibility in Congress, crack down on crime, build more prisons, cut 
welfare benefits in a Personal Responsibility Act, mandate work, and protect family 
values.737  After the GOP trounced Democrats in the 1994 midterm elections, gaining 
control of Congress, Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich led an attack on Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  The resulting welfare reform combined the 
popular backlash against government spending on social programs with an emphasis on 
the dignity of a strong work ethic and family values.  
 The TANF legislation was not simply a “workfare” bill.  In debates about the bill 
in Congress, the topic of making people work for a living went hand-in-hand with a 
preoccupation among members of Congress with what has become known broadly as 
“family values,” with an emphasis on the issues of reproductive behavior and family 
formation.  In this vein, the specter of an intergenerational cycle of dependency loomed 
large in the “welfare reform” policy debates.  For example, Congressman James Talent 
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(R-Missouri), author of the plank on welfare reform in The Contract with America, stated 
on television that the only solution to the cycle of welfare dependency was for the state to 
“remove the incentives in the existing system which reward irresponsibility by young 
men, which lure and trap young women and their children into lives of dependency, 
where it is impossible for them ever to leave poverty.”738 Representative Talent accused 
AFDC of rewarding the irresponsibility of these men and women for having children out 
of wedlock by saying to the young mother: “Ok. Go ahead. If you have a child without 
being married, without a work skill, the system will set you up in your own apartment, 
your own place, and life can be hunky dory for you.”739  This, he emphasized, not only 
wasted taxpayer money on undeserving recipients, but “the present system is” also akin 
to “quicksand [into a cycle of dependency] to them...in a way that lures them into making 
decisions which are destructive for themselves and their children…,” setting them on the 
path to “lives of dependency and dislocation and crime and drugs where families break 
down and neighborhoods break down.”740  Indeed, the stereotype of the welfare queen 
lurks behind the policy-making process insofar as she is the danger to prevent.  The 
resulting policy was lauded by supporters as having the power to instill self-sufficiency 
by shaping neoliberal citizens out of this hitherto dependent underclass.    
 After President Clinton vetoed the first two versions of the “welfare reform” bill 
that passed Congress, the GOP condemned him as a hypocrite who still had not delivered 
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on his last 1992 campaign promise to end welfare.741  In his reelection year of 1996, 
pitted against Senate Majority Leader, Bob Dole, Clinton reached a bipartisan 
compromise to end AFDC.  Just as he had campaigned to do in 1992, the President 
signed a bill ending welfare and could say he delivered on this promise in his 1996 
campaign.  Speaking on the floor of Congress and later voting against the bill, Senator 
Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) condemned the act as “legislative child abuse”742 
 
6. Neoliberal Ideal: The Soccer Mom 
In addition to a picture of the “irresponsible” and “unfit” citizen in the “welfare queen” 
stereotype, we also witness the rise of an image of the ideal neoliberal citizen.  The same 
year that AFDC was abolished and replaced by TANF, the key swing voter in the 1996 
Presidential election was termed the “Soccer Mom.”743  This middle-class, white, 
suburban wife and mother, who was a “mom first” but usually also worked at least part 
time, became the key target group for market advertising and was also crowned the most 
important electoral demographic in the nation in 1996.  With surprisingly little coverage 
of the impact of welfare reform on poor mothers or attention to their political concerns 
about the new TANF legislation, the media in 1996 became fixated on the so-called 
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Soccer Mom as “the key swing consumer in the marketplace, and the key swing voter 
who will decide the election.”744 Who was this mother, portrayed by the media in 1996 as 
both the both the most important consumer and voter in America?   
 The stereotype of the Soccer Mom, like that of the Welfare Queen, is multilayered 
and difficult to fully pin down even as a fiction.  A New York Times story labeled soccer 
moms as “the most sought-after voters of this campaign season.”745 Alex Castellanos, 
media advisor to the Dole campaign, described the soccer mom as the key swing voter 
Bob Dole needed to win over, and Bill Clinton spoke directly to the soccer mom’s 
concerns about school uniforms, teen curfews, curbing crime, longer hospital stays for 
childbirth, and emphasized his role in passing the Family and Medical Leave Act (all 
policies aimed at the middle-classes).746  A Washington Post column on July 21, 1996 
described the soccer mom as “the overburdened middle income working mother who 
farriers her kids from soccer practice to scouts to school.”747   In another article in the 
New York Times on October 20, 1996, shortly before the election, Neil MacFarquhar 
writes, “The hands that steered the mini-van” are “also deciding whether to turn left or 
right in the Presidential election.”748 Noting that the term in reality “embodies the 
concerns of a huge swath of suburban female voters,” this article acknowledges that 
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“pollsters and demographers find the term useful as a catch-all for suburban women, most 
married and working at least part-time outside the home, with children under 18...”749  
 In her 1999 article, “The Disempowerment of the Gender Gap,” analyzing press 
coverage of the Soccer Mom in the 1996 election, Susan Carroll notes that common 
definitions included “married women with children” and “Married, white, suburban 
woman.”750  More specifically, in her words, “the soccer mom’s most frequently 
mentioned attribute was that she was a mother or a woman who had children.”751  Next, 
the most “frequently mentioned characteristics, in order, were: lives in the suburbs 
(41.2% of the articles); is a swing voter (30.8%); is busy, harried, stressed out, or 
overburdened (28.4%); works outside the home (24.6%); drives a minivan, (usually 
Volvo) station wagon, or sports-utility vehicle (20.9%); is middle class (17.1%); is 
married (13.7%); and is white (13.3%).”752   There appears to be a set of fairly specific 
demographic commonalities behind this “media frame,” which points to a married, white, 
suburban, middle-class, working, overburdened but responsible mother.  However, 
perhaps the most important one was that the Soccer Mom was defined totally by her 
children. As Carroll puts it, in the press “there was a near-consensus about the concerns 
of soccer moms...The Soccer Mom, as portrayed in media reports, fit the stereotype of the 
self-sacrificing “mom,” who is always placing the needs and interests of her children and 
family above any personal needs or individual interests she might have.”753  Her life 
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revolved around raising her kids, balancing the demands of work and family with 
panache. According to a Republican Polling company in 1996, “Soccer moms of the 
1990s were the ‘supermoms’ of the 1980s…Many of them have kicked off their high 
heels and replaced them with Keds to watch their kids. If you are a soccer mom, the 
world according to you is seen through the needs of your children.”754 
 We already have a stereotype for the bad neoliberal citizen (the welfare queen), 
which I have suggested was the mythological specter driving the public policy behind 
welfare reform.  In contrast, I want to emphasize that in 1996 we have a corresponding 
stereotype of good civic reproduction to contrast with this powerful non-ideal. In this 
stereotype, we encounter a mother who is economically and reproductively responsible, 
and places her children first. This is a suburban mother, with school-age children, 
portrayed as white, who is at least middle-class but could also be wealthy, who probably 
works at least part-time, but might be a professional or a stay at home mother, who is a 
conscientious but avid consumer, married (or if she is divorced, then she is financially 
stable), and whose life revolves around properly raising her children. The soccer mom is 
defined by her relationship to the market and to her children, and this earns her the status 
of the most important swing consumer and voter of 1996.  The welfare mom is also 
defined by her relationship to the market and to her children, but this earned her 
stigmatized and marginalized status in 1996. I will examine these two tropes of 
responsible and irresponsible motherhood in more detail at the end of this chapter to give 
my analysis of neoliberal citizenship a firm contextual foundation. When Bill Clinton 
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won reelection against Dole in 1996 with a gender gap of 11 percentage points, the media 
resoundingly concluded that 1996 was the year of soccer mom. 
 
7. TANF: A Neoliberal Civic Lineage Policy 
Let us return to welfare reform.  If the soccer mom offers an ideal of neoliberal 
citizenship, then TANF is designed to target the welfare mother who falls short of this 
ideal.  While sharply restricting access to legal immigrants, PRWORA combines both 
workfare and family values in a single bill, telling qualified recipients what counts as 
“responsible” economic behavior in the realms of both work and fertility.  On the one 
hand, in the realm of work, the bill promotes the goals of economic responsibility and 
self-sufficiency through mandatory workfare imposed upon welfare recipients.755  On the 
other hand, regarding fertility and birth, it attacks a “culture of dependency” among poor 
mothers, by condemning birth out of wedlock, teenage pregnancy, and women having 
children that they cannot afford to support without assistance from the government. Most 
scholarly critiques of TANF tend to focus mainly on one or the other—either the role of 
workfare in the Act or its emphasis on family values—for in many ways these two 
ideological goals fit awkwardly together in the legislation.  Indeed, why use government 
policy to promote work among poor mothers if the aim is to promote marriage, and vice 
versa?  Here I highlight that both aspects of TANF are integral to the neoliberal civic 
lineage regime in America.  The hallmark of neoliberalism, as Wendy Brown notes, is to 
promote the principles of market rationality in all aspects of social and political life, and 
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TANF supports this presupposition.756  In addition to reorganizing the welfare state to 
promote market principles in the form of mandatory work, TANF illustrates that the 
discourse of market “responsibility” extends directly to sexuality, birth, and childrearing 
within welfare policy.   
 It is useful to begin with the altered role of the judiciary in TANF, which gets to 
the heart of the relationship between state and citizen under government assistance.  
When Congress and the President repealed AFDC, replacing the previous statute with a 
new one, this rendered decades of court rulings on the previous welfare statute moot.757  
Since this study focuses on the twentieth century, this means that we face a dearth of 
relevant Supreme Court cases on TANF.  The policy itself takes center-stage in our 
examination of this shift to a dominant neoliberal civic lineage regime.  In fact, to ensure 
that courts do not interfere with its stringent time limits and work requirements, booting 
recipients off irrespective of their financial need in five years, TANF directly told the 
courts how to interpret the law.  Among the purposes listed in TANF by Congress is not 
only “to increase the flexibility of states” in creating their own welfare programs, but also 
(in bold letters) “NO INDIVIDUAL ENTITLEMENT.”758  The bill states clearly, with 
the courts in mind, that TANF “shall not be interpreted [by the courts] to entitle any 
individual or family to assistance under any State program under this part.”759 Rather than 
an entitlement program, TANF is a block grant program, which Peter Edelman 
emphasizes means two things: “First, that there will be no federal definition of who is 
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eligible and therefore no guarantee of assistance to anyone; each state can decide whom 
to exclude in any way it wants, as long as it doesn’t violate the Constitution (not much of 
a limitation when one reads the Supreme Court decisions on the subject).  And second, 
that each state will get a fixed sum of federal money each year, even if a recession or a 
local calamity causes a state to run out of federal funds before the end of the year.”760    
With few conditions placed on these block grants—aside from the exclusion of 
most immigrants arriving after the law’s enactment for five years, work mandates, and 
promoting family values—TANF shifts the locus of authority over assistance to the poor 
to the states in a highly decentralized fashion.  This is what I referred to earlier in Part 1 
of this chapter as the place of “new federalism” in the bill.  By requiring that states 
develop their own programs, this devolution of authority to the states largely does away 
with federal oversight beyond requiring that each state follow the basic federal 
benchmarks regarding work and creates its own mechanisms for meeting the goals to 
promote of family values.  In practice, the landscape of welfare went from a state-federal 
joint entitlement program to, in the words of Christine Cimini, a “devolved contractual 
model.”761  
In order to qualify for the federal block grants, the state programs must meet the 
basic requirements of PRWORA.  The work requirements are the most stringent. As 
mentioned at the outset of this chapter, after one member of a household reaches five 
years (60 months) of government assistance under TANF, the entire household is no 
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longer eligible for assistance “even if a family has done everything that it was asked of it 
and even if it is still needy.”762  Additionally, a TANF recipient must engage in an 
approved work activity within two years of receiving their first assistance check, and 
ideally sooner than this, with the minimum hours of work outside the household set to 
reach thirty-hours a week by the year 2000.  To ensure that states follow these strict work 
provisions, the federal TANF legislation specifies work-related benchmarks that the 
states must meet to continue to meet to receive their full block grants.  TANF requires 
that state programs ensure that twenty-five percent of all single-parent families engage in 
a work activity during 1997, at the start of the new program, and raises the requirement to 
fifty-percent by 2002 for a single parent and ninety-percent for a two-parent household at 
the risk of sanctions.763   
These strict work requirements push mothers of young children out of the home 
when their children are two or younger, offering various forms of subsidies (often only 
partial) for daycare.764 Rather than caring for their own dependent children, mothers are 
compelled to work outside the home if they wish to continue receiving their meager 
TANF benefits to support their family.  This is a bargain for the private businesses and 
corporations who often receive government subsidies to employ TANF recipients in low-
wage jobs.  Given its central focus on pushing the parents of dependent children out of 
the home and into work, often with government subsidies for employers, the advent of 
workfare is a triumph for neoliberal market-based approaches to social policy.  Now, 
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parents who cannot afford to support their families and seek government assistance, have 
no alternative but to work. Moreover, as noted earlier, a hallmark of neoliberalism is a 
trend towards the privatization of traditionally public services.  Under PRWORA, this 
move towards the privatization of welfare happened in two ways.  In addition to 1) 
recipients facing strict work requirements in order to continue to receive government 
assistance, we also 2) encounter a shift towards the privatization of state welfare 
programs, with states “contracting out” the creation and implementation of their TANF 
programs to private corporations on the market. In the words of Judith Koons, “The 
devolution of welfare to the states also came with discretion to allow “second order” 
devolution to local governments, as well as to permit states to “privatize” welfare.”765  
With less federal oversight and more state and local flexibility, the design of 
TANF creates incentives for states to push their own government-funded programs onto 
the private market. Many states turned to private companies to oversee this transition as 
efficiently as possible according to the new TANF requirements. As M. Bryna Sanger 
puts it, “The current environment reflects an increasing interest in market solutions that 
have encouraged outsourcing and competition, even in…new federal welfare reform 
legislation.”766 Under a business model, the goal of moving people as quickly as possible 
to market work and off government assistance takes priority over aid to dependent 
children. Poverty—previously deemed a market failure under Keynesian logic—becomes 
recast in a neoliberal state as at best a personal misfortune and more likely an individual 
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failing. This alternative approach to poverty as the responsibility of private individuals, 
not the community as a whole, in turn grants a green light for the government to create 
and foster an “economization” of the intimate lives and sexual behavior of poor women.   
 Indeed, the second dimension of PRWORA is its emphasis on family values. 
Congress explicitly listed the four main purposes of PRWORA in a manner that 
aggressively promotes marriage and two-parent households.  Recall that these four 
purposes are: 1) to provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for 
in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; 2) to end dependence of needy parents 
on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; 3) to prevent 
and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical 
goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and 4) to encourage 
the formation of two-parent families.767  In addition to implementing workfare programs, 
the law requires states to design programs that promote these goals of encouraging 
marriage and two-parent families, discouraging teen pregnancy, reducing unwed birth, 
and abolishing state dependency.  
 Since each state came up with its own program under TANF—replete with 
varying policies to foster marriage and family values within their own welfare 
programs—a detailed analysis of the complex landscape of TANF across all fifty states is 
beyond the scope of this project.  But let us consider a couple of examples of the ways in 
which TANF targets fertility and reproductive behavior.  For instance, PRWORA 
requires recipients in all states to comply with paternity testing and identification, 
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generally performed at the moment of birth in the hospital, to enforce child-support 
among “deadbeat dads” and defer the costs of the government. If a woman refuses to 
participate in such a test—perhaps due to concerns about domestic abuse or worries about 
battles over custody—she faces sanctions, which cut government funding to 
uncooperative recipients in various degrees.768  Additionally, TANF allows states to 
impose “family caps,” on recipients, which exclude additional funding to children 
conceived or born to families already receiving assistance.769  Based on the presumption 
that women on welfare intentionally have babies to get more money from the state, the 
“family cap” imposes an economic penalty on childbirth to encourage “responsible” 
reproductive behavior.  In fact, within a week of TANF becoming law, the Third Circuit 
in C.K. v. New Jersey Department of Health and Human Services (1996) upheld a New 
Jersey “family cap” policy (i.e. at the time resulting from a waiver issued by the federal 
government under AFDC), against both statutory and constitutional challenges to entirely 
excluding benefits to dependent children conceived or born to mothers already receiving 
benefits.770 Citing the Supreme Court in Dandridge v. Williams (1970), the Third Circuit 
emphasized that a state has a rational interest in “promoting individual responsibility” 
within the “family unit.”771  Since the Supreme Court has made it clear that receiving 
government assistance is a privilege not a right, the Third Circuit emphasized, “it would 
be remarkable to conclude that a state’s failure to subsidize a reproductive choice burdens 
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that choice.”772  When a woman makes the irresponsible “procreative choice” to have an 
additional child while she is poor, then she remains no worse off with a child exclusion 
policy than she would be without support from the program at all.773  While not required 
by PRWORA, these “child caps” are incentivized by the advent of fixed block grants to 
the states with no entitlement of access to those who meet the qualification requirements 
under TANF.  With a nod from the federal courts, 24 states implemented some form of 
family cap in their programs immediately under TANF.774   
 Additionally, to encourage states to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancy and 
illegitimate births, the federal government offered an “illegitimacy bonus” of $20 million 
to each the five states that show the highest decreases in out-of-wedlock births without 
corresponding increases in abortion, a ratio they were required to submit to the federal 
government.775 This ratio, with a negative hit for abortions, made promoting birth control 
attractive to most states, particularly semi-permanent forms of birth control.  In her 
analysis of birth control policies in the 1990s, Dorothy Roberts found that all states 
subsidized Norplant under Medicaid for welfare recipients after its approval from the 
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Food and Drug Administration (FDC).776  Norplant is an expensive and invasive minor 
surgical procedure in which tubes with the hormone, progesterone, are implanted under 
the skin of a woman’s upper arm, thereby inhibiting fertility for up to five years.   In 
addition to offering long-term birth control as a general option (upon request), however, 
many states like Tennessee and California actively sought to advertise and promote 
Norplant and Depo-Provera to TANF recipients of child-bearing age, and sometimes 
mandated that they receive counseling or information about semi-permanent forms of 
birth control.  Some recipients have described the promotion of Norplant by TANF 
caseworkers as deceptive and aggressive, particularly framed by the threat of penalties 
for childbirth and no funding for abortion.777  To quote a provision in Tennessee, “The 
department of human services shall provide written information through the Medicaid 
program of the Norplant contraceptive implant, and other functionally equivalent 
contraceptives that provide similar long-lasting pregnancy prevention, to all temporary 
assistance for needy families (TANF) recipients when such persons apply for benefits or 
are recertified.”778 As these examples illustrate, women receiving TANF assistance face 
particularly coercive and punitive policies regulating their sexual behavior and decisions 
about family structure.   
 What should we conclude about these measures?  Through increased mechanisms 
of surveillance and sanctions within anti-poverty programs, the government is able to 
uniquely target the reproductive decision-making of the nation’s most vulnerable citizens, 
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because they are too poor not to refuse government support. This is an important 
distinction, arising from Supreme Court rulings examined earlier in the last two chapters.  
(Recall that after the Supreme Court held that participating in a need-based assistance 
qualifies as a free choice in the 1970s, it further ruled that the government may regulate 
the lives of women receiving assistance in a manner not constitutionally permissible 
under normal conditions.)  This makes poor women vulnerable to forms of reproductive 
regulation by the government, which middle-class and more affluent women avoid 
completely.  For instance, the threat of a mandatory paternity test or “family cap” does 
not apply to those who are not dependent on TANF assistance, and the government could 
not under normal circumstances constitutionally compel individuals to comply with such 
a mandate without violating privacy law.  The ability to control one’s reproductive fate is 
all too often merely matter of money. As a thin privacy right, the “consumer protection” 
does not protect those who are dependent upon the government for basic necessities.   
 Moreover, as we have seen, neoliberal logic couches dependence on the 
government in an odd and slippery discourse of “market responsibility,” but its primary 
concern is not actual independence or self-sufficiency.  Rather, the discourse on 
“responsible” neoliberal citizenship draws a distinction between proper and improper 
forms of dependency, and applies it to the family as a unit.779  For example, it is entirely 
acceptable for a wife and soccer-playing child to be dependent upon a breadwinning 
husband who in turn earns the bulk of the income for the household, or for a successful 
professional to be dependent upon her paycheck from her employer because she works 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
779 See Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “A Geneology of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. 
Welfare State,” Signs 19, no. 2 (1994): 309-336. 
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for her income.  The problem is not dependence, but the kind of dependence.  Indeed, it 
would be unthinkable for the government to tax a soccer mom for having an extra child.  
Instead, the government grants taxpaying families an annual Child Tax Credit (CTC), 
which increases for each additional dependent child under the age of 17 (no cap or 
exclusions).  Neither the CTC nor the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which 
calculates tax refunds based upon number of children and income, apply to welfare 
recipients because they are too poor to have a taxable income. Whereas the poorest 
mothers on welfare are actively penalized for bearing children through “child cap” 
provisions, the opposite is the case for working and wealthy families. 780 The former 
receives meager assistance, coupled with surveillance and various forms of coercion, and 
is effectively punished for exercising her right to bear children. In contrast, the latter 
receives generous subsidies from the government in proportion to the actual number of 
dependent children in their family. 
 In this regard, the concept of ‘labor’ takes on a double-meaning under TANF—
with its emphasis on both work and marriage.  In the face of this emphasis on personal 
responsibility, women are encouraged to practice reproductive self-discipline—or abstain 
from having children—unless they are married or economically self-sufficient 
themselves. Dependence on a man is respectable, but not dependence on the 
government.781 While the fiscal design of the policy places strong emphasis on 
compulsory work (often termed “workfare), the text of the legislation focuses on both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
780 Susan Mettler has argued is a kind of trickle-up social welfare for better-off citizens.   
781 Martha A. Fineman, The Neutered Mother: The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth-Century Tragedies 
(New York: Routledge, 1995). 
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marriage and work as two laudable routes for single-mothers to pursue to escape 
dependence on the government.  The message to single mothers is clear: Either find 
yourself a breadwinner husband, or work and support your own family. Through either 
marriage to a wage-earning spouse or through participation in the market herself, or both, 
the theory seems to be that an impoverished mother can move out of dependence on 
government benefits and into a sufficiently “responsible” position in the market 
economy.  This treats wage labor outside the household—either by breadwinning 
husbands or single mothers—as the only recognizable form of genuine work in neoliberal 
society, discounting the carework that mothers perform within their households for their 
children.782   
 Importantly, the government is not attempting to push all mothers into the 
workforce, rather PRWORA is promoting two avenues off dependency on TANF for the 
poorest Americans with dependent children, either wage labor or marriage. A family 
must attain a degree of market self-sufficiency as a unit, but not every mother must work 
outside the home. By placing one’s relationship to the market economy at the forefront of 
civic status, the subjective category of “responsible citizenship” becomes a precondition 
for access to reproductive choice, ranging from abortion to childbirth. 
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8.0 Towards a Theory of Neoliberal Citizenship 
This brings us to our final section on neoliberal citizenship.783 As I have argued, a 
neoliberal state requires neoliberal citizens to function smoothly according to its logic of 
market norms.  To begin to develop a theory of neoliberal citizenship in the United 
States, this last section is divided into several subsections.  I start by discussing the 
neoliberal state as a strong and interventionist state in its interactions with citizens 
deemed deviant, before turning to what the strong state means for our neoliberal civic 
lineage regime.  To illustrate a political disparity between two classes of neoliberal 
citizens (commonly labeled, responsible and irresponsible), I compare and contrast the 
stereotypical soccer mom with the TANF mother. While the former experiences a 
relatively small and unobtrusive state, the latter experiences a complex network of 
policies regulating the most intimate aspects of her life. In practice, the policies shaping 
neoliberal citizenship perpetuate inequalities affecting historically disadvantaged groups, 
and they do so through political discourses and practices emphasizing economic freedom 
for those who can afford it. Somewhat ironically, following the victories of the civil 
rights and women’s movement, we encounter the advent of a muscularly interventionist 
state relying on market logic to reproduce a host of inequalities in the realms of fertility, 
birth, and civic status.  
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8.1 Citizenship in the Neoliberal Strong State 
Let us turn to a vital point: The neoliberal state is not a “small government” state, as its 
proponents often paint it to be in their classic libertarian posturing against “big 
government.” Granted, the neoliberal state appears relatively small (or far less intrusive) 
to those at the top, who conform to its market norms of citizenship and succeed according 
to these politicalized economic norms.  But as TANF illustrates, the contemporary state is 
a muscularly strong state when it comes to those who fall short of these ideals of market 
responsibility.  While “responsible” neoliberal citizens, such as soccer moms, experience 
the government from the standpoint of respectable consumers and taxpayers, the opposite 
is the case for women on welfare. Identified instead as irresponsible and dependent upon 
the state, mothers in TANF experience an intrusive network of state policies regulating 
everything from the place in which they work, the number of hours they must spend at 
work, and their most intimate choices about their sexual and familial lives.  If a mother 
receiving government assistance fails to meet these stringent work requirements, then she 
loses the meager benefits she qualified for under TANF to support her children. 
Moreover, unlike the array of choices available to economically secure citizens, the 
family values policies that do apply directly to TANF recipients, such as mandatory 
paternity tests and “child caps,” tend to be coercive and invasive.  Since noncompliance 
results in sanctions, policies targeting fertility and family formation do more than merely 
send a message about marriage as a civic lineage ideal. They punish women who fall 
short of the ideal. The government can do this precisely because these women are poor 
enough to become dependent upon government assistance. In the words of Loïc 
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Wacquant, the neoliberal state “embraces laissez-faire at the top…[and] anything but 
laissez-faire at the bottom.”784   
 Neoliberalism, as a distinctive approach to domestic governance (differentiated 
from its more common association with economic globalization), is not a retreat in the 
growth of government or in the power of the state.  Instead, as Wendy Brown has argued, 
neoliberalism involves the reorganization of the state according to new norms of market 
rationality.785  This domestic variant of “market fundamentalism” differs from the classic 
laissez-faire approach, which emphasizes cutting back on the size and scope of 
government.  Unlike classical liberal economic theory, neoliberal statecraft does not 
leave markets alone to naturally develop through patterns of spontaneous human 
interaction shaping supply and demand in a manner peripheral to the political system. 
Instead, the state actively seeks to create, cultivate, and nurture markets through the use 
of public policy and law. As Joe Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram put it,  
Markets must be actively constructed; market behaviors must be learned; and 
once learned, they must be deliberately extended to new arenas.  Neoliberalism 
treats market rationality as a normative ideal to be pursued through applications of 
public authority and uses it as a preeminent standard for evaluating institutional 
designs and individual behaviors throughout society…Thus, rather than limiting 
the state, neoliberalism envisions the state as a site for the application of market 
principles.  Through contracting, decentralization, and competitive performance 
systems, neoliberal reformers work to “reinvent government” in ways that mimic 
market forms…Through privatization and collaboration, they make the state more 
reliant on market actors to achieve public purposes….reconstructing institutions 
to encourage both the governing and the governed to think of themselves and 
behave as market actors.786 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
784 Wacquant, Punishing the Poor, 308. 
785 Brown, Undoing the Demos. 
786Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram, Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism 




In neoliberalism, the invisible hand morphs into the strong arm of the state when it comes 
to regulating those deemed deviant in society.  Seeking to reorganize not abolish the 
welfare state, according to Soss, Fording, and Schram, TANF places the market at the 
center of the government’s funding and distribution of social services so that it operates 
according to a business model.787  Moreover, as I have argued above, welfare reform 
under TANF is an effort to use statecraft to promote particular expectations of individual 
responsibility with dire consequences for poor women.  These market values not only 
identify individuals as proper and deviant citizens, but the state interacts with those 
deemed deviant in a manner that goes beyond market mechanisms in its use of 
surveillance, discipline, and sanctions for TANF recipients.788 With the rise of neoliberal 
modes of governing, we encounter the growth of an increasingly interventionist 
neoliberal state, flexing its muscles to direct and control those deemed deviant, often 
according to market models but also through traditional “law and order” mechanisms, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
787 Ibid., 10, 179, 298-99. 
788 See Wacquant, Punishing the Poor, 42-3, 58, 312. Nowhere is this directly punitive aspect of the 
neoliberal state clearer than in the booming prison system. In his discussion of how neoliberalism goes 
about “punishing the poor,” Wacquant argues that “workfare” and “prisonfare” represent “two integral 
components of the neoliberal Leviathan” state, reorganizing “social services into an instrument of 
surveillance and control” (58). Although government appears to be “shrinking” to those at the top, 
Wacquant maintains that this “centaur state” is liberal only at the top and paternalistic at the bottom,” with 
workfare policing the poor through “surveillance and control” in the first instance and the growing carceral 
system making up for dysfunctions in social welfare by locking deviant members away from full 
membership society altogether (312). Attributing the strategy to a backlash against the successes of the 
civil rights movement in the 1960s, Wacquant calls this a “twofold strategy for using the U.S. bureaucratic 
field to manage poor populations” (42-3). 
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including sanctions under TANF and fostering the massive growth of the U.S. prison 
system.789  
What does this ‘strong state’ mean for theorizing neoliberal citizenship?  With the 
reorganization of the state under this new “economy of politics,” we also get new norms 
of citizenship.  In his important analysis of neoliberalism and punitive policies directed at 
“punishing the poor,” Wacquant vaguely refers to neoliberal citizenship, but he describes 
it as transnational: “Neoliberalism is a transnational political project aiming to remake 
the nexus of market, state, and citizenship from above.”790  In contrast, I want to 
emphasize that neoliberal citizenship is a fundamentally national phenomenon. Consider 
the distinction, discussed earlier, that TANF draws between citizens and non-citizens 
residing within the United States. By denying public benefits to non-citizens—including 
their citizen children—this neoliberal civic lineage policy is profoundly nationalistic in 
its approach to citizenship. It allows legal immigrants to stay and contribute to the 
economy via low-income work, but draws lines in the sand demarcating the benefits that 
accompany the formal status of citizenship versus mere legal residence. Speaking of the 
role of citizenship in PRWORA, Audrey Singer writes “Prior to its enactment, legal 
immigrants residing in the United States by and large had access equal to citizens with 
regard to public assistance benefits.  The new citizenship criterion elevates the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
789 See Marie Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015). 
790 Wacquant, Punishing the Poor, 306. 
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importance of formal citizenship in a way that is inconsistent with both previous U.S. 
policy [under AFDC] and international standards.”791  
Rather than conforming to international norms, these concerns about policing the 
boundaries of U.S. citizenship are distinctly national, not transnational. Although 
neoliberalism seems to work against national distinctions in the context of globalization, 
on a domestic front these ideas must harness the specific values and modes of governance 
within a nation, or they would fail to resonate and stick.  No ideology comes in a one-size 
fits all package, and this includes neoliberalism. Hence, Reaganism and Thatherism are 
different variations on domestic neoliberal policy, each responding in a homegrown 
manner to the distinct culture, traditions, governing institutions, demographic 
landscape—and the political incentives associated with these factors—of the United 
States and Britain.  What makes a political ideology significant on a domestic level is its 
ability to advance the agendas of political elites within the nation, operating within 
indigenous institutions, incorporating the broader systemic norms, and speaking to 
existing values within the domestic political culture as it reshapes them in the process.  In 
this regard, there is no such thing as a neoliberal state without a corresponding notion of 
neoliberal citizenship conditioned by the moral and social values that have historically 
influenced a nation.   
 This is precisely what we find in the United States at the end of the twentieth 
century.  The broader pattern of the “the reproduction of citizenship” continues in 
America today, but the specific contours of our civic lineage regime has shifted over 
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time. Neoliberal civic lineage policy in the United States deploys many traditional 
“American values” in the name of shaping procreation and family formation in a manner 
that is simultaneously both old and new.  Not a complete break with the past, this new 
neoliberal civic lineage regime continues to shape citizenship according to a set of ideals 
about what constitutes proper American citizenship.  As we have seen throughout our 
examination of civic lineage policy in the twentieth century, the ideals of citizenship 
dominating particular periods of U.S. politics use institutional discourses to promulgate a 
host of biases and inequalities pertaining to race, gender, class, disability, culture, and 
sexuality.   
 Neoliberal citizenship is no different in this regard, but the inequalities it supports 
have shifted to allow for new reproductive and professional opportunities for some while 
all but closing the door of opportunity on others. This uniquely American neoliberal civic 
lineage regime continues to promote a picture of the ideal citizen that is strikingly similar 
to those we have encountered throughout the twentieth century. While there appears to be 
greater flexibility based on market status, the neoliberal civic lineage regime still 
idealizes many features from past civic lineage regimes, including whiteness, middle-
class or even more affluent socioeconomic standing, inequality between the sexes, being 
able-bodied (particularly the ability to work), and traditional “family values” associated 
with Christianity.792   
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Muslim terrorism after the 1994 World Trade Center garage bombing.  The other two laws were, first, the 




8.2 Neoliberal Citizenship in Context: Comparing Soccer Mom to Welfare Queen 
To illustrate this civic lineage policy as clearly as possible, let us consider and compare 
our stereotype of the ideal female neoliberal citizen and her non-ideal counterpart in 
1996: The soccer mom versus the welfare queen. Comparing these two political tropes 
helps us to better grasp the stark difference in incentives to reproduce and barriers each 
face in their daily lives.  While more affluent citizens, who can afford it, have expanding 
access to new reproductive opportunities on the burgeoning fertility market, the fertility 
and reproduction of women on welfare is explicitly discouraged and restricted through 
government policy. Of course, it is important not to forget that the soccer mom and the 
welfare queen are just stereotypes.  Nonetheless, these stereotypes help to draw out the 
very real political consequences of a market-based governmental approach to civic status 
and reproductive choice for mothers during of the late twentieth century.   
 I will begin with the ideal of the soccer mom.  The beneficiary of important gains 
made by the women’s movement, the soccer mom has come a long way from the 1950s 
white picket fence ideal of civic lineage within the postwar family.  The soccer mom can 
work, but she can also decide to stay at home and raise her children full time.  She 
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the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility act (IIRIRA) also increased resources for law 
enforcement aimed at immigrants, and included provisions for better data collection, worksite monitoring, 
and more systematic exclusion of undocumented immigrants from Social Security benefits (among other 
things).  Together, these three laws point to a backlash against immigrants at the same time immigration 
was increasing in the United States, which was connected not only to hostility towards undocumented 




probably went to college, and she might even have a Ph.D.793  She has access to 
contraceptives and abortion on the private market, she has the legal and economic ability 
to make her own reproductive choices about childbirth, and she can opt to adopt a child if 
she desires.  Likewise, by 1996, those who could afford it gained access to myriad new 
reproductive technologies for creating families in novel ways and overcoming infertility, 
ranging from the ability to purchase gametes (i.e. sperm and eggs), in vitro fertilization to 
treat difficulties conceiving a child, and even the option of paying a surrogate mother by 
essentially renting her womb for the duration of a pregnancy.794 The federal government 
refrained from regulating or restricting new reproductive technologies in the United 
States, granting (through inaction) a green light to this burgeoning “baby market.”795 As a 
result, citizens of means can in effect “buy a baby” with the rise of these new 
technologies on an unusually open and unregulated reproductive marketplace, compared 
to other more restrictive countries such as Spain or Germany.796   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
793 The first documented political use of the term “soccer mom” was by Susan B. Casey, a professional 
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the race. See MacFarquhar, “What is a Soccer Mom Anyway?” 
794 Ironically, while the government discourages women on TANF from bearing children in a host of 
different ways, the federal government intentionally refused to act to regulate new reproductive 
technologies in the United States.  1n 1988, this resulted in a famous custody lawsuit in New Jersey, In re 
Baby M, in which a professional couple (the Sterns) used a surrogacy contract with a woman (Mary Beth 
Whitehead) who agreed to become pregnant and bear a child for them for $10,000 (more than double that 
with inflation today), using in vitro fertilization with Mr. Stern’s sperm.  When Whitehead changed her 
mind about the surrogacy contract and sued for custody of the child after birth, Mr. Stern was awarded 
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could afford it to participate in new “baby markets.” In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 109 N.J. 396 (N.J. 
1988). 
795 Debora L. Spar, The Baby Business: How Money, Science, and Politics Drive the Commerce of 
Conception (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
796 Debora L. Spar, The Baby Business: How Money, Science, and Politics Drive the Commerce of 
Conception (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006). 
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 Whether she sought fertility treatments or not, the soccer mom’s role as a mother 
was valorized.  The state gives her family generous tax credits for each of her children.  
She is the most sought-after consumer on the market, and her political voice was loud 
enough that it would purportedly decide the 1996 election.797  That said, the soccer mom 
is not a poster-child of feminism.  While she had greater reproductive and professional 
opportunities compared to the June Cleavers and Donna Reeds of postwar America, it is 
also important to note that the entire identity of the soccer mom was rooted in her 
children.  In the words of Susan Carroll, “Even the label “mom,” a word children 
commonly use in referring to their female parent, instead of “woman” or even “mother,” 
symbolically suggested that the interests of her children take precedence over all other 
interests for the soccer mom.”798  No wonder she was so harried and stressed out, 
according to the media.  With little talk of soccer dads, we don’t have a picture of civic 
equality between the sexes, but rather one of expanding opportunities over time in 
particular arenas for middle-class and affluent mothers coupled with the specter of more 
work for them, both inside and outside the home. (Admittedly neoliberal citizenship is 
more easily accessible to men, who do not bear children and can more easily approximate 
the ideals of the self-sufficient and unencumbered market actor, yet the point remains that 
women and women’s bodies continue to be the locus of civic reproduction across 
generations.) Still, with expanded choice and freedom as market actors, some more 
affluent women could challenge traditional stereotypes and take control of their 
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reproductive lives in provocative ways.799 This is the very form of reproductive freedom 
and equal protection championed by the Supreme Court in the cases examined in the last 
two chapters.  If a woman can afford to be “independent,” insofar as the state does not 
fund her healthcare or means of survival, then she has access to meaningful choice on the 
market.  Granted economic standing becomes a new avenue for members of traditionally 
subordinate groups to attain rising civic status, and potentially even become soccer moms 
or dads.  The boundaries are not as firm as they once were (in the days of more explicit 
legal barriers to equality), but the market continues to maintain a landscape of inequality 
and inhibit social mobility in similar patterns corresponding to race and gender. 
 Let us turn to the TANF mother.  If the soccer mom is the ideal in 1996, then the 
mother on welfare, chastised by politicians in debates over welfare reform, is the deviant 
(non-ideal) mother in the same year. Consider that the biggest legislative achievement 
leading up to the 1996 campaign was “the end of welfare as we know it,” which slashed 
benefits for the poorest women in the nation and their dependent children.800  Despite 
this, President Bill Clinton won reelection against Bob Dole with a gender gap of 11 
percentage points, and the soccer mom “deflected attention away from the concerns of 
many other subgroups of women, including feminists, older women, women on welfare, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
799 Weisberg, “Soccer Mom Nonsense.” The author notes that professionals like Murphy Brown on the 
popular sitcom (1988-1998), a wealthy journalist and news anchor, who decided to become a single mother 
in her 40s after becoming pregnant outside of marriage could qualify in this broad definition of a soccer 
mom (e.g., as an affluent, white, suburban mother).  Famously criticized by then Vice President Dan Quale, 
who spoke out against the show in 1992, emphasizing that “bearing babies irresponsibly is simply wrong,” 
the line separating the few professional women who could emulate Murphy Brown from the mother on 
welfare was enough money to operate within the market without relying on the state.   
800 Statement by President William J. Clinton on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (August 22, 1996). 
367	  
	  
women of color, and professional women.”801 For those at the top, the state seems small.  
In fact, in 1996 soccer moms purportedly welcomed a more active government when it 
came to maternal health and family leave protections, enforcing teen curfews, policing 
crime, and promoting uniforms in schools.802 This is a far cry from what we encounter in 
poor communities, in which the state was already active but often in ways that residents 
perceived as injurious to children.  The political voice of women on welfare disappeared 
in the campaign, drowned out by the soccer mom.  The welfare mother was not a key 
swing voter.  She was racially coded as black, geographically coded as urban, and 
assumed to be uneducated.  She was cast as sexually and economically irresponsible.  
Rather than finding new opportunities for making babies on the market, she was 
discouraged by the state from procreating at all.  If she did happen to become pregnant, 
then putting her child up for adoption was praised by politicians as the moral option.803  
 Her relationship to the market was fundamentally different than that of the soccer 
mom.  Under TANF, she would face mandated work.  She was not a widely courted or 
valued consumer.  This mother is trapped in a regime of contradictory policies, which 
condemns and stigmatizes her for her lack of market independence and sexual behavior, 
yet builds barriers to prevent her from escaping poverty by compelling her to participate 
in the low-wage (service sector) labor market while balancing childcare and basic 
necessities to the point of “just scraping by.”  Her chances of escaping poverty are dim, 
but TANF now measures its success by reducing caseloads rather than helping people 
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find their way out of poverty. For instance, despite the fact that most women on TANF 
“remained poor and some lost income.” Lawrence Mead labels welfare reform “a 
triumph,” because “between 1994 and 2001, the AFDC/TANF caseload plummeted by 
around 60 percent, from over 5 million cases to 2 million, vastly its largest fall ever.”804 
The greatest success of TANF, according to Mead, is in removing poor women from 
dependency on the state even if poverty rates remained the same or increased afterwards: 
“The political message of reform to the poor was to give up claims on government based 
on weakness.  Rather, make claims based on contribution, above all, by working.,” and 
most significantly “reform enforced,” in Mead’s words, “citizenship.”805 
 This brings us to the mutually-dependent relationship between these two mothers, 
one celebrated and other stigmatized.  What is this connection?  While soccer moms rely 
on the service sector, as citizen-consumers, mothers on TANF are now mandated to work 
in these low-wage service-sector jobs.  As Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward have 
argued, welfare is directly connected to low-wage work.806  Quite literally, “workfare” 
floods the service sector with laborers, ready to flip burgers at McDonalds, stock shelves 
at Wal-Mart, or clean the homes of soccer moms for low pay and miserly benefits.807  It 
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806 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1971 [1993]). 
807 See Frances Fox Piven, “Welfare to Work,” in Mink, Whose Welfare?, 83-99. In Piven’s words, TANF 
means that “as steady stream of hundreds of thousands of poor women will flow into the low-wage end of 
the labor market, competing with those who are already there.”  After reaching their five-year limit, 
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flood of prospective employees which means they will work for lower wages), but the competition over 
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follows that there is an important socioeconomic interconnection between these two types 
of citizens within the commercialized and corporatized political system. Consider a few 
examples. On the way to work, the professional makes a quick run into Starbucks for a 
Caffè Latte prepared for her by a “workfare” participant.  While driving her daughter and 
friends home from a soccer game in her mini-van, a mother might drop by McDonalds to 
pick up lunch for the team, handed to her at the drive-through window by a recent TANF 
recipient who has maxed out her time-limit in the program and is now barely able to 
support her two children and pay her own bills. Often a budget shopper, the middle-class 
mother picks up school supplies and other household essentials at stores like Wal-Mart, 
whose shelves are stacked by participants in her state’s “welfare to work” program.  
Although this soccer mom is a valued customer, her practice of responsible “market 
citizenship” relies on a steady supply of service-sector workers to enable her 
praiseworthy market behavior.  
 To be clear, this supply/demand part of my analysis is not original, for it supports 
the thesis of Piven and Cloward in their classic book, Regulating the Poor, analyzing the 
interdependent relationship between welfare and low-wage work.808  However, this helps 
us to more fully grasp the complex contours of neoliberal citizenship and demographic 
inequality in the United States. By definition, markets are sources of unequal outcomes.  
In the face of structural inequalities and preexisting psychological biases, human 
behavior tends to respond to prejudice in ways that reinforce past hierarchies through 
private practices on the economic market. When citizenship is reproduced based upon 
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market norms, it follows that the successful neoliberal citizen requires the other less 
successful, subaltern class. In other words, the neoliberal ideal depends upon its non-ideal 
counterpart.   Even worse, the inconsistent and contradictory aspects of the legislation—
for instance, undermining reproductive choice but punishing reproduction, and focusing 
on responsible motherhood yet forcing mothers to leave their children for work at a 
young age—actually work against escaping poverty.  This leads to a sobering conclusion: 
Whether due to an alliance between political actors with conflicting agendas or resulting 
from a fairly widespread agreement about what constitutes “responsible citizenship,” 
there appears to be no authentic or effective government commitment to giving TANF 
recipients a realistic opportunity to attain this ideal, no matter how “disciplined” they 
become in their work and reproductive lives.   
 
8.3 Neoliberal Civic Inequality 
If we accept that the ideal and the non-ideal citizen are both necessary for this new 
neoliberal market system, then it follows that the non-ideal is just as much a “neoliberal 
citizen” as the ideal.  They are two sides of the same coin, one lauded and the other 
demeaned.  We have already seen that each plays an integral role in the new economy of 
civic reproduction, but their market positions are different, and so too is their civic status. 
On the surface TANF appears to be applying disciplinary mechanisms to those who fall 
short of the ideal to encourage them to better approximate the market ideal of responsible 
citizenship, but I argue that this is only a part of what the policy is actually doing for 
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neoliberal citizenship. Most disturbingly, this civic lineage policy continues to maintain 
inequalities in citizenship, based upon race, gender, disability, and sexual behavior in the 
United States.   
 I have addressed these inequalities by looking at the regulation of motherhood 
above, but what about its effect on future generations of impoverished children?  In many 
respects, these kids are forgotten by government with the transition from AFDC to 
TANF.  Whereas AFDC placed aid to dependent children first, TANF conversely 
emphasizes the mandatory work and proper reproductive behavior of parents over the 
goal of aid to dependent children. Since TANF cuts aid to the entire family after any 
adult recipient within the household has received five years of assistance, it follows that 
TANF actually mandates that young children live in poverty if their parents fail to 
become properly self-supporting and independent within five years.  This seems like an 
irrational policy from the standpoint of raising children to become responsible adult 
citizens, but it has important implications for the reproduction of American citizenship.  
While around 9 percent of white families lived in poverty in 1999, the statistics for black 
families was 25 percent.809  In addition to growing up with higher rates of poverty, 
children of color are also exposed to stigmatizing (racialized) rhetoric that labels their 
mothers as “welfare queens,” who raise sons that grow up to become “criminals” and 
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daughters that follow in their pathological footsteps.810  Surely this shapes the way in 
which young children interpret and internalize their own civic status?  
 Even worse, people of color already experience disproportionately high levels of 
police violence and incarceration under the neoliberal state’s “law and order” mission.811 
If these forms of surveillance and discipline are not harmful enough from the standpoint 
of children of color, whose mothers are enrolled in TANF, then lest we forget that the 
government now completely turns it back on these families after five years of benefits. 
When this happens and a family remains in poverty, as it all too often does, then the 
abandonment by the government tells impoverished children as clearly as possible that 
their country appears more concerned about funding law enforcement and building 
prisons than helping to create a healthy and solid foundation for their future. From this 
bizarre network of surveillance and coercion at the strong arm of the government—
ranging from welfare, to subpar schools, to prisons—the most vulnerable children in 
America receive a clarion message from the government that they are not as valuable and 
do not have the same civic clout or status as the white, middle-class, suburban children of 
our stereotypical soccer mom. Thus, in addition to explicitly discouraging pregnancy and 
reproduction among TANF recipients, the government also tells the children born to 
these mothers—and particularly indigent children of color—that they are less valuable to 
American society than other children.  They are, in effect, second class citizens according 
to the values and practices of the neoliberal civic lineage regime. 
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811 See Wacquant, Punishing the Poor; Soss, Fording, and Schram, Disciplining the Poor. 
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 Neoliberal citizenship depends upon the civic inequalities it produces and 
reproduces. When we tease apart the political discourse on “responsible” and 
“irresponsible” citizenship and its connections to welfare reform, as I have done above, 
then it becomes increasingly clear that there are at least two overarching classes of 
neoliberal citizens, both as much a part of the neoliberal regime as the next, but one 
celebrated and the other stigmatized.  The difference between them is their position in 
relation to the market, and whether this translates into an acceptable or unacceptable 
position vis-à-vis the state.  If identified as irresponsibly dependent upon the state or vice 
versa, these two mothers encounter an entirely different neoliberal nexus of policies, 
ranging from relatively unobtrusive to muscularly strong and interventionist. For this 
reason, I suggest that the neoliberal state is sustaining a landscape of civic hierarchy by 
deploying public policy to use the market to do similar work as the preceding postwar 
civic lineage regime (i.e. prior to the victories of the civil rights and women’s 
movement).   
 The Supreme Court’s TANF rulings at the end of the twentieth century are telling 
in this regard.  As we have seen, a thin market-based judicial approach to equal 
protection and reproductive freedom is an anemic response to the very real struggles of 
the members of Americans most vulnerable groups, particularly when applied to a 
preexisting landscape structured by a long history of inequality due to overt forms of 
racism, sexism, and class discrimination.  With a long line of statutory “welfare rights” 
cases rendered moot after the 1996 repeal and replacement of AFDC, it is striking that the 
only significant Supreme Court case involving TANF during the twentieth century 
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involves the Court supporting a right for U.S. citizens of one state to relocate to another 
state—essentially a right to travel.  In Saenz v. Roe in 1999, the Court ruled that the 
“Privileges or Immunities Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment grants all Americans 
the right to relocate as citizens from one state to another.812  This includes welfare 
recipients, who are entitled to the full welfare benefits of any state they move to, even if 
they move to a state with a more generous program.813  Although in theory an indigent 
mother can now “shop around” for the most generous and least coercive TANF 
program—and, for example, even move to another state without a child cap policy if she 
wishes to have another child—this is hardly a realistic option for most impoverished 
mothers.  
 The irony here, of course, is that the idea of moving to pursue a better life is a 
treasured value in American political culture (and consistent with neoliberal 
individualism), because it involves the freedom to travel and “pick up and move” in 
pursuit of a better lifestyle if you can afford it.  However, women on welfare are the least 
likely to have the resources to make such decisions in the first place.  Albeit at first 
glance a ruling in favor of “welfare rights,” Saenz is above-all an affirmation of the right 
of any citizen, who can afford to do so, to travel and relocate from one state to another in 
increasingly neoliberal America.  However, AFDC cases limiting the claims of welfare 
beneficiaries, such as Dandridge, continue to serve as controlling precedent for lower 
courts with regard to allowing states to adopt coercive reproductive policies like “child 
caps.” Since government assistance is treated by the Court as a privilege that a person can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




freely chose to accept or reject, rather than ranking Medicaid or TANF as uniquely 
connected to the basic subsistence and survival of impoverished recipients, then it 
follows that invasions of otherwise protected rights generally do not violate reproductive 
freedom or equal protection even when policies like child caps and the promotion of 
Norplant are intended to coercively influence the procreative choices of recipients.  Due 
to their reliance on government assistance, considered a privilege not a right by the 
Supreme Court, TANF recipients are vulnerable to government coercion in ways that 
wealthier women are not. With their right to privacy quite literally privatized on the 
market, TANF mothers lack the consumer freedom to exercise the range of reproductive 
choices available to soccer moms and cannot afford to reject public assistance programs 
that allow the government, to quite Justice Douglas’s dissent in Wyman, “buy up” their 
fundamental rights. 
 Despite the end of formal legal barriers to equality for hitherto excluded and 
subordinated citizens, the current neoliberal regime reproduces patterns of inequality that 
reflects a landscape reminiscent of past civic hierarchy and new forms of inequality.  The 
government through TANF is doing indirectly what it cannot constitutionally do 
directly—exploiting need for governmental assistance as an avenue to interfere with the 
reproductive choices and sexual behavior of poor women—and combining this with 
forced work participation to push mothers into the low-wage service market.814  Resulting 
from the cooperation of all three branches of national government, with a green light 
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from the judiciary, we witness the institutionalization of a quintessentially American 
neoliberal civic lineage regime shaping welfare policy.  While easy to overlook at the top, 
where the state appears smaller and less intrusive to those who approximate a 
“responsible” neoliberal citizen, those deemed deviant and who are poor experience a 
much more invasive and disciplinary side of American statecraft, ranging from workfare 
to a skyrocketing prison system.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
This chapter has examined the triumph of a neoliberal civic lineage regime at the end of 
the twentieth century by focusing on the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which replaced the sixty-year Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program of the 1935 Social Security Act 
(SSA) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  After examining the 
ways in which welfare policy has always enforced prevailing civic lineage ideals, ranging 
from the eugenic side of Mother’s Pensions during the Progressive Era to the role of 
AFDC in promoting the postwar image of what constitutes proper civic reproduction, we 
turned to the advent of neoliberal discourses about citizenship during the 1970s. The rise 
of neoliberal citizenship in the United States, as I have argued, emerged in the late 1960s 
and the 1970s in the wake of the social and political upheavals brought about by the civil 
rights and women’s movements. There is strong evidence that the success of this 
neoliberal civic lineage approach capitalized on insecurities, both psychological and 
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structural, arising from changes in the American landscape of civic reproduction.815  
These changes include formal legal equality in race relations associated with the black 
civil rights movement, upheavals in the industrial economy linked to globalization, and a 
reorganization in the traditional postwar family due to the women’s movement and the 
sexual revolution. As Soss, Fording, and Shram put it, “Disruptive movements upended 
laws and norms as they challenged the terms of social control surrounding gender, race, 
and sexuality.  The iconic nuclear family buckled as women flooded the workplace and 
conventions related to marriage and reproduction underwent rapid change.”816  In support 
of this retrenchment thesis, the political discourse and policies I have cited throughout the 
last two chapters indicates that the timing of this rise of neoliberal governance is likely no 
accident.817  Instead of embracing these sweeping social changes towards a more equal 
citizenry in the 1960s and 1970s, we witness a retrenchment and backlash against a more 
egalitarian feminist notion of civic reproduction, discussed previously as the not fully 
realized possibility of “voluntary motherhood.”   
 This, then, is the neoliberal landscape of anti-poverty law and policy we 
encounter at the end of the twentieth century. Given the dismal success rate of TANF 
when it comes to actually getting families out of poverty, we can conclude that welfare 
reform appears to fail by its own blunt logic.  However, I want to emphasize that 
PRWORA provides a vital and rarely recognized service for the neoliberal state. 
Neoliberal citizenship in the United States is built upon a statecraft of market inequality, 
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and TANF is one of many civic lineage policies that institutionalizes and naturalizes 
these norms in the everyday lives of Americans. This civic lineage regime promulgates a 
network of coercive and paternalistic policies to regulate the reproductive behavior of 
those who fall short of its neoliberal ideal of citizenship.  In important respects, neoliberal 
citizenship appears just as rigid in practice as the civic lineage regimes that preceded it.  
The main difference is that those who manage to become economically self-sufficient 
enjoy expanding opportunities under the neoliberal regime. Nevertheless, at the same 
time it allows for new avenues of civic mobility for some citizens on the socioeconomic 
front, TANF is doing important civic lineage work for the neoliberal state, including 
maintaining many past patterns of civic inequality corresponding to race, gender, 
disability, class, and presumed sexual deviance and promiscuity.  
My interrogation of TANF reveals the inconsistencies at the heart of the 
neoliberal political project, but it also shows how these contradictions exploited and built 
upon the civic inequalities already existing in the American landscape. Neoliberal 
citizenship is domestic not global, and it reproduces inequality prior to conception and 
birth; from the cradle to the grave.  Although governmental actors no doubt have many 
often conflicting and complex motivations for embracing neoliberal norms, the role of 
public policy in this process raises serious concerns about the institutional complicity of 











At the outset of this dissertation, I introduced a new conceptual framework for analyzing 
citizenship, which I term the ‘civic lineage regime.’ Like all modern nation states, the 
United States erects and maintains various laws and geographic boundaries to demarcate 
citizens from noncitizens. The literature in political science tends to focus on the ways in 
which immigration law structures citizenship over time. As scholars of immigration 
emphasize, one of the primary ways in which modern nation-states, like the United 
States, define themselves over time is by determining who qualifies as members of their 
political community. But, as I have argued, this is at best half the story. In a similar 
manner to immigration, governments also regulate the birth of citizens from one 
generation to the next. I introduce the concept of a ‘civic lineage regime’ as the domestic 
counterpart to the ‘immigration regime’ in structuring civic membership in the United 
States (and other nations). Just as the immigration regime is comprised of the broad set of 
laws and policies regulating immigration at any given political moment, the civic lineage 
regime is comprised of the broad set of laws and policies shaping citizenship by targeting 
procreation, fertility, and childbirth. These state-building policies, targeting the actual 
reproduction of citizens, define and redefine the meaning and scope of U.S. citizenship 
across time by shaping the future “face” of the American polity. Precisely because they 
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play such a fundamental role in structuring political communities over time, governments 
have never failed to construct a civic lineage regime of some sort, a reality that is 
unlikely to change in the future. 
My goal in the preceding chapters has been to convincingly document the 
existence of historically evolving civic lineage regimes in the United States and to 
describe how they have developed and functioned during the twentieth century. To bring 
visibility to this deeply constitutive yet largely unexamined dimension of American 
political development, I have engaged in a close analysis of court cases and other primary 
sources, such as legislative debates, illustrating the governmental regulation of 
citizenship through reproductive policies. In particular, I have focused on: involuntary 
eugenic sterilization during the Progressive Era in Chapter 2, the uneven trajectory of the 
legalization of birth control and abortion in Chapters 3 and 4, the legislative and judicial 
contestation over funding abortion under Medicaid in Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 addressed 
“welfare reform” under TANF at the end of the century. Not only do these examples 
provide powerful evidence that civic lineage regimes exist in America, but they also point 
to the fact that the federal and state governments regulate the intimate lives of Americans 
for many of the same reasons governments seek to control immigration. In both realms, 
the state makes legal distinctions between who can and cannot become a member by 
coercively privileging certain visions of American identity over others.  In fact, as each 
chapter illustrates, government policies aimed at regulating the reproduction of 
citizenship have served (both past and present) to erect and maintain hierarchies of 
citizenship based on race, gender, ethnicity, class, disability, religion, and sexuality.  
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I trace the rise and fall of several different civic lineage regimes during the last 
century. These include the fitter families regime of the Progressive Era, the white picket 
fence postwar regime, the (as yet) unrealized possibility of a voluntary motherhood 
regime, and our new dominant neoliberal regime. For the sake of conceptual clarity, it is 
worth underlining a key difference between the immigration regime and the civic lineage 
regime, which together make up the two main parts of our overarching regime of 
governmental regulations and laws shaping the boundaries of U.S. citizenship. Although 
the regulation of immigration tends to occur in a more clear-cut manner at the national 
level, as we have seen in each chapter, many of the most pervasive and invasive policies 
shaping civic lineage in the United States are disproportionately at the state and local 
level. These reproductive policies are often filtered and distributed through the American 
system of federalism, which disperses power to the states. However, while varying from 
state to state, and albeit comprised of contested and changing orders, these civic lineage 
policies follow broad enough patterns to identify them as demarcating a decentralized 
regime at a given period in U.S. history. More specifically, though there is not a central 
driving force that makes these civic lineage policies fully coherent at one point (or place) 
in time, it is clear—based on the explicit discourses I have cited by government 
officials—that these policies and laws nonetheless add up to a set of interconnected 
policies, which together form a configuration substantial enough to label as a “civic 
lineage regime.”   
Consider, for example, the fitter families regime spearheaded by the eugenics 
movement during the Progressive Era. This was a decentralized regime, but it was 
382	  
	  
nonetheless a coherent regime endorsing eugenic ideals. A vast majority of state 
legislatures adopted eugenic sterilization laws during a short period of time, and acting at 
the national level, the Supreme Court legitimized these laws as constitutional in the case 
of Buck v. Bell.818 Moreover, in addition to using negative eugenics laws to target those 
deemed deviant for involuntary sterilization and removal from society in mental 
institutions, the fitter families regime also included positive eugenics laws aimed at 
encouraging citizens deemed eugenically fit to reproduce.  These positive eugenics laws, 
addressed in several chapters, include the federal Sheppard Towner Act of 1921 to 
promote infant and maternal health, Mother’s Pensions in most states for worthy widows 
to raise their children at home, and opposition to birth control to maximize the number of 
children born to citizens with “good” heritage and mainstream middle-class values (i.e. 
usually native-born white Christians of Anglo-American decent).819 During the 
Progressive Era, the fitter families regime institutionalized the ideals of the dominant 
eugenics coalition, which sets it apart from the conflicting ideal of voluntary motherhood, 
endorsed by the early birth control movement at the time, and the dominant regimes that 
followed. For this reason, I have argued that the fitter families ideal clearly constitutes the 
dominant civic lineage regime during the Progressive Era.  
The same decentralized political pattern holds true for the white picket fence 
regime during the postwar period of American politics. In the wake of the atrocities 
committed by Nazi Germany, the public health discourse emphasizing eugenics was 
delegitimized and eclipsed by a discourse on human rights that facilitated the rise of a 
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819 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 480-524. 
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regime based upon a smaller nuclear family, with a homemaker mother and breadwinning 
husband, and which valued marital privacy over government intrusion in the intimate 
sexual and reproductive behavior of husband and wife.820 This regime, however, 
continued to reinforce formal civic hierarchies in race and gender under the law, which in 
turn set the stage for the family ideal it promoted to buckle under the victories of the 
black civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the sexual revolution during 
the 1960s and 1970s. However, rather than ushering in a more egalitarian regime robustly 
supporting voluntarism in motherhood for all women, instead we witness a period of 
legal uncertainty and transition, followed by the rise of a new regime of citizenship 
emphasizing the privatization and the commodification of reproductive policy. Indeed, 
though these past overtly inegalitarian conceptions of civic membership are now 
discredited, my dissertation shows that the conflictual politics involved in constructing an 
American civic lineage regime continue today in the form of the rise of a new ‘neoliberal 
ideal of citizenship.’  This dominant (yet contested) neoliberal civic lineage regime uses 
the “right to privacy” as a governmental mechanism to push civic reproduction to the 
private sector of the economy, which cuts against equal citizenship by inscribing patterns 
of demographic inequality through market forces. 
In his introductory guide to the terms and themes concerning Neoliberalism, 
Neoliberalism: The Key Concepts, Mathew Eagleton-Pierce lists everything from 
‘adjustment’ to ‘welfare’ (including the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’) but in over 250 
pages, he never mentions the term ‘citizen’ or citizenship’ as being important to 
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neoliberalism.821 In fact, as the last chapter addresses, the idea of a neoliberal civic 
ideal—or civic lineage regime—may, at first glance, appear to be a contradiction in 
terms, because the ideology and practice of neoliberalism tends to undermine the 
economic significance of the modern nation-state by valorizing the free market and 
privatization in an increasingly globalized world.  But that is only a partial snapshot of 
the politics of neoliberalism, for it fails to address the way these values—of negative 
freedom, self-reliance, personal responsibility, privatization, market participation, and 
consumerism—shape domestic laws regulating the reproduction of citizenship in a 
“homegrown” manner in all nations, including the United States. A neoliberal nation 
requires a domestic population of properly neoliberal citizens to make the system work 
smoothly, which in turn means that it has a political investment in harnessing public 
policy to cultivate neoliberal citizenship. This is precisely what we see in our dominant 
neoliberal civic lineage regime today. 
In Chapter 6, I make three arguments about neoliberal citizenship worth 
highlighting in this conclusion. First, the neoliberal ideal of citizenship influencing civic 
reproduction is not a transnational “one size fits all” appropriation of global 
neoliberalism to the United States, but rather a distinctly national appropriation and 
reworking of neoliberal values within the specific context and cultural values of 
American citizenship. This accounts for the rise and continuing success of the regime 
within the United States, and explains the compromises made by the various members 
within the coalition championing it.  Second, I have argued there is strong evidence that 
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the rise and triumph of this new regime in the aftermath of the upheavals of the civil 
rights and women’s movements was not an accident, and that anxieties about social 
change spurred an alliance of fiscal conservatives, racial conservatives, and the religious 
right in favor of a new market-based approach to the reproduction of citizenship. In the 
absence of formal mechanisms for maintaining civic hierarchy, the marketization and 
privatization of rights proved to be an effective mechanism to perpetuate old forms of 
civic inequality and produce new ones.  Third, our contemporary neoliberal state is not a 
small state when it comes to intervening in the most intimate aspects of the lives of its 
citizens, as its libertarian proponents of laissez faire economic policy contend: rather the 
neoliberal state is what I term a ‘strong state.’ Relatively unobtrusive to those deemed 
proper citizens, illustrated by my discussion of the soccer mom in Chapter 6, the 
neoliberal civic lineage regime sponsors a muscularly interventionist state when it comes 
to citizens, like mothers on TANF, who fall short of the ideal of market responsibility.  
The United States, as I have argued, can quite literally be said to “make citizens” 
through the reproductive policies it sponsors and enforces in society. Rather than being 
“born equal” to use the famous words of Alexis de Tocqueville—a sentiment echoed by 
Louis Hartz—this dissertation demonstrates that birth is a fundamental avenue for the 
perpetuation and institutionalization of civic inequality in America`.822  Indeed, the 
neoliberal ideal of citizenship promoted by our current civic lineage regime continues to 
share many striking similarities with the past, including the disproportionate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
822 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Part 2, (1863; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1990); 
Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1955; repr., New York: Mariner Books, 1991).  
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representation of parents who are white, middle-class to affluent, able-bodied enough to 
work, conforming to mainstream Christian family values like marriage, and displaying 
what is considered to be responsible sexual and reproductive behavior in a market-driven 
society. In this dissertation, I have added empirical illumination and normative scrutiny to 
this phenomenon by highlighting myriad ways in which the United States has functioned 
in the past (and present) as more than merely the liberal democratic society it purports to 
be in popular constitutional rights discourse about citizenship.823  It is also, at least in 
part, a “civic lineage regime,” with political leaders and other cultural elites engaged 
from the nation’s outset in a (somewhat feudal-like) political process of creating and 
perpetuating a range of civic distinctions and hierarchies based upon birth.   
 
Epilogue: Neoliberal civic lineage in the twenty-first century today 
This brings me to the question I want to end on: What does this mean today in the 
twenty-first century? As I write this in 2017, it has been twenty years since the “end of 
welfare” in 1996 and the political heyday of the soccer mom. Yet the neoliberal regime in 
many respects only appears to have gained strength with the commercialization and 
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privatization of virtually all aspects of social and political life, including reproduction. In 
fact, the current Trump Administration appears to be fostering not only a nativist 
backlash against Latino immigrants, Muslims, and other ethnic and racial minorities, but 
it has also vocalized support for retrenchment in sexual and reproductive policy. 
Precisely what this will mean for the development of civic lineage in the United States 
has yet to be seen, but our overarching regime of citizenship appears in flux at the same 
time that the role of the market economy in regulating reproduction has never been more 
invasive or pervasive in the lives of Americans.    
Today, those who can afford it have the legal ability in many states to effectively 
“buy a baby.” For enough money, an individual or couple can purchase designer gametes 
(i.e. sperm and eggs), rent a womb through a surrogacy contract, and then pay for 
childcare and the best schools once the baby is born. Fertility treatments, such as in vitro 
fertilization, have become common medical interventions for couples having difficulties 
conceiving their own child. Many opt for adoption. Both fertility treatment and adoption 
are typically expensive, and are often conducted with the assistance of private companies 
specializing in the process. For instance, with a vast array of private Cryobank 
companies, one can search through profiles of male sperm doners on the web and order 
gametes online for different prices—it often costs more for “premium” semen—and have 
these gametes delivered by mail in a refrigerated container to one’s doorstep.824 There are 
also private companies, such as Circle Surrogacy agency, that specialize in finding and 
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overseeing the surrogacy process, so that their customers don’t have to worry about the 
legal details of drawing up and enforcing a surrogacy contract and enjoy the peace of 
mind to instead focus their energy on the excitement of preparing for the birth of their 
baby.825 From my perspective, this booming “baby market” is the clearest example of the 
new opportunities (for some) that have been made available by neoliberal civic 
reproduction. Although balancing a family and a professional career is extremely difficult 
for most women, those who can afford the exorbitant costs of not only fertility assistance 
(if necessary), but also childcare, housecleaning, extracurricular activities, and the best 
schools have new opportunities not fathomable to their mothers (or fathers) a generation 
before. However, these opportunities also remain beyond the financial reach of most 
citizens today.   
Likewise, while I have touched on the topic of marriage throughout this 
dissertation, I did not include a separate chapter on it.  This is in part because the most 
important recent developments pertaining to neoliberal citizenship within marriage have 
occurred after the end of the twentieth century. In a similar manner to birth control and 
welfare, the institution of marriage has changed with the rise and fall of different civic 
lineage regimes.  In Loving v. Virginia (1967), the Court ruled that laws banning 
interracial marriage are unconstitutional, because they violate both due process and equal 
protection.826  This ruling by the Court, issued during the civil rights movement, struck 
down a Virginia anti-miscegenation law outlawing interracial marriage, passed in 1924 
for eugenic reasons on the same day as the state’s eugenic sterilization law, discussed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
825 The company’s website is: http://www.circlesurrogacy.com [last checked July 20, 2017] 
826 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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earlier.827 The Loving ruling, combined with the concept of marital privacy in Griswold 
(1965), would later be cited as precedents by the Court to justify expanding marriage to 
include same-sex couples under the Fourteenth Amendment in Obergefell v. Hodges 
(2015).828 In his 5-4 majority opinion for the Court in 2015, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
wrote a paean on marriage that parallels (and far surpasses in length) that written by 
Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) fifty years earlier.829 Moreover, 
Justice Kennedy also explicitly highlighted civic lineage concerns about same-sex 
parenthood in this case about marriage.  In his words,  
[M]any same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, 
whether biological or adopted…Without the recognition, stability, and 
predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their 
families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of 
being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a 
more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm 
and humiliate the children of same sex couples.830  
 
This case is an example of the inclusionary dimension of neoliberal citizenship, which 
provides new market-based opportunities to some hitherto marginalized groups to take 
full advantage of their privacy rights as “citizen-consumers” using their purchasing 
power on the market (e.g. both the “baby market” and the “marriage market” are 
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unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm.  Its dynamic allows two people to find a 
life that could not be found alone, for marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the 
most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations…It would 
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booming industries today). But, while the neoliberal civic lineage regime has expanded 
the reproductive opportunities for some, the darker side of this new regime, as I have 
documented, is its role in perpetuating and sometimes deepening various forms of civic 
inequality in the realms of class, race, sexual behavior, and gender.   
Since the government will inevitably continue to target civic lineage through law 
and public policy, it is important to recognize that there are clearly better and worse 
ways to steer the reproduction of citizenship. In this regard, the normative thrust of this 
dissertation is that history matters today in the realm of reproductive policy and 
regulation of the newly burgeoning fertility industry. Rather than offering a discouraging 
critique of the relationship between reproductive policy and the inegalitarian structuring 
of citizenship, I hope I have shed light on the current political terrain in which we find 
ourselves—with our dominant neoliberal civic lineage regime and a clash between 
diverging civic lineage orders, including the elusive possibility of a regime of voluntary 
motherhood someday. As I have shown above, the federal government tends to punt a 
vast majority of issues involving the reproduction of citizenship onto the market and state 
governments to structure, but judicial conflicts are bound to increasingly surface in the 
midst of what Deborah Spar terms the booming “baby business,” spurred by dazzling 
new scientific discoveries in the realm of reproduction that can help individuals and 
couples seek alternative ways to have children (if they can afford it).831 State laws already 
reveal numerous points of controversy: whereas California has fostered a highly 
profitable gamete market and a lucrative commercial industry facilitating surrogacy 
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contracts, the states of Louisiana and Michigan refuse to recognize such contracts as 
valid.832 In the future, how will these legal differences play out in shaping the birth of 
citizens? A host of new genetic and reproductive technologies, accompanied by shifting 
norms of procreation and parenthood, will doubtlessly fuel a growing need for innovative 
government choices in the realm of law and public policy. I hope this project will help set 
the stage for a more historically sensitive ethical debate about reproductive policy today.  
The key set of questions in my view is not whether the government actors will 
continue to engage in the process of “people-making” (or “reproducing citizens”) in the 
future, but rather how they will go about doing so, and towards what ends? What kind of 
political and legal boundaries will the federal government and state governments draw? 
Will our neoliberal regime continue to gain strength in the coming decades, or will it 
finally be eclipsed by a new coalition of political actors championing a different civic 
lineage regime? And how will the configuration of these boundaries shape the identity 
and composition of subsequent generations of America’s body politic? How these 
questions will be answered, and who will answer them, are among the most fundamental 
issues of American politics in the 21st century. 
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